Subsea cables cover over 900,000 miles of sea floor from the Atlantic to Pacific. These small, fiber-optic cables are responsible for carrying 99% of global internet data traffic, facilitating connection and communication worldwide (Mauldin, 2023). However, these cables are highly prone to damage, and in recent years, there have been a growing number of incidents. Oftentimes, damage to these cables is unintentional, but increasingly state actors have been deliberately causing damage. One region in particular which has seen repeated suspicious incidents is the Baltic Sea.
Spanning approximately 149,000 square miles, the Baltic Sea is characterized by shallow waters and narrow basins. It is only accessible via three narrow choke points – the Great Belt, the Little Belt, and Øresund – all located in the Danish Straits of Kattegat and Skagerrak (Pawlak, 2024; Encyclopædia Britannica, 2025). Since 2022, about ten subsea cables have been cut that connect the region, with seven of those cuts occurring between November 2024 and January 2025 (Buchholz, 2025). A majority of these incidents have raised suspicions of sabotage by state actors, specifically Russia and China, who have been particularly active in the region (Buchholz, 2025).
The increasing frequency of subsea cable incidents has propelled the Baltic Sea region to the forefront of international political discussions regarding subsea cable security. As the Baltic Sea nations confront the vulnerabilities of their subsea cable infrastructure, addressing the region’s resilience amidst a shifting security landscape has become increasingly paramount.
The Baltic Sea Subsea Cable Network
The Baltic Sea hosts a significant subsea cable network, with over 35 cables connecting the countries bordering its waters (Dufetre, 2023). This network is crucial to the region’s telecommunications and maritime infrastructure. Several telecommunications companies in the region have significant stakes in supporting this infrastructure. Arelion, a Swedish telecommunications company, owns about 17 regional cables, including the EE-S1 and the BCS East-West Interlink, both of which have sustained damage recently (Dufetre, 2023; Voltri & ERR News, 2023). Similar to Arelion is the Finnish Telecommunications and digital services company, Elisa Corporation. While Elisa has approximately three cables in the Baltic Sea, which is less than Arelion, it is one of the companies whose cables have been damaged – namely the FEC-1 and FEC-2 (Elisa, n.d.; Lott, 2024; Dufetre, 2023). Furthermore, the largest suppliers in the region are Ericsson, a Swedish telecommunications company, and the French company, Alcatel Submarine Networks (ASN), which is one of the largest manufacturers and installers of subsea cables (Ericsson, n.d.; & Alcatel Submarine Networks, n.d.).
The subsea cable Eastern Light Sweden-Finland II, built by the Swedish company Eastern Light will become operational later this year (TeleGeography, n.d.). Eastern Light is also planning future subsea cable projects, including EL Baltic Sea East, EL Baltic Sea West, and EL Baltic Sea Crossing, although no conclusive launch dates have been set (Eastern Light, n.d.). Table 1 displays data on the cables in the Baltic Sea that have been suspected of intentional damage. The data includes the date of incident, cable name, length in miles, owners, and supplier.
Table 1: Baltic Sea Cables Damaged in Suspected Attacks
Source: Table data from: Dufetre (2023), Fingrid (2017), Telegeography ( n.d.), Souisa (2024).
Geopolitical Landscape in the Baltic Sea Region
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine ushered in a new geopolitical reality for the Baltic Sea region, as it has forced the bordering countries to confront a rapidly shifting security landscape. In response, Sweden and Finland made the unprecedented decision to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), creating a “NATO Lake” as nine out of the ten countries in the region are NATO members (Kayali, 2023). As a result of NATO’s hold on the Baltic Sea nations strengthening and Moscow’s persistent perception of NATO expansion as a strategic threat to its interests, tensions within the region have increased in an already inflamed security environment (Rahr, 2025).
The Baltic Sea is a shallow body of water, with an average depth of only about 180 feet (Brennan, 2025) The shallow depth makes the subsea cables more accessible to potential malicious actors because they lay closer to the surface. The Baltic Sea is also a central commercial trading hub, with as many as 4,000 ships passing through daily (Brennan, 2025). The combination of shallow depth and significant shipping traffic makes the Baltic Sea regions subsea cables more susceptible to intentional or unintentional damage. The accessibility of subsea cables to hostile actors, combined with rising tensions between Russia, the Baltic Sea nations, and NATO has created a geopolitical hotspot.
