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Transcript: 8.11.2026 EU Democracy & Security Educator Workshop | Sabine Lang

August 19, 2026

Lecture by Dr. Sabine Lange

University of Washington EU Democracy & Security Educator Workshop

August 11, 2026

 

Guntis Smidchens: Welcome to podcasts hosted by the Center for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, Seattle.

The following lecture was hosted by UW’s Jean Monnet EU Center of Excellence, funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are those of the speaker only.

On August 11, 2026, we invited Professor Sabine Lang to speak at our annual Educators Workshop with a lecture titled “Making European Citizens: Civic Engagement Practices in the European Union.”

Professor Lang is Professor of International and European Studies at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington.

Sabine Lang: I will take you in some directions that connect to what my colleagues have already discussed today and to some of the questions that have been raised.

My topic is really the civic engagement component of the broader European democracy puzzle.

Often, when people think about civic engagement, they assume it is the softer side of governance, something participatory or deliberative that governments and international organizations create primarily to appease citizens.

Today, I want to make the case for taking civic engagement much more seriously.

I believe that many of the issues we face in the United States today, as well as some of the political developments we see globally, have roots in a disconnect between citizens and governing institutions. We are seeing governments move in directions that are not always supported by public opinion, and part of the reason is that many citizens feel detached from political decision-making.

Citizens possess electoral rights and may choose to exercise them or not. In some countries, voting is even mandatory.

Beyond voting, however, there is often very little imagination about how citizens can be meaningfully connected to their political communities.

My basic argument is that the European Union is taking this challenge seriously. The EU is actively trying to strengthen connections between citizens and political institutions, and it is working to place that conversation before educators, universities, policymakers, and civic organizations.

That is what I want to discuss with you today.

Throughout the presentation, I will also share findings from research I conducted during a sabbatical year spent in Berlin, where I worked with colleagues on many of these same questions.

What are the key issues?

You will probably recognize several recurring themes from the presentations you have already heard today.

One common argument is that Europe lacks a shared identity or common demos.

One of you asked this morning what exactly a demos is and what would be necessary for people to feel genuinely European.

My argument is that a demos must go beyond culture or personal identity. There has to be a civic demos, an understanding that we are participants in a common political community and that we can help shape it.

Keep that idea in mind.

Another challenge is the complexity of European governance.

Many of us show our students complicated diagrams explaining how the European Union works. We try to explain what it means to live in a system of multilevel governance.

This raises an important question:

Is the EU truly a political community, or is it merely a technocratic governance structure, as Andrew Moravcsik famously argued?

I would disagree with Moravcsik to some extent, and I think Travis Nelson would as well.

The EU has evolved significantly. It began as a relatively technocratic project with limited democratic ambitions, but it has increasingly embraced democratic multilevel governance.

One of its guiding ideas is that decisions should be taken at the lowest possible level consistent with effective action.

Regions consequently play a prominent role in European governance. Nation-states continue to play a central role. Above them sits the European level, centered in Brussels.

This remains an unprecedented political experiment, bringing together multiple countries and enabling them to make joint decisions while retaining substantial national sovereignty.

If I were teaching this in a high school classroom, I would present the European Union as an experiment, something genuinely new and innovative.

Other regional organizations, whether in Southeast Asia, Africa, or elsewhere, have taken inspiration from aspects of European integration. They are nowhere near the EU’s level of institutional development, but they have learned from it.

In that sense, Europe may be functioning as a model of what transnational cooperation can look like.

Another recurring criticism concerns what some call the “Brussels Beltway,” the perception that decision-makers in Brussels operate within a closed political world that remains disconnected from ordinary citizens throughout the member states.

The EU is aware of this criticism.

There is also a familiar political dynamic in which everything unpopular is blamed on Brussels, while every successful policy is attributed to national governments.

National politicians understand very well how much they benefit from EU policies, funding, and cooperation. Yet they also need to win reelection at home.

As a result, they often claim credit for successful outcomes while avoiding responsibility for unpopular decisions, even when those outcomes depended heavily on EU support.

Without European cooperation, many of those achievements would not have been possible.

You may also recognize this dynamic in relation to initiatives such as the Conference on the Future of Europe, which I think offers a useful illustration of the path Europeans are currently attempting to follow.

These are the broader issues.

What I would like to address today are three questions:

First, what does it mean to be European today?

Second, what does the European Union do to encourage democratic participation and civic resilience among its citizens?

