The People’s Republic of China (PRC) possesses high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) weapons designed to paralyze electronic infrastructure–such as telecommunications and industrial control systems. A HEMP is a nuclear warhead that explodes at an altitude of 30-400 km,[1] emitting pulses of long wavelength radio frequency electromagnetic radiation that can damage electronic circuits.[2] The PRC regards HEMPs as an extension of its information and cyber warfare and does not categorize them as nuclear weapons despite HEMPs’ use of nuclear warheads. This categorization indicates a greater readiness to integrate nuclear weapons into non-nuclear war planning. The fielding of HEMPs by the PRC would make US military and civilian electronic infrastructure vulnerable to paralyzing attacks. It also increases the likelihood of conflict between the two nations by degrading nuclear deterrence.
What are High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse Weapons?
High-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) weapons are one of three common types of electromagnetic weapons. The other two common types of electromagnetic weapons are high-powered microwave devices and non-nuclear high-explosive warheads, both of which produce a similar pulse but on a smaller scale. A HEMP is the most effective of the three due to its simple delivery mechanics and wide damage radius. HEMP’s effectiveness makes them the PRC’s primary electromagnetic weapon, with open-source People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reports describing “super-EMPs” as HEMP attacks executed with a high-yield nuclear warhead.[3]
When detonated, HEMPs emit three phases of electromagnetic pulses. The first phase of pulses lasts for nanoseconds, delivering voltage surges stronger than a direct lightning strike to internal wires and conducting materials causing electrical failures.[4] The second phase delivers pulses equivalent to the voltage of a lightning strike that lasts for milliseconds, and the third phase is as strong as those created by solar superstorms. The last two phases do not damage electronics to the same extent as the first but can temporarily disable them.[5]
The range of a HEMP attack depends on the altitude of its detonation. A detonation at 30km can create a 600km radius pulse–essentially a radius that could cover the states of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho combined.[6] A 400km high detonation can produce a 2,200km radius pulse encompassing the continental US—save Alaska. The warhead’s yield does not necessarily determine the strength of the pulse, with a 10-kiloton warhead producing a similar electromagnetic frequency to a 1000-kiloton warhead but over a smaller radius. Since its range is so wide, HEMPs are much easier to deploy than other nuclear weapons as accuracy is not critical for their effectiveness. Additionally, HEMPs don’t need a re-entry vehicle to guide the warhead to a surface target, making it difficult for anti-ballistic missile systems to defend against them.[7]
The Consequences of a HEMP Attack
HEMPs can quickly disable the electronic systems of military forces, consisting of conducting materials and internal wiring vulnerable to electromagnetic radiation. For instance, semiconductors that manage the flow of electrical currents in an array of devices are composed of silicon circuits—a type of conductive metalloid—making them vulnerable to electromagnetic interference.[8] Semiconductors and similar electronics can be found in telecommunication devices, navigation equipment, and computer systems, all of which are critical to US military units’ command and control infrastructures.[9] For example, cellular and radio devices could be disabled in an HEMP attack preventing timely transmissions of information between units. Without these electronics, operational effectiveness would rapidly deteriorate especially considering the large reliance on digital systems by modern militaries like the US.[10]
HEMPs threaten electrical power systems, which consist of a complex assortment of interconnected electronics that deal with the production and delivery of electricity.[11] The risk to electrical systems is particularly severe for technologically advanced countries like the US, where automation has replaced many of the manual components of the electrical grids. Because of the interconnected nature of electrical infrastructure, when certain network nodes falter it can lead to cascading failures causing system-wide paralysis.[12]
An example of such a critical node are the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems that are the ubiquitous industrial control infrastructure that monitors a vast array of physical systems, including power plants.[13] Computers that operate SCADA software rely on microchips made of solid-state circuits that are vulnerable to electromagnetic interference. The US is composed of three self-contained regional electrical grids that consist of interconnected power production and transmission infrastructures.[14] Power plants within these grids rely on SCADA systems to monitor and regulate voltage levels and electrical currents. SCADA systems have sensors that communicate with a centralized computer that adjusts the outputs of electricity from these plants.[15] Should the output from one plant drop, the SCADA system would automatically redirect energy flows from another plant to accommodate such disruptions ensuring a steady supply of electricity. If these supervisory systems are disabled, it would lead to large disruptions of electrical supply as plants would need to adjust outputs manually. SCADA systems also monitor control points to ensure the safe operation of equipment. For instance, steam plants use SCADA systems to maintain safe parameters for physical equipment like the speed of generator turbines, feed water pressure, and boiler steam drum levels. Inadequate monitoring of these control points can cause severe damage to equipment leading to plant shutdowns.