Within the Baltic Sea region, the primary threat actor to subsea cable infrastructure is Russia. The region is known as the “Achilles heel” of Europe because it is particularly vulnerable to Russian attacks due to its proximity to the ports of St. Petersburg and the Kaliningrad enclave (Desmarais, 2024). A comprehensive report released in April 2023 by Sweden’s Television et al. (2023) outlines Russia’s decade-long large-scale activities mapping critical infrastructure in the North and Baltic Sea. The report specifically highlights the operation of 50 Russian ships in these waters, equipped with surveillance and advanced technology (Motrunych, 2023). Many of these ships were operating without their Automatic Identification System (AIS) enabled—a system crucial for ship crews to know their location and those of surrounding ships. The manipulation of this data, also known as AIS spoofing, creates potential for disorder and collisions, and undermines maritime order as it is difficult to take retaliatory measures against these vessels (Braw, 2024; Motrunych, 2023).
Coupled with Russia’s persistent subsea mapping is its rapidly advancing naval capabilities. Stationed in Olenya Guba, off the coast of the Barents Sea, is Russia’s military fleet of special-purpose vessels (Trakimavičius, 2021). These advanced vessels include intelligence ships, auxiliary submarines, and reconnaissance vessels that can hold deep-diving submersibles and drones for subsea engineering missions, all under the operations of Russia’s General Staff Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research (GUGI) (Trakimavičius, 2021). Russia’s increasingly confrontational nature and expansion of naval fleets and equipment are exacerbating the Baltic Sea countries’ concerns about cable spying and sabotage.
While Russia is currently the primary threat in the region, China’s expanding involvement also is heightening apprehensions about the risks posed to subsea infrastructure. In 2020, the United States warned Europe about China’s growing presence in the telecommunications industry, citing concerns over the usage of Chinese-made components in telecommunications infrastructure. However, Europe dismissed this warning, as at the time, it did not share the same threat assessment (Besch & Brown, 2024). But later, in January 2024, the European Parliament passed a resolution highlighting the potential future implications of China’s rising influence on European critical infrastructure (European Parliament, 2024). The report outlines the concerns about Chinese companies linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) acquiring European internet firms, China’s HMN Technologies, and the high risk of cybersecurity and underwater surveillance (European Parliament, 2024). The report also calls on the European Commission to consider enacting new legislation to mitigate security risks related to subsea cables (European Parliament, 2024). Furthermore, allegations have been made that the Chinese vessel Yi Peng 3, involved in a recent subsea cable incident, was working on behalf of Russia. European officials also expressed suspicions over the vessel’s crew, a Chinese captain and Russian sailor and the similarities of the AIS data to previous Russian shadow fleet vessels (Brovko, 2024; The Mari:me Execu:ve, 2024).
China and Russia’s activity in the Baltic Sea have raised significant concerns about their intentions regarding subsea infrastructure. While Russia’s maritime activities are not necessarily unusual, the intensification of its actions in a considerable weaponized capacity is raising questions. Coupled with this is the increasing assessment of China’s activities relating to subsea infrastructure as a threat.
Subsea Cable Incidents in the Baltic Sea
In recent years, the frequency of subsea cable incidents in the Baltic Sea has increased significantly, highlighting the vulnerabilities of this infrastructure. On October 7th and 8th of 2023, the Balticonnector gas pipeline, two subsea cables connecting Finland and Estonia, and the EE-S1 subsea data cable connecting Sweden and Estonia were damaged (Chiappa & Ngendakumana, 2023). However, the overall functionality of the cables was not disrupted. The incident was attributed to the Chinese vessel Newnew Polar Bear, which had dragged its anchor along the sea floor for over 100 miles (Ministry of Defence, 2023; Tegler, 2023). Investigations revealed that the Newnew Polar Bear, and the Russia cargo vessel Sevmorput were present at the damage sites.
The Newnew Polar Bear had also been found at the Russian port of Arkhangelsk with a missing anchor—the same anchor paint was discovered on the severed cable (Benner, 2025). Although Beijing initially denied the vessel’s involvement, about ten months later, it admitted the Chinese flagged vessel was behind the incident, attributing it to “bad weather” (Benner, 2025).
Just over a year later, on November 17, 2024, the BCS East-West Interlink cable connecting Sweden and Lithuania was cut, resulting in about a fifth of Lithuania’s internet capacity being reduced, although consumers were largely unaffected (Astier & Kirby, 2024). Less than 24 hours later, on November 18th, the C-Lion1 cable connecting Finland and Germany was also cut; however, consumers were not affected (Astier & Kirby, 2024). These incidents are believed to be related, with suspicions centering on the Chinese vessel Yi Peng 3. The vessel departed from the Russian port of Ust-Luga on November 15th, and maritime tracking data placed it at the exact time and place of breaches (Reuters, 2024). Following the cable cuts, the Yi Peng 3 was held in the Kattegat Strait, with many Baltic leaders voicing concerns over suspected sabotage and the possibility that the captains or officers of the ship were bribed by Russian agents—no conclusive evidence has been found to corroborate these claims (Astier & Kirby, 2024; Pancevski, 2024). Amid tense negotiations with China, several officials from each of the affected countries were allowed to conduct inspections. A report has yet to be released and on December 21st, the Yi Peng 3 was cleared to continue its journey (Benner, 2025; Swedish Coast Guard, 2024).
