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Analyzing Finland’s and NATO’s Cybersecurity Strategies

October 20, 2023

Author:

Sophie Himka

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine represents a historic shift in Finland’s security environment. The 2022 Ukraine-Russia war has caused Finland to reevaluate its security situation as it shares a 1,340 km (830 mi) border with Russia on its eastern side.[1] As a result, Finland has forsaken its decades-long stance of neutrality and ascended into NATO. Although Russo-Finnish relations have been stable over the last several decades, the threat of Russia has always been considerable, and now that Finland has joined NATO, Russia has not held back on stating its plans for retaliatory measures.[2]

As a major cyber actor and because of the conflict in Ukraine is using, Russia will most likely turn to cyberspace to confront Finland’s decision to join NATO.[3] While Finland has implemented a robust cybersecurity strategy and has technologically advanced systems, the increased threat from Russia means that Finland likely must increase its focus on cybersecurity to safeguard its systems. With its NATO ascension, exchanging operational cyber knowledge can potentially improve Finland’s and NATO’s cyber capabilities.

Overview of Russia – Finnish Relations

Finland has a conflict-ridden history with Russia, shown clearly by its conflicts with the Soviet Union twice during World War II. The first of these conflicts was the Winter War, lasting from 1939-1940. The war was the result of the Soviet Union’s goal of defending its borders against Germany. The USSR requested that Finland to shift its border 16 miles back along the Karelian Isthmus to allow a buffer zone around Leningrad.[4] However, Finland refused to comply, instead strengthening its eastern border and cutting diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union. In response, on November 30, 1939 the Soviet Union attacked Finland. The Finns fought back, yet they were no match for the Soviet Union, and in the end, Finland was forced to yield, resulting in an 11% loss of territory under the Treaty of Moscow.[5]

The second conflict was the Continuation War, which lasted  from 1941-1944. This conflict involved Finland and Nazi Germany fighting against the Soviet Union. In 1940, Hitler came to Finland and asked if Germany could send troops into Finland for passage to Norway. Finland agreed in hopes that the presence of German troops would serve as a warning to keep the Soviet Union from claiming more Finnish territory.[6] However, this, too, was a failure as Germany lost the war, and Finland was advised to make peace with the Soviet Union–which extended an armistice agreement.[7] While unsatisfied with the armistice, Finland ultimately agreed to it, and relocated over 400,000 inhabitants from territories lost to Russia, and pay war indemnities worth $300 million (4.9 billion euros today), leaving Finland in economic hardship.[8]

Furthermore, in 1948, Finland signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union.[9] This agreement established a foundation for Finnish – Soviet relations. Contributing most significantly to the creation of these relations was Article 1 in the agreement, which required military cooperation between the two countries if Germany and other allied powers were to launch an attack.[10] Additionally, a considerable Soviet aim of this treaty was to deter Western powers from possibly launching attacks using Finnish territory, as Finland shares a lengthy geographic border with the Soviet Union.[11] The agreement essentially created a sphere of economic and political dependency on the Soviet Union that further isolated Finland from Western Europe and decreased Finnish integration into US and European-led international institutions.[12]

While these events happened during WWII, the Soviet Union, and after 1991, Russia remained a pressing security threat to Finland. Throughout the decades of the Cold War, Finland worked to keep relations stable with the USSR and maintained relations with Russia primarily to monitor potential security implications it could pose after its collapse. Additionally, with a shared border, Finland desired to keep stable communication to ensure border stability and security, as the security threat of Russia could weaken its geographical position by posing a nuclear or military threat.[13]

Russia and Finnish Cybersecurity

Before Finland joined NATO, like many countries, it was the victim of numerous cyberattacks; however, the cyberattacks were much less frequent. For instance, in 2019 a denial of service attack was conducted on a Finnish voting site. While Finland does not utilize electronic voting, the site kept voting tallies. However, an attack such as this has the potential to cause voter distrust in the government.[14] Following in 2020, there was an attack on the company Vastaamo, a psychotherapy company, where thousands of children, teenagers and adults psychotherapy records were released. With many of the patients “receiving emails with a demand of 200 euro in bitcoin” so as to prevent their files from being released. With further investigation, security experts reported leaked information on the dark web from over 2,000 patients.[15]

