Since its independence in 1971, Bangladesh has steadily advanced technologically, achieving 99.4% electrification, connecting 44.5% of its population to the internet, expanding subsea cable infrastructure, and pursuing a vision of a fully “Smart” Bangladesh by 2041 (CIA, 2025; Macrotrends, n.d.; Freedom House, 2024; Submarine Networks, n.d.; Telegeography. n.d.; Pal & Sarker, 2023). Yet, under the long authoritarian rule of the Awami League and former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, this progress has been accompanied by a deeply institutionalized digital repression system, using censorship, widespread surveillance, and repressive laws to suppress dissent and consolidate authoritarian control. This repression extends beyond national borders, targeting diaspora voices and opposition abroad, creating a hybrid model of domestic and transnational digital control aimed at silencing dissent wherever it arises and suppressing rebellious voices into submission.
Political Context
Bangladesh, like many of its formerly colonized South Asian neighbors, functions as a parliamentary democratic republic with executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The prime minister, appointed by the president—who is elected by the national parliament—leads the executive (Tinker & Husain, 2025). While constitutionally a democracy, Bangladesh endured authoritarian military rule from 1975 to 1990 (Tinker & Husain, 2025). After the return to parliamentary governance, major administrative reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s aimed to decentralize power and prevent future autocracy, granting greater authority to local units (upazilas and thanas) within its 60 districts, housed in a set of larger eight divisions (Tinker & Husain, 2025). The judiciary, established by the 1972 Constitution and centered on an independent Supreme Court divided into Appellate and High Court Divisions, is tasked with ensuring checks and balances. However, its autonomy was severely undermined during military rule, weakening its role in upholding constitutional integrity (Tinker & Husain, 2025).
While Bangladesh made significant strides in reestablishing its democratic framework following the end of military and authoritarian rule in the 1990s, the decades since have seen a gradual but stark return to authoritarianism, largely shaped by entrenched political dynasties (Allchin, 2018). The two dominant figures of this era have been Khaleda Zia—widow of former military ruler Ziaur Rahman and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)—and Sheikh Hasina, daughter of Bangladesh’s founding father and first prime minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and long-time leader of the ruling Awami League (AL) (Allchin, 2018). These two political matriarchs alternated in power from 1991 until 2024, with Hasina serving as prime minister from 1996 to 2001, and then again from 2009 until her ouster in mid 2024 (Allchin, 2018).
While originally hailed as a champion of democracy, Sheikh Hasina’s extended second tenure as Prime Minister increasingly revealed a pattern of centralized authority and authoritarian governance (Mahmud, 2024). One of the defining strategies of her rule involved deepening historical divisions rooted in the unresolved conflict between pro-liberation and anti-liberation forces from Bangladesh’s 1971 war for independence from Pakistan (Das, 2025). Early on in her second tenure, in 2009, Hasina established war crimes tribunals aimed at prosecuting individuals involved in atrocities committed during the conflict—an effort that, while framed as a pursuit of justice, disproportionately targeted leaders of opposition parties including the BNP and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (Das, 2025). These actions significantly weakened her political rivals and contributed to a narrative in which opposition to the Awami League was equated with opposition to the Liberation War and, by extension, the national identity itself (Das, 2025).
This framing allowed Hasina to cultivate a powerful cult of personality and position both herself and the AL as the guardians of the nation’s founding ideals (Das, 2025). Dissent was increasingly labeled as unpatriotic or even traitorous, thereby justifying growing repression against critics (Das, 2025). In a further consolidation of power, Hasina’s government abolished the neutral caretaker government system—which was responsible for ensuring free and fair elections—in 2011 through the Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment, effectively granting the ruling party control over the electoral process. This controversial decision undermined public trust in electoral integrity and laid the groundwork for disputed elections in 2014, 2018, and 2024—all of which were marred by allegations of vote rigging and suppression of the opposition (Das, 2025).
Additionally, Hasina reinforced her hold on power by imprisoning Khaleda Zia in 2018 on corruption charges, a move widely perceived as politically motivated (Mahmud, 2024). The government also passed the 16th Amendment to the Constitution, which granted Parliament the authority to remove Supreme Court judges (Das, 2025). Although this amendment was ultimately rejected by the government following widespread backlash, it further demonstrated the regime’s willingness to erode institutional checks and balances in pursuit of political dominance (Das, 2025). Together, these actions marked Bangladesh’s steady descent from a fragile democracy into an increasingly authoritarian state under Hasina’s rule.