On December 25, 2024, just over a month amer the severing of the BCS East-West Interlink and the C-Lion1 cables, the Estlink 2, the FEC-1, the FEC-2 connecting Finland and Estonia and C-Lion1 cables were cut by the Russian oil tanker Eagle S after it dragged its anchor for almost 62 miles (Lott, 2024). A unique vessel, the Eagle S bears a Cook Island flag, is registered with the United Arab Emirates, operated by an Indian company in Mumbai, and most of the crew is from India and Georgia (Benner, 2025). The ship is currently being detained in Finland, under the pretense of aggravated criminal mischief and interference with communications. Travel bans for nine of the crew members have also been put in place (Martin, 2025; Rintakumpu, Arts & Ondraskova, 2025). During the initial investigation, the Eagle S was found to have specific transmitting gear, laptops with Russian and Turkish language keyboards, and sensor-type devices; therefore, it is also suspected of being part of Russia’s shadow fleet (Bockmann, 2024). Some European and U.S. intelligence analysts have suspected the incident to be accidental; however, the lead investigator and maritime experts argue otherwise, citing that the anchor weighs over 100 metric tons. Therefore, dragging that heavy of an anchor undoubtedly makes a significant amount of noise, and it would be impossible not to notice.
In early March, four months after being detained by Finland, the Eagle S was cleared to leave and escorted to international waters by Finland’s border officials. However, investigations are ongoing, with an examination of materials and continued interviews with the crew, as only five of the initial crew were allowed to leave, while the rest remain in Finland (Yadav, 2025; Martin, 2025; Nierenberg & Lemola, 2025).
International Response to Baltic Sea Incidents
In the wake of these incidents, the Baltic Sea countries are reassessing the vulnerabilities of their subsea infrastructure. This is coupled with a strong response from international organizations, which are initiating operations and action plans to protect subsea cable infrastructure and prevent future incidents.
Responses From States
As a response to these recent cable cuts, Finland, Sweden, and Lithuania have proactively initiated national measures to strengthen the resilience of their subsea networks. As a country that has been the victim of numerous attacks, Finland is diligently working with other Baltic Sea nations, including Sweden, Estonia and Germany, to conduct joint investigations (Bryant & Sauer, 2024). Additionally, Finland and Germany released a joint statement about how it is crucial to safeguard subsea infrastructure (Browne, 2024). Finland’s growing collaboration is due to its dedication to actively working with NATO—for instance, increasing the frequency of patrols around vital subsea cable areas. It is suspected that Russia’s aggression is a result of Finland’s accession to NATO (Braw, 2024; Wallace, 2024). Sweden also is showing strong support for inter-country collaboration and working towards Baltic Sea security. It has pledged to send up to three warships and a sea surveillance aircram, the ASC890, from the Swedish Armed Forces to aid in monitoring subsea critical infrastructure and further investigate Russia’s shadow fleet (Agence France-Presse, 2025). Lithuania is taking a unique approach to address subsea infrastructure vulnerabilities by fostering public and private partnerships. The Lithuanian Armed Forces have signed an agreement with Litgrid, the country’s electricity transmission system operator, to enhance the security of critical subsea infrastructure in the Baltics (BBC, 2025). Although the Baltic Sea nations are addressing subsea cable security issues individually, they also maintain strong regional collaboration and cooperation. On December 17, 2024, The Joint Expeditionary Force Leader summit in Tallinn between 12 countries yielded a strong response to Russia’s growing shadow fleet—countries pledged to disrupt and deter this growing threat (Government Communication Unit, 2024). As part of a coordinated effort, maritime authorities are now requesting proof of insurance from suspected shadow vessels as they pass through the English Channel, Danish Straits of the Great Belt, which is the sound between Denmark and Sweden, and the Gulf of Finland (Government Communica:on Unit, 2024).
