Building Resilience in Taiwan’s Internet Infrastructure from Geopolitical Threats

The Republic of China, or Taiwan, is an island off the coast of China known for its strong democratic system, robust semiconductor manufacturing industry, and potential for creating international conflict. While in many ways Taiwan is independent, including having its own government and elections, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) claims the island is a territory of the PRC. Due to its contested status, Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations and has only 13 official diplomatic allies. But, in spite of this, it is a center of international trade in essential technology. These complex factors make Taiwan a pressing issue for peace and security in Asia.

The PRC’s interactions with Taiwan in recent years generally fall into the category of gray zone aggression–or aggression below the threshold of war^[1]. Taiwanese authorities in 2021 estimated Taiwan undergoes 20 to 40 million cyberattacks a month, and PRC groups are suspected to be behind the majority of the attacks^[2]. In addition to direct cyberattacks, the PRC has implemented large-scale disinformation campaigns, with the goal of undermining and decreasing trust in Taiwan’s democracy^[3]. Internationally, the PRC attempts to isolate Taiwan from institutions such as the United Nations and World Health Organization, as well as poach Taiwan’s formal diplomatic allies^[4]. Most recently the PRC has become increasingly bellicose, sending People’s Liberation Army planes over the Taiwan Strait median line in unprecedented numbers^[5]. Whether or not these pressure and intimidation tactics will escalate into a full-scale war in the Strait, the PRC poses a significant threat to Taiwan’s national security.

Within the context of these tensions, Taiwan is concerned about its internet infrastructure because the physical components of Taiwan’s internet are vulnerable to a potential attack from the PRC. To address this vulnerability, Taiwan’s government bodies responsible for digital communication and infrastructure have developed a plan to build digital resilience across Taiwan. This paper will explore this strategy of digital resilience with particular emphasis on the expansion of satellite networks as an alternative to subsea cables. In an era of highly digitized communication and cyberwarfare, understanding the vulnerabilities and resilience in internet infrastructure is essential for conceptualizing the possibility for conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s Internet Infrastructure

To understand the importance of digital resilience in Taiwan’s internet infrastructure, it is essential to first understand the vulnerabilities. In the case of Taiwan, two main forms of internet connection are central: traditional cabled internet and satellite internet.

Taiwan, like the rest of the world, relies heavily on cabled internet. Cabled internet is comprised of wires that transmit the data of the internet between data centers and to our devices to create a connected network^[6]. Even wireless devices such as laptops and phones rely on routers connected to internet cables to provide a wi-fi network. Hundreds of these subsea cables, only about the size of a garden hose, lie across the ocean floor^[7] (Fig. 1). The cables are encased in protective materials and buried into the ground in areas closer to shore to protect them from damage^[8]. Newer subsea cables are fiber-optic, a type of small cable capable of transmitting data extremely fast – about 69% the speed of light^[9]. With these cables information can travel in milliseconds from Seattle to Tokyo. These subsea cables are mostly owned and built by private telecommunications and tech companies, namely Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Meta, Amazon, and Microsoft, although this was not always the case^[10].

Fig. 1: Undersea Cables in the Indo-Pacific^[11]

Taiwan’s internet connectivity with the rest of the world relies on 15 subsea cables connecting to the island in seven cable landing stations^[12]. Most of these cables provide converge in the northern regions of Taiwan, creating a high concentration of landing sites known as choke points^[13]. There has long been speculation that in the event of a PRC invasion these subsea cables would be vulnerable to attack. It is difficult to say with any certainty whether or not the PRC would take the opportunity to sever Taiwan’s internet cables. To date there is no public record of the PRC deliberately cutting a cable^[14]. However, there is no denying they are a vulnerability for island nations such as Taiwan that rely on cables for internet and communication.

If a subsea cable were intentionally cut during a conflict serious repercussions would be felt for both Taiwan and its allies. A war simulation exercise held by the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies in Tokyo simulated an attack on Taiwan from the Chinese military, including severing subsea cables to Okinawa and Taiwan^[15]. The investment in training exercises indicates that some of these countries are taking the threat of cutting cables seriously. A primary repercussion of cable cuttings would be isolating Taiwan from communication with its international allies, which could reduce reaction time and defense of the island. In an interview, Minister of Digital Affairs Audrey Tang pointed out another potential outcome. If foreign interference or disinformation was received in Taiwan while the internet is down, there would be no way to communicate or verify the information^[16]. This could lead to further confusion and potential success of disinformation campaigns in disrupting the island’s defense.

