U.S. TikTok Ban: National Security and Civil Liberties Concerns

TikTok’s video-sharing app has become the epicenter of a growing American debate over the boundaries of civil liberties and the imperatives of national security in the digital age. With over 150 million U.S. users, TikTok is a dominant force in online entertainment and youth culture and a flashpoint in U.S.-China technological competition.^[1] U.S. officials have raised concerns about the app’s Chinese parent company, ByteDance, arguing that it could be compelled to hand over user data or manipulate content on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party.^[2]

Since 2020, the U.S. federal government has taken increasingly aggressive steps to regulate the platform. In 2020, the Trump administration issued Executive Order 13942, which sought to ban TikTok unless the app was sold to a U.S.-based company.^[3] Federal courts ultimately blocked EO 1392 on constitutional grounds. The primary constitutional ground considered was the First Amendment. Still, the injunctions blocking EO 13942 were mainly issued because the executive order exceeded the statutory authority granted by International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which protects informational materials and personal communications from such regulation. The First Amendment issues were acknowledged, but not the central basis for the initial court rulings against EO 13942. Under the Biden administration, the pressure on TikTok continued, as demonstrated by a new wave of legislation. The most comprehensive among recent legislation is the Restricting the Emergence of Security Threats that Risk Information and Communications Technology Act (or the RESTRICT Act) and the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, both of which aim to expand executive authority to restrict or force the divestment of foreign-owned technology designated as a national security risk.^[4] The U.S. Federal government, through the FCC, already designates technology as a national security risk; however, this act would provide direction on what to do after that designation.

Meanwhile, civil liberties groups such as American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) launched legal challenges, cautioning that attempts to regulate TikTok may infringe on First and Fourth Amendment rights.^[5] As of September 2025, the United States and China have struck a deal; although the full details have not been released yet, it is reported that the agreement addresses U.S. national security concerns and also preserves the “cultural aspects of TikTok” that are important to China.^[6] Following this, President Trump signed an executive order that allows ByteDance to own less than 20% of TikTok, with U.S. investors, whose names have yet to be released, retaining 80% ownership. The Trump plan would achieve the “qualified divestiture” required under federal law.^[7]

However, a critical question is at the heart of the debate: What sets TikTok apart from other social media platforms? The U.S. government contends that its ownership by a Chinese company, which potentially opens the company up to state influence, presents distinct risks.^[8] These risks include the lack of transparency in its content recommendation algorithms and the platform’s access to extensive personal data.^[9] However, defenders, such as civil rights organizations, argue that many U.S.-based tech companies engage in similar invasive data practices, raising questions about whether TikTok is being singled out for its foreign ownership rather than for any substantively different behavior.^[10] The fact that many U.S.-owned platforms engage in the same practices fuels the larger debate over whether the government’s approach is truly about safeguarding national security or whether it risks crossing into unjustified digital censorship. Here I argue that while national security concerns about TikTok are valid, the U.S. response relies on broad legislation and expansive executive authority. Without comprehensive data privacy reform, this approach risks setting a dangerous precedent for civil liberties.^[11]

Historical Context

The targeting of TikTok is not an isolated event, but part of a broader historical pattern in which national security concerns have been used to justify encroachments on civil liberties. Recent efforts to regulate or ban Chinese technology firms mirror these earlier tensions. For example, in 2022, the FCC banned the sale and importation of Huawei and ZTE equipment in the U.S., citing risks of Chinese espionage.^[12] In 2020, President Trump issued an executive order attempting to ban WeChat due to concerns over data security related to its Chinese ownership. However, courts quickly blocked the ban, citing violations of free speech rights and noting that the platform was essential for communication within the Chinese-American community. The Chinese diaspora in the U.S. further criticized the move as culturally punitive and overly broad in scope.^[13] TikTok bears many similarities to the WeChat case: both were targeted by Trump-era executive orders invoking national security risks and both sparked legal challenges grounded in constitutional protections, particularly the First Amendment.^[14] Courts halted the WeChat ban on the grounds that it could suppress protected expression and disproportionately impact users who depend on the app for daily communication. Likewise, TikTok’s proposed ban has drawn concerns about government overreach and restrictions on speech, especially given its role as a dominant platform for political expression and cultural discourse.^[15]

Yet key differences distinguish the two cases. TikTok has a broader, mainstream U.S. user base and functions primarily as a content-sharing platform, prompting heightened scrutiny over its potential for algorithmic influence, data collection, and narrative manipulation. In contrast, WeChat is a messaging and services app, whose centrality to the diaspora’s communication needs made its ban appear especially discriminatory. Moreover, TikTok has triggered more sustained policy responses signaling a transition from ad hoc executive action to a more formalized legislative agenda.^[16] While both cases reflect the recurring tension between national security and civil liberties, TikTok has emerged as a focal point in the broader debate over digital sovereignty, surveillance, and platform governance.