In the summer of 2024, a wave of student led protests erupted across Bangladesh in response to the reintroduction of the Freedom Fighter Quotas, which mandated that 30% of civil service positions be reserved for veterans and relatives of the Mukti Bahini–the Bangladesh Liberation War freedom fighters (Lu, 2024). Students from both public and private universities mobilized in a nationwide reform movement demanding the complete abolition of these quotas, which were widely viewed as outdated and inequitable (Lu, 2024). The movement quickly gained momentum, sparking mass demonstrations and civil unrest. In response, the government launched a harsh crackdown involving widespread arrests and attempts to suppress the protests through intimidation and force (Freedom House, 2024).
These events culminated in a dramatic political upheaval, leading to the ousting of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who subsequently fled to India and entered exile (Alam, 2024). In her absence, a transitional government was established under the leadership of interim Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus (Alam, 2024). The new administration has pledged to hold democratic elections by late 2025 or early 2026 and has taken initial steps to dismantle the authoritarian structures entrenched under Hasina’s rule (Al Jazeera, 2024). Among its more drastic actions, the interim government has effectively banned the Awami League and restricted the dissemination of its content (The Economic Times, 2025). Yet even as the interim government dismantles the visible remnants of Hasina’s authoritarian regime, the deeply embedded systems of digital repression she cultivated continue to cast a long shadow over Bangladesh’s democratic prospects.
Domestic Digital Repression in Bangladesh
In 2024, Freedom House downgraded Bangladesh’s status to “partly free” in both global and internet freedom rankings, reflecting a steady erosion of civil liberties under the long standing rule of the Awami League and former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina (Freedom House, 2024). This decline corresponds with the rise of a deeply entrenched digital repression regime—a system of governance in which information and communication technologies are used to surveil, suppress, and manipulate dissent (Freedom House, 2024).
Internet Disruptions and Censorship Tactics
Throughout Hasina’s tenure, authorities routinely weaponized internet access as a tool of control, particularly during periods of political unrest. In 2021, Bangladesh ranked among the top five countries globally for internet shutdowns, recording six separate incidents (Abdullah, 2024). These disruptions were often timed with opposition led demonstrations, and social media blackouts became increasingly common. For instance, in July 2024, platforms including Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, and Signal were restricted amid student protests against the freedom fighter quota (Freedom House, 2024).
Content control extended beyond temporary shutdowns. Critical news websites were frequently blocked or had their domains revoked, and takedowns of digital content occurred without transparency or any viable appeals process. In addition, the government cultivated a digital echo chamber through pro-state commentators and coordinated online trolling campaigns aimed at drowning out dissenting voices and shaping public discourse in its favor (Freedom House, 2024).
Surveillance Infrastructure and State Control
Bangladesh’s digital repression has been reinforced by an expansive and largely unregulated surveillance apparatus. Despite constitutional protections for freedom of expression and privacy, Section 97k of the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulation Act (2001) permits warrantless surveillance on vague grounds of national security or public order (Techglobal Institute, n.d.). Amendments in 2010 further expanded state authority, while the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) issued licenses that effectively legitimized widespread monitoring (Freedom House, 2024; Mahmood, n.d.).
Advanced surveillance technologies have become a cornerstone of state control. These include Spearhead, a spyware platform that intercepts encrypted messages; MSI backpack devices used by the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) to monitor phone communications; and Cellebrite’s Universal Forensics Extraction Device (UFED), which can extract encrypted data from mobile devices (Freedom House, 2024). The government has also acquired tools to decrypt messaging apps like Telegram and is advancing legislation that would legalize data mirroring, a move that could expand state surveillance even further (Freedom House, 2024). These technologies are believed to have been systematically deployed to monitor opposition figures, intimidate activists, and suppress civil society activity.
