

Localizing the Far-Right Surge: Immigration Effects in Danish Municipalities

William Brown

ABSTRACT

Utilizing data across the five most recent parliamentary election cycles in Denmark, this paper investigates the traditional narrative that immigration drives the growth of far-right political parties. The results expand upon this assertion, demonstrating how the cultural factors of immigration cause a distinct local effect. While non-Western immigration increases far-right vote share on the local level, Western immigration is ultimately insignificant. Although questions remain concerning an antithetical outcome in highly urbanized areas and the relevance of immigration salience in far-right electoral support, this case study reinforces the idea that native populations discriminate between local immigrants based on their region of origin.

Throughout Europe, far-right political parties have achieved increasing electoral success, forming governing coalitions in Italy, Poland,¹ and Hungary.² Many explanations for this shift point toward the backlash against immigration, as far-right parties often establish themselves through anti-immigration positions (Inglehart & Norris 2017; Margalit 2019).

Denmark represents an interesting case due to unprecedented developments in its immigration policy. Starting in 2019, the Danish parliament has introduced a variety of new measures commonly known as the *paradigmeskift* (paradigm shift), under pressure from growing public sentiment against Muslim immigrants. While the leading far-right party — the Danish People's Party (DPP) — lost 21 seats and 13% of the overall vote share in 2019 compared to the previous election in 2015, their anti-immigration position was adopted by the governing coalition led by the Social Democrats (Mariager & Olesen 2020). This new wave of legislation was directed especially towards refugees. Asylum protection became temporary, residence permits gained new requirements, and a measure allowed for refugees to be deported to non-EU states for processing (Bailey-Morley & Kumar 2022). Additionally, hundreds of Syrian refugees were informed that they would need to return to Damascus after a Danish Refugee Council (DRC) report³ claimed the area was safe for return. While several European states such as Poland and Belarus⁴ have taken steps to limit the inflow of migrants, Denmark's *paradigmeskift* marks the region's most notable refusal of integration and move towards threats of mass deportation.

Like many far-right political parties, the Danish far-right primarily focuses on the perceived cultural changes resulting from immigration. Thus, it is essential to find what types of immigration constitute cultural disruption

for the Danish public. Gerdes & Wadensjö (2008) argue this is best understood by splitting immigration between Western and non-Western immigrants to properly show the effect of xenophobic factors. In their historical investigation of Denmark from 1989–2001, the authors found evidence supporting this contention with a prominent link between non-Western immigration and far-right vote share. Similarly, the present study asserts that local non-Western immigration creates a perceived cultural threat to ethnic Danes, leading to increased local electoral support for far-right political parties. Using an updated timeline of 2007–2022, analysis indicates that local rates of non-Western immigration are significantly correlated with votes for the far-right.

The following section will review the relevant literature on immigration and far-right electoral success, and outline the conceptual framework. Next, a portrayal of the empirical methodology will be provided. Finally, the results and potential improvements of the methodology will be discussed, and the paper will conclude.

Conceptual Framework

The ascendancy of far-right parties has brought a variety of explanations from scholars. Economists and political scientists have consistently shown that indicators of economic insecurity lead to political distrust and an increase in non-mainstream voting (Dustmann et al. 2017; Wroe 2016). For Europe, while research has shown that there is a correlation between unemployment rates and economic performance on populist party growth, analyzing additional variables is necessary to fully explain the rise of the far-right. (Algan et al. 2017; Colantone & Stanig 2018; Margalit 2019).

Immigration has increasingly been considered as the driving factor for this new emergence of far-right political success (Inglehart & Norris 2017; Margalit 2019). Immigration to Europe has grown significantly⁵ in recent years, with an especially large influx of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.⁶ Differing cultural practices such as values, language, religion, and attire brought by such immigrants have led to widespread political backlash in many European countries, as some fear changes to national culture (Inglehart & Norris 2017).