Russia has always been a consistent threat to Finland’s security, but ubiquitous digitization has given Russia new channels of access to Finland in the form of cyberattacks. Even now, the cyber threat level in Finland is incredibly high, with Finland facing cyberattacks daily, ranging from ransomware attacks to hacktivist attacks involving multiple actors.[16] Russian attacks are prominent amongst the overall pattern of attacks. In April 2022, while Ukrainian President Volodymir Zelensky spoke to the Finnish Parliament presumably Russian hackers took out the parliament’s site and several other foreign ministries through a Distributed Denial of Service Attack (DDoS)  Moments before the attack, there was also a breach of Finnish airspace by a two Russian MiG – 31 Fighter Jets.[17]

Another attack occurred in August 2022 by the pro-Russian hacker group NoName057(16).[18] Similar to the previous attack in April, the group brought down the Finnish Parliament’s website, citing its NATO application as the reason for the attack.[19] Moreover, in January 2023, the healthcare systems of several countries, one of them being Finland, were hit with a cyberattack originating from the Passion botnet linked to the hacking group Anonymous Russia.[20] A recent attack happened in April 2023, committed again by NoName057(16), who launched an attack on a parliamentary website using a DDoS attack. This attack was the same day that Finland officially joined NATO.[21] With these increasing cyber attacks, Russia has proven itself to be a significant threat to Finland’s security environment.

Finland’s Cybersecurity Strategy

Finland has a comprehensive regulatory environment consisting of several components that work together to contribute to the functioning of Finland’s government. Within this environment cybersecurity has become a pressing concern in recent years as cyberattacks are increasingly threatening the security of Finland.

In 2019, Finland revised its previous 2013 cybersecurity strategy to support the development of its cybersecurity and to protect vital components necessary to the functioning of digital services.[22] Under this strategy, Finland has delegated cybersecurity-related matters to several governmental entities, such as the Security Committee, who are responsible for providing recommendations on cybersecurity-related issues, often requested by a ministry.[23]

Currently, there are 12 ministries, each supporting a different mandate and are responsible for the respective duties.[24] An example of ministries with the most involvement in cybersecurity are the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of the Interior, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Followed by this is the Finnish Transport and Communications Agency, and Traficom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-FI), whose mission is to compile, maintain, and distribute the situation to the support networks and branches of government.[25] These government entities and components work together to ensure the efficient functioning of cyber-related matters within the government and are all supported by the National Cybersecurity Strategy.

Finland’s 2019 cybersecurity strategy is organized into three components: (1) advancing international cooperation; (2) improving coordination of cybersecurity management; and (3) developing cybersecurity competence.[26] Furthermore, the strategy states that participation in international conversations about cybersecurity is essential to maintain system security and allow for continuous improvement of Finnish systems. With international cooperation at the forefront of the cybersecurity strategy, coordinated by the Foreign Ministry,  Finland has been active in international organizations such as the European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the framework of NATO partnership programs until it became a full-fledged member.[27] Finland is involved in these organizations primarily because of goal alignment and what they provide Finland. For instance, the Council of Europe supports democracy and the rule of law, which Finland actively supports.[28] Additionally, Finland strongly advocates for international peace and finding resolutions that do not involve war or conflict, something the UN’s mission involves.[29] Thus, membership in these organizations has the potential to contribute significantly to Finland’s cybersecurity environment and facilitate the creation of international laws that align with Finland’s agenda with the prospect of strengthening cybersecurity and resilience.

Finland’s participation in these international organizations, especially the EU, contributes to developing national cyber policy. For example, Finland actively participates in the EU’s ongoing development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy on cybersecurity and new legislative initiatives such as the EU Network and Information Security Directive (NIS)–a relatively new initiative working to expand cybersecurity involvement to new entities and sectors, allowing for improved resilience and incident response.[30] Involvement in these initiatives and working with the EU to develop new cyber-related policies play a significant role in Finland’s development of its cyber landscape.[31] By participating in international organizations, Finland can achieve its objective of cooperation with the international community. This allows Finland to strengthen its cyber operations through collaboration on methods to increase attribution and expand its threshold for response to cyber incidents.