Major disruptions in energy supplies as described would lead to electricity blackouts that could cripple US society as all 16 of the critical infrastructure sectors listed by the Department of Homeland Security rely to some extent on electricity to function.[16] For instance, telecommunication infrastructures are reliant on electricity to power routers to transport information between users–disruptions in telecommunication services would prevent timely emergency responses.[17] Refrigeration is reliant on electricity to keep perishable food products from spoiling.[18] Most individuals don’t have adequate food stocks to make up for large disruptions in the supply of foodstuffs. If not quickly alleviated, this might lead to famine and civil unrest as people vie for dwindling food supplies. Additionally, electric pumps and valves are critical for the purification and delivery of fresh water.[19] The disruption of these mechanisms would halt fresh water supplies leading to a public health emergency. Without clean water, people would likely resort to drinking from unpurified water sources such as lakes and rivers–leading to serious illness.
What’s more, HEMPs can be deployed against satellites in space. During Operation STARFISH, a US-conducted high-altitude nuclear test in 1962, a 1.4-megaton nuclear warhead was detonated at an altitude of 400km. The electromagnetic pulse generated from the detonation damaged eight of the 23 US satellites in orbit at the time.[20] Scientists determined that high-energy electrons emitted from the warhead’s electromagnetic pulse damaged the circuitry within these satellites. This accidental discovery resulted in the extension of electromagnetic warfare into space. As of 2024, Russia reportedly has fielded weapons that could destroy satellites through energy blasts.[21] US battlefield effectiveness would steeply decline if a large segment of its satellite force became inoperable. For instance, the US military’s Reconnaissance-Strike Complex doctrine seeks comprehensive battlefield awareness through satellite implements such as multispectral sensors which include radar imagery and infrared sensors that are vulnerable to electromagnetic interference.[22] Military leaders utilize intelligence collected from these satellites to conduct precision strikes with guided munitions while simultaneously surveilling adversary and ally movements.
Equipment enclosures and protected shelters formed of metal or conductive concrete are the only viable defense against electromagnetic pulses. Critical electronic equipment and infrastructures can be placed in these shielded areas for protection. That said, the National Coordinating Center for Communications recognizes that it is untenable to secure all electronics in this fashion with equipment such as sensors and antennas needed to be exposed to function. In these cases, they suggest keeping an ample stock of spare parts.[23] In 2019, Executive Order 13865 was signed in the US which directed the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency to coordinate electromagnetic pulse mitigation efforts across the federal government.[24]
Depending on the scope of the attack and the level of preparedness, a HEMP could be potentially devastating not only to military forces by diminishing command and control infrastructure but to society as a whole. The systemic effects HEMPs would have on critical infrastructures would place millions of American lives at risk. William Graham, former chairman of the US General Advisory Committee on Arms Control, and Vincent Pry, Executive Director of Task Force on US National and Homeland Security, even go as far as to call electromagnetic weapons “a civilization killer.”[25]
China’s Ultimate Cyber Weapon
The PRC views HEMPs as a critical cyber weapon in their information-centric warfare strategy that emphasizes maintaining superior reconnaissance, communication, and intelligence capabilities in a conflict.[26] By threatening to quickly damage and disable their adversaries’ command and control infrastructures such as telecommunications, HEMPs are critical to gaining information superiority during war.
The PLA’s National Defense University’s report titled The Science of Military Strategy—one of the PRC’s Central Military Commission’s guiding strategic documents—states that “information-based local war is the main form of war that our country will face in the future.”[27] Local war has been defined by PLA leaders as a contained conflict with limited aims that does not escalate to a global conflict[28]–the PRC’s border war with Vietnam in the 1980s or a potential conflict over Taiwan are examples of this. With the advent of advanced communication technologies in the 1990s, the report describes the global shift from a mechanized to an “informatized” war strategy theory. The authors cite the first Gulf War as the turning point in this “military revolution,”[29] with the US’s dominance of the information space through its cyber capabilities and advanced telecommunications being cited as the primary reason behind its speedy victory in Iraq. With this context, the report definitively states that “the victory of the war begins with the victory of cyberspace.”
