

Jackson School Journal of International Studies



Interview with Dani Rodrik

The Crossfire of Memories and Identities: The East Asian Controversy Over Hiroshima and Nagasaki
The Limits of Tolerance: Evaluating State-Sponsored Multiculturalism in Canada

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Cover photo of Innsbruck, Austria taken Winter 2018 by Kristian Whittaker.

Letter from the Editors

This issue of the Jackson School Journal of International Studies has been a long time in the making. Through several trials and errors, numerous learning experiences, and patience and persistence, we have curated something that we believe will interest you.

In this issue, Professor Rodrik discusses several important modern topics, such as changes in the theory of globalization, the role of global institutions in international affairs, and the field of international political economy. The interview also includes Professor Rodrik's path to becoming a political economist and how he sees international studies as valuable for a meaningful career in any field. Professor Rodrik's visited the University of Washington to deliver his public lecture, 'Reinventing Globalization,' which was part of the Jackson School's U.S. in the World Lecture Series.

We also hope you enjoy this issue's two Policy Papers, "The Crossfire of Memories and Identities: The East Asian Controversy Over Hiroshima and Nagasaki" by Jesse Du and "The Limits of Tolerance: Evaluating State-Sponsored Multiculturalism in Canada" by Freeman Halle. The former explores the modern day impact of historical events that continue to affect politics in East Asia and the latter examines on the pros and cons of a cultural initiative in Canada to address social disparities. Both of these articles shed light on historical and contemporary events, as well as ongoing issues that affect many people across

borders and cultures.

We hope you enjoy this issue and take away from it something new, whether it's through the expert insights of Political Economist Dani Rodrik or the research of UW students like Freeman Halle and Jesse Du.

Sincerely,
Rachel Greenwood and Mackenzie Wamble
Editors-in-Chief

Dedication

Many people have been involved in the creation of this issue. From the authors who conducted incredible research and were subjected to many rounds of editing, to the editors of the past year who dedicated numerous hours to curating this issue and getting it through many difficult stages. We thank the former editors who prepared us to finish the project, as well as the faculty members who graciously reviewed the articles and provided us with their expertise. We wouldn't have been able to produce this issue without the guidance of Dr. Sara Curran, who helped us along with the transition of our Editorial Board. We are extremely grateful for the time and dedication of everyone who contributed to this issue. We especially want to thank our writers who were ever so patient with us—your research and contributions is what keeps the Jackson School Journal alive.

Thank you.

Jackson School Journal of International Studies

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Interview with Dani Rodrik on Political Economy and Globalization

Professor Dani Rodrik, Harvard University, sat down with JSJ Editors Priya Sarma and Charlotte Li to discuss how he became a political economist and the value of international studies for a meaningful career in any field. Professor Rodrik's visit to the University of Washington was occasioned with his public lecture, 'Reinventing Globalization,' delivered as part of the Jackson School's U.S. in the World Lecture Series on Wednesday February 13th, 2019.

Jackson School Journal: How did you get your start in economics and what got you there?

Rodrik: I took an indirect route to economics. I started first in political science and then I eventually turned to economics because, at the time, economics was the more technical and rigorous discipline. I thought I had to be toolled up and so I went to economics eventually.

Jackson School Journal: What did you find challenging in changing your area of study from political science to economics and what factors led you to study Globalization and Economics?

Rodrik: It wasn't challenging. The only disadvantage was that it took longer than it could have, had I known from the beginning that I was slated for an Economics PhD. On the other hand, I think the fact that I had a background in political science helped me with my thinking later on. It gave me a better perspective on institutions and on historical trajectories than if I had just

started out with economics and hadn't branched out.

The main factor that led me to study what I study, which is globalization and development, was that I came from a different part of the world and all of this was new and of course when you come from a poorer part of the world, one of the first questions you ask is why are some parts of the world poor and other parts rich. And, what explains that? That was probably the overarching question that motivated my studies.

Jackson School Journal: You've said that your experience coming from a country other than the United States motivated you to study globalization. What was that experience like? How did that help your study?

Rodrik: I think that perspective of how different societies are organized and why certain things work here and don't work somewhere else—I think that's a very valuable perspective—particularly

if you are going to study economics. Because, economists tend to have the perspective that there is one solution and that solution applies everywhere. One of the themes in my work has always been that even though there are some general principles in economics that carry over to different societies, the way that they are implemented, and the concrete form they take, have to be filtered through local circumstances. I think that's a lesson that may be easier for someone who has come from a different society and culture than for somebody who has not had that experience.

Jackson School Journal: You've said that "Globalization as we know it is under threat, and for good reason. We will have to reinvent it to serve more people better." Could you elaborate on that statement? How is it under threat and how should we reinvent it?

Rodrik: Well, I think it's under threat because large segments of society have been served poorly by the kind of globalization we've had. I think the benefits of the hyper-globalization of the last three decades were oversold. I think those benefits were largely concentrated in corporations, in big banks, and in wealthy and skilled professions. We see that at the same time, ordinary working men and women in the US and Europe didn't do all that well under those same arrangements. I think we're seeing the consequences and the political backlash in what animates the rise of populists. I think the way we need to address this is not to reject globalization

per se but to change the terms on which we globalize and I think the most important thing is to ensure that we change the nature of our international trade and international arrangements in a direction that is much more balanced, that benefits working people as well as those who have the skills and the assets and the ability to benefit from a hyper globalized world. That doesn't mean less globalization, it means a different kind of globalization that puts labor and environment and concerns of civil society and the needs of inclusion at the forefront.

Jackson School Journal: You've talked about how hyperglobalization runs the risk of populist backlash. What countries do you think we see this phenomenon occurring in?

Rodrik: Most visibly, of course, is in the United States. I think Trump's victory in the 2016 election and his considerable support, although it's not a majority, has a lot to do with large segments of the country that have become disaffected from the political elites and are very disenchanted with the kind of economic model that this country has pursued since the 1990's. In Europe, the same reaction takes a somewhat different form. It is directed at the European Union and the institutions of the European Union because that is the form in which hyper globalization is experienced in Europe.

Jackson School Journal: Would you mind defining the term "hyper globalization?"

Rodrik: Hyper globalization is a term I used to signify a single minded effort to eliminate all barriers of the free flow of goods and capital, even if that comes at the expense of policy autonomy or domestic, economic, and social objectives.

Jackson School Journal: We've seen institutions such as the IMF adopting neoliberal and pro-globalization policies, where they don't take into consideration cultural or social factors of countries. What course of action do you think international organizations such as these should take to help developing countries?

Rodrik: I think in general they have to pay a lot more attention to local context and the peculiarities of local context. I have to say, I blame far less international, multilateral institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank than I blame the governments themselves. I think institutions like the IMF and the World Bank ,except during periods of extreme crisis when they have the upper hand, are mostly an instrument for national governments. Thus, we've seen around the world that even countries that are actually quite poor and don't have a lot of leverage, if they know what it is that they want to do, they don't have to be a slave of the IMF or the ideology of the IMF. So often if the IMF or the World Bank have too much power, it's because the national governments abdicate their responsibilities. So, I put more blame on governments for not doing their own jobs and not living up to their own responsibilities.

Jackson School Journal: Sometimes institutions such as the IMF say they won't extend loans until certain conditions are met. Do you think implementation of conditionality policies also affect governments abdicating their power?

Rodrik: Within certain limits, yes. I think too often governments do not formulate their own alternatives. When governments show up at the door of the IMF, it's typically because they have completely failed—that's when you show up at the IMF. There is not much variation on that bitter pill, which you have to swallow, It is tightening the belt and doing some things that are going to be painful. There is always some latitude; and I think countries that have a better sense of how they should adjust to a crisis and put their house in order, may still be in a position to do a better job than those who simply expect the answer to come from above, from the IMF. In general, the time at which conditionality is applied is a very special time, when governments have already demonstrated their incompetence. That is not necessarily the right prism with which to understand the relationship between global institutions and the ill effects of globalization..

Jackson School Journal: I read in your article "Rescuing Economics from Neoliberalism" that many economists advocate for free trade, more finance and less government; they can almost be seen as biased and in one direction -- there's a universal or cookie-cutter policy that can act as a solution. How do you think

economists can do a better job of changing that reputation?

Rodrik: I think the main way and it is happening, is for economics to be more engaged in the real world, as we live in it. As economics is becoming increasingly more empirical, I think in fact, that change is taking place. If you live in the simple world of theoretical constructs, "Econ 101" and the demand and supply frameworks, then it is easier to live in an artificial world where markets are always perfect and you should always rely on markets for solutions. But, if your research actually consists of seeing what actually works in practice and what happens in practice, which is what more and more economics research is really about, then you are forced to adjust your theoretical framework to the complexity and nuance that the real world throws at you. I think that process has been very productive. We are starting to see that the more empirical an economic subfield then the fewer the cookie-cutter solutions. I think labor economics, or development economics which is probably the most empirical, virtually have no universal policy come out of those fields whereas macroeconomics which has largely remained theoretical, and evidence has rarely resolved any interesting question. I think the battles tend to be a lot more ideological.

Jackson School Journal: I think we'll conclude by asking: What piece of advice would you give to current Jackson School Students who are pursuing a degree in

International Political Economy?

Rodrik: I would say that you should immerse yourself in economics. Economics might seem forbidding because so much of it is formal and mathematical and might look like it's a lot of investment in Greek letters, but I do think it pays off. At the same time being, of course, in a School of International Studies, you are going to get the broader context—and the institutions, politics, and history as well. I think that combination is what creates the best foundation for your futures.

The Crossfire of Memories and Identities: The East Asian Controversy Over Hiroshima and Nagasaki

By Jesse Du

Note on Transliteration and Asian Characters: For all Chinese, Japanese and Korean personal names, I follow the Asian custom of placing surnames before given names; for the sake of consistency, this rule is followed even for Asian authors who have published their works in English (hence "Wang Zheng" instead of "Zheng Wang"). The only exception is for those who have Asian surnames but English given names, or those who have expressly stated a preference (as is the case with Akira Iriye). For the transliteration of Chinese sources and terms, I use the pinyin romanization system and strictly follow the updated Basic Rules of the Chinese Phonetic Alphabet Orthography; for Japanese terms I use the Modified Hepburn system; for Korean terms I use the Revised Romanization of Korean system. However, for certain already well-known proper names, the common English spelling is used. All diacritics are omitted in text but kept in the endnotes and bibliography. When Asian characters are used to identify sources and terms mentioned, simplified characters are used for all Chinese sources and terms; shinjitai is used for all Japanese terms with kanji; hangul, immediately followed by the corresponding hanja if possible, is used for all Korean terms.