The TikTok ban represents a digital-age escalation of these trends. Unlike previous concerns centered around physical infrastructure (Huawei) or messaging platforms (WeChat), TikTok’s algorithmic content amplification introduces new “propaganda”, cultural influence, and information control complexities. With approximately 170 million U.S. users, the potential scale of impact on free expression is unprecedented.^[17] Moreover, TikTok has become a symbolic battleground in the broader U.S.-China rivalry, reflecting both espionage fears and more profound anxieties about narrative dominance and global digital sovereignty. Public and institutional reactions to the TikTok debate echo post-9/11 patterns, particularly the tension highlighted by the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, which was enacted to curb mass government surveillance after Edward Snowden’s revelations about the United States using spy tools on its citizens, and updated its predecessor, FISA. These developments are rooted in earlier legislative responses to terrorism and intelligence threats, notably the PATRIOT Act. After the September 11 attacks, the PATRIOT Act dramatically expanded FISA’s powers, primarily through Section 215, which allowed the collection of “any tangible things” deemed relevant to a terrorism investigation, including library records, emails, and business documents, often without probable cause.^[18] The expansion triggered a wave of constitutional concerns about violating the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The tension lies in the dual imperatives of security and privacy: the state’s interest in preempting threats versus the individual’s right to freedom from government intrusion.^[19] Critics argue that the low evidentiary bar for surveillance requests and the FISC’s (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, established under FISA) lack of adversarial process enabled unchecked executive power and systemic overreach. Proponents, however, claim that such flexibility is essential for responding to non-traditional and rapidly evolving national security threats.^[20] These long-term precedents shape skepticism toward platforms like TikTok, where national security is again cited as justification for regulation without clearly defined limits.

Much like that era, public opinion remains divided. At the same time, Snowden’s disclosures initially saw widespread public apathy toward mass surveillance; today’s younger generations and civil liberties organizations, informed by past surveillance excesses, have become increasingly vocal in opposing the TikTok ban. Meanwhile, older demographics and non-users tend to support restrictive measures.^[21] Legislative patterns reveal stronger bipartisan enthusiasm for ad-hoc security measures such as platform bans rather than comprehensive privacy reforms similar to the Freedom Act, which could more systematically address underlying vulnerabilities. Still, it also reflects three critical shifts: the digitalization of perceived threats (from physical to algorithmic influence), the globalization of the internet (raising fears of a fragmented, nationalized web), and the youth-led mobilization around digital rights, marking a distinct contrast with earlier eras of public passivity.^[22]

National Security

The central framing of the U.S. government argument about TikTok is that TikTok presents a national security risk. United States’ officials are worried about the growing number of Americans using TikTok and the potential for misinformation and data security issues.^[23] Previous Chinese cyber operations, including infiltrations into the American utility grid and telecommunications networks, back these fears.^[24] Attacks such as the Salt Typhoon campaign have reportedly enabled Chinese intelligence to compromise critical infrastructure and access sensitive communications, escalating concerns about U.S. national security vulnerabilities.^[25]

The Biden administration and cybersecurity officials sounded the alarm over Volt Typhoon, a recent cyber operation attributed to a Chinese state-sponsored group. Discovered in 2023, Volt Typhoon specifically targeted U.S. critical infrastructure sectors by embedding malware designed to remain undetected for extended periods.^[26] According to Microsoft and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the operation appeared aimed at pre-positioning access that could be activated in a major geopolitical conflict, such as over Taiwan, allowing China to cause widespread disruption.^[27]

These attacks have intensified bipartisan concern in Congress that platforms like TikTok, which collect vast data on American citizens and influence digital information flows, could be similarly exploited, whether through surveillance, censorship, or psychological operations in times of crisis.^[28] However, these concerns are purely speculative, based on current Chinese laws such as the National Intelligence Law, which compels organizations to cooperate with state intelligence efforts, and the Cybersecurity and Data Security Laws, which grant the government broad authority over data access and control.^[29] Cyber warfare has become a key front in the wider U.S.–China rivalry, with both countries viewing dominance in cyberspace as vital to their national security and geopolitical influence. While the U.S. has accused Chinese state-backed actors of massive data breaches, such as the 2015 Office of Personnel Management hack, China has similarly criticized U.S. surveillance programs like PRISM (which allowed the NSA to cloud data and servers of many big tech names such as Google and Facebook).^[30] The mutual distrust reflects how digital platforms are increasingly entangled in strategic competition, further heightening concerns over TikTok’s potential misuse.^[31]