In 2015, the PLA centralized its scattered cyber operators under one chain of command with the creation of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) which would direct the PLA’s cyberspace, electromagnetic, and psychological warfare operations.[30] The formation of the SSF as an independent service alongside the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force indicated the PLA’s intention to more effectively conduct information campaigns by implementing full-spectrum cyber warfighting. In April of 2024, the SSF was restructured from a full-service branch into three independent arms of the PLA.[31] In what they termed the “four services (军种) and four arms (兵种)” structure of the PLA, the Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, and Information Support Force represent the new arms alongside the already established Joint Logistics Support Force. These “arms” serve as inter-service support elements that conduct operations in support of the theatre-level commands. Overall, this restructuring seems to be intended to improve operational effectiveness by dividing responsibility for the multifaceted capabilities of the SSF amongst three commands instead of a singular one.[32]
The first two arms are based on former departments within the SSF indicating a continuity in operations, with the former Space Systems Department being converted into the Aerospace Force and the Network Systems Department into the Cyberspace Force.[33] On the other hand, the Information Support Force is a new formation that did not have an SSF department predecessor. Instead, it seems that this new force is an evolution of a subordinate organization called the Information Communications Base indicating the growing importance of information warfare in PLA strategy.[34] Authority over electromagnetic operations will likely be divided amongst the arms. Meia Nouwens, Senior Fellow at The International Institute for Strategic Studies, posits that the Cyberspace Force will continue the defensive and offensive functions of the Network Systems Department–possibly directing the use of HEMPs.[35] Moreover, the former Network Systems Department was charged with Electronic Warfare under the SFF suggesting that there would be a continuation of command over electromagnetic operations with the Cyberspace Force. The Aerospace Force will command the space forces, defending against possible HEMP attacks against space assets like satellites. Finally, the Information Support Force will focus on maintaining communication networks and network defense, including preparing for HEMP attacks on PLA infrastructure.[36]
The Science of Military Strategy differentiates between two forms of cyber attacks. The first is “soft destruction” which focuses on disrupting cyber capabilities through hacking and communication interference. The second is “traditional hard destruction” which are attacks that damage physical infrastructures.[37] Both are critical to “gain information superiority and then seize the initiative in war.” This is done by targeting the key nodes of their adversary’s command and control infrastructure leading to a diminished war fighting capacity. Although HEMPs are categorized under traditional hard destruction by the document, they fit both categories of attacks by being capable of both temporarily interfering with and permanently damaging electronic equipment. Because of its dual characteristic, an Institute for National Strategic Studies report has called electromagnetic weapons the “bridge” between these two forms of cyber attacks.[38]
An Assassin’s Mace
The PLA categorizes HEMPs as an “Assassin’s Mace” weapon.[39] This term originated from Chinese mythology, where a hero confronted by a more powerful adversary uses a hidden spiked club to knock out his opponent in a single strike.[40] As a form of asymmetric warfare, a HEMP detonation can quickly paralyze advanced electronic equipment, instantly negating any comparative advantages that a technologically superior adversary like the US would hold. Accordingly, The Science of Military Strategy calls cyber attacks the “trump card for a weak country to deal with a powerful country.”[41]
In a foreshadowing of the use of HEMPs in combat, the fourth-century BCE Chinese military strategist Sun Tze dedicates an entire chapter in his book The Art of War to conducting incendiary attacks—another assassin’s mace tactic.[42] He describes how the setting of fires behind enemy lines is an effective way of sowing chaos amongst their adversaries’ ranks by destroying critical supplies and infrastructure. This ancient example of asymmetrical warfare is mirrored today with the PRC’s HEMPs. As an opportune fire can quickly turn the tables in favor of a weaker power, so can an electromagnetic attack.