In April 2015, with the 70th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki fast approaching, delegations from around the world gathered at the United Nations Headquarters in New York for the Ninth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a quinquennial meeting of the NPT's 190 state parties to review the treaty's implementation in the previous five years.

On 27 April, the opening day of the meeting, the Japanese delegation, led by Ambassador Sano Toshio, called for new actions in disarmament and transparency, and commented on issues such as fissile material cut-off and the Nuclear-Test-

Ban Treaty. At the end of Sano's speech, the delegation stressed the importance of raising awareness of "the tragedy that had been brought about by the use of nuclear weapons," and asked to have the Conference's Final Document invite world leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki "to witness the reality [of atomic bombings] first hand."¹

Perhaps the Japanese delegation did not expect any controversy to derive from this speech, but their suggestion triggered an almost visceral reaction from China. In a closed-door session on 11 May, the portion

1 United Nations, 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, *Main Committee 1 - Summary Record of the 1st Meeting*, NPT/CONF.2015/MC.I/SR.1 (10 June 2015), 5, <http://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2015/MC.I/SR.1>.

in the Final Document regarding Hiroshima and Nagasaki was deleted at the Chinese delegation's request, a move also supported by the South Korean delegation.

After Japanese news disapprovingly reported on this incident, and the Japanese government attempted to repeal the deletion, China responded with even greater fervor. When questioned by Japan's Kyodo News about the deletion, Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs Fu Cong did not bother with equivocation: "There are reasons why [Hiroshima and Nagasaki] were bombed... We don't want the humanitarian issue [regarding nuclear weapons] to be taken advantage of by [a] certain government with ulterior motives in trying to distort the history and trying to impose a partial interpretation of the Second World War."² Fu clarified that China's reaction was not directed against the Japanese people, "least of all [against] the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombing," but the NPT Conference "should keep clear of the history."³

Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide, like many other Japanese, seemed to be confounded by China's accusation. In a press conference on 13 May, he stressed that the invitation of world leaders to Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a corollary of Japan's experience of the reality of being the target of atomic bombings (hibaku no jittai被爆の実態), proposed out of its wish for and promotion of a world

without nuclear weapons. "It is not related to any history problem, and such action [by the Chinese government] is difficult to understand."⁴

The Chinese government, on the other hand, thought everything was quite obvious. Quoting from a number of Chinese scholars in Japan Studies, a special report by the state-run Xinhua News Agency condemned the Japanese government's intention to portray itself as a victim of the Second World War, while downplaying its role as the victimizer.⁵ In the report, comments by an Associate Professor at the China Foreign Affairs University mirror those made by Fu: While commemorating the atomic bombings, Japan also ought to emphasize why exactly Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed. As a victim of the atomic bomb, Japan should also "answer the history problem to the victim countries [of its own past aggression]."⁶

In the end, the NPT Review Conference failed to ratify their proceedings, mainly over the issue of the creation of a Weapons of Mass Destruction-free zone in the Middle East, about which state parties could not reach consensus in a Final Document. Amidst the month-long contention and frustration, the diplomatic

2 "U.N. disarmament conference drops call for leaders to visit Hiroshima after China envoy complains," The Japan Times, 13 May 2015, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/13/national/u-n-disarmament-conference-drops-call-leaders-visit-hiroshima>.

3 Ibid.

4 "Kakkoku shidōsha no hibakuchi hōmon ni Chūgoku ga hantai 'Rikai ni kurushimu' Kanbō Chōkan NPT saikentō kaigi" 各国指導者の被爆地訪問に中国が反対「理解に苦しむ」官房長官 NPT再検討会議 [Invitation of world leaders to atomic bombing sites rejected by China 'difficult to understand' Chief Cabinet Secretary NPT Review Conference], Hazard lab ハザードラボ, 13 May 2015, <http://www.hazardlab.jp/know/topics/detail/9/8/9893.html>.

5 Yang Zhou 杨舟, "Ribēn yāoqǐng gè guó lǐngdǎorén fǎngwèn Guǎngdǎo Chángqí zhī jiǎng shòuhài shēnfèn" 日本邀请各国领导人访问广岛长崎只讲受害身份 [Japan invites world leaders to visit Hiroshima Nagasaki only talks about victim identity], Xinhuanet 新华网, 17 May 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-05/17/c_127808495.htm.

6 Ibid.

skirmish between China and Japan was of little account, and was quickly forgotten by the Chinese and Japanese publics themselves, who have long been used to such political squabbles. However, this peculiar incident epitomizes not merely a disagreement between the Chinese and Japanese interpretations of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but a larger fundamental conflict of historical memory and national identity between China, Japan, and Korea, fuelling tensions in the region.⁷

In East Asian diplomacy, the four-character word “history problem” (*lishi wenti* 历史问题; *rekishi mondai* 歴史問題; *yeoksa munje* 역사문제 歷史問題) carries a lot of weight. From Mainland China to Taiwan, the two Koreas to Japan, all are haunted by their own unique set of history problems—unanswered questions and unresolved issues of their nation’s troubled pasts that are often considered too sensitive to study and too controversial to discuss. Although mostly concerning the modern period, many of these problems have roots that can be traced back centuries, a legacy of the interconnected history of Asia’s ancient civilizations. As a result of this interconnection, the history problems of one nation or state party are often intertwined with those of another. One problem can unite nations in sympathy while another can turn them against each other with resentment, weaving a delicate web of complex international relations that sometimes baffles Westerners. A

7 Lai Yew Meng, *Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan’s Relations with China: A Neoclassical Realist Interpretation* (New York: Routledge 2013), 31-32.

popular Chinese Internet adage manages to provide a concise summary of the intricacy involved:

Sino-Japanese friendship relies on [common disdain towards] Korea; Sino-Korean friendship relies on [common hatred of] Japan; Japanese-Korean friendship relies on [common aversion to] China.⁸

For one not well-acquainted with East Asia, the significance of the role played by history problems in the quagmire of international relations may be initially hard to grasp. However, upon close examination it is not hard to find how the subtle effects of these problems seep through the very fabric of socio-political life. The profound societal influence of these disputed histories is entrenched in the national identities of the people of East Asia, shaping peoples’ collective perceptions of each other.⁹ An analysis of Hiroshima and Nagasaki’s history and contemporary memories offers an opportunity to better understand these complexities.

History and Emotion

There is a paradigmatic difference in the Western and East Asian historiographies regarding the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. American scholars generally have been able to isolate the bombings from the emotions of the rest of World War II history and focus the debate

8 The original phrase in Chinese is: 中日友好靠韩国; 中韩友好靠日本; 日韩友好靠中国。 Different variations of this saying can be found in abundance on the Chinese Internet.

9 Qin Pang and Nicholas Thomas, “Chinese Nationalism and Trust in East Asia,” *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 47 (2017): 834-835, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2017.1322627>; Scott Synder, “Overcoming the Japan-South Korea Historical Identity Complex,” *Forbes*, 7 February 2014, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2014/02/07/overcoming-the-japan-south-korea-historical-identity-complex/#440a83c07d9f>.

largely in strategic terms—i.e. the military and political calculations behind the Truman administration's atomic bomb decision. Gar Alperovitz, the leading revisionist historian on the atomic bombings, notes that the American public sometimes has "felt a strong need to justify the bombings by reference to what can only be called notions of 'revenge'" fuelled by "anger at Japan's sneak attack and the brutality of her military," but ultimately concludes it as a "quite separate issue."¹⁰ Both the orthodox and revisionist schools seem to agree.¹¹ Barton J. Bernstein takes a step further and writes that even in the summer of 1945, "such sentiments of punishment and revenge were not the key motives for use [of the atomic bombs]" of the Truman administration.¹² While certainly still a cause célèbre in the United States—as proven by the controversies surrounding the Smithsonian Institution's 1995 Enola Gay exhibition and President Obama's 2016 visit to Hiroshima—the American debate over the atomic bombings is for the most part narrowly defined within the immediate context of war termination, i.e. the surrender of Japan in the summer of 1945.

In China and Korea, however, the historiographies are different. The interpretation of the bombings is invariably associated with the memory of the Second

World War and its impact on the emotions of nationalism and identity. For members of academia, government, and the public, it is virtually impossible to separate the rationale of the atomic bombings from that of Japanese aggression and atrocities in the 20th century. Consequently, the main question at the heart of the atomic bomb debate in China and Korea, to the extent one exists, is not "were the bombs necessary to induce Japan's surrender?" "should alternatives to the bombs have been explored?" or "were the bombs militarily justified?" but simply: "Were the atomic bombings morally justified as a retribution for Japan's own atrocities against other Asian peoples?" For them, the overwhelming answer is undisputedly, "Yes."

Remember and Redress

Current Chinese and Korean national identities are similar in that they both heavily employ the collective memory of victimization as the basis of their nations' modern historical consciousness. In both narratives, the once-glorious, ancient civilization of the East was defeated by superior industrial technology from the West, and consequently ravaged by imperialist aggression and subjected to national humiliation throughout much of the modern period, initially at the hands of Western powers but later, and most horrendously, by Japan, who had successfully Westernized and become an imperialist power itself.¹³

In Chinese historiography, the

¹⁰ Gar Alperovitz, *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 628.

¹¹ Some scholars, such as Hasegawa Tsuyoshi, argue otherwise. Hasegawa's book *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005) indicates that one of the main causes of the atomic bombings was Truman personal vengeance for Pearl Harbor.

¹² Barton J. Bernstein, review of *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan*, by Hasegawa Tsuyoshi, *H-Diplo Roundtables*, Volume VII, No.2 (2006): 17, <https://issforum.org/roundtables/PDF/Bernstein-HasegawaRoundtable.pdf>.