Recent legislation and executive actions reflect these concerns. In 2020, Executive Order 13942 gave the Secretary of Commerce broad authority to address national security threats from TikTok’s operations in the United States.^[32] Specifically, the order empowered the Secretary to “identify transactions” involving TikTok or its parent company, ByteDance, that pose an undue risk to national security, and to “prohibit, or impose conditions on” such transactions.^[33] The EO included the ability to adopt implementing rules and regulations to carry out the order’s provisions, such as developing compliance requirements for U.S. companies interacting with TikTok, and establishing penalties for violations.^[34] Furthermore, in 2022, as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2023, the No TikTok on Government Devices Act was signed into law, prohibiting the use and download of TikTok on federal devices with exceptions for law enforcement, national security, and security research purposes if authorized.^[35]

Another essential piece of legislation, H.R. 7521, the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, was passed and signed into law. The primary purpose of this bill is to protect U.S. national security from threats posed by foreign adversary-controlled applications, such as TikTok and any successor apps developed by ByteDance Ltd.^[36] The bill introduces mechanisms, including a ban on distributing, maintaining, or updating such applications within the United States, while allowing exemptions for qualified divestitures and necessary compliance services. This bill has brought forward questions on if this is fair due to the “targeting” of one app; however, in June of 2025 the House of Representatives banned the use of WhatsApp on House of Representatives devices stating that the “Office of Cybersecurity has deemed WhatsApp a high risk to users due to the lack of transparency in how it protects user data, absence of stored data encryption, and potential security risks involved with its use.” This move could signal a shift in a broader implementation of security protocols, expanding beyond foreign-controlled applications, considering WhatsApp is owned by Meta.

Along with these bills, which reinforce the government’s position on TikTok, many government officials have voiced their concerns. In 2023, then FBI Director Christopher Wray testified before the House Committee on Homeland Security that TikTok posed significant national security concerns. He highlighted the risk that the Chinese government could compel ByteDance, TikTok’s parent company, to provide access to Americans’ data and potentially use the platform to influence or control what users see, hear, and believe.^[37] In the same hearing, Representative Cathy McMorris Rodgers (WA-R), Chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, repeatedly stated that TikTok collects extensive data on Americans, including location, keystrokes, contacts, and biometric information. She warned that “the Chinese Communist Party can use this as a tool to manipulate America as a whole,” and emphasized that “we do not trust TikTok will ever embrace American values.”^[38]

In addition, whistleblower accounts suggested that “everything is seen in China,” and that TikTok employees have reported directly to Beijing. This is mainly due to ByteDance being a Chinese company, thereby obligated to comply with CCP legislation that governs data collection.^[39] On March 17, 2023, the Department of Justice opened an investigation into ByteDance for surveilling American journalists through TikTok, including tracking their digital activity and physical movements.^[40] According to a Congressional Research Service report, ByteDance, TikTok’s parent company, has admitted that employees improperly accessed the user data of journalists in an attempt to identify sources behind leaks within the company.^[41]

Table 1, below, outlines a timeline of the U.S. federal legislation related to TikTok I have discussed here beginning with EO 13942 in August of 2020.

Table 1: Timeline of Legislation Regarding TikTok

Civil Liberties

In contrast with the U.S. government’s focus on national security, civil liberties organizations and advocates have raised concerns about potential violations of the First and Fourth Amendments, equal protection, and due process rights. The ACLU called on the Supreme Court to step in on the regulations on TikTok, claiming that the TikTok ban directly threatens the First Amendment and is a form of mass censorship restricting the freedom of expression.^[42] In a press release, the ACLU, EFF, and Knight First Amendment Institute emphasized that the government must meet an “extraordinarily high bar” to justify such a restriction: it must show the ban is the only way to prevent serious, imminent harm and that it limits no more speech than necessary.^[43] Beyond First Amendment concerns, civil liberties groups argue that recent legislation raises significant Fourth Amendment issues.^[44] The Fourth Amendment protects Americans’ privacy by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, including unwarranted access to personal data.

While the government has justified a ban on TikTok as a measure to prevent potential access to user data by the Chinese government, privacy advocates and legal analysts argue that TikTok’s data practices are not unique.^[45] Instead, they argue they reflect a broader systemic problem: the absence of comprehensive federal privacy protections. This regulatory gap is exacerbated in a post-9/11 legal framework, particularly the USA PATRIOT Act, which significantly expanded government surveillance authority with minimal oversight.^[46] The Act normalized broad data collection practices under the justification of national security, creating a precedent where platforms like TikTok can be targeted in the absence of concrete privacy standards. Without a unified federal data privacy law, national security becomes a catch-all justification for restricting digital platforms, raising civil liberties concerns, and allowing executive discretion to fill the void left by legislative inaction.^[47] The legal gap leaves Americans’ data vulnerable across many digital platforms. This intensifies the arguments that targeting TikTok alone does little to address these deeper issues and urges Congress to focus instead on enacting nationwide privacy legislation to safeguard digital rights better.^[48] The Knight Institute added that restricting Americans’ access to foreign media mirrors tactics used by repressive regimes and imposes an unjustified restraint on First Amendment rights.^[49] As ACLU policy counsel Jenna Leventoff noted, “Just because the bill sponsors claim that banning TikTok isn’t about suppressing speech, there’s no denying that it would do just that. We strongly urge legislators to vote no on this unconstitutional bill.”^[50]

