

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Cover photograph by Erin Hill.

Letter from the Editor

The Jackson School Journal is proud to begin this issue by highlighting work from the Jackson School's Undergraduate Honors Program. *Identity Politics in Kumaon*, provides a richly detailed examination of development in Uttarakhand. The author's first-hand experience living in the mountainous region of Northern India, presents a compelling and new account of how economic system and practices of Kumaon have been influenced by their geographic and political isolation.

The Development of the National Referral Mechanism, the second piece featured in this issue, was sourced by the editorial board from the International Conference of Undergraduate Research. Originally written for an economics course at Singapore Management University, *The Development of the National Referral Mechanism* addresses inconsistencies between China's domestic policy and the international and regional agreements that China is a party to and concludes with policy recommendations intended to curb human trafficking in the region.

The third and final paper takes an original look at something that has been around as long as the earliest of civilizations—street art. *Graffiti and Street Art in the Middle East* uses contemporary pieces of protest art in conjunction with a theoretical analysis of the concepts of power to provide the reader with an interesting discussion on the importance of graffiti as an expression of resistance in the region.

Expert Insights interviews with two new members of the Jackson School faculty, professors Daniel Bessner and Rebecca Weber complete this issue of the Journal

The diversity of the topics included in this issue of the Journal acts both as a testament to the interdisciplinary nature of Jackson School curricula, and to the outstanding work that Jackson School students—and other undergraduates—are capable of producing. As the Journal enters its sixth year in production, the Editorial Board looks to continue to provide a bridge for undergraduates to engage with the academic community at the Jackson School and beyond, improve upon quality scholarship, and grow as individuals and intellectuals.

Sincerely,

Simon Walker
Editor in Chief

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The ninth issue of the Jackson School Journal is dedicated to Professor Fredrick Lorenz.

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Arianna M. Delsman

Identity Politics in Kumaon

Geography of identity, the state, and development

Kumaon is a mountainous division of a newly independent Indian state, Uttarakhand. The rural region with dramatic topography and the hill people who live there are often represented as "backwards" by scholars, historians, and politicians alike. Although once subjected to an extractive history of British colonial and Indian national imperatives, the hills region now thrives economically in its current development trends. In this study I explore why the isolated, seemingly "underdeveloped" region of Kumaon that has only recently emerged is now able to succeed in fulfilling its own grassroots development vision. I propose an answer rooted in identity politics and a regional social movement. I examine the interdependency between geography and social and historical social processes, to inform my analysis of the local identity-based development strategy. The analysis uses data collected through qualitative, ethnographic interviews and participant observation in the field. Supplementing the primary data with literature on identity assertion as a response to colonial and neocolonial processes, I argue that Kumaon has thrived and made significant progress because development there is inextricably linked to a regional identity of isolation and to collective movements for social change. These social movements distinguish Kumaon and have contributed to the evolution of a conservationist and rights oriented regional identity, which has helped form a particular vision for Kumaoni development focused on the environmental and economic rights of the people living in its hills.

This article traces the emergence of successful development processes in Uttarakhand, a newly established state in northern India. Government-driven incentives to build up tourism and manufacturing sectors in the state have frequently been identified as the source of successful economic development in Uttarakhand; however, the crucial role that participation of local people has played in these processes and the way that geographical conditions have informed their culture and identity as a distinctive component of developmental success have not been adequately investigated. This article argues that regional *Pahari* identity, grounded in the experience of geographical separateness as well as culturally specific environmental and economic claims, constitutes an important feature of development success.

This article draws on research conducted primarily during two months in 2012 where I lived in Kumaon with two host families as well as at a local village retreat. My field work took place in Nainital and Almora, two districts in Kumaon, one of the two political divisions of Uttarakhand, where I lived for two months with host families

and at a local village retreat. During this period I completed research both independently and also for a local non-governmental organization (NGO), Chirag.

North of Delhi sits the small, largely mountainous and heavily forested Indian state of Uttarakhand. After a movement for statehood that was based on economic and political claims, coincide with the administrative divisions. This greater altitudinal division between the hills and the plains represents differences in culture and identity, and the marked inequality between the hills and the plains. Most of the evidence within this paper comes from the people who live in the hills, particularly the lesser Himalaya districts of Kumaon.



Figure 1: Map showing India, Uttarakhand, its divisions and their districts, and changes in territory over time. (Map designed by Rajiv Rawat.)