In addition to military risks to cables, there are also natural risks. Taiwan experiences high volumes of seismic activity. In 2006, a 7.0 earthquake struck off the southwest coast of Taiwan, damaging several subsea cables in the region and disrupting internet services for Taiwan, China, South Korea, and Japan^[17]. Financial services and the exchange market were interrupted^[18], demonstrating that even temporary outages like this can cause serious economic consequences.

Tonga is an example of the additional vulnerability island nations’ face with internet access, and the damage on subsea cables from natural disasters. Tonga, a small island nation in the South Pacific, suffered a several weeks of digital outage after its single subsea cable was severed in a blast from an underwater volcano^[19]. Repairs took many days because there are few service providers capable of doing the delicate and remote work. In the meantime, there was limited information on the damage and humanitarian aid necessary in the wake of the eruption and tsunami^[20].

One of the most relevant examples to Taiwan’s vulnerabilities came in February 2023. On February 2^nd and 8^th, both internet cables to Matsu, a series of outlying islands off the coast of China but under the jurisdiction of Taiwan, were severed in quick succession^[21]. Damaged subsea cables to Matsu are not uncommon, but this was the first time both cables were severed at the same time. The incident was attributed to two Chinese fishing and cargo boats^[22]. There was no evidence that the cables were a deliberate act by the Chinese government, but it has been speculated that the cable cutting could have been an act of gray zone aggression to pressure Taiwan politically or to prepare for a military invasion^[23]. The loss of the cables resulted in what was effectively an internet blackout, with communication and online banking disrupted for Matsu’s 13,000 residents^[24]. When such an event occurs, Taiwan relies on a small number of private companies to fix the cables, which can take weeks or months to be completed. Residents of Matsu described the months before the cables were fixed as an “invisible blockade” severing the islands from the rest of Taiwan^[25].

Taiwan’s solution to the loss of internet service in Matsu was to establish a microwave internet system. Microwave internet uses a high-powered microwave radio link that does not require cables or extensive infrastructure other than a clear line of sight^[26]. A tower stationed on Yangmingshan, a mountain near Taipei City, sent a microwave signal to Dongyin Island in Matsu^[27]. Service was prioritized for critical government offices, hospitals, and military buildings. The backup system initially provided a bandwidth of 2.2 gigabits per second, a fraction of the 8 or 9 gigabits the islands usually require. Sending a text message took 15-20 minutes^[28]. The Matsu incident highlighted the vulnerability of Taiwan’s cables and the long lasting repercussions to any damage. The Taiwanese National Communications Commission, a government agency responsible for regulating telecommunication and broadcasting services^[29], has announced plans to build an additional cable to the Matsu islands by 2025. In addition, a draft amendment was proposed to the Telecommunications Management Act enacting fines and jail time for the damage of sea cables^[30]. These measures aim to protect Taiwan’s cables, but Taiwan’s plan for digital resilience goes further and incorporates alternate methods of internet connection.

Taiwan’s Plans for Satellite Networks

Taiwan’s government is addressing the vulnerabilities of its internet cable infrastructure through the strengthening of digital resilience. Digital resilience in the realm of cybersecurity is defined as the capabilities of entities to develop digital technologies to deal with extraneous stressors^[31]. Extraneous stressors can include natural disasters, war, or other major shocks to digital technology^[32]. In Taiwan, one example of digital resilience occurred during the COVID-19 crisis. Taiwan was able to rely on digital technologies to mitigate the pandemic’s disruption, including creating digital fencing tools, contact tracing, and tourism hotspot warnings^[33]. This rapid digital resilience response in Taiwan led to an internationally heralded success in dealing with the pandemic.

A strategy used by Taiwan to address the vulnerabilities of subsea cables and create digital resilience in wartime or disaster scenarios is satellite networks. In addition to cables, satellites are another way of connecting to the internet. Instead of relying on a network of cables, satellite internet relies on a constellation of satellites orbiting above the earth. A large antenna called a “ground station” sends an internet signal to an orbiting satellite, which then transmits the signal back down to earth to a receiving dish mounted on a building. The receiving dish connects to the overall internet infrastructure ^[34]. Satellite internet requires electricity and a clear view of the sky to receive signals, but it is otherwise an effective alternative to cable internet in rural or hard to reach areas where there is a lack of ground infrastructure^[35]. While the bandwidth of satellite internet does not rival cabled internet, it is already offered commercially from providers such as Starlink, Viasat, and HughesNet^[36].