Many of the explanations for this hypothesis draw upon Blumer's (1958) group threat theory, which stipulates that a society's dominant group will sustain an increasingly negative view of the outgroup as the outgroup increases in size. In the context of political responses to immigration, this argument contends that anti-immigrant preferences can result from a threat to cultural practices, where culturally dominant citizens fear changing cultural norms and respond by voting in more conservative parties to restrict the minority group's perceived disruption (Etzerodt & Kongshøj 2022; Hjerm & Nagayoshi 2011; Quillian 1995; Semyonov et al. 2006). Recent studies across Europe have generally found that increases in refugees and immigrant populations tend to enhance far-right support: Though time periods and methods differ, localized research by Halla et al. (2017) in Austria, Hangartner et al. (2018) in Greece, and Mehic (2021) in Sweden reinforce this assertion.

Studies on Denmark have shown this correlation between immigration and far-right success to be largely true historically. In the 1960s, Denmark's booming economy and labor shortages opened the door to immigrants, but this changed in the dwindling economy of the early 1970s. The far-right party *Fremskridtspartiet* (The Progress Party) entered the Danish parliament for the first time in 1973, and immigration has continued to be extremely restricted ever since. In the 1980s, salience of this issue was renewed from new immigration flows — largely family reunification immigrants and a growing number of refugees. Scholars such as Harmon (2018) and Gerdes and Wadensjö (2008) have thus investigated the time period from the 1980s to the close of the century, finding that localized immigration increases preference for the far-right among Danish voters.

Harmon (2018) used a timeline of 1981-2001 to perform an instrumental variable analysis, measuring ethnic diversity in housing stock and the electoral success of various political parties. His findings showed that far-right parties won seats as populations of non-Western immigrants and their descendants increased, consistent in both municipal and national elections. However, the results of this study may be understated if we understand election results to represent voter sentiments, particularly in the national parliament. Denmark's proportional

electoral system allows for the multi-party representation seen across European parliaments, but outlier groups still face an uphill battle to gain seats (Gerdes and Wadensjö 2008). With far-right groups often acting as fringe extremist parties, it can be difficult to gauge the perception of voters based solely on elections. Additionally, the use of ethnic composition rather than immigration figures would cause difficulties when focusing on cultural changes. Established immigrants and their descendants tend to be relatively integrated into the dominant society (Heath & Schneider 2021; Vink et al. 2021), reducing their potential for cultural strain. On the other hand, newer immigrants forming their own communities tend to keep their cultural practices and norms, increasing cultural strain (Heath & Schneider 2021). Therefore, measures of immigration are a more accurate embodiment of change to the local cultural environment.

To address the limitations of ethnic and election figures, this study will utilize other variables to gain better access to the connection between immigration and the success of far-right political parties. Vote share will be used in place of election results to reduce underrepresentation of far-right parties. In addition, immigration data will be used rather than ethnic diversity figures, as this highlights the cultural differences at the heart of this issue.

Two studies have already analyzed historical evidence focusing on Danish far-right growth with a similar methodology. Gerdes and Wadensjö (2008) investigated the impact of non-Western immigration on the vote share of far-right parties. Their analysis, spanning from 1989 to 2001, revealed a substantial surge in far-right party support in municipalities that experienced a higher influx of non-Western immigrants. Similarly, Dustmann et al. (2019) took advantage of the random allocation of refugees among Danish municipalities from 1986 to 1998, wherein refugees were randomly assigned residency between each of the municipalities according to the municipal population. Their study discovered a positive correlation between refugee proportions and far-right vote share for the vast majority of municipalities. Each of these studies found significant results in both local and national elections. With more recent data, this work utilizes a similar methodology to evaluate whether these results are consistent with present immigration politics, and uncover the role of immigration within the recent growth of the Danish far-right.

Methodology

The following empirical analysis draws upon data from the last five parliamentary elections to estimate the effect of recent increases in migration on far-right vote share at the municipal level. With the primary interest of non-Western

immigration’s impact on far-right voting, total immigration to each municipality was aggregated into those originating from Western states (EU/EEA members, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) and non-Western states (all others, including stateless refugees).

To calculate the vote share of far-right parties, three parties were selected: the Denmark Democrats (Danmarksdemokraterne), the New Right (Nye Borgerlige), and the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti). Popu-List⁷ only classifies the New Right and the Danish People’s Party as far-right populist parties, but this is due to outdated data from the previous election in 2019. Founded in 2022, the Denmark Democrats are widely considered to be a far-right party (Switzer & Beauduin 2023), and their website alone shows clear indicators of a radically anti-immigration position: refugees are described as “Islamist bogeymen” ⁸who make up a “criminal immigrant milieu.”⁹ Votes for these parties as a percentage of the overall vote was calculated for each municipality in each year.

