Lecture by Dr. Travis J. Nelson
University of Washington Educators Workshop
August 11, 2026
Guntis Smidchens: Welcome to podcasts hosted by the Center for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, Seattle.
The following lecture was hosted by UW’s Jean Monnet EU Center of Excellence, funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are those of the speaker only.
On August 11, 2026, we invited Dr. Travis J. Nelson to speak at our annual Educators Workshop with a lecture on European Union Democracy and Institutions.
Dr. Nelson is Associate Dean of International Education and Special Academic Programs at Edmonds College and a part-time instructor in the University of Washington’s Department of Political Science.
Travis Nelson: So, in this presentation, I am focusing on the concept of democracy in Europe.
I am going to begin with some history. First, I will discuss what has been called the democratic deficit debate and trace the evolution of that debate over time. Then I will examine how the European Union and its institutions have come to function as a backstop against democratic backsliding within member states.
The concept of a democratic deficit arises from the idea that a supranational organization such as the European Union exercises authority that has been delegated by member states.
However, individual citizens often feel they have limited influence over the policies and mandates that emerge from EU institutions.
At the beginning of European integration, the European Commission held most of the authority. The European Parliament had relatively little power in creating or implementing new policies.
European Commissioners are appointed by member states. Each member state nominates a commissioner, meaning commissioners are not directly elected by European citizens. Although they often have prior democratic experience within their own countries, they serve in appointed rather than elected positions at the EU level.
Similarly, member-state governments shape much of EU policymaking through intergovernmental processes that operate somewhat outside direct parliamentary control.
As a result, many European citizens have historically felt somewhat distant from EU decision-making.
Andrew Moravcsik, a well-known political scientist, argues that the European Union does not actually suffer from a democratic deficit.
According to Moravcsik, the EU functions primarily as a regulatory agency.
In most democracies, citizens elect representatives who then delegate certain responsibilities to bureaucratic institutions. Those institutions carry out the policies and objectives established by elected officials.
Moravcsik argues that the EU operates in much the same way.
For example, citizens in the United States do not vote directly for members of the Federal Reserve Board. Instead, they elect presidents and legislators who appoint officials responsible for monetary policy.
Similarly, Moravcsik contends that many EU decisions are highly technical in nature, involving areas such as banking regulation, trade policy, and environmental standards. These areas are often intentionally insulated from day-to-day political pressures.
From this perspective, the EU is not fundamentally undemocratic. Rather, it reflects a particular model of democracy that relies on delegated authority and specialized expertise.
Other scholars, including Simon Hix and Andreas Follesdal, disagree.
They argue that while national governments remain accountable to their citizens on domestic issues, EU issues do not always appear clearly on national political agendas.
As a result, elections to the European Parliament are often fought primarily over domestic concerns rather than EU-wide policy questions.
When voters cast ballots for Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), they frequently do so based on national political issues rather than European ones.
Because of this, critics argue that the European Parliament has historically operated with a relatively weak democratic mandate. Voters often do not clearly understand what policies they are supporting at the European level.
Historically, voter turnout in European Parliament elections has also been relatively low compared with national elections.
According to this critique, regulatory independence is acceptable only when there is sufficient democratic input somewhere within the system. If democratic input is weak throughout the process, independence can begin to resemble opacity.
The European Parliament emerged from the institutions of the European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1952.
Although a parliamentary body existed, it possessed very limited legislative authority. It could not initiate legislation, block legislation, or exercise significant policymaking power. Its role was largely advisory.
A major shift occurred in 1979 with the first direct elections to the European Parliament. For the first time, citizens could directly elect their representatives.
Even then, however, Members of the European Parliament held relatively little actual power. National governments remained reluctant to transfer substantial authority to the Parliament.
Consequently, the Parliament became more democratic in terms of representation, but remained politically weak.
By 2009, the Lisbon Treaty significantly expanded parliamentary influence.
The treaty strengthened the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, under which the European Parliament and the Council jointly legislate on most EU laws.
The European Commission could no longer act alone on many policy issues.
Parliament gained the power to veto legislation and approve or reject the President of the European Commission. It also acquired greater influence over the appointment of commissioners and the overall direction of EU policymaking.
On paper, these reforms appeared to address many concerns associated with the democratic deficit.
However, questions remained regarding how the EU’s supranational institutions would exercise authority during major crises, particularly the financial crisis and migration crisis.
These events raised new questions about the balance between democratic accountability and technocratic governance.