Repressive Digital Legislation in Bangladesh
Beyond technology and infrastructure, digital repression in Bangladesh has been heavily enabled by repressive legal frameworks. Laws like the now repealed Digital Security Act (DSA) and its successor, the Cyber Security Act (CSA), have played a central role in criminalizing online expression and legitimizing state overreach.
The now repealed Digital Security Act (DSA) and its successor, the Cyber Security Act (CSA), have both served as tools for domestic digital repression in Bangladesh. Despite the repeal of the DSA, the CSA retained 58 of its 62 provisions, continuing to systematically suppress peaceful dissent and curtail critical expression online (Amnesty International, 2024). The CSA maintains similar purposes: to empower regulatory authorities to remove or block data or information, including through regulation of intermediary service providers, and to prosecute those who are in violation of its provisions regarding online activities. In essence, the CSA empowers regulatory bodies, including the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC), to mobilize law enforcement agencies to identify, suppress, and prosecute individuals they believe are in violation of the Act’s provisions (International Center for Not-For-Profit Law [ICNL], 2024). Among the most frequently invoked provisions are Section 8, which authorizes the BTRC to remove or block online content deemed threatening to “national unity”, “economic activity”, “security”, “defence”, “religious values”, or “public order”—often based solely on requests from law enforcement or the director general of the National Cyber Security Agency (Mustafa, 2024). Similarly, Section 25, preserved from the DSA, criminalizes the transmission or publication of any information intended to “annoy, insult, defame, or degrade” a person, enabling arbitrary crackdowns on journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens (Mustafa, 2024). Moreover, Section 42 of the CSA empowers police to search, seize, and arrest with a warrant anyone they believe is likely to commit a cyber related offense, further expanding law enforcement’s discretionary power to preemptively suppress dissent (Mustafa, 2024).
Critics have also condemned the CSA for its vague and overly broad language, which gives authorities sweeping discretion to target digital expression. Notably, the Act retains five repressive speech offenses carried over from the DSA—used extensively by the ruling party to silence peaceful dissent. These include criminal penalties for speech that authorities interpret as “propaganda against the spirit of the liberation war”, “false or offensive information”, “hurting religious sentiments”, “defamatory content”, or anything seen as “disrupting communal harmony” or threatening public order (Amnesty International, 2024). Such ambiguous terms made it easy for officials to weaponize the law against opposition voices and civil society (Mustafa, 2024). For instance, Section 27 on “cyber terrorism” punishes any action deemed to jeopardize “the integrity, security, and sovereignty of the state” or disrupt “public order” with penalties of up to 14 years in prison—terms easily manipulated to silence critics (ICNL, 2024). Additional sections such as 18 and 24, which criminalize “illegal access” to digital systems and “identity fraud” respectively, are often deployed against online critics, regardless of whether intent to harm is established (ICNL, 2024). When combined with Section 20 on source code modification and Section 26 on unauthorized use of identity data, the CSA forms an expansive legal framework that allows the state to prosecute dissent and control digital space under the pretext of cybersecurity (ICNL, 2024). All of these sections have a resultant penalty of minimum 6 months to a max 14 year imprisonment if a person is found guilty of the crime.
Transnational Digital Repression from Bangladesh
In the digital age, social media and online platforms have empowered diasporic communities, exiled activists, and political dissidents to voice their concerns, organize across borders, and challenge authoritarian narratives, circumventing the traditional territorial limits of state control (Michaelsen, 2020). Yet this same digital connectivity has become a double edged sword. Authoritarian regimes increasingly exploit the vulnerabilities of online platforms to extend their repressive reach beyond national borders. Through surveillance, cyberattacks, harassment, disinformation, and reputational smears, states are able to digitally target individuals abroad (Michaelsen, 2020; Sen & Farooq, 2024). These digital tactics are often amplified by offline measures—such as harassment or legal action against family members still residing in the home country—creating a climate of fear that fosters self-censorship among diaspora communities and transnationals (Michaelsen, 2020). The growing affordability and accessibility of digital surveillance technologies have only accelerated this trend, posing a profound threat to freedom of expression and global democratic norms (Sen & Farooq, 2024).