Voting in Denmark is highly regionalized, with some municipalities consistently favoring specific parties (Gerdes & Wadensjö 2008; Mehic 2021). To properly measure the effect of immigration on far-right voting, several steps have been taken to reduce false correlations in the data. First, vote-share percentages for each of the far-right parties were combined within each municipality to avoid undue bias towards any specific party in a high-migration area. This elucidates a clearer picture of far-right electoral preferences as a whole. Secondly, the dataset only includes results from parliamentary elections, as municipal government

elections often discriminate against more mainstream parties, leading to increased support for outlier groups.

Data

The data in this study¹⁰ was obtained from Statistics Denmark’s municipal-level immigration registries, electoral archives, and extensive population measures. These were calculated for the parliamentary election years between 2007 and 2022. The independent variable of municipal-level immigration is expressed as an annual rate of municipal population to negate bias towards larger municipalities, which sustained consistently high immigration. In consequence, these values are extremely low: total immigration ranged from 0.00-3.64%, with a median of only 0.81%.

For control variables on the municipal-level, the dataset contains averages for income¹¹ and age, as well as calculated rates of unemployment, violent crime, and working age¹² dependence on public benefit programs based on municipality populations in each year. Data from each of the 98 Danish municipalities are included.

Four models were constructed to better understand immigration’s effects on far-right voting. The first two models show total immigration with and without control variables added. The final two models show immigration split between Western and non-Western, again with and without controls. This method of analysis will give a much

TABLE 1. Table 1: Total Immigration.

	A	B
Total Immigration	4.7619*** (0.5054)	6.2199*** (0.6164)
Age		1.4943*** (0.2013)
Income		-6.6394*** (0.8921)
Benefit Usage		0.4343** (0.1617)
Unemployment		-1.9092** (0.5916)
Violent Crime		-1.8969*** (0.1925)

Standard errors in parentheses
N = 490, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

TABLE 2. Table 2: Split Immigration.

	A	B
Western Immigration	-3.1443* (1.3514)	-0.2096 (1.1001)
Non-Western Immigration	9.7706*** (0.9340)	11.472*** (0.9594)
Age		1.5745*** (0.1905)
Income		-7.3321*** (0.8489)
Benefit Usage		0.2472 (0.1552)
Unemployment		-1.1010* (0.5711)
Violent Crime		-1.6046*** (0.1868)

Standard errors in parentheses
N = 490, * p<0.1, ***p<0.001

clearer picture as to whether immigration has an effect on far-right voting, and further highlight if the origin of immigrants has a role. Finally, each model was analyzed through a linear panel regression at a 95% confidence interval to account for the impact of immigration on far-right voting in individual municipalities over time, and across the municipalities.

Results

Results from the first two panel regressions show that total immigration is positively correlated even when taking controls into account, demonstrating that unspecified local immigration significantly predicts far-right voting. Table 1 shows this correlation of total immigration to far-right vote share, both without controls (A) and with all controls included (B). Based on these results, a 1% increase in immigration will lead to an average rise of 6% in votes for far-right parties, accounting for all controls. However, control variables show that other factors may influence far-right support, such as income and age. Municipal populations with lower income and higher age produce greater electoral support for far-right political parties.

Despite the significant positive correlation from these models, neither indicate how the origin of immigrants may impact far-right voting. To properly test this hypothesis, total immigration is then dissected into immigration from Western and non-Western states.


With this adjustment, the effect of specific types of immigration is more visible. Table 2 shows the correlation of Western and non-Western immigration to far-right vote

share, again both without controls (A) and with controls (B). In both models, non-Western immigration has significant predictive power; while Western immigration has a minimal impact, becoming insignificant when controls are added. These results support the hypothesis that immigration of non-Westerners, not immigration as a whole, is the ideal predictive factor in local far-right voting. In model B, non-Western immigration causes an 11% increase in local far-right voting per 1% increase in local immigration. While the range of this immigration is limited (0-1.6%), their correlation is substantial.