Following its focus on international cooperation, Finland is working to advance its coordination of cybersecurity management. Finland’s primary method to achieve this improved coordination is developing a program that promotes partnership and planning. The original program began with the 2013 cybersecurity strategy but was inefficient as it only implemented proposals from singular actors overseeing its development along with the relevant authorities.[32] The new program will involve all twelve ministries.[33] The central goal of this program is to solidify national cybersecurity policies and to create a clearer overall picture of cybersecurity-related projects, research, and new programs.[34]

Part of the new program is to create a Cyber Security Director appointed by the Ministry of Transport and Communications with the duties of cybersecurity development coordination. However, it is essential to note that while the cybersecurity director oversees the coordination of new developments, each ministry retains its cyber-related responsibilities.[35] With new leadership under the cybersecurity director, coordination involving all twelve ministries, the security committee, and all cybersecurity actors will be developed. Additionally, those involved in the cybersecurity industry will participate in developing the program, as it is essential to have information flow and cooperation between the public and private sectors.

Furthermore, the establishment of the NCSC, cybersecurity directors, and program implementations all help make up the backbone of intergovernmental collaboration. This backbone enables effective communication and coordination of information, allowing for the correct responses in the event of a cyber attack.

Finland has been developing cyber competence in public administration, such as high-quality university research and training citizens and businesses in awareness, readiness, and response.[36]  Utilizing solutions such as these will enhance the resilience of information and technological systems, as citizens and businesses will have protocols to follow in the event of an attack instead of relying entirely on cyber authorities. Regarding the private sector, which has a prominent presence in the cyber domain, having access to a reliable and real-time assessment of a cyber situation can be vital in securing their systems and recovery.[37] Access to cybersecurity experts and competent personnel aids in advancing company skills and cooperation among the business community and research done by experts through the exchange of information.[38]

Additionally, companies who do not have a focus in technology and cyber-related products are just as at risk as those who do. When a cyberattack or related incident takes place, companies not involved in the tech sector could be facing consequences just as significant. Therefore, it is essential to establish and develop cyber competence within these companies as well as require advanced personnel training.[39] Furthermore, developing regulations and requirements can include establishing training programs at the educational and university levels that will primarily focus on software and digital security. Moreover, implementing national training and exercising a digital security system focusing on training public administration, companies, and the various stakeholders and citizens.[40]

NATO’s Cybersecurity Strategy

As the cyber threat landscape continually changes with emerging actors and rapidly advancing technologies, international organizations such as NATO prioritize having a cybersecurity strategy to help ensure collective security. NATO’s cybersecurity strategy provides insight into the primary goals and principles of prevention, resilience, and non-duplication.[41] These goals and principles apply to the three core tasks of NATO, outlined in the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels, which include collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security, emphasizing defense and deterrence.[42] Apparent in many countries’ cybersecurity strategies are protocols for the prevention of cyber attacks, crisis management frameworks, the preparation of systems, and recovery actions, all of which aid in the concept of resilience. The last primary goal is non-duplication, rooted in cooperative and collaborative security, increasing countries’ cyber resilience with shared knowledge.[43] The non-duplication principle has recently become more prevalent as NATO and other allies have begun prioritizing cybersecurity and classifying it as a genuine and upcoming threat. Therefore, NATO and its allies often conduct joint exercises and exchange knowledge on cybersecurity.[44]

The overarching goal of NATO’s cybersecurity strategy emphasizes defense and deterrence, and it facilitates exchanges with allies to develop expertise in shared goals and values involving cyber deterrence and defense. At the 2021 NATO Summit, NATO’s strategy and goals were further solidified by the allies’  commitment to adhere to international law and pursue initiatives that would represent the core tasks and principles, through enhanced stability and mitigating the risks of conflict.[45] Moreover, NATO’s strategy includes an emphasis on working with the private sector, as many companies have a significant presence in cyberspace, especially those who develop cyber technology and those at risk of cyber attacks.[46] Therefore, collaboration with private sector companies is essential to create a stable cyber environment and mitigate cyber-attacks. NATO’s cyber strategy encompasses and connects the principles and tasks that promote collective security, emphasizing defense and deterrence.