Bangladesh presents a revealing case of transnational digital repression, particularly during the tenure of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League government (Sen & Farooq, 2024). Although its overseas surveillance capabilities remain more limited and selective compared to those of more technologically advanced authoritarian states, Bangladesh has nonetheless employed a range of digital tactics to target transnationals and exiled individuals. These efforts have disproportionately focused on journalists and activists believed to be spreading “anti-state propaganda” from abroad (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2023). In both 2017 and 2023, official directives from Prime Minister Hasina and the Foreign Minister instructed Bangladeshi embassies and diplomatic missions to monitor the activities of expatriate journalists and report back to Dhaka (UCANews, 2017; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2023). While such directives offer only a partial glimpse into the full extent of the state’s overseas monitoring, they suggest the existence of a coordinated and ongoing effort to track and intimidate Bangladeshi transnationals.
In practice, Bangladesh’s transnational repression toolkit includes a combination of cyberattacks, targeted online harassment, disinformation and smear campaigns. These digital operations are frequently accompanied by offline pressure exerted on the families of dissidents who remain in Bangladesh—ranging from surveillance and intimidation to arrest under broadly defined national cyber security laws. Collectively, these strategies form a coordinated effort to curtail the freedom of expression of transnational individuals accused of spreading “anti-state” propaganda or disinformation. Notably, among the most prominent tactics within this toolkit is cyber attacks, which have been used extensively to target exiled journalists and political dissidents. Taken together, these provisions have provided a powerful legal arsenal for the Bangladeshi state to surveil, intimidate, and criminalize online dissent—both within its borders and, increasingly, beyond them through transnational digital repression.
Cyber Attacks
As part of its transnational digital repression strategy, Bangladesh has employed hacking campaigns and other cyber attacks targeting exiled journalists, activists, and politically active commentators abroad. These operations are carried out through a hybrid network of state sanctioned entities and state aligned or sympathetic non-state actors. While not always officially acknowledged, these groups operate in close ideological alignment with the government, using cyberattacks to compromise social media accounts, steal information, and disrupt the online presence of transnationals and diaspora figures. Cyberattacks have remained central tools in Bangladesh’s efforts to silence dissent beyond its borders, especially under the leadership of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and has persisted even after the Awami League’s departure from power.
Key examples include Facebook based groups such as “Crack Platoon-Bangladesh Cyberforce”, “A Team”, and “Rajjya Shova”, which, in January 2025, launched hacking and account deletion campaigns on social media platforms, targeting student leaders and activists involved in movements like Students Against Discrimination (The Daily Star, 2025). One high profile target was exiled journalist Zulkarnain Saer Khan, who has been a target of many transnational digital repression efforts (The Daily Star, 2025). These groups operate in political and sometimes ideological alignment with the Awami League, suggesting informal state coordination (The Daily Star, 2025). Nevertheless, Bangladesh’s use of non-state actors against transnationals dates back further. In 2020, Meta dismantled several coordinated cyber networks operated by groups such as Don’s Team and the Crime Research and Analysis Foundation (CRAF), which were engaged in digital repression targeting dissidents both within Bangladesh and abroad. These networks employed a range of tactics including mass reporting—a coordinated abuse of platform reporting systems designed to trigger the takedown of legitimate content or user accounts (Meta, n.d.). In addition to this, they engaged in impersonation, malware distribution, and phishing attacks. Phishing in this context involved the use of fake or spoofed accounts, emails, and websites that closely resembled legitimate sources, in order to deceive targets into disclosing sensitive personal information (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). These activities represent a clear example of how pro-government actors have leveraged digital tools to suppress dissent and silence criticism, not only within national borders but across international digital spaces (Gleicher, 2020; Shoeb A, 2024). While these actors lacked formal government status, their alignment with Awami League narratives and targets indicated implicit state approval (Gleicher, 2020).
More directly, Bangladesh’s Government, through the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) and more specifically, its subunits, the Signal Intelligence Bureau (SIB) and Public Relations Monitoring Cell (PRMC), orchestrates sophisticated digital repression efforts (Netra News, 2020). These units, staffed in part by civilian contractors, execute offensive cyber operations, including account hacking, surveillance, and coordinated abuse campaigns on platforms like Facebook (Netra News, 2020). The PRMC maintains thousands of fake accounts and daily receives spreadsheets from DGFI listing dissidents—many of who are exiled or transnationals—to target (Netra News, 2020). The SIB, on the other hand, specializes in technical intrusions, such as intercepting SMS based two factor authentication and exploiting weak passwords to hack directly into accounts and reuse them for further state purposes—methods used in high profile cases like the 2018 hacking of exiled writer Pinaki Bhattacharya (Netra News, 2020).