Current Legal and Court Activity

Due to the many civil rights concerns regarding TikTok’s potential ban, H.R. 7521 has been challenged in the courts. On September 16, 2024, the case was brought to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, where the law was upheld. The court recognized that it triggered First Amendment scrutiny but found the government’s national security justification and the law’s tailoring sufficient. In January 2025, the Supreme Court heard arguments in TikTok v. Garland, in which TikTok appealed to the DC Circuit Court’s decision.

In a joint amicus brief, which is a formal report that an organization not involved directly in the case but has strong interests in the outcome, for the case, the ACLU, EFF, and the Knight First Amendment Institute raised several concerns about the ban. First, they argued that the Act constitutes a form of prior restraint, a type of censorship in which the government prevents speech or publication before it occurs.^[51] To support their argument, they cited two major Supreme Court cases: New York Times Co. v. United States (a comparable case in which national security was invoked as a justification), which emphasized the high burden the government must meet to justify prior restraint, and Ashcroft v. ACLU, where the Court held that the government must consider less restrictive alternatives before imposing any restrictions on speech. The brief further argues that the Act imposes a content and viewpoint-based limitation, making it subject to the highest level of judicial review: strict scrutiny. Under this standard, the government must prove that the restriction serves a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. According to the brief, the D.C. Circuit failed to apply this standard properly.^[52] The authors of the amicus brief emphasize that even when national security is invoked, the government’s burden under the First Amendment remains; claims of national security cannot be used to bypass another foundational principle of judicial oversight: constitutional scrutiny.^[53]

The petitioners, TikTok and ByteDance, argued two main points in their case brief. First, they contended that the Act is subject to heightened scrutiny.^[54] They stated that concerns over covert influence and data security do not justify the Act’s scope, which unfairly targets TikTok and discriminates based on content. Second, they argued that the Act constitutes a viewpoint-based restriction by specifically targeting viewpoints perceived as aligned with the Chinese government, further violating fundamental First Amendment protections.^[55]

In contrast, the U.S. government defended the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act as a content-neutral, narrowly tailored response to a legitimate national security threat. Officials argued that TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, is subject to Chinese laws, such as the National Intelligence Law and Cybersecurity Law, which could compel it to share data with the Chinese government.^[56] These laws, combined with TikTok’s vast American user base and ByteDance’s control over its algorithm and source code, raise concerns about the potential for foreign surveillance, blackmail, and influence operations.^[57] Congress, citing years of failed negotiations and executive orders, concluded that only a complete divestiture of TikTok’s U.S. operations would mitigate the risks and passed H.R. 7521 accordingly. While the government acknowledges the Act burdens expressive activities, it maintains the restriction is justified by the compelling interest of preventing foreign adversary access to sensitive data and is not a content- or viewpoint-based restriction.^[58] The Supreme Court ultimately upheld this reasoning, applying intermediate scrutiny and deferring to congressional judgment on national security matters, even without definitive evidence of imminent harm.^[59]

The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the TikTok ban, finding that the law did not violate the First Amendment. The Court applied intermediate scrutiny, reasoning that the law was content-neutral and targeted TikTok because of foreign ownership and national security concerns, not because of the content of speech on the platform.^[60] The Court acknowledged the law’s significant impact on speech, recognizing TikTok’s role as a central communications platform, but ultimately concluded that TikTok’s unique scale and susceptibility to foreign control justified treating it differently.^[61] Acknowledging the broad discretion of Congress in national security matters, the Court ruled that even speculative threats justified action, with divestiture deemed a reasonable remedy. In light of this opinion, legal experts have expressed concern that the ban sets a precedent for government overreach in restricting access to major communications platforms, especially in the absence of concrete evidence of imminent harm.^[62]

Table 2 outlines these legal challenges and court activity related to TikTok discussed in this section.