Following the first Gulf War, the PLA recognized that the increasing reliance on advanced communication technologies and automated systems globally created the potential to systemically paralyze its adversaries by disrupting these electronic nodes.[43] For instance, a Shanghai Communist Party Central Committee’s newspaper stated that “a high degree of electronification is like an ‘Achilles’ heel’ for an aircraft carrier fleet, which relies heavily on electronic equipment as its central nervous system.”[44] Additionally, in an eerie reference to WWII, a 1996 PLA newspaper article stated that it “could be regarded as the ‘Pearl Harbor Incident’ of the 21st century if a surprise attack is conducted against the enemy’s crucial information systems of command, control, and communications.”
The PLA believes that initiating concerted and sudden attacks on these electronic systems is critical in gaining a battlefield advantage. In a series of Lectures on Joint Campaign Information Operations published by the PLA’s National Defense University in 2009, officials agreed that the PLA should “concentrate various information attack strengths to suddenly initiate attacks against the enemy to cause the enemy to be too surprised to defend.”[45] As one of the special information weapons listed in the lectures, HEMPs are a key component of such a surprise campaign. As the Japanese sought to deliver a devastating first strike against the US’s forward-deployed naval forces in Hawaii during WWII, it seems that the PRC has considered a similar surprise attack using HEMPs as well.
What’s more, HEMPs are a critical weapon for one of the PRC’s foremost national security concerns—the unification of Taiwan with the PRC. A Taiwan Defense Review article states that the two asymmetric scenarios that could bring Taiwan “to heel without bloodshed” are a long-range blockade and “a lightning strike over Taiwan by nuclear EMP.”[46] Furthermore, a report by Taiwan’s Military College of National Defense University states that “The EMP attack scenario presents the only attack option that meets the demand for making the first, paralyzing strike of a war, paving the way for the other troops to attack Taiwan.”[47] In light of these findings, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense announced in 2023 that they have installed defensive measures on their Naval bases against HEMP attacks. This includes shielded rooms where important electronic infrastructure is contained in six-sided double-layer zinc-plated steel walls that will deflect electromagnetic pulses.[48]
Degrading Nuclear Deterrence
The PLA’s categorization of HEMPs as cyberweapons–despite being a nuclear warhead–and its expanding nuclear arsenal suggest that the PRC is diverging from its no-first-use nuclear weapons policy. According to PLA doctrine, there is no similar no-first-use policy for cyberweapons–in fact, they encourage preemptive first strikes with these weapons.[49] Consequently, the categorization of HEMPs under cyber warfare has lowered the high threshold for the deployment of a nuclear warhead. This has undermined nuclear deterrence by allowing the PLA to utilize HEMPs in retaliation to non-nuclear threats. When seen in conjunction with the expansion of the PRC’s nuclear arsenal, this has increased the likelihood of a conventional conflict with the US slipping into a nuclear one.
The PRC has long viewed nuclear weapons solely as a strategic deterrent against other nuclear powers. Shortly after conducting its first nuclear weapons test in 1964, the PRC declared to “never be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances.”[50] Under this framework, the PRC sought a limited nuclear arsenal that was capable of sufficiently damaging their rivals to dissuade them from nuclear coercion.[51] The PRC’s current Defense Policy summarizes this concept stating that “we will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.”[52] In what would be coined as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) theory, other nuclear powers at the time also began adopting a similar posture—including the US. Nonetheless, since the PLA only considers HEMPs as a cyberweapon, it is unclear whether the no-first-use policy applies to its deployment.
Despite the continuation of nuclear non-aggression pledges under Xi Jinping’s rule, there has been a marked increase in the PRC’s nuclear capabilities in conjunction with Xi’s push to make the PLA into a “world-class” force.[53] The Pentagon estimates that the PRC’s stockpile of 500 nuclear warheads will increase to about 1000 by 2035.[54] The PRC’s expanding nuclear arsenal indicates that they are possibly shifting away from its no-first-use policy, premised on fielding nuclear weapons solely as a strategic deterrent to a policy of utilizing these weapons to gain a battlefield advantage. This development is relevant for this report as every nuclear warhead in the PLA’s arsenal is a potential HEMP weapon.
