A surprising political incident unfolded in South Korea, catching both its citizens and the global community off guard. At 11 p.m. on December 3, President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law. In response, the Korean National Assembly, where the opposition party holds a majority, unanimously voted to block the decree, with 190 out of 300 members present. Remarkably, just six hours after the martial law declaration, the President reversed his decision and withdrew the deployed troops.
At first glance, this short-lived political turmoil is difficult to comprehend. A key question lingering in many minds is: why did President Yoon declare martial law only to withdraw it so quickly? He must have been aware that the South Korean Constitution requires the president to revoke martial law if the National Assembly demands it through a majority vote. What political objectives was Yoon aiming to achieve? What does this failed attempt at martial law signal for the future of South Korean politics? And what are the broader implications for the future of South Korean democracy?
Various reports from Korea suggest that President Yoon independently pushed for the declaration of martial law without consulting leaders of his own party or close confidants in the Presidential Office. He chose to proceed alone, even anticipating potential failure. What might explain such a seemingly reckless move? One immediate explanation lies in his own statement during the martial law declaration, where he voiced his frustration with the opposition party. He accused them of obstructing major policy initiatives, blocking personnel nominations, and making repeated impeachment attempts—22 motions in total—against government officials since the administration’s inauguration (https://news.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20241203050125).
To better understand this puzzling decision, it is important to examine his peculiar approach to politics. Since his inauguration in 2022, he has frequently mentioned the following principles: first, that politics should be conducted strictly in accordance with the law; second, that he will not be swayed by ever-changing public opinion; and finally, that his work is dedicated solely to serving the entire people. This approach could be described as ‘puritan legalism,’ marked by strict adherence to moral codes and inflexible obedience to a set of rules. Such puritan legalism has contributed to a rigidity in his dealings with political opponents. He has even refused to meet with the opposition leader, Lee Jae-myung, on the pretext of the ongoing criminal trials against Lee. Yoon’s political perspective appears to be guided by a singular criterion: right or wrong.
This rigid legalism has proven to be unrealistic and impractical, as it clashes with the legal consciousness of Korean society, where strict legalism is often seen as inflexible. Yoon’s statement that he won’t be influenced by frivolous public opinion suggests that he is a leader who prioritizes end results over process. He is a teleological leader who disregards other considerations as long as the outcomes are positive. In this sense, he mirrors the perspective of Park Chung Hee, a figure whose approach seems irrelevant to the realities of 21st-century Korea.
In every speech, President Yoon has repeatedly emphasized that he works solely for the Korean people. However, he does not understand that the abstract notion of ‘the people’ needs to be translated into specific groups in politics. A typical example of this issue is evident in how Yoon handled admission policies for medical schools. In February 2024, the Yoon administration announced a new policy to significantly increase student admissions to medical schools to address the growing demand for medical services. This policy prompted thousands of residents and interns to resign in protest, leading to an ongoing crisis in South Korea’s health care system (https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(24)01680-5/fulltext).
Unable to persuade current medical students and doctors, President Yoon has repeatedly argued that he adopted this policy for the sake of the people and the state. Combined with his puritan legalism, his people-oriented politics has led him to a failure to compromise and to the belief that the public does not understand his true intentions.
His rigid legalism has brought political havoc when the opposition party accused his wife of improper behavior as first lady, including alleged corruption and political involvement behind the scenes. Yoon’s mishandling of this issue has worsened relationships with both the opposition party and his own party. Instead of recognizing public sentiment on this problem and addressing it politically, Yoon seems to convey that he has been following principles and laws, and that the people do not understand him. He has become a ‘naked emperor.’
Upon closer examination, his declaration of martial law can be seen as a desperate attempt to assert that he is right in his own way, regardless of what others may think. It also serves as a strange demonstration of his rigid legalism. He may have believed that the declaration of martial law was legally permissible as long as he followed the laws. He might not have considered grave political implications. Furthermore, the fact that he withdrew the law as soon as the National Assembly nullified it attests to his legalism.
The martial law turmoil this time is an outcome of President Yoon’s peculiar approach to politics and political brinkmanship in dealing with oppositional parties. His rigid legalism, which conflicts with the popular legal consciousness in South Korean society, combined with the ever-plummeting support for the president (dropping from 50% to 19%), led him to the strategy of brinkmanship as a desperate action.
On the surface, the failed martial law is a blot on South Korean democracy. More deeply, this case demonstrates that democracy cannot be sustained solely through rigid legalism. The legal consciousness of ordinary Korean people was shaped historically during the periods of authoritarianism and rapid industrialization. The people were aware that many laws were violated in the pursuit of political or business goals. This legal consciousness should be reconsidered and gradually reformed in post-democratization South Korean politics. A leader, however clean they may be on a personal level, must recognize the broader societal context and adopt a step-by-step approach to achieving a more comprehensive version of legalism.
At the same time, this martial law episode highlights the strong support for democracy in Korean society. It demonstrates that martial law or a coup d’état is unthinkable in South Korea. It is encouraging to see that the military refuses to be politicized and that the public rejects any abrupt political upheavals through undemocratic means.
Nevertheless, the immediate future of South Korean politics does not appear bright. The failed martial law will give the opposition party an upper hand. Opposition leaders are likely to organize mass rallies aimed at driving President Yoon out, potentially within six months, to pave the way for a new election.
Facing the impending political crisis, several scenarios can be proposed. One possibility is the president’s voluntary resignation before completing his full term. In doing so, he could propose an amendment to the constitution, changing the presidency from a single five-year term to two four-year terms. This would provide a significant opportunity for political reshuffles within both the ruling and opposition parties. Another potential outcome is the impeachment of the president by the opposition party. This process would take several months, as the Constitutional Court in South Korea must render a final decision. Such a scenario would create considerable uncertainty, especially given that three seats on the Constitutional Court are currently vacant (https://m.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20241204050114). The final scenario is that the president could be forced out of office through mass demonstrations.
No matter which scenario materializes, the Korean political scene is set to be turbulent and precarious. What is important to remember is that Korean society has long suffered from dysfunctional political parties and politicians, whether from the ruling or opposition party. Until the current political parties genuinely reflect and address the key issues facing Korean society—particularly by narrowing the gap between the elites and the masses—the political uncertainty in South Korean democracy will persist, even after the post-martial law crisis subsides.
Professor Yong-Chool Ha is Director of the Center for Korea Studies at the University of Washington. He is the author of Late Industrialization, Tradition, and Social Change in South Korea (2004, University of Washington Press).