Table 2: Legal Actions about TikTok

Tension in Practice

The passage and upholding of the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act have intensified tensions between the branches of government, security and civil liberties, and policymakers and public opinion, highlighting the balancing act between national security and constitutional rights. Despite the Supreme Court’s decision and President Trump’s role in the TikTok ban initially, enforcement of the ban has been delayed by executive orders from President Trump, who argues for the need for more time to negotiate a deal and avoid immediate disruption.^[63] The President’s use of executive authority to pause or potentially override a congressional mandate has sparked debate about the separation of powers and the proper limits of executive discretion.^[64] The rapid passage of this ban and the process of executive interventions illustrate the push and pull between national security imperatives and constitutional rights.^[65]

An interesting factor in the case of TikTok is what role (or lack thereof) public opinion plays in these debates. In a democracy, public opinion plays a fundamental role; however, while it has played a part in this case, it hasn’t always had a decisive role. According to the Pew Research Center, research support for banning TikTok has dropped sharply in the past two years. In March 2023, approximately 50% of Americans supported a ban; but by March 2025, that figure had decreased to 34%, with 32% opposed and 33% undecided. The share of Americans viewing TikTok as a national security threat also declined from 59% to 49% over the same period.^[66] Those supporting the ban cite data security and Chinese ownership as their main concerns, while opponents are primarily motivated by free speech considerations. Notably, TikTok users overwhelmingly oppose a ban, while non-users are more likely to support it.^[67] While public opinion has shifted toward skepticism of a ban, bipartisan majorities in Congress passed the legislation, suggesting that national security arguments carried more weight among policymakers than public hesitancy about the encroachment of civil liberties.^[68]

Critics, including legal experts and civil liberties advocates, say that the TikTok ban represents government overreach, targeting a single platform based on speculative threats and setting a precedent for restricting speech on national security grounds without clear evidence.^[69] The law’s structure, allowing for divestment rather than an outright ban, was intended as a compromise, aiming to address security concerns without immediately cutting off access to the platform. Executive orders from both the Biden and Trump administrations, which delayed enforcement, reflect efforts to pursue a negotiated or politically palatable solution rather than immediate, unilateral action. The delay highlights how national security rationales can be leveraged for political pressure, particularly in negotiations with ByteDance, while avoiding the legal and public ramifications of an outright ban. In this context, the argument of national security appears, at least in part, to serve strategic or diplomatic ends, rather than signaling an imminent threat requiring urgent intervention.^[70] The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision upheld the law, citing deference to Congress’s judgment on national security, while also recognizing TikTok’s role in facilitating free expression. Significantly, the Court limited its ruling to the specific facts and legislative record of the case, stopping short of affirming a broad government authority to ban communications platforms outright.^[71]

Implications

Evaluating the strength of the national security justification against its impact on civil liberties reveals that the TikTok case reflects a longstanding, rather than newly intensified, tension between these priorities. U.S. officials present substantial national security arguments, citing historical cybersecurity threats and documented instances of Chinese espionage.^[72] Concerns over TikTok’s data practices, potential algorithmic manipulation, and vulnerabilities to foreign influence lend credible weight to the government’s justification.^[73] However, critics argue that similar risks exist across many platforms, yet few have faced equally sweeping regulation.^[74] Much of the perceived threat remains speculative, rooted in potential rather than proven harm.^[75]

On the other hand, the civil liberties concerns are equally significant. The TikTok ban raises serious First Amendment issues, particularly regarding prior restraint and content-based regulation.^[76] Critics warn that such broad measures could set troubling precedents for restricting speech without transparent evidence of imminent danger.^[77] Fourth Amendment concerns also emerge, given the law’s selective focus on TikTok without addressing the broader need for comprehensive digital privacy protections.^[78] Civil liberties advocates argue for systemic reform over ad hoc bans and caution that targeted actions like this risk undermining public trust and normalizing speech restrictions in the name of national security.^[79] Advocates for civil liberties further stress the risk that such targeted actions may erode public trust and establish dangerous precedents for limiting speech under the pretext of national security.^[80]

The digital era has shifted national security concerns from focusing on physical espionage to algorithmic influence and information control. TikTok’s case illustrates growing anxieties over digital sovereignty and geopolitical narrative dominance. Despite declining public support for a ban, Congress has consistently favored intense national security action over comprehensive data privacy reform. The courts and Congress continue to show broad deference to executive and legislative claims of national security, even in the absence of explicit, imminent threats to national security. This case, while unique in scale, fits a familiar pattern in which civil liberties are constrained in the face of evolving conceptions of national security, especially in the digital age. Despite recognizing its significant speech impacts, the Supreme Court’s ruling upholding the ban reflects a historical continuity rather than an unprecedented escalation.^[81] This ruling aligns with longstanding judicial deference to national security rationales, suggesting that the tension between national security and civil liberties persists within existing paradigms rather than expanding them. Although the ruling has raised concerns about potential government overreach, its narrowly tailored reasoning, focused explicitly on foreign ownership and the option for divestment, limits its scope and mitigates the threat of establishing expansive new precedents.^[82] Nonetheless, this judicial decision reinforces a precedent that grants considerable leniency to governmental claims of national security, potentially influencing future court decisions on similar matters.