The PRC’s no-first-use policy was questionable from its inception, as the PLA’s core principle of “active defense” encourages preemptive attacks to deter enemy aggression.[55] This empowers the PLA to attack first before an adversary has the opportunity to do so—justifying proactive aggression. The PLA’s Science of Campaign report reinforces this principle by emphasizing the importance of sudden attacks to “catch the enemy unaware.”[56] Moreover, the US Department of Defense suggests that despite the PRC’s stated no-first-use policy, it is likely that the PLA’s nuclear strategy includes “consideration of a nuclear strike in response to a nonnuclear attack threatening the viability of China’s nuclear forces or C2, or that approximates the strategic effects of a nuclear strike.”[57] According to this intelligence, the PLA may respond to conventional attacks with nuclear weapons—contradicting its no-first-use policy premised on deterring nuclear attacks only. Therefore, even if we consider the use of HEMPs under the PLA’s nuclear doctrine, it is possible that its deployment alongside other traditional nuclear weapons would be considered in a conventional conflict.
The fielding of new dual-capable delivery systems is further evidence of the PRC’s divergence from its declared policy. The PLA’s fielding of the DF-26 intermediate ballistic missile, a hot-swappable weapon that can deliver both conventional and nuclear payloads, in 2016 is one such example.[58] The DF-26 was the first conventionally armed ballistic missile the PLA fielded capable of reaching the US territory of Guam. Additionally, this weapon system is road-mobile meaning it can be launched from wheeled transporters making it more difficult to target than stationary systems. The US Department of Defense views the DF-26 as the PLA’s “most likely weapons system to field a lower-yield warhead in the near term” making it one of the primary systems to launch HEMPs in a regional conflict–such as one over Taiwan.
The PLA has also recently deployed hypersonic missiles capable of being armed with nuclear warheads.[59] Hypersonic missiles are either boosted by a rocket or released from an aircraft into the upper atmosphere where they glide unpowered at high speeds at an altitude of 40-100 km before descending on their target.[60] Evading detection by traveling at high speeds and a low altitude, Hypersonic missiles are ideal for a first-strike attack. When paired with HEMPs, the PLA can quickly disable the electronic infrastructures of their adversaries.
The PRC’s degrading of its no-first-use policy through its increased non-strategic nuclear posturing and development of advanced nuclear weaponry is undermining the implicitly agreed upon MAD framework that governs nuclear policy internationally. Herman Khan stated in his book On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios that countries under this framework “should not try to get any ‘positive’ benefits from its nuclear weaponry, but be content to use this weaponry only as nuclear deterrence.”[61] Kahn suggests that once countries try to gain a comparative advantage in nuclear capabilities through technological developments or posturing, deterrence collapses. This situation leads to a security dilemma where the expansion of one power’s capabilities leads the other to seek a counterbalance creating an escalating cycle of power accumulation.[62] If the PRC continues to develop its nuclear weaponry and veer away from its no-first-use policy it will drive the US to expand its arsenal as well and shift its peacetime nuclear posture to a wartime one. This would spark an arms race analogous to the one between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War; ratcheting up tensions, and setting both countries on the path to conflict.
Blurring the Nuclear Threshold
The asymmetric nature of HEMPs brings into question how the US would respond to a HEMP attack from the PRC. The PRC’s classification of HEMPs as just another component of its cyber and information warfare suggests that they view it as being below the threshold of conventional nuclear weapons. The US also seems to share this view with various military documents classifying HEMPs as under the “electromagnetic spectrum” instead of nuclear warfare. In the US Joint Chiefs of Staff publication series for Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, beyond describing the nuclear detonation involved in HEMPs, its authors don’t give its use any special consideration—treating it as any other non-nuclear electronic weapon.[63] Additionally, the 2022 US Nuclear Posture Review does not even mention HEMPs.[64] This indicates a parallel policy by both powers of categorizing HEMPs within a non-nuclear strategic doctrine.
The ambiguity surrounding the classification of HEMPs—being both a nuclear and electronic weapon—creates difficulties in arranging a proportionate response to an attack by one. The US Department of Defense’s Law of War Manual does not specifically regulate how military units should operate in the electromagnetic spectrum. In other documents, it seems that strategic considerations in this spectrum are lumped with cyberspace due to their overlapping qualities. For instance, the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations document describes how the Army conducts “cyberspace electromagnetic activities” in a unified manner.[65] Therefore, we can gain some sense of the strategic frameworks that may guide responses to HEMP attacks based on the Law of War Manual’s outline of cyberspace operations. The document states that the US “will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as it would to any other threat to the country.” In terms of the nature of such a response, they state that, “there is no legal requirement that the response in self-defense to a cyber armed attack take the form of a cyber action.” This provides military leaders with an extensive and diverse array of contingencies–including nuclear weapons–when responding to a cyber and possibly an electromagnetic attack.