Additionally, state linked actors have used copyright takedown abuse to disable websites of transnationals, including Amar Desh UK and exiled journalist Kanak Sarwar’s personal site (Bergman, 2021). These operations involve creating spoof websites to falsely claim ownership of content and filing fraudulent complaints to hosting providers, leading to temporary or permanent shutdowns (Bergman, 2021). While attribution remains indirect, the strategic consistency with other state linked digital repression efforts suggests coordinated or state sanctioned involvement.
These attacks on transnationals not only highlight the persistent use of cyberattacks but also underscore the coordinated and ongoing use of harassment, another key tactic in Bangladesh’s repression strategy.
Disinformation and Smear Campaigns
Harassment in the form of smear and disinformation campaigns remains a central tactic in Bangladesh’s transnational digital repression toolkit, particularly under the former Hasina administration. These campaigns—often orchestrated through a combination of state actors, state sanctioned actors, and ideologically/politically aligned non-state groups—have been used to discredit, intimidate, and silence dissenting voices abroad. While hacking campaigns have grown in prominence, coordinated disinformation efforts have long been a staple of the government’s digital repression approach, especially on social media platforms where targeted individuals are most vulnerable.
Exiled journalists and transnational dissidents are frequently subjected to relentless online harassment, ranging from coordinated trolling and character assassination to doctored images and fabricated criminal accusations (RSF, 2023; BenarNews Staff, 2023). These efforts are often led by pro-state commentators and online trolls, some with verified links to the Awami League or state affiliated media networks (Freedom House, 2024; Netra News, 2020). Platforms such as Facebook and X have been primary centers for these digital attacks. In many instances, transnational dissidents receive waves of abusive messages following the publication of articles or commentary critical of the Awami League (BenarNews Staff, 2023). Victims report slurs, unfounded accusations, and even death wishes (RSF, 2023; BenarNews Staff, 2023). One such case is that of Asad Noor, founder of the bilingual platform Anweshan, who has faced prolonged harassment from Islamist groups in Bangladesh after publishing a negative article (RSF, 2023). After a fatwa was issued against him—a fatwa is a legal opinion issued by a religious leader in Islam—the pressure against him became so severe that British authorities reportedly expelled him from the UK, fearing for public safety (RSF, 2023). Although the Bangladeshi government did not officially sanction this harassment, its silence and refusal to denounce such actions implicitly legitimized it.
In other cases, the government has taken a more direct role. Zulkarnain Saer Khan, an exiled investigative journalist, has been repeatedly targeted through what appear to be state linked disinformation campaigns (ANFREL, 2023). State affiliated trolls have circulated fake images and slanderous accusations online, labeling him with homophobic slurs, portraying him as a drug addict, and falsely accusing him of terrorism and ties to Hamas (ANFREL, 2023; BenarNews Staff, 2023). Some disinformation has even falsely linked him to a bombing in Hungary, his former place of residence (BenarNews Staff, 2023). A search for his name on the monitoring platform CrowdTangle revealed more than 3,000 derogatory Facebook posts since early 2021, illustrating the scale of the smear campaign (ANFREL, 2023). These efforts were further bolstered by fabricated videos, altered newspaper headlines, and amplification by pro-government websites and social media pages, many of which have direct or indirect links to the ruling Awami League (ANFREL, 2023).
The state’s role in these campaigns is not limited to tacit support. In early 2023, Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister instructed envoys abroad to respond “spontaneously” to anti-state narratives without waiting for direction from Dhaka (ANFREL, 2023). Around the same time, a domestic coordination committee was established to address “anti-state propaganda”, reflecting the government’s broader strategy to neutralize dissent both at home and abroad (ANFREL, 2023). In September 2023, Prime Minister Hasina herself encouraged party operatives to spend at least 30 minutes daily countering anti- government content online (Freedom House, 2024). While framed as “information correction”, this initiative has been widely criticized as a state-led disinformation effort aimed at drowning out independent opposition voices.