The overall question is: To what extent do national security concerns justify the U.S. government’s ban on TikTok, and do those concerns outweigh the civil liberties that may be compromised in the process? The evidence suggests that the ban is justified only to a limited extent. While national security officials have identified legitimate concerns, particularly given China’s record of cyber operations targeting U.S. infrastructure and the CCP’s legal authority to compel access to company data, the government’s case against TikTok remains primarily preventative rather than based on demonstrated, imminent harm. As such, the scale of the restriction is disproportionate to the current evidentiary threshold, raising questions about the appropriateness and constitutionality of targeting a single platform so aggressively.

The TikTok debate reveals the increasingly blurred line between national security and civil liberties in the digital age. It shows that democracy is being tested not just by external threats, but by how governments choose to respond to them. The rapid passage of restrictive legislation, reliance on vague national security language, and judicial deference to congressional and executive authority all indicate a governance model that prioritizes perceived threats over rights. At the same time, the growing divide between policymakers and the public, particularly younger users who overwhelmingly oppose the ban, demonstrates a disconnect between national security rhetoric and democratic responsiveness. The case also illustrates how technology governance is no longer just a matter of economic regulation or innovation policy; it is fundamentally about who controls information, whose values shape digital platforms, and how constitutional rights are preserved when private tech infrastructure intersects with geopolitics.

Ultimately, the TikTok controversy should be viewed as part of a broader, ongoing regulatory trend rather than an isolated case. Thus, rather than marking a new frontier in the balance between security and liberty, the TikTok debate underscores a persistent tension, shaped and reinforced by historical precedent and contemporary geopolitical anxieties, particularly the intensified U.S.-China rivalry. Future policy considerations should emphasize the development of targeted, comprehensive data privacy legislation that effectively balances security imperatives with the protection of civil liberties. By addressing the underlying structural issues rather than focusing on individual platforms, policymakers can better protect national security without disproportionately compromising essential democratic freedoms.

With the recent development of a deal, questions arise about the compromises made and precisely what the agreement entails, all of which will come to light in the coming months. As of now, we know that a deal is in the process of being finalized, which would put 80% of the parent company of TikTok into the hands of U.S. investors; however, it leaves 20% still in ByteDance’s hands. Looking ahead, future policy must move beyond reactive bans and address the structural vulnerabilities that give rise to these concerns. This means enacting comprehensive federal data privacy legislation that limits the capacity of all platforms, foreign or domestic, to exploit user data without transparency or accountability. It also means designing targeted, evidence-based regulatory frameworks that uphold civil liberties while ensuring security and safety. U.S. governance should prioritize rules-based approaches grounded in constitutional norms rather than relying on sweeping executive action or ad hoc congressional bans. Digital rights legislation, stronger oversight of algorithmic systems, and international cooperation on tech governance will all be essential to maintaining democratic resilience. Ultimately, safeguarding both national security and civil liberties will require policies that do not treat these goals as mutually exclusive but as fundamentally interdependent in the 21st century.

Sources

^[1] Statista. “Countries with the Largest TikTok Audience as of February 2025.” Statista, February 13, 2025. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1299807/number-of-monthly-unique-tiktok-users/.

^[2] David E. Sanger, “This Was the Government’s Case for Banning TikTok on National Security Grounds,” The New York Times, January 17, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/17/us/politics/why-government-ban-tiktok.html.

^[3] Caitlin Yilek, “Trump to Delay Enforcement of TikTok Ban with Another Executive Order,” CBS News, April 4, 2025. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-tiktok-ban-delay-executive-order/.

^[4] Congress.gov, “H.R.7521 – 118th Congress (2023–2024): Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act,” 2023. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/7521.

^[5] American Civil Liberties Union, “ACLU Slams House for Latest Plan to Ban TikTok and Stifle Free Speech,” March 5, 2024. https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-slams-house-for-latest-plan-to-ban-tiktok-and-stifle-free-speech; Knight First Amendment Institute, “Knight Institute, ACLU, EFF Urge Supreme Court to Block TikTok Ban,” December 17, 2024. https://knightcolumbia.org/content/TikTok-ban-supreme-court-knight-insitute-aclu-eff.

^[6] David Lawder and Pietro Lombardi, “US, China Reach Framework Deal on TikTok; Trump and Xi to Speak on Friday,” Reuters, September 15, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-china-reach-framework-deal-tiktok-trump-xi-speak-friday-2025-09-15/.

^[7] Jonathan Vanian, “Trump Approves TikTok Deal through Executive Order, Vance Says Business Valued at $14 Billion,” CNBC, September 25, 2025, https://www.cnbc.com/2025/09/25/trump-approves-tiktok-deal-through-executive-order.html.

^[8] Sanger, “Case for Banning TikTok.”

^[9] Kristen Busch, “TikTok: Recent Data Privacy and National Security Concerns,” Congress.gov, March 29, 2023. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12131.

^[10] Nate Lavoy, “TikTok Is a Threat to National Security, but Not for the Reason You Think,” RAND Corporation, August 14, 2024. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/08/tiktok-is-a-threat-to-national-security-but-not-for.html.