And third, what challenges currently stand in the way of those efforts?

You’ve already heard much of the historical background, so I won’t repeat all of it.

European integration emerged after World War II from a simple but powerful idea: never again should European countries go to war with one another.

As you’ve heard today, while wars have occurred in Europe since 1945, there has never been a war between EU member states.

That experience remains central to European identity.

Even younger generations continue to inherit the belief that the devastation of the Second World War helped create the conditions that ultimately led to European integration.

This legacy also contributed to a strong tradition of pacifism across much of Europe.

Today, however, European governments are grappling with the implications of that legacy. They are attempting to reintroduce conversations about defense, military preparedness, and in some countries even forms of military service.

For societies accustomed to thinking of peace as a permanent condition, this shift presents significant challenges.

There is also the importance of social market economies and welfare states.

Someone asked earlier why values such as equality, inclusion, and social solidarity seem so central to many Europeans’ understanding of their societies.

My answer is simple: Europeans have experienced these systems firsthand.

Many postwar political movements, including conservative parties, helped build welfare institutions.

In Germany, for example, the Christian Democratic Union’s early postwar programs included support for socializing certain public goods and ensuring broad public access to essential services such as electricity and water.

The idea that childcare, healthcare, and other social services should be supported in part by the state has been a significant feature of European political development since 1945.

Those arrangements were not created automatically. They emerged from political struggles, labor movements, public debates, and democratic negotiations.

As a result, many Europeans grew up viewing these protections as normal features of political life.

Being European also involves living comfortably with multiple identities.

As Ryan mentioned earlier, Europeans often cross borders regularly while still maintaining strong attachments to local communities.

People frequently identify themselves simultaneously through regional, national, and European identities.

For example, I am German, but I am also Swabian, from a particular region in southern Germany.

Many Europeans think in similar terms.

The European Union has actively encouraged this by investing heavily in regional development and by recognizing the importance of regional identities.

At the same time, belonging without exclusion remains an ongoing challenge.

Respect for human rights and inclusion is central to the EU’s stated values.

Yet questions of migration, race, identity, and belonging continue to generate tension across Europe.

“Othering” remains a persistent challenge.

Nevertheless, the idea that Europeans share a common commitment to peace, democracy, human rights, and social solidarity continues to serve as an important foundation of European identity.

Some Europeans define that identity in religious terms, such as Christian or Judeo-Christian traditions.

Others understand it differently.

Despite these differences, peace, social democracy, regional belonging, and cooperation remain among the most consistent themes that emerge when Europeans describe what Europe means to them.

You’ve asked this morning about how Europeans see themselves, and this chart addresses the idea of European identity as a hybrid or composite identity.

What I find most striking is how stable these patterns have remained over time.

The data begin in 2010 and include periods marked by major events, including the refugee crisis of 2015-2016. Yet the overall structure of identity has remained remarkably consistent.

The number of people who identify exclusively with their nation-state and not as Europeans has increased somewhat, but only slightly.

The latest data here are from spring 2026. By the way, these figures come from the Eurobarometer surveys. If you teach about Europe, I strongly recommend the Eurobarometer website. The European Union collects extensive public-opinion data on topics ranging from defense and climate change to migration and democracy. It is an excellent resource for educators.

In broad terms, the dominant pattern remains a hybrid identity. Most Europeans see themselves as both national and European.

Only a relatively small percentage of people identify primarily as European and only secondarily as members of their nation-state. At present, that figure is roughly 7 percent.

What this suggests is not the replacement of national identities by European identity, but rather the coexistence of multiple identities.

There has been some modest renationalization in recent years, but overall the pattern remains remarkably stable.

This stability reflects one of the EU’s central goals: encouraging people to see themselves simultaneously as Europeans, citizens of their member state, and members of their local communities.

You do not have to choose between being European, German, and Swabian, for example. These identities can coexist and become more or less salient depending on context.

Another finding I find interesting concerns the distinction between feeling attached to Europe and feeling attached to the European Union.

In my interpretation, attachment to Europe reflects a cultural identity, whereas attachment to the European Union reflects a civic or political identity connected to institutions and governance.

Survey results show that somewhat more people feel attached to Europe than to the European Union.

If we combine those who report feeling “fairly attached” and “very attached,” we find strong identification with Europe as a cultural entity. Attachment to the EU as a political institution is somewhat lower.

That distinction points toward an important difference between cultural belonging and civic engagement.

The country-level data are also interesting.