Pro-state media outlets and online pages—many previously flagged by Meta for coordinated inauthentic behavior—serve as centers for these operations (Shoeb A, 2024). In 2024, Meta removed 50 Facebook accounts and 98 pages tied to the Awami League’s propaganda arm, the Center for Research and Information (CRI), for engaging in systematic disinformation, primarily targeting the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) (Shoeb A, 2024; Freedom House, 2024). These disinformation networks span across platforms, including X, YouTube, Telegram, and TikTok, underscoring the expanse and sophistication of the government’s propaganda infrastructure (Shoeb A, 2024).
Of growing concern is the emergence of AI-generated content, including deep fakes—media in which a person’s appearance, voice, or actions have been digitally manipulated to convincingly resemble someone else—which poses a significant and evolving threat to transnational activists (Sen & Farooq, 2024). Although there is no confirmed evidence of AI generated media being used against exiles or transnationals, several deepfake videos attacking domestic opposition politicians—including one targeting BNP leader Tarique Rahman—surfaced online ahead of the 2024 elections (The Daily Star, 2023). The increasing accessibility of generative AI technology raises alarms about how such tools could be exploited to fabricate evidence, create synthetic news, or undermine the credibility of real dissenters (Sen & Farooq, 2024). More troubling still is the likelihood that governments could exploit the mere possibility of AI manipulation to discredit factual information they find politically inconvenient (The Daily Star, 2023; Sen & Farooq, 2024).
These smear and disinformation campaigns are frequently compounded by offline harassment and intimidation of relatives remaining in Bangladesh. Under the broad and opaque provisions of the Cyber Security Act and other national security laws, not only are transnationals exiled individuals abroad targeted, but their families in Bangladesh are often subjected to surveillance, legal threats, and physical intimidation. As with cyberattacks and disinformation/smear campaigns, these efforts represent a strategic extension of Bangladesh’s domestic repression into the transnational space, aimed at silencing critics and reinforcing state control over the digital narrative.
Pressure from within Bangladesh
Another central tool in Bangladesh’s transnational repression strategy is the use of domestic pressure—targeting family members within the country in order to intimidate and silence dissidents abroad. This method complements the government’s digital repression tactics by leveraging its internal control mechanisms to create fear and vulnerability among those living in exile abroad (Michaelsen, 2020). While there is no concrete evidence of a large scale overseas digital surveillance program operated by Bangladesh, there is ample evidence that the state uses its robust domestic surveillance apparatus to track, harass, and punish the families of critics who reside abroad. These tactics include surveillance, intimidation, physical harassment, and legal coercion through politically motivated investigations and arrests (Freedom House, 2024).
Surveillance and intimidation are often the precursors to more overt forms of repression. Many transnational dissidents have reported that their family members in Bangladesh have been surveilled or threatened due to their activism abroad. In more extreme cases, this has escalated into physical violence (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2023). For example, in March 2023, exiled journalist Zulkarnain Saer Khan reported that his brother was brutally attacked with iron rods by four men allegedly affiliated with the ruling Awami League—an act widely viewed as retribution for Khan’s reporting on Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina (CIVICUS, 2023). Such retaliatory violence is not isolated, and fear for the safety of family members remains a powerful deterrent for many critics living abroad (Michaelsen, 2020).
However, the most frequent and institutionalized form of pressure from within the country comes through the use of politically driven investigations and arrests under repressive legislation such as the Digital Security Act (DSA) and its successor, the Cyber Security Act (CSA). These laws are routinely weaponized to criminalize dissent (Amnesty International, 2024; American Bar Association, 2024). Even if transnationals reside outside Bangladesh, they are often charged in absentia with offenses such as “spreading disinformation” or “tarnishing the image of the nation” (Freedom House, 2024). For instance, Tasneem Khalil, editor of Netra News and a current resident of Sweden, faces up to a 10 year prison sentence under the DSA if he returns to Bangladesh for articles critical of the government’s COVID-19 response (RSF, 2021). His property in Bangladesh also remains subject to seizure (RSF, 2021). Similarly, activist Pinaki Bhattacharya and journalist Zulkarnain Saer Khan have both been charged under the DSA for their critical commentary, placing them at risk of arrest should they return to the country (Just News BD, 2022; CIVICUS, 2023). While the recent repeal of the DSA and CSA by the current Yunus administration may alter the legal landscape, these cases reflect a longstanding pattern of legal intimidation used to silence critics abroad.