Today, the European Parliament functions as a genuine legislative body under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure.
It can:
- Legislate jointly with the Council of the European Union
- Approve or reject Commission appointments
- Question commissioners
- Remove the Commission through a vote of censure
- Approve the EU budget
One of Parliament’s most significant powers is its role in determining and approving the EU budget.
At the same time, important limitations remain.
The Parliament:
- Cannot formally initiate legislation
- Cannot dictate monetary policy, which remains the responsibility of the independent European Central Bank
- Cannot override unanimous decisions made by member states in certain policy areas
- Cannot directly force member states to implement EU laws
As a result, Parliament is powerful when consensus exists, but considerably weaker in cases of deep disagreement among member states.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ), more formally known as the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), has gradually assumed a larger role in promoting and protecting democratic governance within the European Union.
Two landmark judicial decisions are frequently cited as foundational in establishing the authority of EU law: Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlands (1963) and Costa v. ENEL (1964).
The Van Gend en Loos case involved a Dutch company that imported goods from Germany. The Dutch government imposed an import tariff on those goods, despite provisions within the treaties creating the European Economic Community.
The company challenged the tariff, arguing that it violated European law. The case ultimately reached the European Court of Justice.
The Court ruled in favor of the company, establishing the principle of direct effect. This doctrine holds that European law creates rights for individuals that can be enforced directly in national courts.
In other words, EU law is not simply an agreement between governments. It can also create enforceable rights for citizens and businesses.
The second landmark case, Costa v. ENEL, further expanded the authority of European law.
Flaminio Costa was an Italian citizen and shareholder in an electricity company that was nationalized by the Italian government and incorporated into the new state-owned utility, ENEL. Costa argued that the nationalization violated European law and refused to pay his electricity bill.
After losing in the Italian courts, he appealed through the European legal system.
The European Court ruled that when a conflict exists between national law and European law, European law takes precedence.
This established the doctrine of the supremacy of EU law, meaning that member states cannot simply ignore their treaty obligations by passing conflicting national legislation.
Together, Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL laid the constitutional foundations of the European legal order.
Scholars such as Walter Mattli, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and others have argued that the European Court of Justice effectively constructed constitutional principles through decades of litigation.
National courts gradually accepted doctrines such as direct effect and supremacy. Through judicial decisions rather than a formal constitutional convention, the Court helped create a constitutional legal order within the European Union.
As a result, constitutional principles emerged through case law and ongoing judicial dialogue between national courts and European institutions.
Yet these developments primarily addressed the relationship between EU law and national law. They did not directly solve the question of how European institutions might defend democracy when member states themselves began moving in an authoritarian direction.
In recent years, concerns have emerged about democratic backsliding within several EU member states.
Hungary is one of the most frequently cited examples.
Under Viktor Orbán, Hungary experienced a sustained erosion of democratic norms and institutions. The government weakened judicial independence, placed loyalists in key positions throughout the court system, and restricted media freedom.
Civil society organizations faced increasing pressure, and the Central European University, one of the region’s leading institutions of higher education, was eventually forced to relocate most of its operations outside Hungary.
As a result, Hungary became the focus of repeated criticism and legal challenges from European institutions over violations of democratic principles and fundamental rights.
Poland experienced similar concerns.
Judicial reforms implemented by the Polish government increased executive influence over the courts and raised questions about the independence of both the judiciary and the Constitutional Tribunal.
These developments created an important challenge for the European Union:
How can democratic institutions within the EU defend democracy when democratically elected governments within member states are themselves undermining democratic norms?
One answer has been the increasingly active role of the European Court of Justice.
Several major cases illustrate how the Court has functioned as a safeguard against democratic erosion.
One notable example involved judicial retirement ages in Hungary.
The Hungarian government lowered the mandatory retirement age for judges from 70 to 62. In practice, this forced a large number of experienced judges from office almost immediately.
Approximately 274 judges were required to retire early in a single year.
Critics argued that the policy allowed the government to remove judges viewed as politically independent and replace them with individuals more closely aligned with the ruling party.
The European Court of Justice ruled against Hungary, determining that the measure constituted unjustified age discrimination and violated European law.
Hungary ultimately modified the policy, reinstated some affected judges, and adjusted the retirement framework.
The significance of the case extended beyond employment law. It demonstrated how European institutions could defend judicial independence indirectly through legal mechanisms available under EU law.
This is a useful illustration of a broader principle in international politics.