These results show that a more nuanced view of immigration's impact is needed. The association between immigration and far-right voting oversimplifies the interaction of these variables. Instead, the specific category of non-Western immigration represents a key driver of local-level far-right voting, showing a clear discrimination by voters between immigration from different regions. Figure 1 plots this correlation with the absence of controls, showing a distinct upward slope with data from all municipalities.

The control variables also show several insights. Just as with the previous models, older and less wealthy populations tend to increase electoral support for the far-right, consistent with recent findings in Western Europe (Hall 2016; O'Grady 2023). Violent crime is correlated with decreased vote share for far-right parties — though as violent crime increases with municipal population, this is likely due to population and density factors. This will be explored while limitations of the model are discussed. Last, and perhaps most surprisingly, unemployment has a marginally significant negative correlation with the far-

FIGURE 1. Non-Western Immigration vs. Far-Right Vote Share in All Municipalities.



Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Denmark data (2007-2022).

right vote. Though a number of studies relating economic insecurity to far-right support use unemployment as a key variable (Algan et al. 2017; Vlandas & Halikiopoulou 2019), these results suggest otherwise. The possibility remains that unemployment in Denmark may be a poor indicator of economic insecurity, as income has a very significant correlation with far-right vote share. Further investigation may be needed to explain the connection between unemployment and far-right voting for the case of Denmark.


Limitations and Improvements

While this research indicates that non-Western immigration increases far-right electoral support, there are limitations concerning municipal population and immigration salience. Notably, Copenhagen and the other most populous municipalities (Frederiksberg, Aarhus, and Odense) show a negative correlation between non-Western immigration and far-right vote share (Figure 2). By 2022, Copenhagen had the lowest far-right vote in the country at just 4.4%. This is consistent with the findings of Dustman et al. (2019) which tentatively showed increased refugee allocation within the largest 5% of municipalities¹³ was correlated with a decrease in far-right voting for both local and municipal elections. Their study suggests that for the majority of municipalities in a rural setting, expanding refugee populations led to competition for social and cultural dominance, increasing anti-immigrant sentiments and far-right vote share. This supports group threat theory (Blumer 1958), as the present study argues. However, the authors further asserted that urbanized areas had increased

rates of close interaction with immigrants, which led to a decrease in anti-immigrant sentiments. The empirical analysis makes no claim regarding the causal factors for decreased support for far-right parties in highly urbanized areas, but additional research focused on cities may explain this continued phenomenon to a greater extent.


An evident obstacle in this model is the lack of an immigration salience variable measuring the importance of immigration to Danish voters. Figure 3 shows the national salience of immigration in Denmark, defined as the percentage of respondents who identified immigration as a key issue. Salience peaked in 2015, aligning with the European migrant crisis that vastly increased Danish immigration, and the dramatic rise in electoral success of far-right parties. Although local non-Western immigration (particularly refugee inflow) in 2015 likely increased local electoral support for far-right parties, this analysis does not make a causal claim through the use of local saliency, as no data was available. However, it is clear from a broader perspective that issue salience matters in this analysis. Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 illustrate this visually, with darker areas showing increased immigration in Figures 4 and 5, and increased far-right vote share in Figures 6 and 7. There is a correlation between non-Western immigration and far-right voting in both 2015 and 2022, particularly in the northern midlands and western areas of Denmark. However, rates of far-right voting are significantly higher across the municipalities in 2015, despite lower rates of non-Western immigration. This points to the impact of immigration issue salience in the far-right vote — a topic that should receive further study for the case of Denmark and beyond. Finally, these maps also show more clearly how the Copenhagen area (in the east) and other large

FIGURE 2. Non-Western Immigration vs. Far-Right Vote Share in All Municipalities Largest Municipalities.



Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Denmark data.
Municipalities: Copenhagen, Frederiksberg, Aarhus, and Odense (2007-2022).

FIGURE 3. Immigration Salience in Denmark.



Source: Eurobarometer, n.d.