The Intersection of NATO and Finland’s Cybersecurity Strategies

Finland’s and NATO’s cyber strategies differ in various ways; however, with Finland’s ascension into NATO, some similarities they share are becoming more apparent. NATO’s strategy of developing crisis management and cooperative security aligns with Finland’s strategy of improved cybersecurity management enabling resilience.[47] NATO and Finland share this common theme of resilience, and NATO’s prioritization of crisis management fits into Finland’s goal of cybersecurity management.[48] From this, authorities can develop crisis management protocols that can enact cooperative security, leading to resilience on both sides. Finland has strong views on international cooperation, believing it is one of the essential components contributing to a country’s security environment.[49] One of NATO’s principles is non-duplication, which promotes collaboration to strengthen cybersecurity measures. Even before Finland ascended into NATO, it worked with them in close collaboration, and now, full membership unifies their cyber resilience in conducting joint exercises and sharing knowledge.[50]

Furthermore, the strategies of both Finland and NATO identify the desire for cooperation with the private sector, as they are an integral part of the security environment.[51] Finland believes that private sector companies need protocols to protect their systems, as some are the most vulnerable in the areas of critical infrastructure.[52] NATO also advocates for this, wanting member nations’ governments to work with their private sector. While Finland and NATO share many of the same values in cybersecurity, Finland fails to identify a robust cyber defense and deterrence strategy. Therefore, NATO can fill in the gaps for what Finland lacks in cyber deterrence and defense strategies by providing the necessary knowledge that protects their systems from cyber attacks.

Conclusion

With Russia’s cyber-threats looming over Finland, and the likelihood these threats will not be mitigated anytime soon, Finland’s ascension into NATO will act as a barrier and unify Finland and NATO in cyberspace. The cybersecurity strategy of Finland is robust and incorporates both public and private sectors to expand development in cybersecurity competence and management that improve system security.[53] NATO’s strategies establish clear principles and goals that can be applied to all member allies, including Finland.[54] NATO contributes to Finland’s strategy by improving their cyber defense and deterrence knowledge. Finland, a member nation, will now collaborate with NATO partners on increasing cyber resilience. The shared principles, ideas, and contributions between NATO and Finland promote the resilience of Finland and NATO. The outline of new protocols for cyber threats provide information on how to utilize new technologies and cyber strategies in the cyber sphere.

Endnotes

[1] Kostya Manenkov, and Sergei Grits, “Newest NATO Member Finland Starts Building Fence on Russian Border,” PBS, April 15, 2023, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/newest-nato-member-finland-starts-building-fence-on-russian-border

[2] Euronews, “Russia Warns of ‘retaliatory Measures’ over Finland’s NATO Membership,” euronews, April 4, 2023, https://www.euronews.com/2023/04/04/russia-warns-of-retaliatory-measures-over-finlands-nato-membership

[3] James Reddick, “Finland, Now a NATO Member, Sees an Uptick in Cyberattacks,” The Record from Recorded Future News, April 21, 2023, https://therecord.media/finland-reports-uptick-in-cyberattacks-after-nato-membership

[4] Evan Andrews, “What Was the Winter War,” History, November 30, 2016, https://www.history.com/news/what-was-the-winter-war

[5] Sidney B. Fay, “RUSSO-FINNISH RELATIONS,” Current History 6, no. 33 (1944): 385–90. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45306513

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Anne Kaureanen, and Johan Ahlander, “A Brief History of Finland’s and Sweden’s Strained Ties with Russia,” Reuters, May 11, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/brief-history-finlands-swedens-strained-ties-with-russia-2022-05-12/