Among the countries with the strongest attachment to the EU are several Baltic states, as well as Denmark and Ireland.

Among those reporting weaker attachment are countries such as Greece, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, and Estonia.

The EU average is approximately 62 percent reporting attachment to the European Union.

When mapped geographically, there are some visible regional patterns. Older member states such as Germany, Ireland, Sweden, and Spain tend to report relatively strong attachment. Other areas show lower levels of support, revealing both east-west and north-south variations.

With that background in mind, the next question becomes:

What is the European Union actually doing to encourage a stronger sense of European citizenship?

We’ve already discussed some obvious symbols.

The passport is still a national passport, but it carries a common European design.

The euro has also been important. Many people initially resisted replacing national currencies. In Germany, for example, attachment to the Deutschmark was extremely strong.

Once people experienced traveling across borders with a common currency, however, they discovered practical advantages. They could compare prices more easily and move across Europe without exchanging money. For many people, this contributed to a greater sense of belonging within a shared economic space.

The EU has also emphasized human rights as part of its identity project.

European citizenship includes not only individual rights but also collective rights associated with membership in a broader political community.

The EU has increasingly developed an international presence as well. It maintains delegations in approximately 140 countries worldwide.

European citizens traveling abroad know that they can often seek assistance from another EU country’s embassy if their own country lacks representation.

Political rights matter too.

EU citizens who move to another member state cannot vote in national elections there, but they can vote in local elections and European Parliament elections.

That has contributed, at least to some degree, to the development of a shared civic identity.

The EU also invests heavily in cultural and educational programs.

Erasmus+ is perhaps the best-known example.

Many people think of Erasmus solely as a university exchange program, but it extends much further. It supports exchanges for high schools, vocational education, training programs, and workforce mobility.

In fact, vocational training receives a substantial share of Erasmus funding.

A Polish nurse spending several months working in France, for example, participates in the same broader European project of mobility and exchange.

Young Europeans have become particularly aware of these opportunities.

The EU also sponsors initiatives such as the European Capitals of Culture.

Each year, cities receive funding and recognition that highlight their cultural contributions to Europe as a whole.

The EU also invests heavily in research through programs such as Horizon Europe.

For many academics, scientists, and researchers, collaboration across European borders has become a normal and expected part of professional life.

All of these initiatives help foster a sense of belonging.

However, they do not fully address the civic dimension of citizenship.

That brings me to the question I am most interested in:

What does the EU do to create active European citizens?

Over the past several decades, the European Union has invested heavily in civil society.

Someone asked earlier what exactly civil society means.

Historically, the EU’s response was to build a European-level civil society infrastructure.

Between the 1960s and roughly 2000, the EU funded large numbers of umbrella organizations representing causes such as women’s rights, environmental protection, animal welfare, and countless other policy areas.

These organizations established offices in Brussels and became part of the broader policy process.

This approach generated criticism.

Some questioned whether organizations dependent upon EU funding could remain truly independent.

On the other hand, the arrangement ensured sustained interaction between policymakers and organized civic actors.

For decades, these organizations became an important component of policymaking in Brussels.

After the Lisbon Treaty, however, criticism evolved.

Observers increasingly argued that consultation with organized interest groups was not the same thing as direct engagement with citizens.

The EU had succeeded in creating connections with advocacy organizations, but not necessarily with ordinary Europeans.

As a result, policymakers began searching for new ways to engage citizens directly.

One of the flagship initiatives is the European Citizens’ Initiative.

This mechanism allows citizens to propose policy action at the European level.

The process is not easy. Organizers must gather one million signatures from across the European Union on an issue that falls within EU competence.

Once the signatures are verified, the proposal receives formal consideration by European institutions, including the European Parliament and European Commission.

One of the first successful initiatives was the Right2Water campaign launched in 2013.

The initiative emerged partly as a reaction against perceptions that European integration prioritized privatization and market liberalization.

Supporters argued that access to water should be recognized as a public right rather than treated solely as a market commodity.

The initiative succeeded.

Following deliberations within the EU institutions, new policies strengthened recognition of the right to water across Europe.

This remains one of the most successful examples of citizen-driven policymaking at the European level.

Since 2013, approximately 135 European Citizens’ Initiatives have been registered.

Many failed to gather sufficient signatures, while others encountered legal obstacles, but fourteen have succeeded.

Even unsuccessful initiatives often generated valuable public discussion.

Examples include campaigns on pesticide regulation, animal testing in cosmetics, and digital consumer rights.