In this context, the use of conventional nuclear weapons in a retaliatory strike against a HEMP attack could be justified. Nevertheless, President Joseph Biden wrote in a 2020 Foreign Affairs piece that “I believe that the sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be deterring—and, if necessary, retaliating against—a nuclear attack.”[66] Whether this sentiment would encompass HEMPs is unspecified. In contrast to Biden’s statement, the US 2022 Nuclear Posture Review states that “nuclear weapons are required to deter not only nuclear attacks, but also a narrow range of other high consequence, strategic-level attacks.” This suggests that even if non-nuclear attacks are of a strategic level, the US would consider a retaliatory nuclear strike.
The Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States defines the strategic level of warfare as actions that affect national policy and theater strategy.[67] An effective HEMP attack that disables critical command and control infrastructures in or across theaters could thus be categorized as a strategic attack by the US military theoretically justifying nuclear retaliation. Moreover, operational and tactical level attacks could potentially veer into the strategic level as US doctrine states that “there are no finite limits or boundaries between these levels.” For instance, satellites are traditionally considered a strategic infrastructure but also support small unit maneuvers on the tactical level. This also raises the possibility of a limited HEMP attack leading to a higher-order retaliatory attack.
Although it is impossible to state definitively how the US would respond to a HEMP attack, we can surmise that in a mutually reinforcing relationship, as the effectiveness and scope of a HEMP attack increases so does the pressure to retaliate increase in step. For instance, if the scale of the HEMP attack is large enough that US leaders feel particularly vulnerable the likelihood of a nuclear response is greater. On the other hand, if HEMPs were used in a limited fashion and caused only temporary disruptions to electronic infrastructures a response of that degree would be highly unlikely. In either circumstance, due to the limited institutional frameworks guiding responses to these specific attacks, the nature of retaliation will ultimately depend on the significance accorded by high-level military and civilian leaders to these attacks.
A New Era of Warfare
As residents of Hawaii’s Manoa Road were preparing to sleep in the sweltering summer heat on July 9, 1962, a bright flash could suddenly be seen on the horizon. What was described as a “spectacular pyrotechnic” turned the skies from night to day, lingering for seven minutes.[68] This bewildering phenomenon would later be reported as the US’s Operation STARFISH, a nuclear test 1445 km to the west of Hawaii. As the flash faded, residents noticed that the street lights lining Manoa Road were shut off. Local government officials would attribute the blown circuit fuses found in the lights to the HEMP emanating from the detonation. In total, around 300 street lights were reported to have gone out during the event across Hawaii. Little did these residents know that they just experienced a revolutionary new weapon that would be a central element in the military strategies of the great powers decades later–a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse. Many of the same people had looked to the sky 20 years before to see Japanese dive-bombers descend in swarms toward naval ships ported in Pearl Harbor inaugurating the era of naval aviation and aircraft carriers. In a similar vein, this distant flash of light on the horizon represented the dawn of a new era of warfare–one dominated by the cyber and information space. As we enter what Richard Haas has coined “The Dangerous Decade,” with a decline in world order and deteriorating US-PRC relations,[69] the risk has never been higher than since the Cold War that Manoa Road may once again go dark.
Endnotes
[1] Radasky, William, and Peter Pry. 2021. “BLACKOUT WARFARE: High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Attack On The U.S. Electric Power Grid.” EMP Task Force on National and Homeland Security. https://emptaskforce.us/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/BLACKOUTWARFAREhempREPORTfinal21X.pdf.
[2] Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Following a Nuclear Detonation – Radiation Emergency Medical Management.” n.d.-a. Accessed April 29, 2024. https://remm.hhs.gov/EMP.htm.
[3] Pry, Peter Vincent. Nuclear EMP attack scenarios and combined-arms cyber warfare. Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, 2017. https://www.thesilo.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/nuclear_emp_attack_scenarios_and_combined-arms_
[4] Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Following a Nuclear Detonation – Radiation Emergency Medical Management.” n.d.-a. Accessed April 29, 2024. https://remm.hhs.gov/EMP.htm.