[9] DBpedia, “Finno-Soviet Treaty of 1948,” DBpedia (n.d.), https://dbpedia.org/page/Finno-Soviet_Treaty_of_1948

[10] Countrystudies, “The Cold War and the Treaty of 1948,” countrystudies (n.d.), https://countrystudies.us/finland/24.htm

[11] DBpedia, “Finno-Soviet Treaty of 1948,” DBpedia (n.d.), https://dbpedia.org/page/Finno-Soviet_Treaty_of_1948

[12] Anne Kaureanen, and Johan Ahlander, “A Brief History of Finland’s and Sweden’s Strained Ties with Russia,” Reuters, May 11, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/brief-history-finlands-swedens-strained-ties-with-russia-2022-05-12/

[13] Henri Vanhanen, “Something New, Something Old – Finland on the Verge of a New Russia Relationship,” Wilson Center, September 7, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/something-new-something-old-finland-verge-new-russia-relationship

[14] Synergia Foundation, “Finland Suffers Major Cyber Attack” Synergia Foundation, April 12, 2019, https://www.synergiafoundation.org/insights/analyses-assessments/finland-suffers-major-cyber-attack

[15] The Guardian, “‘shocking’ Hack of Psychotherapy Records in Finland Affects Thousands,” The Guardian, October 26, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/26/tens-of-thousands-psychotherapy-records-hacked-in-finland

[16] Helsinki Times, “Cybersecurity Threat Level Remains High in Finland – Targeted Attacks on the Rise,” Helsinki Times, April 21, 2023, https://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/domestic/23428-cybersecurity-threat-level-remains-high-in-finland-targeted-attacks-on-the-rise.html

[17] Lexi Lonas, “Finland Hit by Cyberattack, Airspace Breach,” The Hill, April 8, 2022, https://thehill.com/policy/international/3262439-finland-hit-by-cyber-attack-airspace-breach/

[18] Vilius Petkauskas, “Russian hackers Target Finland’s parliament,” Cybernews, August 10, 2022, https://cybernews.com/cyber-war/russian-hackers-target-finland-parliaments-website/

[19] Ibid.

[20] Jessica Davis, “Passion Botnet Cyberattacks Hit Healthcare, as Actors Offer Threat as Ddos-as-a-Service,” SC Media, February 2, 2023, https://www.scmagazine.com/analysis/cybercrime/passion-botnet-cyberattacks-hit-healthcare-as-actors-offer-threat-as-ddos-as-a-service

[21] Karl Greenberg, “DDoS Attacks Rise as Pro-Russia Groups Attack Finland, Israel,” TechRepublic, April 6, 2023, https://www.techrepublic.com/article/ddos-attacks-finland-israel/

[22] The Security Committee, “Turvallisuuskomitea – Turvallisuuskomitea on Kokonaisturvallisuuteen …,” October 3, 2019, https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Kyberturvallisuusstrategia_A4_ENG_WEB_031019.pdf

[23] Turvallisuuskomitea, “Security Committee,” Turvallisuuskomitea (n.d.), https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/en/security-committee/

[24] Valtioneuvosto, “About the Government.” Valtioneuvosto, (n.d.). https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/government

[25] Cyberwatchfinland, “A comprehensive Cybersecurity approach – The Finnish Model.” Cyberwatchfinland, (n.d.). https://www.cyberwatchfinland.fi/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/A-COMPREHENSIVE-CYBER-SECURITY-APPROACH-–-THE-FINNISH-MODEL.pdf

[26] The Security Committee, “Turvallisuuskomitea – Turvallisuuskomitea on Kokonaisturvallisuuteen …,” October 3, 2019, https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Kyberturvallisuusstrategia_A4_ENG_WEB_031019.pdf

[27] OECD, “Finland and the OECD,” OECD (n.d.), https://www.oecd.org/finland/finland-and-oecd.htm.; Ministry for Foreign Affairs, “Foreign and Security Policy in International Organisations,” Ministry for Foreign Affairs (n.d.), https://um.fi/foreign-and-security-policy-in-international-organisations.; Ministry for Foreign Affairs, “Cyber Security and the Cyber Domain,” um.fi (n.d.). https://um.fi/cyber-security-and-the-cyber-domain.

