The Philippines’ cybersecurity policy is informed by the barrage of cyberattacks it faces from malicious China-based actors regarding the ongoing and intensifying South China Sea territorial waters conflict. Its internet infrastructure is particularly vulnerable to such attacks because it is well-developed, but under-defended and owned, in part, by Chinese government-owned telecommunications companies. Because of this, the Philippines allocates most of its domestic cyber development resources towards cyber defense capacity building and the maintenance of an “active defense” Cyber Command & Cyber Battalion (EC-Council, 2021; Ornedo, 2024; Philippine Army, 2024). On the international stage, it is a proponent of the multi-stakeholder approach, advocating for funding and support from all stakeholders for cyber defense capacity building.
In all, the Philippines’ cybersecurity policy, both domestic and international, is and will continue to be informed by the ongoing South China Sea territorial water conflict. Resources are and will continue to be focused on thwarting cyber attacks related to this conflict.
Internet Landscape
The Philippines’ has a robust internet infrastructure that supports a majority of the population. Electrification is at 94.8% (World Bank, 2022). Internet access is available for most of the country and nearly universal in urban areas. 56.1% of households have access to the internet (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2023). Most households without access to electricity, and thus without internet, are found in “remote rural” areas (Philippines Dept. of Energy, 2023). Despite high electrification rates, the reliability of infrastructure is volatile, as electricity supply is susceptible to outages during extreme weather (Philippine Institute of Development Studies, 2022).
In terms of internet infrastructure, there are numerous undersea cables connecting the Philippines to the global internet, making cable infrastructure redundant and resilient (Telegeography, 2025). However, many of these cables are owned, in part, by state-owned Chinese telecommunications companies (Telegeography, 2025). This is a major concern as tensions rise over the South China Sea, as China may leverage their control over internet cables should conflict arise, leading to heavy surveillance and/or restricted internet access.
Domestic Cybersecurity Policy Frameworks
The Philippines’ current domestic policy focuses on cyber defense from foreign actors, particularly China-based hackers targeting the Philippines regarding the South China Sea (Lema & Flores, 2025; Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2024; Reuters, 2024). In terms of domestic legislation, the Data Privacy Act of 2012 ensures rights of the data subject and privacy (Data Privacy Act, 2012). The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 ensures data security by codifying cybercrime and standardizing penalties (Cybercrime Prevention Act, 2012).
However, these rights do not ensure internet freedom. Currently, internet freedom is declining and state surveillance is prevalent. Through a practice known as “red-tagging”, government-critical activists and journalists are labeled “terrorists” and censored online, they then face state-sanctioned harassment, physical attacks, enforced disappearances, and even death (Amnesty International, 2023; Amnesty International, 2024; Freedom House, 2023). Surveillance is further strengthened by the SIM Registration Act, which increases ease of access to personal data by mandating data be provided upon government request (SIM Registration Act, 2022). Data rights and privacy are not a priority.
Resources allocated to cybersecurity prioritize cyber defense capacity building to thwart continuous cyberattacks by China-based actors regarding the South China Sea (Ornedo, 2024). Major China-based actors that compromised military entities and telecommunications in the Philippines include Flax Typhoon and Granite Typhoon (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2024). These attacks are unlikely to stop – in fact, it is expected they will intensify as aggressions mount in the South China Sea (Ornedo, 2024). To fend off “malware, DDOS attacks, data leaks, and compromised websites that reflect Beijing’s geopolitical ambitions in the region,” resources are focused on capacity building of “active defense” cyber forces: the Cyber Battalion & the Philippine Army’s Cyber Command (EC-Council, 2021; Ornedo, 2024; Philippine Army, 2024). Overall, domestic policy is well-developed and demonstrates decreasing regard for internet freedom, with an increased focus on cyber defense in response to tensions in the South China Sea.
A Multi-stakeholder Approach to Internet Governance
The Philippines is a firm proponent of a multi-stakeholder approach to cybersecurity, consistently pushing for collaboration between the private and public sector along with international cooperation to strengthen the internet infrastructure of developing states; particularly calling for an international fund for cybersecurity development due to ever-increasing China-based attacks (Philippines Dept. of Foreign Affairs, 2024). This is evidenced by: (1) the Philippines’ National Cybersecurity Plan 2023-2028 which creates avenues for private and public stakeholders to engage in information sharing for the sake of cyber defense; (2) its recent request to the U.N. Security Council to “reinforce the agreed normative framework of responsible state behavior” and to facilitate “partnerships … to help … bolster cyber defenses”; and (3) various treaties and agreements, including the Budapest Convention, the Paris Call for Trust & Security in Cyberspace, and the Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement (Philippine News Agency, 2025a; Lagdameo, 2024; Council of Europe, 2022; Paris Call, 2025; Philippine News Agency, 2025b). It is likely that the Philippines will maintain a multi-stakeholder approach in the future, as the government believes it will help with resources to develop advanced cyber defense capabilities that can withstand increasing aggression from China.
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