There is no global police force that automatically enforces international law. Similarly, the European Union lacks a traditional coercive enforcement mechanism. It cannot simply remove officials from office or deploy force to compel compliance.
Instead, it relies on institutions, courts, and legal obligations.
What is noteworthy is that even governments frequently at odds with Brussels often comply with adverse court decisions.
Another important dispute involved the suspension of EU funding.
The European Union decided to withhold financial resources from Hungary because of persistent concerns related to rule-of-law violations.
Hungary challenged the decision in court.
The European Court of Justice upheld the EU’s authority to condition funding on compliance with core democratic and legal standards.
Over time, the EU has increasingly linked financial assistance to rule-of-law requirements. Member states that fail to maintain democratic governance or comply with EU obligations risk losing access to significant funding.
As a result, financial resources have become one of the EU’s most important tools for promoting democratic accountability.
In this context, money functions as leverage.
Rather than relying on coercive enforcement, the European Union can withhold funds, delay disbursements, or impose financial consequences when member states violate shared principles.
Taken together, these mechanisms create a multi-layered system designed to prevent democratic backsliding within the European Union.Several safeguards operate simultaneously:
- The EU can suspend certain rights of member states under specific circumstances.
- The European Court of Justice can invalidate national measures that violate EU law.
- The European Commission can launch infringement proceedings.
- The EU can withhold funding through rule-of-law conditionality.
- Political pressure from other member states can reinforce these institutional mechanisms.
This layered structure means that if one mechanism proves ineffective, others remain available.
For example, the European Court of Justice cannot directly remove a national judge. However, it can rule that judicial independence is a legal requirement under EU law, forcing governments to revise policies that undermine it.
The result is a system in which democratic norms are protected not by a single institution, but through overlapping legal, political, and financial safeguards.
The Eurozone financial crisis raised a new set of questions regarding democracy and accountability within the European Union.
Following the global financial crisis, several EU member states faced severe debt problems. Countries such as Greece, Ireland, and Spain required financial assistance to avoid economic collapse.
In response, a group often referred to as the “Troika” was formed, consisting of:
- The European Commission
- The European Central Bank (ECB)
- The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
The Troika coordinated financial assistance packages for struggling member states while also imposing conditions intended to prevent future crises.
As part of this process, the European Union adopted new fiscal rules and oversight mechanisms designed to promote financial stability.
One of the most significant developments was the Fiscal Compact.
The Fiscal Compact reflected ideas strongly influenced by German economic thinking, particularly the tradition known as ordoliberalism.
Ordoliberalism emphasizes fiscal discipline, balanced budgets, and strong economic rules. Its basic premise is that states should live within their means and avoid excessive public debt.
Supporters argued that one of the lessons of the Eurozone crisis was that some governments had accumulated unsustainable levels of debt and spending.
The Fiscal Compact therefore imposed stricter requirements on member states, including requirements to maintain balanced budgets and limit budget deficits.
While limits on deficits already existed under Eurozone rules, the new framework strengthened enforcement mechanisms and oversight.
Another important innovation was the European Semester.
Under this system, member states submit their national budgets to the European Commission for review before final implementation.
The Commission evaluates whether proposed budgets comply with EU fiscal rules and can issue recommendations or criticisms when countries fail to meet established standards.
The EU also strengthened the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), which allows the Commission to monitor government borrowing and, in certain circumstances, impose penalties on member states that repeatedly violate deficit limits.
Additionally, the adoption of reverse qualified majority voting made it more difficult for governments to block enforcement actions.
Together, these reforms significantly expanded supranational oversight of national economic policy.
Critics argued that these reforms came with democratic costs.
When unelected institutions review national budgets and require changes to elected governments’ policy programs, tensions inevitably arise between technocratic governance and democratic accountability.
For example, governments elected to expand social welfare programs or reduce unemployment sometimes found their proposals constrained by fiscal rules enforced at the European level.
Spain provides one example. Democratic governments elected to address unemployment and stimulate economic growth faced pressure to reduce spending in order to comply with deficit targets.
Similarly, in Greece, voters elected governments such as Syriza that campaigned against austerity policies. Yet many of the policies these governments wished to implement were limited by agreements negotiated with European institutions and international lenders.
As a result, critics argued that political power had shifted away from national parliaments and toward appointed experts and bureaucratic institutions.
Citizens could vote for particular economic programs, but elected governments often lacked complete freedom to implement those programs.