*Immigration salience is measured as the percentage of respondents who answered “immigration” to the question “What do you think are the two most important issues facing Denmark today?” Results in fall 2020 and 2021 delayed to winter 2020-21 and 2021-22 due to Covid-19 (2007-2022).


population areas have consistently low rates of far-right vote share despite high levels of immigration.

Conclusion

Analyzing municipal data across five Danish election cycles, this study demonstrates that non-Western immigration strongly impacts far-right vote share. However, the sizable effect of other factors such as age, income, population density, and issue salience show that far-right electoral preference remains a complex topic. This study prompts questions about the role of multiculturalism and urbanization in political preferences, with a more thorough analysis of local factors needed to completely determine the cause of far-right political victories.


Despite these limitations, this research complicates the common narrative associating far-right success with overall immigration trends, and emphasizes the importance of differentiating between Western and non-Western immigration. While total immigration exhibits a positive correlation with far-right vote share, this effect is largely driven by non-Western immigration, which proves to be a significant predictor even when accounting for multiple control variables. These findings extend the current literature on the Danish case by providing contemporary analysis which supports the claims of Gerdes and Wadensjö (2008) and, to a more limited extent, Dustmann et al. (2019). Additionally, the results substantiate beliefs that the geographic origin of local immigrants influences the political behavior of native residents. With such a strong response to recent European immigration, it is essential to consider cultural and demographic factors in election outcomes to truly understand the growing support for far-right movements.

FIGURE 4. 2015 Non-Western Immigration.




Source: Shown as percent of municipal population. Interactive map available at: <https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/2HMc9/1/>

FIGURE 5. 2022 Non-Western Immigration.




Source: Shown as percent of municipal population. Interactive map available at: <https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Iq44A/6/>

FIGURE 6. 2015 Far-Right Vote Share



Source: Shown as percent of municipal population. Interactive map available at: <https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/TpFJo/2/>

FIGURE 7. 2022 Far-Right Vote Share



Source: Shown as percent of municipal population. Interactive map available at: <https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Sv6KD/5/>

Endnotes

1 Far-right political parties in Poland are no longer within the majority coalition as of October 2023. See “Poland - 2023 general election.” Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/poland/>.

2 See “Populists in Europe – especially those on the right – have increased their vote shares in recent elections.” Available at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/10/06/populists-in-europe-especially-those-on-the-right-have-increased-their-vote-shares-in-recent-elections/>

3 11 of the 12 experts cited in this report condemned the relocation decision, claiming the DRC misrepresented their findings. See “Denmark asylum: The Syrian refugees no longer welcome to stay.” Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57156835>

4 See “A roadmap for European asylum and refugee integration policy.” Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/a-roadmap-for-european-asylum-and-refugee-integration-policy/>

5 Growing from 2,890,780 in 2013 to 4,055,071 in 2015, with a slight decrease to 3,744,277 in 2021. Available at Eurostat’s data browser (<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/data/database>) with the data code “migr_imm12prv” or https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_imm12prv/default/table?lang=en.

6 See “Migration Flows to Europe: Arrivals” Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/europe/arrivals?type=arrivals>

7 Available at: <https://popu-list.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Denmark.pdf> Accessed Sept. 30, 2023.

8 “islamistiske mørkemænd.” ‘Mørkemænd’ translates literally as ‘dark men,’ but approximates in English as ‘bogeyman.’ Available at: <https://danmarksdemokraterne.dk/forside/udlaendingepolitik/>.

9 “kriminelle indvandermiljøer.” Available at: <https://danmarksdemokraterne.dk/forside/udlaendingepolitik/>.

10 Full dataset available upon request.

11 Income in Danish Kroner (DKK), expressed as ((income)*10-5) to simplify analysis.

12 Ages 16-67

13 The study conducted by Dustman et al. (2019) used data from before the 2007 reforms (1986-98), which grouped the previous 271 municipalities into the current 98. Thus, the largest 5% of municipalities represented in population size included a larger grouping of municipalities (13) than the data may otherwise suggest, yet represent similar areas in the most urbanized settings around Copenhagen and other major cities.