[5] Pry, Peter Vincent. Nuclear EMP attack scenarios and combined-arms cyber warfare. Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, 2017. https://www.thesilo.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/nuclear_emp_attack_scenarios_and_combined-arms_
[6] Pry, Peter Vincent. Nuclear EMP attack scenarios and combined-arms cyber warfare. Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, 2017.
[7] Pry, Peter Vincent. Nuclear EMP attack scenarios and combined-arms cyber warfare. Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, 2017.
[8] “Stanford Explainer: Semiconductors.” n.d. Accessed July 17, 2024. https://news.stanford.edu/stories/2023/09/stanford-explainer-semiconductors.
[9] Clarke, Ryan, Xiaoxu Lin, and LJ Eads. 2023. “There’s Darkness in the Distance: The Rising Threat of China’s EMP Weapons to U.S. Defenses and Critical Infrastructure.” The CCP Biothreats Initiative. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/6444894f2a886e74091c9e1b/t/64f9c058e780165a2ec3eb53/1694089305455/There%27s+Darkness+in+the+Distance+-+The+Rising+Threat+of+China%27s+EMP+Weapons+to+U.S.+Defenses+and+Critical+Infrastructure.pdf.
[10] Clarke, Ryan, Xiaoxu Lin, and LJ Eads. 2023. “There’s Darkness in the Distance: The Rising Threat of China’s EMP Weapons to U.S. Defenses and Critical Infrastructure.” The CCP Biothreats Initiative. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/6444894f2a886e74091c9e1b/t/64f9c058e780165a2ec3eb53/1694089305455/There%27s+Darkness+in+the+Distance+-+The+Rising+Threat+of+China%27s+EMP+Weapons+to+U.S.+Defenses+and+Critical+Infrastructure.pdf.
[11] “How Does the U.S. Power Grid Work? | Council on Foreign Relations.” n.d. Accessed June 30, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-power-grid-work.
[12] “How Does the U.S. Power Grid Work? | Council on Foreign Relations.” n.d. Accessed June 30, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-power-grid-work.
[13] Stouffer, Keith, Keith Stouffer, Michael Pease, CheeYee Tang, Timothy Zimmerman, Victoria Pillitteri, Suzanne Lightman et al. Guide to operational technology (ot) security. US Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2023. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r3.pdf
[14] “How Does the U.S. Power Grid Work? | Council on Foreign Relations.” n.d. Accessed June 30, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-power-grid-work.
[15] “Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack.” 2008. Critical National Infastructures. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA484672.pdf.
[16] “Critical Infrastructure Sectors | CISA.” n.d. Accessed April 25, 2024. https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors.
[17] “Communications Sector-Specific Plan.” 2015. US Department of Homeland Security. https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-communications-2015-508.pdf.
[18] “Food and Agriculture Sector-Specific Plan.” 2015. US Department of Homeland Security. https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-food-ag-2015-508.pdf.
[19] “Water and Wastewater Systems Sector-Specific Plan.” 2015. US Department of Homeland Security. https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-water-2015-508.pdf.
[20] Conrad, Edward E., Gerald A. Gurtman, Glenn Kweder, Myron J. Mandell, and Willard W. White. “Collateral damage to satellites from an EMP attack.” Fort Belvoir (2010). https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA531197.pdf
[21] “The Specter of EMP Weapons in Space.” n.d. Accessed June 3, 2024. https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/media/article/the-specter-of-emp-weapons-in-space.
[22] Pekkanen, Saadia M., and P.J. Blount, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Space Security. Oxford Academic, 2024. Online edition, February 22, 2024. https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/56003/chapter/440993567
[23] “EMP Protection and Resilience Guidelines.” 2019. National Coordinating Center for Communications. https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0307_CISA_EMP-Protection-Resilience-Guidelines.pdf.
[24] “Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic Pulses.” 2019. The President of the United States. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-03-29/pdf/2019-06325.pdf.
[25] William R. Graham and Peter Vincent Pry, opinion contributor. 2018. “Ignoring EMP Threat Is a Death Sentence for Americans.” Text. The Hill (blog). October 16, 2018. https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/411451-ignoring-emp-threat-is-a-death-sentence-for-americans/.
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