¹³ Wang Zheng, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 54.

“Century of Humiliation” (bainian guochi 百年国耻) inflicted by foreign aggressors on a weakened China, a period of modern history spanning over 100 years from the First Opium War of 1839 to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949,¹⁴ “defines the national trauma China uses to identify itself.”¹⁵ Of all the imperialist powers that bullied China, however, Japan inflicted the heaviest damage, both physically and psychologically.¹⁶ To the average Chinese citizen today, the Japanese aggression against China during this Century of Humiliation is best symbolized by the Second Sino-Japanese War, or as the Chinese call it, the “War of Resistance Against Japan” (Kangri zhanzheng 抗日战争), from 1937 to 1945. In turn, Japanese atrocities committed against the Chinese people in the invasion are embodied in the “Rape of Nanjing (Nanking),” the six-week long mass murder and mass rape of civilians in the then capital of China by the Imperial Japanese Army in 1937, a tragedy considered “worse than

the Holocaust,”¹⁷ and regarded by one scholar as “the fundamental keystone in the construction of the modern Chinese national identity.”¹⁸ Some Western scholars dismiss this victim consciousness as some kind of “mind-trap” set down by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as its de facto ideology has shifted from Marxism to nationalism.¹⁹ Although the CCP does indeed take advantage of this mentality as a tool to legitimize its single-party state (by casting itself as the liberator of China from such humiliation), the humiliation narrative in fact precedes the communist takeover of China by at least half a century. It is a concept as old as Chinese nationalism itself, which emerged during the late-Qing period, in the wake of the first wave of national humiliations brought about by Western powers.²⁰ The discourse of national humiliation was further developed by the Nationalist Party (also known as the Kuomintang, or KMT) as an integral part of Chinese national identity during its years on the Chinese mainland, and then on the island of Taiwan after 1949.²¹ The collective memory of humiliation is not only a national narrative of modern Chinese history, but a “key part of modern Chinese subjectivity” on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.²²

14 Some scholars like Wang Zheng in *Never Forget National Humiliation* (60) think that China’s Century of Humiliation ended with the defeat of Japan and the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945. In the book (48), Wang lists the major foreign invasions China suffered during this Century: the First Opium War (1839-1842), the Second Opium War (1856-1860), the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Eight-Nation Alliance intervention during the Boxer Rebellion (1900), constant Japanese encroachment of Chinese territories in the 1930s, and finally the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945); Wang also deems the series of “unequal treaties” (bupingdeng tiaoyue 不平等条约) China was forced to sign during this period as an equally important component of the humiliation memory. In the end, whether or not the Second Chinese Civil War from 1945 to 1950 should be considered as a part of the Century is mostly a matter of technicality, the central role played by the humiliation memory in the shaping of China’s modern national identity is acknowledged by virtually all scholars of China Studies.

15 Wang, *Never Forget*, 68.

16 Ibid., 54.

17 William A. Callahan, “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism,” *Alternative: Global, Local, Political* 29, no. 2 (2004): 206.

18 David Askew, “The Nanjing Incident: Recent Research and Trends,” *Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies*, no. 1 (2002).

19 Gerrit W. Gong, “The Beginning of History: Remember and Forgetting as Strategic Issues,” *Washington Quarterly* (Spring 2001): 47, quoted in Callahan, “National Insecurities,” 206.

20 Wang, *Never Forget*, 71-78.

21 Ibid., 78-84; Callahan, “National Insecurities,” 206.

22 Ibid. It is worth noting, however, Taiwan’s history curriculum has slowly begun to change since the Lee Teng-hui leadership in the 1990s. The gradual shift of Taiwan’s identity politics is an interesting topic, but is outside the scope of this paper.

While the Chinese remember Japan for the brutal eight-year long conflict (now officially 14-year long²³) and the immense suffering it brought about, the Korean memory of Japanese imperialism is even more bitter. Subjugated by Japan after the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and annexed into the Japanese Empire in 1910, Korea experienced the impact of Japanese colonization during what the Koreans call the “Period of Japanese Imperialist Forced Occupation” (*Ilje gangjeomgi* 일제강점기 日帝强占期). Just like how 18 September 1931, the beginning of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, is remembered as the unofficial National Humiliation Day (*guochi ri* 国耻日) in China, Koreans view the signing of the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty of 1910 as the “National Humiliation of the Year of the Yang Metal Dog” (*gyeongsul gukchi* 경술국치 庚戌國恥).²⁴ Although the modern North and South Korean governments each have their own historical narratives, both find common ground on their shared ethno-nationalism when it comes to the memory of Korea’s colonial history, and the powerful anti-Japanese sentiment it

evokes.²⁵ In North Korea, schoolchildren worship the revolutionary history of “Great Leader Comrade Kim Il-sung” against the backdrop of Korea’s anti-Japanese resistance movement during the Second World War.²⁶ Across the Demilitarized Zone, in a comparatively more objective manner, South Korean secondary school students learn about Japan’s economic and military exploitation of Korea in state-issued history textbooks.²⁷

This notion of constructing national identity around humiliation may be puzzling to some—after all, are such humiliation not evidence of a nation’s weakness? But when the memory of past humiliation and weakness is contrasted against present-day success and strength, it can function as a source of patriotic nationalism. This is especially the case with China. William Callahan succinctly summarizes the mentality behind modern Chinese nationalism: “Only China could go from so high a civilization to be the lowest of the low, the Sick Man of Asia, and back again.”²⁸ This ethnocentric perception of uniqueness in China’s ability to persevere and return to greatness is a source of pride for many Chinese, but the painful memory of a history of foreign aggression

23 China’s Ministry of Education amended its official history curriculum in 2017 to include the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria as a part of the “War of Resistance Against Japan.”

24 Ben Blanchard and Antoni Slodkowski, “China marks ‘National Humiliation Day’ with anti-Japanese protests,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, 18 September 2012, <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2012/0918/China-marks-National-Humiliation-Day-with-anti-Japanese-protests>; Han Jong-gu 한종구, “‘Nara ppaetgin chiyong itji malja’ ... Gyeongsul Gukchiil jogigeyang jeongung hwaksan” ‘나라 빼앗긴 치욕 잊지 말자’ ... 경술국치일 조기개양 전국 확산 [‘Never forget the humiliation of losing our country’ ... Gyeongsul Gukchi half-mast memorial expanded nationwide], *Yonhap News 연합뉴스* 聯合뉴스, 9 September 2016, <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2016/09/08/0200000000AKR20160908124700063.HTML>.

25 Chris Wilson, Danton Ford, and Alisa Jones, “The History Text: Framing Ethno-Cultural and Civic Nationalism in the Divided Koreas,” in *History Education and National Identity in East Asia*, ed. Edward Vickers and Alisa Jones (New York: Routledge, 2005), 249.

26 *Ibid.*, 235-240.

27 *Ibid.*, 245-248. It is worth noting that South Korea, like most other East Asian countries, also maintains a highly centralized curriculum system under its Ministry of Education. Only until very recently has limited textbook pluralism been legislated. Efforts by the Park Geun-hye government to push for a new state-issued history textbook in 2015 met heavy public resistance and was officially abolished by the succeeding Moon Jae-in government in 2017.

28 Callahan, “National Insecurities,” 206.

also instils a perhaps unconscious sense of apprehension, lest China be visited by such humiliation again. According to Callahan and many others, this apprehension is present in the back of the minds of both China's leaders and populace when it comes to interactions with the West, and the notion of restoring "the rightful place of China on the world stage" is driven by "a strong sense of victimization, insecurity, and righteousness in foreign policy."²⁹ Similar sentiments of seeking the "rightful place" can also be found in modern Korean nationalism.³⁰

For both China and Korea, Japan's role as the main victimizer is crucial to the construction of their humiliation memory, which itself is an integral part of their respective modern nationalist narratives. Consequently, Japan's refusal to admit to this role is not only perceived as a mere lack of contrition, but a direct affront to the very essence of their national identities. An often-drawn comparison of attitudes towards World War II history is that between Japan and Germany.³¹ Many Chinese and Koreans would eagerly point out how the Federal Republic of Germany, although institutionally separate from the German Reich, has managed to face its brutal past and take active responsibility for the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities, addressing them in history education and making compensations to surviving

victims.³² The modern state of Japan on the other hand is a direct heir to the former Empire of Japan and, as China and Korea claim, not only refuses to acknowledge the full extent of its past crimes, but is actively seeking to manipulate history and cast itself as the victim of war. China and Korea point to Japan's resurgent nationalism (although the two are just as nationalistic, if not more so, themselves)³³, historical revisionism, and general failure in answering their relevant history problems as evidence of the former imperialist aggressor's unrepentance. For China, the problem of the utmost significance is that of the Nanjing Massacre; for Korea, it is perhaps that of the "comfort women"—women and girls, many of them Korean, who were forcibly conscripted into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army in occupied territories.³⁴ Such history problems have long been evaded, downplayed, and even occasionally outright denied by Japanese politicians,³⁵ and they consistently prove to be a stumbling block in Japan's international relations with its Asian neighbours.

Forgive and Forget

While China and Korea continue to accuse Japan of unrepentance, why do more and more Japanese think that enough atonement has already been made? Why would Japan feel victimized in the first place? While the Japanese people did suffer

29 Ibid., 214; Zhao Suisheng, "Rethinking the Chinese World Order: The Imperial Cycle and the Rise of China," *Journal of Contemporary China* 24, no. 96 (2015): 961-982, doi: 10.1080/10670564.2015.1030913.

30 Vickers, introduction to *History Education*, 17.

31 Philip A. Seaton, *Japan's Contested War Memories: The "Memory Rift" in Historical Consciousness of World War II* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 69.

32 Wan Ming, *Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 154.

33 Vickers, introduction to *History Education*, 16-17.

34 Nozaki Yoshiko, "Japanese Politics and the History Textbook Controversy, 1945-2001," in *History Education and National Identity in East Asia*, ed. Edward Vickers and Alisa Jones (New York: Routledge, 2005), 290.