The main government agency in Taiwan responsible for the development of digital resilience is the Ministry of Digital Affairs, or MODA. The establishment of MODA was announced in 2020 by President Tsai Ing-Wen and it was inaugurated in 2022^[37]. Within MODA is the Administration for Cybersecurity and the Administration for Digital Industries. Led by Digital Minister Audrey Tang, MODA is responsible for driving Taiwan’s digital development, increasing digital connection, and improving digital security^[38].

In September 2023, Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs published the Program for the Digital Resilience Validation of Emerging Technologies for Contingency or Wartime Applications^[39]. This program by MODA verifies the feasibility of constellations of satellites from non-Chinese partners as backup systems during disaster scenarios. The program prioritizes infrastructure in rural areas lacking infrastructure, such as Taiping Island^[40]. MODA’s website states that by the end of 2023 Taiwan’s government plans to build 11 domestic terminal equipment sites and five cellular backhaul sites to facilitate satellite internet. The goal is to have 700 equipment sites, 70 cellular backhaul sites, and three international equipment sites by the end of 2024^[41]. This program is party of a larger initiative by MODA to build communication resilience in land, sea, and air domains^[42].

Taiwan’s plans to expand satellite networks distinguish between the different types of satellite orbits. There are important distinctions between low earth orbit (LEO), medium earth orbit (MEO), and geostationary or geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO). The main factor is the height at which the satellite orbits around the earth. Satellites in lower orbit move faster because of the Earth’s gravitational pull^[43]. Geostationary earth orbit satellites, sometimes known as high earth orbit, are at a much higher altitude than LEO and MEO satellites. Once these orbits reach about 36,000 kilometers above the Earth’s surface, the satellite begins orbiting at the same speed the earth is rotating^[44]. This is a geosynchronous orbit, in which the satellite stays in one place over the Earth. A weather forecast that shows changing weather patterns over an area is taken using a satellite in geosynchronous orbit. The main issue with GEO satellites is that the huge distance between the satellite and earth creates latency: a delay in data transmission between one end (the ground station) to another (the receiving dish). Depending on the height of the orbit, latency of a few hundred milliseconds is not be a significant issue for many applications but causes problems with video conferencing or online gaming^[45].

Taiwan’s plans for expanding satellite networks generally focus on non-geostationary orbit satellites (NGSO). NGSO satellites, or satellites whose positions move across the earth during orbit, include medium earth orbit and low earth orbit. MEO offers lower latency than GEO because the satellites are much closer to the receiving dish, orbiting at a range of 5,000 to 20,000 kilometers above the Earth’s surface^[46]. MEO satellites have historically been used for GPS and other navigation applications^[47]. Low earth orbit satellites offer even less latency than MEO, orbiting at a mere 500 to 1,200 kilometers above the Earth’s surface^[48]. But the downside to this close orbit is that the satellites have a smaller coverage area, and, therefore, require many satellites in a constellation to provide consistent service. Starlink’s network is an example of a LEO satellite constellation.

The Ministry of Digital Affairs’ plan for a backup NGSO satellite network is in the beginning stages of working with international partners to supply constellations of satellites. MODA began partnering with SES, a French-Luxembourg satellite company who specializes in MEO satellites, in the initial verification stages. The Telecom Tech Center (TCC), an advisory group to MODA responsible for testing and research began with satellite receivers in Matsu^[49]. Testing and verification in this case involves the adjustments of antenna and measuring the bandwidth and latency to determine what demand the satellite constellations can meet. Many scenarios must be considered, including how weather affects clear connections and how moving vehicles receive a signal^[50]. The government has subsidized 550 million NTD, or almost five million USD for these testing procedures as an important step in MODA’s multi-year resilience preparation for disaster scenarios^[51].

In addition to MEO constellations like SES’s, MODA is encouraging the development of LEO satellite networks. In November of 2023, Chunghwa Telecom, the largest telecommunication service provider in Taiwan, signed a multi-million-dollar distribution partner agreement with Eutelsat OneWeb, an LEO satellite company^[52]. Chunghwa has been a private company under Taiwanese law since 2005, but Taiwan’s Ministry of Transportation and Communication still owns 35.29% of shares^[53]. Alex Chien, Executive Vice President of Chunghwa Telecom, said in a press release: “By integrating Eutelsat OneWeb’s LEO satellite service with our Geostationary Orbit (GEO) satellite service, Chunghwa Telecom takes the first step towards establishing a multi orbit satellite service portfolio”^[54]. OneWeb has more than 600 LEO satellites delivering low-latency services^[55]. Chunghwa Telecom provides service for both business and government customers and collaborates closely with government satellite research institutions, so the reliability of their service is important for Taiwan’s digital resilience^[56]. In addition, this agreement creates a format for other telecommunications companies to expand coverage with satellite providers.