More commonly, when the government does not or cannot directly target the dissidents themselves, it turns to their relatives. Family members are detained, interrogated, or charged under fictitious or exaggerated allegations, often without due process. In one such instance, the sister of exiled journalist Kanak Sarwar, along with her three sons, was detained in the early hours of the morning in 2021 by the Rapid Action Battalion (CIVICUS, 2022; RSF, 2021). She was interrogated about her brother’s activities and had a police information report filed against her under the DSA (CIVICUS, 2022). The charges were based on posts made from a fake Facebook account impersonating her, which she had already reported to authorities (CIVICUS, 2022). The account was likely operated by one of the state supported disinformation networks previously discussed. This pattern of using relatives as proxies to inflict pressure on exiles and transitionals illustrates the regime’s willingness to exploit the vulnerability of familial ties to enforce transnational discipline.
These practices highlight how Bangladesh’s repression of transnational dissent is not confined to cyberspace or online campaigns. Instead, it is reinforced by a parallel strategy of domestic coercion that punishes family members, seizes property, and weaponizes the legal system to maintain control over transnationals.
Looking Ahead for Bangladesh
In July 2024, Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League (AL) government were ousted and replaced by an interim government led by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus. One of the interim administration’s central objectives has been to roll back the authoritarian policies entrenched under Hasina, particularly those enabling domestic and transnational digital repression. This effort included repealing the Cyber Security Act and introducing a new Cyber Security Ordinance (CSO). However, the initial 2024 version of the CSO drew sharp criticism for retaining several repressive sections from the DSA and CSA—specifically Sections 25, 26, and 42 (Mustafa, 2024). In response to public backlash, the interim government unveiled a revised 2025 version of the CSO, which removed nine controversial provisions that criminalized criticism, misinformation, and defamatory speech related to the Liberation War, the spirit of the Liberation War, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the national anthem, and the national flag (The Daily Star, 2025). The government also emphasized that the ordinance now recognized internet access as a basic citizen right and included new penalties for online abuse. Whether this revised framework will genuinely safeguard digital freedoms or become another tool of repression remains uncertain. Still, the interim government’s early steps, though presented as reform, have raised important questions about the direction of Bangladesh’s digital governance.
These concerns were amplified in May 2025 when the interim government announced a sweeping ban on the Awami League and its affiliated organizations under Section 18 of the newly enacted Anti-Terrorism Act. This provision allows the government to declare any individual or organization a terrorist entity on “reasonable grounds” and restricts any form of publicity, including press releases, social media posts, or public gatherings, in support of those under trial before the International Crimes Tribunal (The Economic Times, 2025). While the move has been justified as necessary due to ongoing cyber harassment by AL linked troll networks following Hasina’s removal, it also mirrors similar tactics the former AL regime used to silence opposition supporters. The digital suppression of AL related content raises concerns about whether the government is dismantling authoritarianism, or merely reshaping it. As Bangladesh enters a new political era, the future of its digital space remains precarious.
Under the former Hasina government, Bangladesh systematically engaged in transnational digital repression, deploying a multifaceted toolkit that included cyberattacks, coordinated smear and disinformation campaigns, and coercive pressure on transnationals’ family members within the country. These methods were rarely employed in isolation, rather, they were often combined to maximize psychological and reputational harm, creating a layered system of intimidation designed to silence, discredit, or force the self-censorship of transnationals and dissidents abroad. Despite the recent political transition and the installation of a provisional government, reports of ongoing repression—whether directly sanctioned by former state actors or executed by informal pro-state networks still aligned with the ousted Awami League—suggest that this apparatus of transnational digital repression remains active. Collectively, these tactics reflect a deliberate and evolving strategy by the Bangladeshi state to extend its repressive reach beyond its borders. They demonstrate how both official state institutions and informal proxy actors are used together to export repression abroad, blur lines of accountability, and undermine the safety and freedom of expression of Bangladeshi transnationals.
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