35 Ibid., *passim*.

greatly during the later years of the war, it was their government and military, which they ardently supported, that initiated the conflict and committed undeniably horrendous atrocities—do the Japanese people not remember that? Is Japan a remorseless nation, fundamentally different from Germany? After examining China and Korea’s national identities, it is only fair to also take a look at Japan’s side of things. Most Japanese do not deny that significant destruction and human suffering accompanied Imperial Japan’s invasion of Mainland Asia and the Pacific, and the Japanese government does officially recognize its aggression during the Second World War.³⁶ Indeed, throughout the post-war years, multiple Japanese Prime Ministers and Chief Cabinet Secretaries, and in fact even the current Emperor Akihito himself, have made a series of apologies and expressions of regret.³⁷ But China and Korea have questioned the sincerity of these statements, especially one given by Abe Shinzo in 2015, on the eve of the 70th anniversary of Japan’s surrender, which merely reiterated his predecessors’ previous statements, and only made oblique references to the specific issues of the Nanjing Massacre and comfort women.³⁸ In light of Abe’s nationalist drive, many Chinese and Koreans scoff that Japan’s words have not been matched by its actions. More importantly, as Akira

Iriye incisively points out, “these [official apologies] have not been incorporated into [Japan’s] public memory.”³⁹ While individual, private memories of the Second World War are innumerable and wide-ranging, the Japanese people as a whole have failed to develop a collective, public memory of this specific period of history; this is in stark contrast to China and Korea, both of which not only have coherent public memories of Japanese imperialism and aggression, but have thoroughly incorporated them into their national identities.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, while memory of the rest of World War II history broke down into a disparate jumble among the Japanese public, that of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were ingrained in the Japanese historical consciousness.

For the Japanese, the fact that their country is the only one to have ever been attacked by nuclear weapon plays an important role in the construction of their national identity,⁴¹ and out of this a kind of victim consciousness very different from that of China and Korea is born. Originating during the Cold War years, caught between the titanic Soviet-American power struggle in Asia, the Japanese construction of a post-war national identity was driven by an intimate sense of nuclear victimization. As the fear that Japan would once again become the victim of nuclear warfare pervaded the public, the 1950s gave rise to the anti-nuclear weapons peace movement

36 Lai, *Nationalism and Power Politics*, 81.

37 Akira Iriye, “Introduction: Historical Scholarship and Public Memory,” *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 4, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 89-90.

38 Jonathan Soble, “Shinzo Abe Echoes Japan’s Past World War II Apologies but Adds None,” *The New York Times*, 14 August 2015, <https://nyti.ms/2jDFuE8>.

39 Iriye, “Introduction,” 90.

40 Ibid., 89-90.

41 Asada, Sadao, “The Mushroom Cloud and National Psyches: Japanese and American Perceptions of the A-Bomb Decision, 1945-1995,” *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 4, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 95.

and anti-military pacifism that would influence Japanese politics for decades to come.⁴² However, while the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki played its lead role under the spotlight, those of Japan's own wartime atrocities were quietly forgotten. John W. Dower gives a crisp analysis on the special Japanese sense of victimization in his essay "The Bombed: Hiroshimas and Nagasakis in Japanese Memory":

Hiroshima and Nagasaki became icons of Japanese suffering—perverse national treasures, of a sort, capable of fixating Japanese memory of the war on what had happened to Japan and simultaneously blotting out recollection of the Japanese victimization of others. Remembering Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that is, easily became a way of forgetting Nanjing, Bataan, the Burman-Siam railway, Manila, and the countless Japanese atrocities these and other place names signified to non-Japanese.⁴³

Such is Japan's historical memory, or the lack thereof, of the Second World War. One perhaps would wonder then, if the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is so indispensable to Japan's modern national identity, the United States must have been cast as the ultimate victimizer behind such tragedies. However, this is not the case.

Unlike those of its Asian neighbours, which put emphasize on the victimizers as well as their atrocities, Japan's victim consciousness focuses almost entirely on the memory of human suffering. While

a significant portion of the Japanese are still bitter over the dropping of the atomic bombs when asked by surveys,⁴⁴ there is no deep-seated resentment towards the United States among the general public, certainly not to the degree as there is towards Japan in China and Korea.⁴⁵ The profusion of atomic bomb literature in Japan focuses on the human element of the bombing survivors' (hibakusha 被爆者) personal experience, not American decision-making. While the Chinese and Koreans remember themselves as victims of Japan, the Japanese remember themselves as victims of the atomic bomb, not the United States. As a matter of fact, contemporary Japanese history textbooks give the atomic bombings only a perfunctory mention, and sometimes do not even say who dropped the bombs.⁴⁶ Japan's Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (Monkashō 文科省, formerly Monbushō 文部省), the authority in charge of the screening and approval of all textbooks, has been furtively pushing an agenda to downplay the atrocities and horrors of war, including the atomic bombings.⁴⁷ As more

44 Ibid., 96-101.

45 Ben-Ami Shillony, "Auschwitz and Hiroshima: What Can the Jews and the Japanese Do for World Peace?" *IHJ Bulletin* 27, no. 2 (2007):

9. When it comes to academia, however, Japanese scholars have widely adopted the "atomic diplomacy" school of thinking, first introduced by English physicist P. M. S. Blackett. The orthodox interpretation of the atomic bombings in Japan reflects the American revisionist view, concludes Asada Sadao in "The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and the Japan's Decision to Surrender—A Reconsideration," *Pacific Historical Review* 67, no. 4 (1998): 481. Again, there is a contrast to China and Korea, whose academia is dominated by an interpretation in line with the American orthodox view.

46 Asada, "The Mushroom Cloud," 113

47 Ienaga Sabuō, "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education," *International Security* 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/94): 113-133; Ienaga Soshō Shien Shimin no Kai 家永訴訟支援・市民の会 [Ienaga Litigation Support Citizen Council], ed., *Taiheiyō Senso to Kyōkasho 太平洋戦争と教科書* [The Pacific War and Textbooks] (Tokyo: Shisō no Kagakusha 思想の科学社, 1970), passim, quoted in Asada, "The Mushroom Cloud," 113.

42 John W. Dower, "The Bombed: Hiroshimas and Nagasakis in Japanese Memory," in *Hiroshima in History and Memory*, ed. Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 135.

43 Ibid., 123.

than one scholar has pointed out, today's Japanese remember the atomic bombings almost like some sort of natural disaster that simply "happened," without much thought or reflection on the lead-up to and reasoning behind the American planning and decision.⁴⁸

According to Ben-Ami Shillony, the Japanese mentality regarding the Second World War is to "forgive and forget"—forgive what others had done to Japan, and forget what Japan had done to others.⁴⁹ To many on Japan's political right, their country's experience in the war is an unpleasant episode of the past, and a major hindrance to the reconstruction of Japanese nationalism.⁵⁰ The sooner the psychological scars of that devastating trauma can be healed, and its memory be expunged from the nation's historical consciousness, the sooner Japan can be restored as a "normal" country. Thus, Japanese atrocities in China, Korea, and other Asian countries are covered with euphemism and circumlocution, while the firebombing and atomic bombings of Japan are treated as natural disasters. Promoted by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (which has effectively ruled Japan as a single-party state for much of its post-war history), aided by the right-leaning Monbushō bureaucracy, and riding on the resurgence of right-wing nationalism, this narrative stood firm through the Cold War years, as Japan was diplomatically severed from its neighbours who had turned

communist, and the common "red menace" kept silent any discussion of potentially divisive history problems with its remaining capitalist allies.⁵¹

Contradicting History and Politics

However, after the Iron Curtain fell, the history problems that had been smothered by Cold War dispensation finally began to surface as focal points in East Asian international relations. When it comes to imperialism, atrocities, and the Second World War, the Chinese and Koreans are about remembrance, while the Japanese wish to forget. Caught in the crossfire of conflicting historical memories and national identities, the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have sadly been reduced to a chess piece for diplomatic leverage in the game of nationalism between the East Asian peoples.

The ever so parlous history problem predicament haunting East Asian diplomacy has not been ameliorated by the current Japanese government, whose conservative Prime Minister, Abe Shinzo, is a staunch right-wing nationalist, and wishes to restore Japan's own rightful place as a "normal" power on the world stage.⁵² Abe's openly nationalist agenda to amend the pacifist Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, coupled with other incendiary political gestures such as appointing prominent World War II revisionists to important government positions and visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, where chief

48 Asada, "The Mushroom Cloud," 113; Shillony, "Auschwitz and Hiroshima," 8.

49 Shillony, "Auschwitz and Hiroshima," 9.

50 Lai, *Nationalism and Power Politics*, 103.

51 Nozaki, "Japanese Politics," 291.

52 Takahashi Kosuke, "Shinzo Abe's Nationalist Strategy," *The Diplomat*, 13 February 2014, <https://thediplomat.com/2014/02/shinzo-abes-nationalist-strategy>.

war criminals are enshrined among the war dead, have only validated China and Korea's already firm conviction that an unrepentant Japan has not learnt its lesson from the Second World War, and subsequently strengthened China and Korea's stance on denying Japan's quest of recognition for its own wartime victimhood.