Taiwan’s focus on MEO and LEO constellations goes beyond the basic levels of digital resilience. Digital Minister Audrey Tang said in an interview with Bloomberg News that some of the 700 non-commercial receivers being built around Taiwan can receive from both MEO and LEO constellations^[57]. This is one way of creating redundancy and resilience in satellite infrastructure. LEO has lower latency than MEO, but because the number of LEO satellites and bandwidth is limited, MEO is more reliable, especially in heavy weather^[58]. Using this strategy, communication pathways and internet connection are even more resilient to a variety of circumstances.

After the testing and verification is complete, a diversity of private companies will contract with the Taiwanese government to provide emergency and disaster backup services^[59]. While so far MODA is working with international companies, a future domestic partner could be the Taiwan Space Agency, which in October 2023 launched its first domestically produced geostationary weather satellite^[60]. For now, public-private partnerships from international providers are the best option for a comprehensive rollout of satellite services on Taiwan’s pressing timeline. In addition to these government contracts, it is likely more satellite providers such as OneWeb will apply for commercial licensing. Taiwan has a 51% domestic investment quota for commercial licensing of telecommunication companies, so networks cannot only be international providers like SES and Starlink^[61]. A commercial license already exists for MEO, and according to Digital Minister Tang that process will move forward with LEO in the future^[62], expanding access to satellite internet for Taiwanese people.

However, the burden placed on backup satellite networks during a disaster scenario is still too high unless a huge portion of Taiwan’s communication is switched to domestic networks^[63]. Right now a high percentage of communication metadata is routed to other jurisdictions^[64]. For example, if two people within Taiwan open a video call, there is still a round trip of the data outside of Taiwan through subsea cables. This is important because if Taiwan’s subsea cables are severed domestic communication could be severely impaired. Certain platforms such as Google Meet uses entirely domestic routing in Taiwan, making it more resilient in the event of a disaster. Tang stresses the need for internal communication to be shifted to local providers, reducing the burden on external communication. This is local resilience – a component of digital resilience that would allow Taiwan to function in the event of severed cables. Otherwise, Taiwan will experience a similar situation as in Matsu in February of last year.

The Ukraine/Taiwan Comparison

The emergency satellite network being used in Ukraine is currently a common comparison for Taiwan’s ambitions. Starlink, a subsidiary of SpaceX, is a U.S. based commercial satellite service^[65]. Starlink began providing Ukraine with free access to Starlink’s LEO satellite network shortly after Russia invaded because of concerns that shelling could disrupt internet access^[66]. According to a letter from the Federal Aviation Administration, Starlink’s network is made up of more than 5,000 LEO satellites^[67]. As the only company with a landable, reusable rocket capable of delivering multiple payloads^[68] Starlink has gained recognition for its large satellite constellations as well as its use in Ukraine.

While the Russia-Ukraine war is certainly not a blueprint for a hypothetical invasion of Taiwan, Ukraine’s use of Starlink has demonstrated important lessons for Taiwan. There have been unconfirmed reports of assistance of Starlink networks in Ukrainian missile strikes. In April 2022, a Russian missile cruiser was sunk in the Black Sea by Ukrainian R-360 Neptune anti-ship cruise missiles^[69]. There are unconfirmed media reports of the Ukrainian military using Starlink to guide two of these missiles^[70]. The Telegraph reported in 2022 that Starlink was being used in drone attacks on Russian positions^[71]. The use of Starlink in Ukraine is an unprecedented example of this kind of commercial civilian technology used in a military context^[72]. This is an example of the possible applications for satellite constellations for Taiwan’s defense. Russia has attempted to hack and interfere with the Starlink network, so far unsuccessfully^[73]. This may indicate that large constellations of lower orbit satellites are more resilient to hacking than smaller constellations in higher orbit^[74], and supports MODA’s plan to focus on NGSO networks.