Uttarakhand became a new state on November 9, 2000 when it was carved out of the larger state of Uttar Pradesh. Uttarakhand is now divided into two divisions, Garhwal to the north and Kumaon to the south. Nainital and Almora, the sites in which most of the research for this thesis was conducted, are districts of the latter division.

Uttarakhand, politically organized into divisions and districts, is also geographically separated into hills and plains regions that

The underlying premise of this study is that regional development revolved around a regional identity of 'separateness' that is inextricably connected to effective movements for social change. These movements led to the emergence of a conservationist and rights-oriented regional identity, which informed a particular vision for Kumaoni development that focused on environmental and economic rights of people living in this region. This identity has

proven integral to the success of the initiatives for Uttarakhand's progress, and has ultimately allowed the people to propagate a specific vision of development for the future.

Following Dear, this study concerns "the illumination of the concrete process of everyday life," which reflects specific spatial foundations of Kumaon identity formation.[1] Identity formation in Kumaon is understood as a response to the environmental realities of the region; prior to Uttarakhand's statehood, people living in northern Uttar Pradesh regarded themselves as different by virtue of not only their ethnicity but also because of their geographical and political isolation.[2] The vision of development has its roots in the tradition of Kumaoni social movements rooted in separateness and geographical isolation, associated collective identity, and environmental conservation.

In part due to the raw, undeveloped nature of Uttarakhand's terrain, modern scholars



Figure 2: Map showing terrain and altitudinal changes of Uttarakhand, which illustrates the overlapping nature of the hills and plains between Kumaon and Garhwal. (Map designed by Rajiv Rawat.)

and politicians have frequently viewed the region as comprehensively 'backwards' and in need of development.[3] Sridhar portrays this attitude in an economic profile of Uttarakhand, describing it as not economically viable, backward, of agrarian character and with fragmented and uneconomical landholdings.[4] Nehru himself added to the portrayal of Uttarakhand as socially backwards, which Joshi highlights in his analysis of Nehru's letters where he said he wanted the people in Kumaon to "show progress" and reverse their backwardness.[5] Post-independence, raw resources were necessary for infrastructure in the plains, and the "backwards," northernmost part of Uttar Pradesh had those resources. When national industry and the Indian Planning Commission (IPC) realized this, there began a dramatic exploitation of the mountains' natural resources, continuing the long trajectory of exploitation begun with British colonialism.[6]

Nehruvian industrialization perpetuated colonial trends as it damaged the forest and therefore the hill peoples' livelihoods.[7] The forest, villagers say, would have been better left to the devices of the villagers. Instead, the over-exploitation of natural resources led to environmental decline and socio-economic dislocation in Uttarakhand, which alienated village people, increased female workload, and endangered folk heritage.[8] The destructive changes to the region's environment ultimately influenced the peoples' relationship to their environmental space, and changed a focal point of their collective identity.

Space dictates social behavior. Understood as a dimension defining the arena within which the social takes place, a given space creates the venue for and functionality of social processes, or what Dear identifies as the "reflexive impact of space on society":

> Social relations are constituted through space (e.g. the organization of production in resource-based activities and environments); constrained by space (such as inertia imposed by the built environment or the limits imposed by natural hazards); or mediated through space (including the development of ideology and beliefs within geographically-confined regions or locales.[9]

Given my interest in how development emerged in a region on the periphery of its nation, Dear's focus on specific locales that create spaces for interaction is especially significant.

My experience working with the NGO Chirag in Kumaon bears witness to the central role of geography in regional identity formation. Aside from the use of the patchwork-like road system, people travel between homes, farms, and places of work in the region by foot. Daily foot journeys can take up to two hours one way and involve climbing steep, slick, rocky and narrow paths, scaling terraced agricultural land, and jumping from rock to rock across running streams.[10] One NGO staffer's introduction to Chirag's work focused largely on how development in Uttarakhand is influenced by the fact that the region as a whole is "hard to access."[11]

Robbins writes that geography and resources inform the creation of regional identity.[12] Other scholars additionally stress the relationship between geographical reality and regional identity;[13] they call attention to how space mediates social and cultural processes, and that the latter must be seen as an embedded response to the former. Raju's work makes a

compelling case for a synthesis of the social and the geographical:

> By shifting the focus of attention from mutually isolated social and physical processes to a synergy that sees social and cultural institutions as embedded response to ecological/environmental/ material realities and by moving from dominant discourses to voices at the margins, critical geography in India has initiated the reclaiming of spatially structured and produced social differences.[14]

Physical realities inform the emergence of social patterns such as identity formation, social movements and regional vision. Rangan's observation that regional movements emerge from "collective identification with the experience of *spatialized differences* [emphasis added] in social and economic opportunities" iterates my argument's logic.[15]