This situation reignited concerns about the democratic deficit.
The central question became:
Can policymaking remain genuinely democratic when important economic decisions are constrained by unelected institutions?
The economic consequences of austerity contributed to significant political backlash across Europe.
Citizens increasingly challenged what they perceived as a technocratic consensus imposed from Brussels.
New political movements emerged, including:
- Podemos in Spain
- Syriza in Greece
- The Five Star Movement in Italy
These parties often criticized austerity measures, fiscal restrictions, and the growing authority of supranational institutions.
In many countries, prolonged economic hardship fueled broader populist movements that questioned established political institutions.
In Spain, youth unemployment exceeded 50 percent during parts of the crisis, contributing to widespread frustration with existing political and economic arrangements.
These developments revealed an important tension at the heart of European integration:
Economic stability may require supranational coordination, but excessive technocratic oversight can generate democratic dissatisfaction.
Rather than abandoning technocratic governance altogether, the European Union sought to redirect it toward protecting democratic values.
One significant innovation has been the growing use of budget conditionality.
Under this approach, financial assistance and access to certain EU funds are linked to compliance with the rule of law and democratic standards.
The case of Hungary provides a notable example.
The EU has withheld funds from Hungary in response to concerns regarding judicial independence, corruption, media freedom, and democratic governance.
This reflects a shift in how EU institutions use their authority.
Where earlier mechanisms focused primarily on fiscal discipline, newer mechanisms increasingly emphasize democracy, institutional accountability, and constitutional governance.
At its core, the European Union is built on a democratic premise.
Democratic member states voluntarily delegate certain powers to supranational institutions.
Those institutions, in turn, are expected to govern according to democratic principles.
Yet supranational democracy faces challenges that national democracies do not.
One challenge is the absence of a fully developed European political community, or what political theorists call a demos.
Most citizens continue to participate politically primarily through national elections rather than transnational ones.
Language differences, cultural diversity, and national political traditions remain important features of European political life.
As a result, holding supranational officials accountable can be more difficult than holding national governments accountable.
The European Union has responded to these challenges by developing a distinctive institutional structure.
Rather than relying exclusively on majority rule, it combines several elements:
- Technocratic independence
- Democratic representation
- Judicial oversight
- Supranational governance
- National sovereignty
Over time, the European Parliament has become more powerful.
The European Court of Justice has expanded its role in defending democratic norms and constitutional principles.
Multiple layers of governance now interact to create checks and balances at both the national and European levels.
The question remains whether these mechanisms are sufficient.
Today, democracy in Europe faces several continuing challenges.
These include:
- Authoritarian tendencies and democratic backsliding
- Populist challenges to EU institutions
- Climate-related crises
- Migration pressures
- Geopolitical competition
- Security threats from powers such as Russia and China
These challenges often encourage governments to rely on executive authority and technocratic decision-making.
While such responses can sometimes produce effective policy outcomes, they may also increase concerns regarding democratic legitimacy.
The tension between efficiency and accountability therefore remains unresolved.
The debate over democracy in the European Union extends beyond Europe itself.
The world does not have a single global government. However, it does have a growing number of international and supranational institutions, including:
- The European Union
- The United Nations
- The World Trade Organization
If these organizations exercise authority without meaningful democratic accountability, important global decisions may increasingly be made by experts and technocrats without direct public participation.
For this reason, the debate surrounding the EU’s democratic deficit has significance far beyond Europe.
The European Union serves as one of the world’s most developed examples of supranational governance, and its successes and failures offer important lessons for global politics.
The democratic deficit is a real and legitimate concern, but it has evolved significantly over time.
Whether one agrees with Andrew Moravcsik’s argument that the EU functions primarily as a regulatory bureaucracy, or with critics who emphasize the distance between citizens and institutions, it is clear that the European Union has changed considerably.
The European Parliament has evolved from a largely advisory body into a genuine co-legislator with substantial authority.
The European Court of Justice has become a central institution in defending democratic norms and preventing democratic backsliding within member states.
At the same time, crises such as the Eurozone financial crisis and the migration crisis continue to expose tensions within the European project and raise difficult questions about democratic legitimacy and technocratic governance.
The European Union remains an imperfect, contested, and evolving experiment in supranational democracy.
Yet its institutions, including the Parliament, the Court of Justice, and the Commission, continue to play an important role in promoting and defending democratic values, even when member states themselves challenge those values.
Thank you.