In 2013, during the height of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan, and with a series of other historical controversies still stirring public sentiments, footage emerged of a smiling Abe Shinzo posing with a thumbs-up inside the cockpit of a Japan Air Self-Defense Force jet marked "731"—coincidentally the code number of the infamous Imperial Japanese Army unit that conducted appalling chemical and biological experiments on Chinese civilians and Allied prisoners of war.⁵³ South Korean media instantly exploded. All three of the country's largest newspapers ran articles condemning what they perceived as Japan's callous provocation. JoonAng Ilbo, however, brought up the issue of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. With venomous language, a column by an editorial writer labelled the two atomic bombings as "God's punishment and humanity's revenge" (Sinui jingbeorija inganui boksuyeotda 신의 징벌이자 인간의 복수였다) for the Asian victims of Japan's militaristic nationalism, such as those murdered by Unit 731.⁵⁴ The Japanese government immediately lodged an official

protest over the article, with an indignant Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga declaring: "We will never tolerate such an attitude [towards the atomic bombings]."⁵⁵ The Chinese media, on the other hand, warmly embraced its Korean counterpart's fervor. Quoting from the Korean column, a Xinhua special report again made the comparison between Japan and Germany, proclaiming that "Germany has been 'reborn as a liberal and progressive country,' while Japan still refuses to apologize for its 'past crimes.'"⁵⁶

During the 2015 NPT Review Conference controversy, when Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary explained that visits to Hiroshima and Nagasaki were "not related to any history problem," the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman retorted: "Let me ask first: when will Japanese leaders come to China and visit the memorial hall of victims in the Nanjing massacre?"⁵⁷ A year later, when President Obama made the unprecedented visit to Hiroshima, a short documentary aired on China's state media CCTV explicitly proclaimed that "under the historical circumstances at the time, the dropping of the atomic bombs on an unyielding Japan was a wholly necessary decision to preserve world peace."⁵⁸ The Koreans also

53 Yang Zhou, "Ribēn yāoqīng gè guó língdǎorén."

54 Ibid.; Hu Ruoyu 胡若愚, "Hánméi chēng Ribēn zāo hébào shì 'tiānqiǎn'" 韩媒称日本遭核爆是 '天谴' [Korean media claims Japan's nuclear bombing was 'divine retribution'], Southern Metropolis Daily 南方都市报, 24 May 2013, AA27.

57 China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on May 13, 2015* (Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1263642.shtml.

58 "Xīnwén bèijīng: Ribēn Guǎngdǎo hé Chángqí zāo měijūn yuánzìdàn hōngzhà" 新闻背景: 日本广岛和长崎遭美军原子弹轰炸 [News background: Japan's Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings by US military], CCTV-13, 27 May 2016, <http://m.news.cntv.cn/2016/05/27/ARTIDuHlGyFby3QDyxwZQeh9160527.shtml>.

53 Kirk Spitzer, "Sorry, But Japan Still Can't Get the War Right," Times, 20 May 2013, <http://nation.time.com/2013/05/20/sorry-but-japan-still-cant-get-the-war-right/>.

54 Kim Jin 김진 金璉, "Abe, Marutau boksureul jjeonna" 아베, 마루타의 복수를 잊었나 [Abe, did you forget the revenge of Maruta], JoonAng Ilbo 중앙일보 中央日報, 20 May 2013, <http://news.joins.com/article/11559123>.

were not too contented with Obama's so-called "reconciliation of the century"⁵⁹; one of the leading news media conglomerates in South Korea, Chosun Ilbo, criticized the U.S. President for not visiting the Korean memorial, or attempting to talk to the Korean delegation present in the Hiroshima Peace Park.⁶⁰

More than seventy years have passed since the end of the Second World War. China, Japan and South Korea have all become modern, prosperous countries and important actors on the world's stage. To the majority of their populations, as it is mostly the case in America and Europe, the painful memory of their nation's wars and suffering should be something of the distance past. However, unlike in America and Europe, the baggage of history weighs heavier in East Asia. "In China," notes Peter H. Gries, "the past lives in the present to a degree unmatched in most other countries."

⁶¹In Korea, the collective socio-cultural emotion of hatred (한恨) "encapsulates the grief of historical memory."⁶² While Japan, in contrast, only has a "historiographic cacophony" and a "miserable record when it comes to offering a clear and unequivocal

acknowledgment" of the past.⁶³ A Pew Research Center survey conducted in 2016 found that 77% of the Chinese population believe that Japan has not apologized sufficiently for its military actions during the 1930s and 1940s, a number that has not significantly changed over the past decade. In contrast, 53% of Japanese believe they have apologized sufficiently, a proportion that has steadily increased since 2006, while 17% say that no apology is necessary at all.⁶⁴ The nations' contradicting memories of the turbulent 19th and 20th centuries, and the national identities upon which they are built, not only shape how they look back at the past, but also how they imagine themselves in the present and ultimately how they view the world and others.

Multilateral Reconciliation Endeavor

When it comes to the question of addressing history problems, time and again, the comparison between Japan and Germany is made. Germany, many would say, is the only mentor that can offer lessons to East Asians on successful reconciliation. Although the German government has been largely reticent about involving itself in the East Asian history

59 Jo Deok-hyeon 조덕현, "'Bulgwa 2bun georiinde' Obamaga chatji aneun hangugin wiryeongbieseo hangugin pihaeja 'nahollo wiryeongje'" '불과 2분 거리인데' 오바마가 찾지 않은 한국인 위령비에서 한국인 피해자 '나홀로 위령제' ['Just 2 minutes away' Obama did not look for Korean victim, Korean victims held 'memorial alone'], Chosun Ilbo 조선일보 朝鮮日報, 27 May 2016, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/05/27/2016052703153.html.

60 Ibid.

61 Peter H. Gries, "Face Nationalism: Power and Passion in Chinese Anti-Foreignism" (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1999), 15, quoted in Christopher B. Williams, "110 Years of Humiliation from 1839 to 1949: China's Grand Strategy" (master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2016), 10.

62 Sandra So Hee Chi Kim, "Korean Han and the Postcolonial Afterlives of 'The Beauty of Sorrow,'" *Korean Studies* 41 (2017): 257, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/665890>.

63 Walter Hatch, "Bloody Memories: Affect and Effect of World War II Museums in China and Japan," *Peace & Change* 39, no. 3 (2014): 381, <https://doi.org/10.1111/pech.12078>; John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 563.

64 Bruce Stokes, *Hostile Neighbors: China vs. Japan* (Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2016), 9-10. The survey was conducted only in China, Japan, Australia and India, and does not provide data on Korean opinion on the issue.

feud,⁶⁵ Chancellor Angela Merkel did leave behind some words for thought when she visited Japan in March 2015, just weeks before the diplomatic incident erupted at the NPT Review Conference. Against the backdrop of an approaching 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, Merkel urged Japan to confront its wartime history as Germany had “faced its past squarely.” However, she also stressed the importance of the “generous gestures by [Germany’s] neighbours” in accepting their former enemy’s re-integration into a post-war European community. Reconciliation is a process that involves both the victimizer and the victims; the French and the British have made “just as valuable a contribution as the Germans have.”⁶⁶ By giving credits to Germany’s neighbours, Merkel was implicitly encouraging that Japan’s neighbours also have to do their part by taking an active role in creating a more understanding socio-political environment to embrace their once hated foe, instead of stubbornly clinging to the past, holding on to condemnation and vilification, and simply expect Japan to one day apologize.

Indeed, to truly resolve any history problem, an answer needs to be submitted by all sides involved. From disagreements over the interpretation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to the controversies regarding

Nanjing and the comfort women, are all manifestations of the fundamental conflict of historical memory and national identity. If one wishes for an East Asia of mutual understanding, free from the tethers of a disagreed history, then the only fundamental solution to this fundamental conflict is the creation of a shared historical memory, an international perspective bridging national identities. As Akira Iriye puts forward in his introduction to a special issue of *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the atomic bombings, “shared historical memory remains a worthy goal for all nations if they are to understand each other better,” but also acknowledges that “public memory, once constructed, is very slow to change.”⁶⁷ The biggest obstacle to World War II reconciliation in East Asia, unlike some would argue, is not solely Japan’s obstinate impenitence of its crimes, or just China and Korea’s perverse obsession of the past, but the widespread ethno-nationalism and institutionalized animosity between the East Asian peoples. The construction of a universal interpretation of the past, as replacement for the existing nationalistic historical narratives, is an endeavour that can only succeed through the open dialogue and honest cooperation of historians from across China, Japan and Korea. Without active support from these respective governments, the challenges of this Herculean undertaking will be enormous, and the reshaping of public memory through scholarly history is a process that can only be measured in generations.

65 “Xi Jinping’s Germany Trip: Berlin Nixes Holocaust Memorial Request,” *Spiegel Online*, 3 March 2015, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/no-holocaust-memorials-for-china-president-xi-on-trip-to-berlin-a-956574.html>. Quite notably, Germany declined overtures from both Chinese President Xi Jinping and then South Korean President Park Geun-hye to target Japan on addressing World War II history when the two visited the country in 2014.

66 “Germany’s Merkel addresses WW2 reconciliation in Japan,” *BBC*, 9 March 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31792313>.

67 Iriye, “Introduction,” 91-92.

However, historians should not be daunted. In Iriye's words, the very *raison d'être* of this profession is the dispassionate inquiry of the past, not for the purpose of serving any nationalist dogma, but of enlarging the realm of shared knowledge for all.⁶⁸ History as rebuilt by modern historians, as true as the contemporary availability of resources and evidence allows, should be one without national boundary, and with only one international identity. In time, the establishment of this scholarly history will have to influence the conflicting national memories of the past.

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68 Ibid., 92-93.

The Limits of Tolerance: Evaluating State-Sponsored Multiculturalism in Canada

Freeman Halle

Throughout the last part of the 20th century multiculturalism, the celebration of coexistence between diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural identities, became a powerful rallying call for progressive political visions¹. However, by the end of the first decade of the 21st century, some politicians heralded its demise. Chancellor Angela Merkel said multiculturalism had “failed utterly”² in 2010. Former British PM David Cameron claimed that multiculturalism’s “hands-off tolerance”³ had failed to bring Muslim immigrants into the fold, opening up the way for increasing alienation and violence. Conservative and anti-immigrant movements in many countries capitalized on these fears, using them to paint multiculturalism as a Trojan horse; one that provides cover for anti-democratic cultural practices to flourish in the West. These narratives jeopardize more lenient assimilation policies, not only in Europe and the U.S, but also in Canada. As recently as 2017, Conservative MP Kellie Leitch proposed a test to screen immigrants for anti-Canadian values. Calls to ban religious garb have also returned to

national and provincial political debates. As the first country to adopt multiculturalism as an official state policy, Canada provides an important case for diagnosing the contemporary condition of multiculturalism. Even more vital, Canada may be one of multiculturalism’s last defenders, given the successes of xenophobic politics throughout Europe and the U.S.