If social structures are spatially constructed because geography mediates the social, what are the implications of isolation, a geographical and political reality in Kumaon? This discussion applies the metrics of isolation both physically (in terms of distance from the plains and urban centers), and also politically, because the region on the physical periphery of the nation requires more resources for the government to oversee and manage, and therefore informs a specific political mindset. Given its geographical and political isolation and its "agro-ecological setting singularly unfavorable to manpower and grain-amassing strategies of states," a place whose return to the state is "likely to be less than the administrative and military costs of appropriating it," Scott may describe Kumaon as a "nonstate space."[16] Life in Uttarakhand is literally life on the periphery of India. Koskimaki writes that "Uttarakhand is a state on India's border regions, literally on its margins, and this marginality has figured into the discursive representation of people who live there, where the region is often termed 'backward.'"[17]

In addition to Uttarakhand's peripheral nature, northern Uttarakhand rests in the high Himalaya, southern Uttarakhand resides in the foothills, and Uttar Pradesh – the state from which Uttarakhand separated itself in its 1990s movement for statehood – is in the lower plains. Given that the mountainous region of today's Uttarakhand is dramatically different topographically from the plains of Uttar Pradesh, a differentiation between the "plains" and "hills" peoples has existed since the two states were one.[18] This differentiation between the people, cultures and existences of the plains and the hills regions is very important, because it has informed differing mentalities that, since pre-colonial times, have influenced political and economic decisions.[19] Set high in the mountains, *Pahari* people could geographically discern the difference between 'us' and 'them.' Politically and economically, the hills and their people were treated differently by the state, which through not creating employment opportunities in the hills, extracted not only natural resources but also labor from the *pahari* regions and people in the form of a remittance economy. Not only was there a geographical difference between the 'us' of the hills and 'them' of the plains and beyond, but the hill people were treated differently on social and political fronts alike.

Kumaon's mountainous environment imposes different demands from a life in the plains. Without potential for comprehensive irrigation, the subsistence farmers of the hills depend on rainfall for their agriculture. Similarly, the people rely on their bodies to make up for what lacks in infrastructure. One day, I returned to my homestay tired from trekking. Baghuati-ji, the grandmother of the household and a woman in her late-50s, told me about her own Kumaoni yoga: that day, she had carried twenty crates of peaches, each the size of a milk crate and overloaded with fruit, on her head and up the hill from the farm to the street.[20] She told me, with a gesture and the use of *darda*, the Hindi word for pain, that her neck hurt. This physical, painful manifestation of the labor necessary to maintain a livelihood practice in the mountains signifies the geography's direct influence on the lived experiences of Kumaonis in their environment.

I met Laal Singh during an interview on a warm, sticky morning. Laal sat through the interview composed and conversational, at ease in his wool sweater vest and crisp collared shirt. A staffer from Chirag with whom I spent several days administering surveys, Laal climbed the slippery hillsides with grace, always patiently waiting a few steps in front of me. One afternoon, when we had been ascending a hillside for what felt like an hour, Laal appraised my exhaustion and said "yoga – it's good, is it not?" Upon further explanation, I learned that what he meant by "yoga" is the symbiotic relationship between mind and body that enables us to perform. He spoke of the ability to traverse such a difficult landscape as a gift, something beautiful that keeps people and their environment healthy, and teaches cohabitation. According to Laal and other Kumaoni people I met, living and working intrinsically involves the environment around oneself, and requires a mutual sense of respect. This relationship of symbiosis and respect for the land's majesty represents a regional attitude toward life in Uttarakhand's mountains.

Such relations with the environment are often intrinsically connected to physical relationships and wellbeing. Scheper-Hughes' and Lock's idea of the "mindful body" illustrates the interconnected nature of relationships to an environment and emotional wellness.[21] In turn, environmental relations connect to social relations, particularly because the environment is an integral part of identity formation. Lévi-Strauss' ethnographic work adds to the notion of a mind-body connection to the spatial and temporal environment, such that "…physical integrity cannot withstand the dissolution of the social personality."[22] Scheper-Hughes' and Lock's conceptualization of embodiment complements this view, as it speaks to the effects of the lived experiences of stress on a "mindful body" involving individualized, social, and body-politic responses. In Uttarakhand, Laal Singh's yoga provides an example of mediation of the spatial relationship to the environment that influences social relations. Similarly, the geography inherently influences the pain associated with labor in the hills, which creates a direct link between spatial, temporal, and social relationships. Geography's influence on social relationships is also reflected in the consequences of the region's post-independence extractive industries.

