Lecture by Dr. Julio Bonillo
University of Washington EU Democracy & Security Roundtable
June 9, 2026
Guntis Smidchens: Welcome to podcasts hosted by the Center for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, Seattle.
The following lecture was hosted by the University of Washington’s Jean Monnet EU Center of Excellence, funded by the European Union. The views and opinions expressed are those of the speaker alone.
On June 9, 2026, at the University of Washington, we invited Julio Guinea Bonillo to share his thoughts at our Symposium on the Security of European Union Democratic Institutions.
Professor Julio Guinea Bonillo is Deputy Director of the Center for European Studies at Rey Juan Carlos University in Madrid. Among his many publications are books on the European Union’s foreign relations, security, and defense policies.
Professor Guinea Bonillo’s lecture is titled Europe’s Geopolitics: The View from Spain.
Julio Bonillo: Well, I want to start with a brief historical perspective because, as a historian, I think it is important to understand that the concept of strategic autonomy is not new. Its origins do not stem solely from the confrontation with Russia, the war in Ukraine, or the fact that the United States is now under the leadership of Donald Trump.
The idea goes back to the 1950s. We will not go too deeply into that history, but Europe had already attempted to achieve autonomy through its own defense structure with the European Defence Community during the Korean War period.
At that time, Europe’s founding leaders found themselves in a position of weakness. It was the height of the Cold War, and tensions with Stalin’s Soviet Union were high. Before creating a political federation or deeper form of integration, they considered creating a European army.
The proposal came from France, but it ultimately failed because of political instability within France and concerns about losing national sovereignty. Many political actors were reluctant to support such a project. The French political landscape was highly divided, and the left opposed the creation of a European army, particularly if it appeared directed against the Soviet Union.
International circumstances also changed. Stalin died in 1953, tensions eased, and the Korean War came to an end. As a result, many leaders felt there was no longer an immediate threat that justified moving forward with the project. Political instability further weakened support.
The question became: why build a European army if there is no urgent need for one? Member states were reluctant to give up elements of sovereignty that were central to their national identities.
Since then, Europe has often lacked a strong sense of urgency regarding the development of its own military and security capabilities.
It was not until 1992, with the creation of the European Union through the Treaty of Maastricht, that security became part of the broader process of European integration. In some ways, Maastricht introduced elements that had been envisioned decades earlier. We were talking about a Europe of nations, a Europe still largely dominated by its member states.
The second and third pillars of the Maastricht framework introduced intergovernmental cooperation into areas traditionally reserved for national governments. While the Union became more integrated, member states retained significant control over key policy areas.
Since Maastricht, there have been several moments when Europe’s inability to act strategically has been exposed. The wars in the former Yugoslavia were one such moment. Europe was unable to intervene effectively or speak with a unified voice. It was a decisive period when Europe could have played a leading role in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, yet it remained dependent on the United States.
We continued to rely heavily on the transatlantic alliance. A major development came after the Treaty of Amsterdam with the leadership of Javier Solana. As a former Secretary General of NATO, Solana understood where the weaknesses existed and where stronger links were needed between the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance.
In 2003, he presented a security strategy that encouraged the Union to think more strategically. From a Spanish perspective, this reflected a longstanding commitment to deeper European integration. Since joining the European Communities in 1986, Spain has consistently supported a stronger and more federal European Union.
Spain’s position has been to support integration, European citizenship, and the creation of a Union with a stronger political identity. These ideas can be found throughout the reflections and memoirs of former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González.
The Solana years, from 1999 to 2009, were particularly important. However, even during that period, divisions within the Union remained visible. First, those divisions emerged during the Yugoslav conflicts, and later they were evident during the Iraq War.
During the Iraq War, Germany and France opposed the intervention, while Spain and the United Kingdom supported it. At the same time, initiatives such as the Saint-Malo Declaration of 1998 demonstrated that member states could work closely together to strengthen European security and defense cooperation.
Yet whenever major foreign policy issues emerged, divisions among member states often resurfaced.
This highlights an important reality: although we call it the European Union, it is not always united. From Maastricht onward, key intergovernmental elements remained in place, creating opportunities for those who advocate returning powers from Brussels to the member states.
After the failure of the Constitutional Treaty and the rejection of the constitutional project in the French and Dutch referendums of 2005, the European Union moved toward the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty introduced a new institutional framework and a new set of tools.
One of those tools is Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union, which includes provisions for mutual assistance between member states in the event of an attack. France has already invoked similar principles in the past, emphasizing mutual support among partners.
However, the treaty leaves considerable room for interpretation regarding how assistance should be provided. Support can take many forms, ranging from military deployments to logistical assistance or other contributions. The treaty does not specify exactly what those measures must be.