References

- Algan, Y., Guriev, S., Papaioannou, E., & Passari, E. (2017). The European trust crisis and the rise of populism. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 48(2), 309–382.
- Blumer, H. (1958). Race prejudice as a sense of group position. *Pacific Sociological Review*, 1(1), 3–7.
- Colantone, I., & Stanig, P. (2018). Global competition and Brexit. *American Political Science Review*, 112(2), 201–218.
- Damm, A. P. (2009). Ethnic enclaves and immigrant labor market outcomes: Quasi-Experimental Evidence. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 27(2), 281–314.
- Dustman, C., Eichengreen, B., Otten, S., Sapir, A., Tabellini, G., & Zoega, G. (2017). *Europe's trust deficit: Causes and Remedies*. Monitoring International Integration 1, CEPR Press.
- Dustman, C., Vasiljeva, K., & Damm, A. P. (2019). Refugee migration and electoral outcomes. *Review of Economic Studies*, 86, 2035–2091.
- Eurobarometer. (n.d.). 'Standard Eurobarometer'. European Commission. <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/browse/all/series/4961>.
- Etzerodt, S. F., & Kongshøj, K. (2022). The implosion of radical right populism and the path forward for social democracy: Evidence from the 2019 Danish National Election. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 45, 279–300.
- Gerdes, C., & Wadensjö, E. (2008). The impact of immigration on election outcomes in Danish municipalities. *IZA DP*, 3586.
- Hall, J. K. (2016). Income inequality and voting for radical right-wing parties. *Electoral Studies*, (42) 54–64.
- Hangartner, D., Dinas, E., Marbach, M., Matakos, K., & Xefteris, D. (2019). Does exposure to the refugee crisis make natives more hostile? *American Political Science Review*, 113(2), 442–455. Cambridge University Press.
- Harmon, N. (2018). Immigration, ethnic diversity, and political outcomes: Evidence from Denmark. *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 120(4): 1043–74.
- Heath, A., & Schneider, S. (2021). Dimensions of migrant integration in western Europe. *Frontiers in Sociology*, 6.
- Hjerm, M., & Nagayoshi, K. (2011). The composition of the minority population as a threat: Can Real Economic and Cultural Threats Explain Xenophobia? *International Sociology*, 26(6), 815–843.
- Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2017). Trump and the populist authoritarian parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse. *Perspectives on Politics*, 15(2), 443–454.
- Lonsky, J. (2021). Does immigration decrease far-right popularity? Evidence from Finnish Municipalities. *Journal of Popular Economics*, 34, 97–139.
- Margalit, Y. (2019) Economic insecurity and the causes of populism, reconsidered. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 33(4), 152–70.
- Mariager, R., & Olesen, N. W. (2020). The Social Democratic Party from exponent of societal change to pragmatic conservatism. In P. M. Christiansen, J. Elklit & P. Nødergaard (Eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Danish Politics* (278–295). Oxford University Press.
- Mehic, A. (2022). Regional aspects of immigration-related changes in political preferences. *Journal of Regional Science*, 62(5), 1386–1413.
- O'Grady, T. (2023). Is ideological polarisation by age group growing in Europe? *European Journal of Political Research*, 62(4), 1389–1402.
- Quillian, L. (1995). Prejudice as a response to perceived group threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe. *American Sociological Review*, 60(4), 586–611.
- Semyonov, M., Rajman, R., & Gorodzeisky, A. (2006). The rise of anti-foreigner sentiment in European societies, 1988–2000. *American Sociological Review*, 71(3), 426–449.
- Switzer, R., & Beauduin, A. (2023). Embodied nativism in Denmark: Rethinking Violence and the Far Right. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 46(7), 1335–1356.
- Vink, M., Tegunimataka, A., Peters, F., & Bevelander, P. (2021). Long-term heterogeneity in immigrant naturalization: The Conditional Relevance of Civic Integration and Dual Citizenship. *European Sociological Review*, 37(5), 751–765.
- Vlandas, T. & Halikiopoulou, D. (2019). Does unemploy-

ment matter? Economic insecurity, labour market policies and the far right vote in Europe. *European Political Science*, 18(3), 421-438.

Wroe, A. (2016). Economic insecurity and political trust in the United States. *American Politics Research*, 44(1), 131-163.

Zweimueller, J., Halla, M., & Wagner, A. F. (2017). Immigration and voting for the far right. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 15(6), 1341-1385.