Furthermore, in early January 2025, the U.K. initiated a Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), dubbed operation “Nordic Warden,” which consists of the Baltic Sea nations, Iceland, Norway and the Netherlands to bolster security in the Baltic Sea, North Sea, English Channel, and Kattegat Strait (Ministry of Defense et al., 2025). Nordic Warden primarily utilizes artificial intelligence (AI) to analyze data from various sources and compile a system where shadow fleet vessels can be registered (Ministry of Defense et al., 2025). If a risk is detected, a widespread signal is spread to NATO and other allies. This JEF operation focuses on the protection of Critical Undersea Infrastructure, complementing NATO’s actions to deepen military ties and interoperability between these countries (Ministry of Defense et al., 2025; & Moyer, 2024).
Responses From International Organizations
The threat to the Baltic Sea countries’ subsea infrastructure has forced the European Union to evaluate how it can become more resilient against cable damage. On December 26, 2024, one day after the severing of the Estlink 2 cable between Finland and Estonia, the European Commission and the High Representative on the Investigation into the Damaged Electricity and Data Cables in the Baltic Sea released a joint statement (European External Action Service [EEAS], 2024). This statement not only commended Finland’s rapid response to the incident but also reaffirmed the European Commission’s strong and unwavering support for Finland, Estonia, and Germany (EEAS, 2024). It also proposed measures to protect critical undersea infrastructure and address Russia’s shadow fleet including enhanced information sharing, developing repair capabilities, and creating new detection technologies to reinforce subsea safeguards (EEAS, 2024).
Then, on January 29, 2025, the European Commission, led by Equality Commissioner Helena Dalli, called for an EU-wide response to the mounting threats towards crucial subsea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea (CE Noticias Financieras: English, 2025). The European Commission, citing Russia’s aggressive actions and China’s increasing influence, stressed the need for a unified EU response (CE Noticias Financieras: English, 2025). Dalli reiterated the region’s vulnerability to hybrid attacks and the EU’s role in defending national critical infrastructure and bolstering European Security (CE Noticias Financieras: English, 2025).
Less than a month after this declaration, Henna Virkkunen, Executive Vice-President of the European Commission for Tech Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, presented the Joint Communication to strengthen the security and resilience of submarine cables (European Commission 2025). This EU-wide action plan, with its focus on prevention, detection, response, recovery, and deterrence, is designed with a long-term vision to ensure the security of subsea cables (European Commission, 2025). The primary actions included in this strategy are investing in cable resilience through new technology, increasing the ability to detect and respond to incidents before they occur, and enhancing surveillance capabilities and cooperation on intelligence data sharing. The goal of this new plan, which will take place between 2025 and 2026, is to expand the EU’s subsea cable security in the face of a dynamic threat landscape (European Commission, 2025). The EU is taking the concrete steps needed to ensure Europe’s subsea cable security, as the continued incidents in the Baltic Sea have displayed the vulnerabilities of subsea cables and the potential for destabilization through subsea cable destruction (European Commission, 2025).
In response to the recent string of subsea cable incidents in the Baltic Sea, NATO’s Allied Command Operations (ACO) launched a new mission known as “Baltic Sentry” on January 14, 2025. This mission aims to increase NATO military presence and build countries’ resilience against future attempts at damage by an adversary (SHAPE Public Affairs Office, 2025). The Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCB) is leading the new mission and working closely with the Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) and the NATO Maritime Centre for Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructure (NMCSCUI) (SHAPE Public Affairs Office, 2025). The strategy involves the deployment of a wide range of advanced assets, including frigates, maritime patrol aircraft, naval drones, and surveillance technology, all to counter the destabilizing actions posed by state and non-state actors (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2025). With the new mission underway, NATO is set to deploy uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), also known as drone boats, as part of the Baltic Sentry (Altman, 2025). The USVs will continuously monitor critical areas 24/7, delivering situational awareness via imagery and electromagnetic spectrums, generating it on various platforms (Altman, 2025).
Despite its short operational period, the Baltic Sentry mission has already proven its effectiveness in deterrence, proven with the absence of any suspicious cable incidents since its inception (Schwirtz & Hill, 2025). This success underscores NATO’s resilience and its ability to respond to threats in a destabilizing environment. The mission has not only sparked a regional response but also demonstrated the unity of nations in the face of increasing challenges (Schwirtz & Hill, 2025). As a new mission, Baltic Sentry could possess the potential to set a new precedent for deterrence operations in subsea cable security in the Baltics.
Implications
In the midst of rising geopolitical tensions, the Baltic Sea region is confronting a new reality regarding threats and offensive actions against their subsea cable infrastructure. With Russia’s expanding maritime activities, and China’s increasingly assertive nature, the Baltic Sea nations and international organizations are realizing the very real threat to the subsea cables in the region. This realization is driving the urgency of collaborative efforts to implement more essential safeguards that ensure the safety and resilience of these cables.
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