Rwanda is an emerging cyber actor with a developing but uneven internet infrastructure. While electricity access is widespread, limited national grid connectivity continues to constrain internet expansion. Rwanda exercises strict state control over the internet, balancing cybersecurity initiatives with extensive surveillance. The government invests in cybersecurity and participates in international frameworks such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, aligning itself with U.S. and Western-backed initiatives. At the same time, Rwanda enforces strict oversight of its digital space, using surveillance and content regulation to maintain political stability. This dual strategy reflects Rwanda’s broader approach: embracing global norms to build cyber capacity while preserving sovereign control over its digital landscape.
Rwanda’s internet infrastructure is expanding, but its development remains uneven across different regions. While urban centers such as Kigali have seen significant advancements in broadband connectivity and mobile internet access, rural areas face challenges due to limited infrastructure, high costs, and accessibility barriers. Although 81.4% of the population has access to electricity, only 26.5% is connected to the national electrical grid, restricting reliable internet access (Rwanda Energy Group, 2024). Regarding internet connectivity, 34% of the population has access, but service remains inconsistent. Despite 99% of the population residing in areas with 4G coverage, only 25% of these regions have stable networks capable of supporting internet services, with connectivity being most reliable in urban areas. The Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority oversees telecom communications, while private providers such as MTN Rwanda, Liquid Telecom, and Airtel Rwanda supply internet services (Logistics Cluster, 2025).
The domestic political landscape in Rwanda regarding the internet is characterized by strict state control, extensive surveillance, and limited online freedom, reflecting the government’s broader approach to governance—centralized authority with a strong emphasis on stability and security (Freedom House, 2025). While Rwanda has implemented cybersecurity measures through the National Cyber Security Authority (NCSA) and the Rwanda Computer Security Incident Response Team (Rw-CSIRT) to address rising cyber threats, these efforts operate alongside legal frameworks that enable state surveillance and suppress dissent (NCSA, n.d; Rw-CERT, n.d; Media Defence, 2024). The country’s Data Protection Law (2021) aligns with international standards like the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation. Yet, it functions within a system prioritizing government oversight over individual privacy (NCSA Data Protection Office, n.d). Rwanda’s planned accession to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime in 2025 signals an interest in international cooperation, but its approach to digital governance remains fundamentally restrictive (Council of Europe 2025).
Rwanda’s overall orientation to international internet governance is a model of dualism that strategically signs agreements that align with a multi-stakeholder view. However, Rwanda also has taken a very restrictive approach to internet freedoms (Freedom House, 2025). The country actively participates in regional platforms such as the East Africa Internet Governance Forum and the Rwanda Internet Governance Forum, fostering inclusive, multi-stakeholder dialogue and advancing regional digital policies while simultaneously adopting key Western-backed legal measures—most notably, its accession to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and adherence to Euro-Atlantic protocols on data interception and xenophobic content—to ensure a secure, stable, and interoperable digital infrastructure (Council of Europe, 2024; EAIGF Member States – East Africa Internet Governance Forum, 2024; Rwanda: Adopted Presidential Order for Accession to Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 2024). Moreover, drawing on a non-aligned legacy for independent policy-making and multilateral dialogue, Rwanda effectively navigates the interplay between global standards and regional norms, asserting a sovereign and proactive approach that strengthens its cybersecurity posture and sets a strategic blueprint for resilient internet governance in the African Union.
Sources
About. (n.d.). NCSA. https://cyber.gov.rw/about/
Authoritarianism and Digital surveillance: Has the internet become a new battleground for monitoring public dissent in Rwanda? – Media Defence. (2023, January 20). Media Defence. https://www.mediadefence.org/news/authoritarianism-and-digital-surveillance-rwanda/
Council of Europe. (2025, January 15). Rwanda becomes the 78th Party to the Convention on Cybercrime and accedes to the First Protocol. Cybercrime; Council of Europe. https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/-/rwanda-becomes-the-78th-party-to-the-convention-on-cybercrime-and-accedes-to-the-first-protocol
EAIGF Member States – East Africa Internet Governance Forum. (2024). East Africa Internet Governance Forum. https://eaigf.africa/eaigf-member-states/
Electricity Access. (2024). Www.reg.rw. https://www.reg.rw/what-we-do/access/
Rwanda Internet Governance Forum 2024 “Building our Multi-stakeholder Digital Future” Keynote speech by Ozonnia Ojielo, UN Resident Coordinator. (2024). United Nations Rwanda. https://rwanda.un.org/en/278042-rwanda-internet-governance-forum-2024-%E2%80%9Cbuilding-our-multi-stakeholder-digital-future%E2%80%9D
Rwanda: Adopted Presidential Order for Accession to Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. (2024). Digital Policy Alert . https://digitalpolicyalert.org/event/23646-adopted-presidential-order-for-accession-to-budapest-convention-on-cybercrime
Rwanda: Freedom on the Net 2024 Country Report | Freedom House. (2025). Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/country/rwanda/freedom-net/2024
TeleGeography. (2025). Submarine Cable Map. Https://Www.submarinecablemap.com/. https://www.submarinecablemap.com/