Canada provides a provocative counterpoint to current European and American narratives about multiculturalism and immigrant incorporation. Amidst a resurgence of nationalist movements across Europe and the United States, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau even went so far as to call Canada the “first post-national state”.⁴ But does Canada truly live up to its utopian branding? A 2016 poll by CBC and the Angus Reid Institute shows that 68% of Canadians agreed with statements that minorities should do more to fit in with mainstream Canadian society, surpassing the results of a similar survey conducted in the U.S where only 53% shared this sentiment.⁵ Another study revealed that 80% of Canadians surveyed felt that European immigrants made a positive contribution to Canada, while only 59% felt this way about Asian immigrants; 45%

1 Kymlicka, Will. “The rise and fall of multiculturalism? New debates on inclusion and accommodation in diverse societies.” *International Social Science Journal*, vol. 61, no. 199, 23 Nov. 2010. Wiley Online Library.

2 “Merkel’s Rhetoric in Integration Debate is ‘Inexcusable.’” *Der Spiegel*, October 18, 2010.

3 “State Multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron.” *BBC*, February 5, 2011.

4 Foran, Charles. “The Canada experiment: is this the world’s first “post-national” country?” *The Guardian*, January 4, 2017.

5 Reid, Angus. “Canadians aren’t as accepting as we think — and we can’t ignore it.” *CBC*, October 4, 2016.

for East Indians, and 33% for Caribbeans.⁶ Meanwhile, there are persistent concerns that ethnic enclaves in major Canadian cities are on the rise, and that this segregation threatens social cohesion and the creation of a shared Canadian identity.⁷

These anxieties are not new in Canada. Politicians and academics were already questioning the value of the multicultural experiment during the 1990's, evoking fears of hyphenated identities, conflicting social and legal norms, and the ghettoization of newcomers: all of which they attributed to the "cult of multiculturalism".⁸ We can see these same critiques reemerging in Canada's political discourse today. In 2018, then-conservative MP Maxime Bernier attacked Prime Minister Trudeau's "cult of diversity", claiming it would "divide us into little tribes that have less and less in common."⁹ Bernier has since broken with the Conservative Party to form his own People's Party of Canada, which has defined itself in opposition to "extreme multiculturalism."¹⁰ But what is "multiculturalism" in Canada, and how have its critics arrived at these damning conclusions? Fulfilling dual roles as both official policy guideline and symbolic virtue, this paper finds that the measure of multiculturalism's successes and failures are often too superficial to draw meaningful

conclusions. A more balanced assessment requires an understanding of Canada's history with integration policy.

This paper begins with a brief summary of the "modes of incorporation" framework proposed by Alexander (2001), followed by a description of Canada's history with multicultural policy. This discussion prefaces a critical examination of two of the more popular critiques of multiculturalism. After describing these critiques, I turn to the work of Canadian scholar Kymlicka (2010) who offers an alternative interpretation of the current results of Canada's multiculturalism policies. Kymlicka's argument suggests a far more positive interpretation of the impact of Canada's experiment with multiculturalism. In my conclusion, I recommend ways to counter and shore-up the compelling arguments for continuing to support a structural multicultural policy approach.

Origins of Multiculturalism

What is multiculturalism? Multiculturalism emerged in response to growing numbers of migrants and the diversity of their origin communities and nations.¹¹ As immigration from the global south to north increased from postcolonial to contemporary times, global north or western nations faced challenges for how to absorb the new entrants to their nations. Alexander (2001) lays out three major modes of immigrant

6 Gregg, Allan. "Identity Crisis: Multiculturalism: A twentieth century dream becomes a twenty-first-century conundrum." *The Walrus*, March 12, 2006.

7 Ibid.

8 Bissoondath, Neil. *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada*. Penguin Books, 1994.

9 Wright, Teresa. "Tory MP Maxime Bernier criticizes Trudeau's 'extreme multiculturalism' in series of tweets." *The Globe and Mail*, 13 Aug. 2018.

10 Budd, Brian. "What I learned at a People's Party of Canada rally." Editorial. *National Post*, 20 Nov. 2018.

11 Kymlicka, Will. "The rise and fall of multiculturalism? New debates on inclusion and accommodation in diverse societies." *International Social Science Journal*, vol. 61, no. 199, 23 Nov. 2010. Wiley Online Library.

incorporation¹² - assimilation, hyphenation, and multiculturalism. Alexander defines assimilation and hyphenation as variations on a theme, in which dominant groups seek to either diminish or privatize the expression of ethnic differences so that they can maintain control over the terms of mainstream citizenship.¹³ By contrast, multiculturalism is an attempt to dismantle these hierarchies by expanding the definition of what mainstream citizenship entails. Alexander argues that "instead of trying to purify the characters of denigrated persons...discursive conflicts that are mediated by the multicultural mode of incorporation revolve around efforts to purify the actual primordial qualities themselves"¹⁴ or, put another way, a multicultural approach values minority cultures as equally valid expressions of mainstream citizenship, rather than an impediment to integration. When this approach is adopted by public institutions, Alexander claims that multiculturalism is also an empirical policy framework which produces quantifiable progress towards reducing the marginalization and disenfranchisement of minority cultures and immigrant populations.

Canada started down its own path to multiculturalism during the 1970's with the adoption of the Canadian Constitution and the Official Languages Act. Enshrined within the former is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Article 27 of which

mandates that the charter be interpreted in a manner "consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians."¹⁵ This article, in tandem with the Official Languages Act, was intended to codify Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's vision of a multicultural Canada within a bilingual framework, and to defuse the tensions between Ottawa and the burgeoning nationalism of French Quebec. Trudeau acknowledged how the policy was in response to these tensions in his Memoirs, describing his actions as necessary to combat the "shriveled intellect"¹⁶ of nationalism which he feared would jeopardize the ethnic and cultural tapestry of Canada. Others, however, have also suggested that multiculturalism was at least partially a surreptitious bid by the Liberal Party to court ethnic votes through special favors and taxpayer-funded multicultural program funding.¹⁷ Subsequently, this critique would be echoed by multiculturalism's detractors in the decades that followed, most recently by Maxime Bernier when he said multiculturalism relegated immigrant groups to "political clienteles to be bought with taxpayers' money and the offer of special privileges."¹⁸

Whether or not one ascribes to the more cynical views of the elder Trudeau's motives for promoting multiculturalism,

15 Government of Canada. "Your Guide to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms." Accessed January 23, 2018. <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/how-rights-protected/guide-canadian-charter-rights-freedoms.html>.

16 Pierre, Trudeau. Memoirs. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993.

17 Plamondon, Bob. "The truth about Pierre Trudeau and immigration." Maclean's, October 4, 2016.

18 Wright, Teresa. "Tory MP Maxime Bernier criticizes Trudeau's 'extreme multiculturalism' in series of tweets." *The Globe and Mail*, 13 Aug. 2018.

12 Alexander, Jeffrey C. "Theorizing the Modes of Incorporation: Assimilation, Hyphenation, and Multiculturalism as Varieties of Civil Participation." *Sociological Theory* 19, no. 3 (November 2001).

13 Ibid., 242

14 Ibid., 246

the important role which non-Francophone minority groups played in defining multiculturalism should not be understated. Having relaxed its immigration quotas on other non-Western countries during the 1960's, the Canada which elected Pierre Trudeau was diversifying at an increasingly rapid pace. In 1971, the majority of new immigrants to Canada were non-white for the first time.¹⁹ In this respect, the switch from biculturalism to multiculturalism under Trudeau served a necessary role in augmenting Canada's identity politics to better reflect its increasingly diverse population. These immigrants also played an active role in lobbying for their interests during the 1960's, effectively co-opting the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism as a means to communicate their own concerns to Ottawa.²⁰ This was pivotal to expanding the discussion of ethnocultural relations in Canada, beyond the Royal Commission's original motivation of traditional Anglo-Franco concerns. In 1971, Trudeau formally acknowledged this shift by introducing a multicultural policy with four main objectives: to support the development and retention of ethnocultural identities, to minimize the barriers to integration facing non-Western immigrants, to encourage intercultural awareness and communication, and to help newcomers acquire at least one of Canada's two official

languages.^{21,22}

Critiques of Multiculturalism

Canada's decision to pursue a culturally pluralistic vision for the country marked an important shift in the politics of citizenship and immigration for the country, and it stood at odds with contemporaneous policies of incorporation in many other Western democracies. This was true just south of the border, where the melting pot approach encouraged immigrants to shed their more foreign qualities in pursuit of a more homogenous mainstream American society. Multiculturalism was not only a formal recognition of the contributions of immigrant and indigenous cultures made to Canada, but it formed government agencies and allocated funds to preserve and promote those cultures. Critics of Canada's multiculturalism policies were suspicious of these programs, arguing that state intervention in cultural relations could risk perpetuating differences and justifying the continued economic and social balkanization of immigrant populations.²³ Another common concern was that laissez-faire policies regarding immigrant assimilation might weaken the influence which public institutions and even laws hold over those populations. Left unchecked, it has been suggested this could create a tolerant

19 Burnet, Jean, and Leo Driedger. "Multiculturalism." *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, 27 June 2011.

20 Ley, David. "Multiculturalism: A Canadian Defence." In *The Multiculturalism Backlash*, edited by Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, N.p.: Routledge, 2010.

21 Library and Archives Canada. Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 28th Parliament, 3rd Session, Volume 8 (8 October 1971): 8545-8548, Appendix, 8580-8585.

22 Kymlicka, Will. *Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada*. N.p.: Oxford University Press, 1998.

23 Gregg, Allan. "Identity Crisis: Multiculturalism: A twentieth century dream becomes a twenty-first-century conundrum." *The Walrus*, March 12, 2006; Vertovec, Steven, and Susanne Wessendorf. "Introduction: assessing the backlash against multiculturalism in Europe." In *The Multiculturalism Backlash*, edited by Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, N.p.: Routledge, 2010.

climate towards deviant and even illegal activity.