^[11] Gorski and Toomey, “Banning TikTok Is Unconstitutional”; Knight First Amendment Institute, “Urge Supreme Court to Block TikTok Ban.”

^[12] BBC, “US Bans Sale of Huawei, ZTE Tech amid Security Fears,” BBC News, November 26, 2022, sec. US & Canada, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-63764450.

^[13] U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2020).

^[14] Ibid.

^[15] McBrien, “TikTok v. Garland,”

^[16] Sanger, “This Was the Government’s Case for Banning TikTok on National Security Grounds,”

^[17] “Countries with the Largest TikTok Audience as of February 2025,” Statista, February 13, 2025, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1299807/number-of-monthly-unique-tiktok-users/.

^[18] Ibid.

^[19] “FACT SHEET: Implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, https://www.intelligence.gov/ic-on-the-record-database/results/787-fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-usa-freedom-act-of-2015.

^[20] “Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0920_plcy_strategic-framework-countering-terrorism-targeted-violence.pdf.

^[21] Tyler Owens, “Gauging the Foreign and Domestic Impacts of Snowden’s Revelations – the SAIS Review of International Affairs,” The Sais Review of International Affairs, November 21, 2013, https://saisreview.sais.jhu.edu/gauging-the-foreign-and-domestic-impacts-of-snowdens-revelations/.

^[22] Gorski and Toomey, “Banning TikTok Is Unconstitutional”; Lavoy, “TikTok Is a Threat to National Security”; Ioana Literat and Neta Kligler-Vilenchik, “TikTok as a Key Platform for Youth Political Expression: Reflecting on the Opportunities and Stakes Involved,” Social Media + Society 9, no. 1 (January 2023), https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051231157595.

^[23] Kristen Busch, “TikTok: Recent Data Privacy and National Security Concerns,” Congress.gov, March 29, 2023. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12131

^[24] Sanger, “Case for Banning TikTok”; Microsoft Threat Intelligence, “Volt Typhoon Targets US Critical Infrastructure.”

^[25] Sanger, “Case for Banning TikTok.”

^[26] David E Sanger, “This Was the Government’s Case for Banning TikTok on National Security Grounds,” The New York Times, January 17, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/17/us/politics/why-government-ban-tiktok.html; David Vergun, “Leaders Say TikTok Is Potential Cybersecurity Risk to U.S.,” U.S. Department of Defense, April 6, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3354874/leaders-say-tiktok-is-potential-cybersecurity-risk-to-us/.

^[27] Microsoft Threat Intelligence, “Volt Typhoon Targets US Critical Infrastructure with Living-Off-The-Land Techniques | Microsoft Security Blog,  May 24, 2023, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/.

^[28] Sanger, “This Was the Government’s Case.”

^[29] China Law Translate, National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China (2017), https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/national-intelligence-law-of-the-p-r-c-2017/; Stanford DigiChina Project, Translation: Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China (Effective June 1, 2017), https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/translation-cybersecurity-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-effective-june-1-2017/; China Law Translate, Data Security Law of the People’s Republic of China, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/datasecuritylaw/.

^[30] David Lyon, “Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, Consequences, Critique,” Big Data & Society 1, no. 2 (July 9, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951714541861.

^[31] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 2022, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf; Adam Segal, The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and Manipulate in the Digital Age (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016).

^[32] Yilek, Caitlin. “Trump to Delay Enforcement of TikTok Ban with Another Executive Order.” CBS News, April 4, 2025. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-tiktok-ban-delay-executive-order/.

^[33] Yilek, “Trump to Delay Enforcement of TikTok Ban.”

^[34] Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13942: Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok, and Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, August 6, 2020, Federal Register 85, no. 155 (August 11, 2020): 48637–48640, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/11/2020-17699/addressing-the-threat-posed-by-tiktok-and-taking-additional-steps-to-address-the-national-emergency.

^[35] No TikTok on Government Devices Act, S. 1143, 117th Cong. (2021–2022),

^[36]H.R.7521 – 118th Congress (2023-2024): Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act,”

^[37] TikTok: How Congress Can Safeguard American Data Privacy and Protect Children from Online Harms, Hearing Before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, 118th Cong., 1st sess. (2023).

^[38] Ibid

^[39] National Intelligence Law, Cybersecurity Law, and Data Security Law of the People’s Republic of China.

^[40] Kristen Busch, “TikTok: Recent Data Privacy and National Security Concerns,” Congress.gov, March 29, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12131.

^[41] Ibid

^[42] Ashley Gorski and Patrick Toomey, “Banning TikTok Is Unconstitutional. The Supreme Court Must Step In. | ACLU,” American Civil Liberties Union, January 15, 2025, https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/banning-tiktok-is-unconstitutional-the-supreme-court-must-step-in.