[28] Ministry for Foreign Affairs, “Foreign and Security Policy in International Organisations,” Ministry for Foreign Affairs (n.d.), https://um.fi/foreign-and-security-policy-in-international-organisations.

[29] Ibid.

[30] The Security Committee, “Turvallisuuskomitea – Turvallisuuskomitea on Kokonaisturvallisuuteen …,” October 3, 2019, https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Kyberturvallisuusstrategia_A4_ENG_WEB_031019.pdf.; European Commission, “Directive on Measures for a High Common Level of Cybersecurity across the Union (NIS2 Directive),” European Commission (n.d.), https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/nis2-directive#:~:text=The%20NIS2%20Directive%20is%20the,came%20into%20force%20in%202023

[31] The Security Committee, “Turvallisuuskomitea – Turvallisuuskomitea on Kokonaisturvallisuuteen …,” October 3, 2019, https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Kyberturvallisuusstrategia_A4_ENG_WEB_031019.pdf.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Valtioneuvosto, “Ministries,” Valtioneuvosto (n.d.),  https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/ministries.

[34] The Security Committee, “Turvallisuuskomitea – Turvallisuuskomitea on Kokonaisturvallisuuteen …,” October 3, 2019, https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Kyberturvallisuusstrategia_A4_ENG_WEB_031019.pdf.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Cyberwatchfinland, “A comprehensive Cybersecurity approach – The Finnish Model.” Cyberwatchfinland, (n.d.). https://www.cyberwatchfinland.fi/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/A-COMPREHENSIVE-CYBER-SECURITY-APPROACH-–-THE-FINNISH-MODEL.pdf

[38] The Security Committee, “Turvallisuuskomitea – Turvallisuuskomitea on Kokonaisturvallisuuteen …,” October 3, 2019, https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/Kyberturvallisuusstrategia_A4_ENG_WEB_031019.pdf

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Darius Štitilis, Paulius Pakutinskas, and Inga Malinauskaitė, “EU and NATO cybersecurity strategies and national cyber security strategies: a comparative analysis,” Security Journal, October 17, 2016.

[42] NATO, “Cyber defence,” NATO, September 14, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm

[43] Darius Štitilis, Paulius Pakutinskas, and Inga Malinauskaitė, “EU and NATO cybersecurity strategies and national cyber security strategies: a comparative analysis,” Security Journal, October 17, 2016.

[44] Ibid.

[45] NATO, “Cyber defence,” NATO, September 14, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm

[46] Darius Štitilis, Paulius Pakutinskas, and Inga Malinauskaitė, “EU and NATO cybersecurity strategies and national cyber security strategies: a comparative analysis,” Security Journal, October 17, 2016.

[47] NATO, “Cyber defence,” NATO, September 14, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm

[48] The Security Committee, “Turvallisuuskomitea – Turvallisuuskomitea on Kokonaisturvallisuuteen …,” October 3, 2019, https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Kyberturvallisuusstrategia_A4_ENG_WEB_031019.pdf

[49] Ibid.

[50] NATO, “Cyber defence,” NATO, September 14, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm

[51] Ibid.

[52] Cyberwatchfinland, “A comprehensive Cybersecurity approach – The Finnish Model.” Cyberwatchfinland, (n.d.). https://www.cyberwatchfinland.fi/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/A-COMPREHENSIVE-CYBER-SECURITY-APPROACH-–-THE-FINNISH-MODEL.pdf

[53] The Security Committee, “Turvallisuuskomitea – Turvallisuuskomitea on Kokonaisturvallisuuteen …,” October 3, 2019, https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Kyberturvallisuusstrategia_A4_ENG_WEB_031019.pdf.

[54] Darius Štitilis, Paulius Pakutinskas, and Inga Malinauskaitė, “EU and NATO cybersecurity strategies and national cyber security strategies: a comparative analysis,” Security Journal, October 17, 2016.