Bissoondath (1994) analysis of a 1993 Decima Research Center poll finds strikingly similar results as the more recent poll reported on by Angus Reid.²⁴ In Bissoondath's study, 72% of respondents felt that the "multicultural mosaic isn't working and should be replaced by a cultural melting pot."²⁵ This sentiment, as Bissoondath attempts to illustrate, was the product of an overbearing drive towards state-mandated tolerance and diversity, at the expense of meaningful understandings of other people and the retention of a cohesive Canadian identity. Moreover, he asserts that these fears were actualized in ways that threatened both the socioeconomic and physical security of Canadian communities. The primary concerns were that multiculturalism had further marginalized immigrants by encouraging ethnic enclaves, and that the emphasis on respect and tolerance towards difference had been internalized in ways which prohibited meaningful inter-group mutual understanding. He also argued that cultural relativism and political correctness were paralyzing the state when it came to addressing the possible inherent contradictions between supporting cultural beliefs that might be associated with illegal practices.

Bissoondath argues that a focus on preserving cultural heritage impedes the process of social integration for newcomers

and successive generations of immigrant families. He voices his concerns for a public which relies on a government policy to validate, or even create, its sense(s) of community.²⁶ Additionally, Bissoondath claims that the portrayal of minority cultures through educational programs or festivals may amplify misconceptions about those communities and trap them into reified categories that superficially caricaturize their heritage. By extension, multiculturalism could discourage meaningful, natural dialogue between different ethnic and cultural groups and undermine a newcomer's sense of belonging within the host country. The risk of multiculturalism distorting cultural expression was not unique to its opponents. Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (1994), another influential intellectual authority on Canadian multiculturalism, agrees that misrecognition of identity could be its own form of oppression, "imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being."²⁷

There has also been concern that the lack of overlap between immigrant groups would encourage physical segregation based on ethnic and cultural affiliations. Concerns over immigrant segregation have emerged in more recent commentaries as well. Gregg (2006) cites two reports from Statistics Canada in an attempt to illustrate how immigrant segregation in Canada was not only real, but that it had worsened since the 1980's. The first report, published in 1981, identified six communities in Canada

24 Reid, Angus. "Canadians aren't as accepting as we think — and we can't ignore it." *CBC*, October 4, 2016.

25 Bissoondath, Neil. *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism*. N.p.: Penguin Books, 1994.

26 Ibid., 213.

27 Taylor, Charles. "The Politics of Recognition." In *Multiculturalism*, edited by Amy Gutman, N.p.: Princeton University Press, 1994.

where 30% or more of the population was comprised of a single ethnic identity. The report classified these communities as ethnic enclaves. In a more recent report published in 2001, there appeared to be a rise from 6 to 254 in the number of such enclaves, and that an "alarming number",²⁸ to quote Gregg, were significantly poorer than national averages. Gregg argues that these communities were breeding grounds for disenfranchisement, resentment, and, ultimately, outbreaks of intense violence - similar environments which he claims gave rise to violent outbursts in Paris and London. Indeed, the argument that multiculturalism "fosters separateness"²⁹ formed the backbone of the infamous Cattle Report on the cause of the Oldham race riots in the UK.³⁰ This report, paints a picture of immigrants living "a series of parallel lives,"³¹ and suggests that oaths of allegiance and a more "meaningful concept of citizenship"³² could serve as possible antidotes to ethnic tension. Cattle claims that multiculturalism in Britain was "past its sell-by date."³³

Related to the criticism that it fosters separateness, multiculturalism is often accused of stifling criticism and creating

a so-called "cult of multiculturalism",³⁴ as Bissoondath calls it. Bissoondath accuses multiculturalism of being a "state sanctioned mentality,"³⁵ and holds it responsible for a rise in censorship which silenced criticism of cultural practices like clitoridectomy or forced marriage.³⁶ This evasiveness, he claims, generated a dangerous form of cultural relativism which jeopardized the liberal democratic social and legal norms of Canadian society. Bissoondath uses the 1994 trial of a Muslim-Canadian man who was charged with, and convicted of, raping his stepdaughter, as an example. In this case, the judge decided to give the man a considerably more lenient sentence, because judge concluded that in sodomizing the girl, the man had actually exhibited a cultural respect for her virginity and her honor.³⁷ Bissoondath interprets this judgement statement as an indication of how misguided interpretations of cultural sensitivity could hamper the government's authority to apply its own laws and policies.

Gwynn (1995) employs the same rape case as an extreme example of what he calls the "cultural defence."³⁸ Gwynn puts the question bluntly: "if female genital mutilation is a genuinely distinctive cultural practice, as it is among Somalis and others,...why should this practice be disallowed in Canada any more than singing

28 Gregg, Allan. "Identity Crisis: Multiculturalism: A twentieth century dream becomes a twenty-first-century conundrum." *The Walrus*, March 12, 2006.

29 Vertovec, Steven, and Susanne Wessendorf. "Introduction: assessing the backlash against multiculturalism in Europe." *In The Multiculturalism Backlash*, edited by Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, N.p.: Routledge, 2010.

30 Ibid.

31 "Key points of the Cattle report." *The Guardian*, December 11, 2001.

32 Ibid.

33 Bingham, John. "Multiculturalism 'past its sell-by date' warns race expert." *The Telegraph*, 15 Sept. 2012.

34 Bissoondath, Neil. *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism*. N.p.: Penguin Books, 1994.

35 Ibid, 7.

36 Ibid, 138-140.

37 Ibid., 90.

38 Gwyn, Richard. *Nationalism Without Walls: The Unbearable Lightness of Being Canadian*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1995. 198.

"O Sole Mio" or Highland dancing?"³⁹ Gwyn admits the starkness of this comparison, but suggests that dismissing these kinds of questions as racist without addressing the underlying societal anxieties could actually exacerbate distrust of immigrant groups and the kind of "cultural unease"⁴⁰ which sparked backlash against multiculturalism in the 1990s.⁴¹ Citing several opinion polls, Gwyn claims that a lack of clarity on the relationship between cultural accommodation and social and legal norms increased disaffection for multiculturalism as a whole. This emboldened the Reform Party to take increasingly aggressive stances against multiculturalism, eventually calling for its abolition in 1993.⁴²

Defending Multiculturalism in Canada

The anxieties outlined by critics of multiculturalism continues to shape debate on the value of multiculturalism in Canadian society. But to what extent have the trends they describe actually become manifest in Canadian society? The argument that support for cultural events and community programs will dilute immigrants' sense of citizenship and loyalty to Canadian values is not well substantiated by the preceding works. Rather, both Bissoondath (1995) and Gwynn (2005) cite polls of what native born Canadians think about immigrants' willingness to participate in Canadian society, rather than the opinions and actions of the immigrant groups. Critics of multiculturalism tend to treat it as a "single

doctrine",⁴³ rather than a "diffuse and myriad patchwork of policies, practices, and institutional adjustments",⁴⁴ which would otherwise more accurately characterize multiculturalism programs, practices, and policies in Canada. The complexities of multiculturalism, and the ways in which it manifests at the federal, provincial, and community levels, defy the kind of pass-fail criteria which often frame these debates. In fact, multiculturalism and its policies have evolved, and continue to evolve in many ways, to mitigate new definitions of equity and citizenship among immigrant communities.

To the first point, Kymlicka (1998) argues that in order to prove the theory that multiculturalism was decreasing civic participation by immigrants, needs to be a measurable decrease in naturalization rates and political participation among these groups.⁴⁵ Contrary to this, Kymlicka finds that the percentage of immigrants who pursued naturalization in Canada increased since the adoption of multiculturalism, despite the diminished role that citizenship had come to play in determining economic success for newcomers. This, he argues, demonstrates a genuine desire to participate in civil society, irrespective of whether it brings immediate material gain.⁴⁶ Other studies have also shown a positive correlation between the adoption of multicultural policies in Canada and

43 Vertovec, Steven, and Susanne Wessendorf. "Introduction: assessing the backlash against multiculturalism in Europe." *In The Multiculturalism Backlash*, edited by Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, N.p.: Routledge, 2010.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., 20

39 Ibid, 189.

40 Ibid, 190.

41 Ibid, 189.

42 Ibid, 189-190.

its naturalization rates. A 2010 article in the *Globe and Mail* compared Canadian naturalization rates to those in the U.S, noting that the two countries had almost identical rates of naturalization at the time Canada began implementing multicultural policies in the 1980's. By 2006 these rates had diverged significantly, leaving U.S immigrants at 43% naturalization compared to Canada's 73%.⁴⁷

Kymlicka diagnoses the health of Canadian multiculturalism again in a 2008-2010 survey, which reaffirms the trends he had found in the 1990's.⁴⁸ Moreover, the study finds that children of Canadian immigrants received better education than in any other Western nation, and that there was an "almost complete absence"⁴⁹ of ethnic ghettos in Canada. This finding runs counter to the assertions of Gwynn (2006), which Kymlicka claims is a misinterpretation in Statistics Canada's reporting. Kymlicka calls these claims a "red herring" and, "an artifact of poorly defined Statistics Canada categories, combined with a misunderstanding of the historical record of immigrant settlement".⁵⁰ In defining an ethnic enclave as any community which consisted of 30% or more of the same ethnic group, Kymlicka argues that Statistics Canada sets the bar too low. Further, Kymlicka asserts that the residential concentration of immigrants today is actually lower than it was in

Canada's immigrant ghettos of the early 1900's.

Kymlicka (2008-2010) also finds no decline in minority political participation and civic engagement, but rather an increase. This trend is borne out by electoral results, with a record number of minorities, many from immigrant communities, being elected to the House of Commons in 2015.⁵¹ Members of non-Western immigrant groups have also achieved leadership positions in Canada's federal ministries and political parties, such as Harjit Sajjan, a first generation Sikh immigrant from India and the current Minister of National Defence; and Jagmeet Singh, the son of Indian immigrants and leader of the New Democratic Party. Kymlicka further notes the absence of ethnic voting blocs, noting that immigrant communities display diverse and active political affiliations within Canada.