Another lesson for Taiwan came in 2022 when SpaceX CEO Elon Musk disabled Starlink near the coast of Crimea. The outage was reportedly to prevent a Ukrainian drone attack on ships, something Musk considered to be unnecessary escalation^[75]. For Taiwan, this instance underscored the need for diversity of providers in internet infrastructure. Diversity of providers not only avoids the issues raised when tech CEOs make military decisions normally reserved to government actors, but also prevents a single point of failure. Multiple providers, especially spread across LEO, MEO, and GEO satellite networks, provide fail safes in case one connection is jammed or disrupted^[76]. Digital Minister Tang has made it clear Taiwan is willing to work with any non-Chinese international provider, saying in an interview “we’re in talks with pretty much all of them”^[77]. Although, with Elon Musk’s public pro-China stance and significant Tesla holdings in the PRC, it seems unlikely Starlink would partner with Taiwan^[78]. Diversity of providers is a consistent theme across MODA’s messaging and an important aspect of Taiwan’s digital resilience.

Taiwan is also planning to prioritize emergency satellite bandwidth for foreign correspondents and journalists^[79]. Digital Minister Tang emphasized in an interview the importance of strong journalism as essential to preventing foreign interference and disinformation^[80]. This is another instance in which Ukraine is an apt example. The conflict in Ukraine is considered by some the most documented war in history due to advances in technology and the availability of satellite internet^[81]. This heavy media coverage has rallied international support that has been essential to Ukrainian defense^[82]. In a hypothetical conflict between the PRC and Taiwan, the same level of coverage could be very impactful. Prioritizing this international correspondence is important in an invasion scenario to bring international attention to Taiwan and rally the support of ally nations.

Conclusion

Taiwan’s reliance on subsea cables is a consequential vulnerability for Taiwan in light of the tensions with the PRC. The Ministry of Digital Affairs’ strategy for addressing this vulnerability is to build digital resilience across Taiwan’s internet infrastructure. A central component of this plan is the expansion of satellite networks, particularly low and medium earth orbit. MODA is encouraging a diversity of providers in public/private partnerships to establish effective satellite backup systems as quickly as possible. In addition, MODA is emphasizing the need for communication in Taiwan to be routed domestically in order to not overload these backup systems. Taiwan’s plans reflect lessons learned from the unfolding conflict in Ukraine, preparation for disaster scenarios, and consideration of the dangers of geographic isolation. In a digitized world where cybersecurity is increasingly important for national security and critical infrastructure, Taiwan’s economic success and political independence depend on the strengthening of its digital resilience.

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^[14] Ibid.

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^[18] Ibid.

^[19] Natasha Frost and James Glanz, “With a Repair Ship Many Days Away, Tonga Faces Weeks of Digital Darkness,” The New York Times, January 19, 2022, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/19/world/australia/tonga-volcano-internet-cable.html.

^[20] Ibid.

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^[22] Ibid.

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^[24] Wang, “Remote Corner of Taiwan Confronts Wartime Scenario.”

^[25] Ibid.

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^[32] Ibid.

^[33] Joyce Yi-Hui Lee et al., “Building Digital Resilience against Crises: The Case of Taiwan’s COVID-19 Pandemic Management,” Information Systems Journal 34, no. 1 (2024): 39–79, https://doi.org/10.1111/isj.12471.

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^[36] Ibid.

^[37] “History-About moda｜Ministry of Digital Affairs,” accessed February 21, 2024, https://moda.gov.tw/en/aboutus/history/410.

^[38] “Introduction to Moda-About moda｜Ministry of Digital Affairs,” accessed February 21, 2024, https://moda.gov.tw/en/aboutus/introduction/404.

^[39] “Program for the Digital Resilience Validation of Emerging Technologies for Contingency or Wartime Applications-Programs-Communications and Cyber Resilience-Digital Affairs｜Ministry of Digital Affairs,” accessed January 24, 2024, https://moda.gov.tw/en/digital-affairs/communications-cyber-resilience/programs/4187.

^[40] Ibid.

^[41] “Program for the Digital Resilience Validation of Emerging Technologies for Contingency or Wartime Applications-Programs-Communications and Cyber Resilience-Digital Affairs｜Ministry of Digital Affairs.”

^[42] “Enhancing the Resilience of Communications Network-Operations-Communications and Cyber Resilience-Digital Affairs｜Ministry of Digital Affairs,” accessed February 8, 2024, https://moda.gov.tw/en/digital-affairs/communications-cyber-resilience/operations/310.

^[43] “Catalog of Earth Satellite Orbits,” Text.Article (NASA Earth Observatory, September 4, 2009), https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/OrbitsCatalog.