In recent years, security tensions have continued to grow. On the eastern flank, concerns primarily focus on Russia. The dominant narrative in Brussels increasingly centers on military deterrence, hard power, and the broader Eurasian security environment.
At the same time, Spain has worked to draw greater attention to the southern flank. The Spanish perspective is gradually becoming more visible in European discussions. Although Spain is geographically peripheral within Europe, it faces significant security challenges from the south.
We are dealing with migration pressures, instability in the Sahel, terrorism, hybrid threats, and wider Mediterranean security concerns. These issues increasingly affect the European Union as a whole.
Following the COVID-19 crisis, the European Union began paying greater attention to the southern dimension of security. This change can be seen in European Council conclusions and strategic discussions.
Together with several colleagues, I have studied European Council conclusions from the beginning of the integration process to the present day. We have collected and analyzed these documents and observed how the Union’s priorities have changed over time.
In the early years, the focus was largely on economic integration, institution-building, and the development of a common political identity. As new member states joined, however, different concerns entered the discussion.
When Greece joined, Mediterranean issues became more prominent. Greece brought concerns related to Turkey, the Eastern Mediterranean, and developments in the Middle East. During the 1980s, the Community had to adapt to those realities.
Spain’s accession also broadened the Union’s outlook. As a result, the European Council increasingly addressed issues affecting Latin America, the Mediterranean region, and broader international partnerships.
This also raises questions about how Europe should build its relationship with the United States. In recent years, disagreements have emerged between the Spanish government and the United States regarding defense spending and military investment.
For example, the Trump administration strongly promoted higher defense expenditure targets among NATO allies. However, the debate within Europe is not limited to how much money should be spent. The more important question is how that money should be invested.
Europe increasingly discusses the need to strengthen its own defense industrial base. The objective is not simply to purchase equipment from external suppliers but to develop European capabilities and increase strategic autonomy.
Globalization has exposed a number of vulnerabilities and demonstrated weaknesses in Europe’s ability to respond independently to major challenges. As a result, many now argue that Europe needs greater autonomy in critical sectors, including defense and security.
This brings me to my final point. The institutions of the European Union, even with twenty-seven member states, remain relatively weak when measured against the scale of today’s challenges.
Together with colleagues who work within and around the European institutions, I have argued in several publications that the European Union lacks a truly executive government. The European Commission often remains constrained by the preferences of the member states.
The President of the European Commission participates in meetings of the European Council, but ultimate authority frequently remains in the hands of national leaders. Progress depends largely on whether member states are willing to move forward together.
If the member states want deeper integration, the Union can advance. If they do not, progress becomes extremely difficult.
Imagine if the fifty governors of the United States met together to determine national policy. The European Union currently consists of twenty-seven member states, and future enlargement could increase that number to thirty or more as countries from the Western Balkans join the Union.
As membership expands, decision-making becomes increasingly complex.
In my view, the Union’s decision-making procedures have not evolved sufficiently since the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty, and the Lisbon Treaty. Institutional reform remains necessary.
I recognize that reform is difficult because it often requires unanimity. Moving beyond unanimity in foreign and defense policy represents one of the Union’s greatest challenges. Escaping that institutional constraint will not be easy.
Nevertheless, there may be a window of opportunity for reform. Much will depend not only on internal political decisions but also on the external pressures facing Europe. Those pressures may encourage Europeans to support deeper cooperation and stronger common institutions.
At the same time, the growth of far-right movements across Europe has strengthened demands to return powers from Brussels to national capitals. This reflects a broader tension between deeper integration and the reassertion of national sovereignty.
We are witnessing a struggle between centripetal forces that pull Europe together and centrifugal forces that push authority back toward the member states.
Whether opening a discussion on treaty reform would ultimately benefit the Union remains an open question. That is the political arena in which Europe currently finds itself.
I think the most interesting part of our discussion will be the questions that you raise, and I am happy to discuss them with you.
Thank you very much.
Guntis Smidchens: Thank you. You have been listening to Julio Guinea Bonillo speaking at the Symposium on the Security of European Union Democratic Institutions, recorded at the University of Washington in Seattle on June 9, 2026.
This lecture and podcast were produced by the UW Jackson School of International Studies and supported by funding from the European Union.
The views and opinions expressed are those of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect those of the University of Washington, the European Union, or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency.
Neither the University of Washington nor the European Union can be held responsible for those views.
You also heard the European Anthem, Big Band Version, composed by Pierre Lange and Bertrand Vigier and performed by Pierre Lange, Joe Krenker, and Jean-Gilles Charvot.