The characterization of multiculturalism as a feel-good celebration of ethnic food and dance - what has been referred to as the "3S" model of multiculturalism in Britain (Saris, Samosas, and Steel drums) - is also problematic. On the one hand, state-sponsored preservation of cultural identities can be seen as a superficial attempt to promote diversity with the potential to reinforce the notion that cultural minorities are something "other" than normal citizens. This criticism is levelled by Bissoondath (1994), who sees cultural programs as nothing more than "a

47 Bloemraad, Irene. "Multiculturalism has been Canada's solution, not its problem.", October 28, 2010.

48 Kymlicka, Will. *The Current State of Multiculturalism in Canada and Research Themes on Canadian Multiculturalism 2008-2010*. N.p.: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2010.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Chowdhry, Affan. "Record Number of Visible Minority MPs Elected to Commons." *The Globe and Mail*, October 20, 2015.

dash of colour and the flash of the dance".⁵² However, this concern is belied by the fact that the primary funder of multicultural programming, Heritage Canada, requires that cultural events and community programs must facilitate understanding between at least two cultural or religious groups, foster civic pride or memory, and promote respect for core democratic values to be eligible for government assistance.⁵³ It is the stated purpose of these grants to "support the socio-economic integration of individuals and communities and helps them to contribute to building an integrated, socially-cohesive society."⁵⁴ The other problem with this critique is that it overstates the centrality of cultural events at the expense of discussing the more systemic shifts in Canadian public policy that multiculturalism has led to.

In *Multiculturalism: A Canadian Defence*, David Ley (2010) cites Audrey Kobayashi's theory of the three stages of multiculturalism to describe how Canada's policies have evolved. In the first stage of multiculturalism - demographic multiculturalism - the state formally recognizes additional ethnic identity groups with viable claims to citizenship, beyond the original "charter groups" of English and French. In the second stage, Canada entered a period of symbolic multiculturalism. This included the funding of heritage programs and the amplification of minority art, music, food and language

within mainstream society. Today, however, Canada is implementing a "structural multiculturalism,"⁵⁵ which he describes as seeking four goals; fostering cross-cultural understanding, combating racism and discrimination, promoting civic participation, and "making Canadian institutions more reflective of Canada's diversity."⁵⁶ Thus, while Canada still provides support for cultural preservation and education, the belief that multiculturalism is nothing more than "a dash of colour and the flash of the dance"⁵⁷ ignores the ways in which multiculturalism produces profound shifts in redefining Canada's social, economic, and political landscape.

Sharia Makes a Splash

Polls show that the majority of Canadians view multiculturalism as one of the country's most important symbols and values.⁵⁸ However, polls that question whether immigrants do enough to fit in, or whether they share the same values, suggest that many Canadians are more comfortable with the symbolism of multiculturalism than the kind of reality it envisions. For example, a national poll showed a 13% decline in support for cultural accommodations and a 24% increase in support for assimilation

52 Bissoondath, Neil. *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism*. N.p.: Penguin Books, 1994

53 Government of Canada. "Inter-Action: Multiculturalism Funding Program." October 20, 2015.

54 Ibid.

55 Ley, David. "Multiculturalism: A Canadian Defence." In *The Multiculturalism Backlash*, edited by Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, N.p.: Routledge, 2010.

56 Ibid.

57 Bissoondath, Neil. *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism*. N.p.: Penguin Books, 1994.

58 Thompson, Derek. "Canada's Secret to Escaping the "Liberal Doom Loop"." *The Atlantic*, 9 July 2018.

between 2005 and 2006.⁵⁹ Similarly, a poll in 2008-2009 saw a rise in the number of respondents who agreed that laws and norms should not be changed to accommodate minorities.⁶⁰ The extent to which Canadians support the policy objectives of multiculturalism, juxtaposed with their support for the concept of multiculturalism, reveals a certain degree of dissonance manifest in the treatment of Canada's Muslim population.

The 2006 repeal of Ontario's Arbitration Act of 1991 is a good example of the rising unease with some forms of structural multiculturalism. The law permitted faith-based tribunals to resolve familial and business disputes in accordance with religious and cultural principles, though it still gave the powers of final review to the Canadian courts. The primary beneficiaries of this act had been the Catholic and Orthodox Jewish communities in Ontario, but in 2006 the law was repealed after the Muslim community sought to exercise similar rights under the law.⁶¹ Because the Arbitration Act allowed Ontario to enforce the rulings of religious courts, women's rights activists worried that extending the same autonomy to Sharia arbitration would amount to sanctioning and enforcing a version of family law that was "inherently discriminatory,"⁶² against women. The prevailing opinion in the

case was that Sharia law should never be permitted in Canada, and that there should be one law for all Ontarians.⁶³ However, these arguments ignored wording in the Arbitration Act that explicitly required gender parity in faith-based arbitration, and which maintained the supremacy of provincial and federal law in any instance where the dictates of religion contravened common law.

The 2016 proposed "Quebec Plan" revealed a similar distrust of the Muslim community in Quebec, sparking a heated provincial debate on integration. In 2016, an accountant named Nabil Warda proposed the construction of a neighborhood which would provide low-cost, interest free housing to Muslims who believed that mortgages violate Islamic views on usury.⁶⁴ The proposal was met with swift condemnation. Quebec's premier said that there was "no way (they) would allow discrimination,"⁶⁵ in housing development, and Quebec's Minister for Immigration, Diversity and Inclusiveness stated that "neither ethnic origin nor religious belief should ever be considered as criteria for the creation of a housing project."⁶⁶ Warda argued this was a misinterpretation of his proposal,⁶⁷ but the court of public opinion had already branded him an extremist. Quoted in a Globe and Mail article, Haroun Bouazzi, co-president of Muslims for a

59 Soroka, Stuart, and Sarah Robertson. *A literature review of Public Opinion Research on Canadian attitudes towards multiculturalism and immigration, 2006-2009*. N.p.: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2009.

60 Ibid.

61 Sturcke, James. "Sharia law in Canada, almost." *The Guardian*, February 8, 2008.

62 Jimenez, Marina. "Rabbinical courts at core of dispute are seldom used." *The Globe and Mail*, September 14, 2005.

63 Freeze, Colin, and Karen Howlett. "McGuinty government rules out use of sharia law." *The Globe and Mail*, September 12, 2005.

64 Sevunts, Levon. "Quebec Premier slams proposed plan for Muslim neighbourhood." *Radio Canada International*, November 15, 2016.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 Hassan, Farzana. "Multiculturalism must be a two-way street." *Toronto Sun*, November 24, 2016.

Secular Quebec, was quick to highlight the role Islamophobia played in the public's reaction to Warda's plan, and the double standard to which Muslims were being held. Bouazzi noted that housing developments that court Orthodox Jews already exist,⁶⁸ so why not for Muslims?. This episode would not be the last bout of animosity between the Quebec government and the Muslim population either.

The passage of Bill 62 in October, 2017 further increased tensions between Quebec's political mainstream and the Muslim population of the province. This law made it illegal to give or receive public services without revealing your face, which disproportionately affected Muslim women. Proponents of the Bill argued that it was necessary to protect the secularity of Quebecois society, but many others saw this as an overtly racist law masquerading as neutral; the machination of "Catholaïcité." In another *Globe and Mail* article, Haroun Bouazzi, decried the hypocrisy of the Bill, noting "sadly, secularism seems to be invoked just to take away rights from religious minorities and not for the right things."⁶⁹ Bourrazzi and others also noted the blatant contradiction between the secular rhetoric, and the fact that a crucifix hangs in the very chamber where the law was passed. While support for cultural accommodation consistently runs lower in Quebec than the rest of Canada, polls have revealed that previous iterations of Bill 62

were also viewed favorably by a majority of Canadians. Bill 94, introduced in 2010, contained many of the same provisions as 62, but received an 80% approval rating from Canadians outside of Quebec.⁷⁰

Conclusions

In this study, I sought to review the evidence surrounding the emergence and resilience of multiculturalism policies in Canada. I find that the focus of Canada's multiculturalism policies have evolved from demographic recognition, to cultural amplification, and now to structural multiculturalism. Overall, despite attempts to challenge multiculturalism, most Canadians are proud of the concept's centrality to the nation's normative priorities. In addition, rather than segregate communities, it appears to have led to much higher levels of integration than expected. High levels of political and economic participation on the part of immigrant communities is proof of this success. Nevertheless, claims that Canada is a post-nation state ignore the reemergence of pushback towards cultural accommodation, most recently directed towards religious tolerance in the context of structural multiculturalism. As Fo Niemi, Director of the Centre for Research Action on Race Relations, said in response to Quebec's Bill 62, "today it is the niqab, tomorrow it could be the hijab the day after that it could be the Sikh turban ... and then

68 Shingler, Benjamin. "Developer vows to go ahead with Montreal-area Muslim housing project despite opposition." *Globe and Mail*, 16 Nov. 2016. Accessed 13 Mar. 2018.

69 Hamilton, Graeme. "Ban the Niqab, keep the Cross?" *National Post*, December 7, 2017.

70 Chowdhury, Safia. "Is Canada's multiculturalism in peril?" *Al Jazeera*, April 2, 2014.

afterwards ... how far do we go?"⁷¹

Canada's ability to weave diversity into its narrative of nationhood has been helpful in maintaining support for the multicultural model of immigrant integration. Its embrace by both Conservative and Liberal governments - for the most part - has also helped to minimize direct attacks on multiculturalism policy. Nevertheless, some politicians at the provincial and federal level have been experimenting more aggressively with politics of division. The Conservative party's loss in 2016 was seen, in part, as a rebuke of their experimentation with more divisive messages on immigration and cultural assimilation. Maxime Bernier's People's Party now seems poised to test their own brand of right-wing populism in the 2019 federal elections. Attempts to use multiculturalism as a political wedge cannot be ignored on the presumption that Canadian politics are somehow immune to this kind of populism. As the Director of the Angus Reid Institute said, "if we view populism as bacteria, look in the petri dish: It's already growing, it always has. We deny it at our peril. The only antibiotic is to shine a light and acknowledge this."⁷²

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⁷¹ "Quebec will require bare face for service: Legislation addresses thorny issue of accommodating minorities." *CBC News*, March 24, 2010.

⁷² Kurl, Shachi. "Yes, Trump-style populism could happen in Canada. Here's why." *The Angus Reid Institute*. March 24, 2010.

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Iriye, Akira. "Introduction: Historical Scholarship and Public Memory." *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 4, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 89-93.

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