These initiatives demonstrate that Europeans can act collectively across borders when they identify shared concerns.

A second important development involves public consultations.

Today, virtually every major EU policy initiative undergoes public consultation through the “Have Your Say” platform.

Citizens can provide feedback during multiple stages of policy development. The EU is required not only to collect comments but also to publish reports explaining how those comments were considered.

This is admittedly a cumbersome process.

Yet it represents an effort to address longstanding criticisms that the EU is remote, technocratic, and inaccessible.

My colleagues and I studied these consultations extensively during my sabbatical year.

One striking finding is that participation remains relatively low.

Many consultations attract only a few hundred responses.

Translation into all EU languages has helped increase accessibility, but participation remains limited.

At the same time, some consultations receive extraordinary levels of engagement, sometimes exceeding 10,000 responses and occasionally reaching over 100,000.

Our research suggests that these “super consultations” are usually driven by organized campaigns conducted by civil society organizations.

Groups such as Amnesty International, environmental coalitions, and other advocacy networks encourage their members to participate.

Interestingly, EU officials often treat these campaign-generated submissions differently from independently submitted comments.

This raises important questions about what counts as genuine civic engagement.

In our view, campaigns play an important role. They raise awareness, educate citizens, and encourage participation.

Yet there remains debate within European institutions regarding how such participation should be interpreted.

One challenge is that public awareness remains relatively low.

Less than one-third of Europeans are familiar with many of the participatory tools available through the EU.

The final example I want to discuss is the Conference on the Future of Europe.

Originally planned as a two-year initiative beginning in 2021, it was shortened due to the pandemic.

The goal was ambitious: gather ideas from ordinary Europeans on major questions facing the continent.

The conference focused on themes such as economic and social justice, democracy, climate change, and migration.

Citizens participated through local events, regional discussions, online platforms, and European-level citizen panels.

More than 100,000 events took place across member states.

Ideas generated through those events ultimately fed into citizen panels and eventually reached European policymakers, including Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

This effort represented one of the largest participatory exercises ever conducted at the European level.

It demonstrated how face-to-face engagement and digital participation can be combined.

Our research examined whether countries with lower trust in the EU participated less actively than countries with higher trust.

The relationship was not particularly strong.

Some countries with relatively high trust hosted fewer events, while some countries with lower trust hosted more.

Overall, the results suggest that participation and trust are connected in complicated ways.

The Conference on the Future of Europe demonstrated that large-scale participation is possible.

At the same time, it highlighted how much work remains to be done.

These efforts are taking place at a moment when European institutions face competing priorities, including security concerns, geopolitical challenges, migration pressures, and economic uncertainty.

As a result, it is unclear how much political energy and financial investment will remain available for participatory initiatives.

The future of these programs may also depend on electoral outcomes.

If nationalist and far-right parties gain substantially more influence within the European Parliament and member states, support for civic participation programs could decline.

Many of these initiatives require significant resources and long-term institutional commitment.

For that reason, the political direction of Europe matters greatly.

I never expected to find myself saying this, but there are political forces in Europe that would pose much greater challenges to European integration than governments we currently regard as contentious.

For your students, I think it is useful to view the European Union as a laboratory for democratic innovation.

The EU has frequently been recognized as one of the most participatory political systems among OECD countries.

That does not mean the system is perfect.

Far from it.

The examples I have discussed today all contain limitations, contradictions, and unresolved tensions.

Nevertheless, I believe we have little choice but to become more imaginative about citizen engagement.

Voting alone is no longer sufficient.

Particularly for younger generations, democratic participation must involve additional opportunities for meaningful involvement.

Whether through citizens’ initiatives, consultations, deliberative forums, or new forms of civic participation, we need to continue experimenting.

The European Union offers one of the most ambitious attempts currently underway.

Thank you very much.

Guntis Smidchens: You have been listening to a lecture by Professor Sabine Lang titled Making European Citizens: Civic Engagement Practices in the European Union, recorded at the University of Washington in Seattle on August 11, 2026.

This lecture and podcast were produced by the UW Jackson School of International Studies with support from the European Union.

The views and opinions expressed are those of the speaker alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the University of Washington, the European Union, or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency.

Neither the University of Washington nor the European Union can be held responsible for them.

You also heard the European Anthem, Big Band Version, composed by Pierre Lange and Bertrand Vigier and performed by Pierre Lange, Joe Krenker, and Jean‑Gilles Charvot.