^[43] Knight, “Knight Institute, ACLU, EFF Urge Supreme Court to Block TikTok Ban,” Knight First Amendment Institute, December 17, 2024, https://knightcolumbia.org/content/TikTok-ban-supreme-court-knight-insitute-aclu-eff.

^[44] Ibid.

^[45]  Tom McBrien, “In TikTok v. Garland, Supreme Court Sends Good Vibes for Privacy Laws, but Congress’s Targeting of TikTok Alone Won’t Do Much to Protect Privacy,” EPIC – Electronic Privacy Information Center, January 17, 2025, https://epic.org/the-tiktok-v-garland-decision-wont-end-free-speech-but-the-divest-or-ban-law-wont-do-much-to-protect-privacy/.

^[46] Doyle, The USA PATRIOT Act: A Sketch.

^[47] Busch, “TikTok: Recent Data Privacy and National Security Concerns.”

^[48] Ibid

^[49] Knight, “Knight Institute, ACLU, EFF Urge Supreme Court to Block TikTok Ban.”

^[50] ACLU, “ACLU Slams House for Latest Plan to Ban TikTok and Stifle Free Speech,” American Civil Liberties Union, March 5, 2024, https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-slams-house-for-latest-plan-to-ban-tiktok-and-stifle-free-speech.

^[51] ACLU et al., Brief for Amici Curiae, TikTok Inc. v. Garland

^[52] ACLU et al., Brief for Amici Curiae, TikTok Inc. v. Garland

^[53] Knight First Amendment Institute, “Urge Supreme Court to Block TikTok Ban.”

^[54] Ibid

^[55] Ibid

^[56] National Intelligence Law; Cybersecurity Law.

^[57] Busch, “TikTok: Data Privacy and National Security Concerns”; Sanger, “Government’s Case for Banning TikTok.”

^[58] Sherman, “Free Speech and National Security.”

^[59] US Supreme Court Upholds TikTok Ban, Al Jazeera.

^[60] Antonia Tzinova et al., “U.S. Supreme Court Upholds TikTok Sale-Or-Ban Law | Insights | Holland & Knight,” Holland & Knight, January 17, 2025, https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2025/01/us-supreme-court-upholds-tiktok-sale-or-ban-law.

^[61] TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 604 U.S. ___ (2025)

^[62] Gorski and Toomey, “Banning TikTok Is Unconstitutional.

^[63] Yilek, “Trump to Delay Enforcement of TikTok Ban.”

^[64] Caitlin Yilek, “Trump to Delay Enforcement of TikTok Ban with Another Executive Order,” Cbsnews.com (CBS News, April 4, 2025), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-tiktok-ban-delay-executive-order/.

^[65] Mark Sherman, “Free Speech and National Security Collide as TikTok’s Case Arrives at Supreme Court,” PBS News, January 9, 2025, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/free-speech-and-national-security-collide-as-tiktoks-case-arrives-at-supreme-court.

^[66] Colleen McClain, “Fewer Americans Now Support TikTok Ban, See the Platform as a National Security Threat than in Spring 2023,” Pew Research Center, March 25, 2025, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/03/25/fewer-americans-now-support-tiktok-ban-see-the-platform-as-a-national-security-threat-than-in-spring-2023/.

^[67] McClain, “Fewer Americans Now Support TikTok Ban.”

^[68] Tzinova et al., “U.S. Supreme Court Upholds TikTok Sale-Or-Ban Law.

^[69] Alexis Takashima, “Supreme Court to Decide on TikTok Ban amid January Deadline,” Syr.edu, January 10, 2025, https://lawreview.syr.edu/supreme-court-to-decide-on-tiktok-ban-amid-january-deadline/.

^[70] Yilek, “Trump to Delay Enforcement”; Sanger, “Government’s Case for Banning TikTok.”

^[71] Al Jazeera, “US Supreme Court Upholds Law Banning TikTok,” Al Jazeera, January 17, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2025/1/17/us-supreme-court-upholds-law-banning-tiktok.

^[72] Sanger, “This Was the Government’s Case”; Vergun, “Leaders Say TikTok.”

^[73] Busch, “TikTok: Recent Data Privacy and National Security Concerns.”

^[74] McBrien, “In TikTok v. Garland.”

^[75] Lavoy, “TikTok Is a Threat to National Security.”

^[76] Gorski and Toomey, “Banning TikTok Is Unconstitutional.”

^[77] Knight, “Knight Institute, ACLU, EFF Urge Supreme Court.”

^[78] McBrien, “In TikTok v. Garland.”

^[79] Lavoy, “TikTok Is a Threat to National Security.”

^[80] ACLU, “ACLU Slams House.”

^[81] Al Jazeera, “US Supreme Court Upholds Law Banning TikTok.”

^[82] Tzinova et al., “U.S. Supreme Court Upholds TikTok Sale-Or-Ban Law.”