Politically and economically, before Uttarakhand separated from the larger state of Uttar Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh's government exploited the mountainous regions for state gain and diminished local economies in the mountains. Shekhar Pathak writes that Uttar Pradesh's governmental overexploitation of natural resources alienated village hills people,

"Politically and economically, the hills and their people were treated differently by the state, which through not creating employment opportunities in the hills, extracted not only natural resources but also labor from the pahari regions and people in the form of a remittance economy."

increased the female workload, and resulted in "cultural encroachment endangering the folk heritage and indigenous lifestyle."[23] Rangan points out that prior to statehood politicians routinely ignored the region and instead focused on the industrialized plains.[24]

While the geographical differentiation between the plains and hills of Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh implies distinctive lives in the two regions, so does availability of resources like water. Regarding the reliance on rain for water and irrigation, Juyal and Sati emphasize that agriculture is rain-dependent because not even ten percent of arable land is irrigated.[25] Krishna Sridhar designates water scarcity as a problem for such an isolated region and explains that, despite a World Bank-funded rural water project, water scarcity in the region continues and still stems from rainfall issues, resource degradation and erosion due to extractive industries.[26] The lack of infrastructure as basic as irrigation precluded the adoption of bio-chemical and innovative technology, and advancements that took place across much more of India (such as the Green Revolution) never occurred in mountainous and rain-dependent Uttarakhand.[27] The region's isolation, Rangan says, contributed to its lack of irrigation and water-related infrastructure, which in turn diminished the region's capacity to support mainstream development trends and prohibited the region from a developmental trajectory parallel to that of its neighbors.[28]

In addition to their reliance on rain for agriculture and livelihood purposes, the people of Uttarakhand rely on the forest for resources integral to everyday life. Villagers work in the forests on a daily basis to collect fuel, fodder, and other forest products essential to their lives. Pathak details the hills people's reliance on the forests for agriculture, rearing animals, traditional medicines, agricultural-pastoral-trade equipments, cottage industries, fodder, firewood, and manure, as their isolation means they cannot go elsewhere for such resources.[29] Mawdsley expounds this point and writes, "the forests provide essential inputs of fertilizer (in form of leaf mulch), grazing, fodder, fuel and a host of other non-timber forest products, such as medicinal herbs, fibres and foodstuffs."[30] In one meeting, Naveen-ji looked at me as they discussed the health of one forest and said "over sixty percent of Uttarakhand is forested – do you know what it means for much of that to be degraded? It means harder livelihood times for the people."[31] Unable to attain such products elsewhere due to their remoteness in the mountains, the people of Uttarakhand depend on their environment for all livelihood resources. Much of the population depends on healthy forest, and an unhealthy forest proves detrimental to the livelihoods that surround it.

Rangan articulates that, because of the region's isolation and mountainous locale, state initiatives in the region included negligent industrial forestry policies through the Forest Department.[32] Forest Department policies diminished local resource use and confirmed

government apathy for community welfare and development in the hills; they substantiated the idea that, while geographically isolated and different from its neighbor regions, Uttarakhand was also treated as if it were socially dissimilar to the surrounding areas. With regards to Uttarakhand's social uniqueness, Pathak describes it as a place where "micro-societies and cultures co-exist with different forms of subsistence living and folk expressions."[33] This recognition and treatment of the region as 'different' contributed to the portrayal of it as 'backwards.'

In Chipko, a pre-statehood environmental people's movement, civil society and local leaders called for an end to the extractive industries' environmental destruction and also the routine dismissal of the people as 'peripheral' to the state. The movement and its success was a pivotal moment in regional identity evolution as the people called for restoration of their rights and access to the region's natural resources. Rangan maintains "for the men and women involved in [Chipko], statehood was the necessary condition for extricating their region from its backwardness."[34] While backwardness is a result of the region's isolation, there are additional social implications of isolation. The social implications of isolation reached beyond the assigned descriptor of 'backwards,' and into political relationships.

State society relations illustrate a final consequence of geographical isolation. James Scott argues that state failures are rooted in miscalculations that overlook the importance of local identity and traditional knowledge in regional development and adaptation.[35] Because of this, particularly in agrarian societies, stateless people (or those not adequately represented by their state) resist "internal colonialism" as they redefine their own rights, access to resources, and relations to their state.[36] To articulate his argument, Scott defines his conception of *Zomia*, "virtually all the lands at altitudes above roughly three hundred meters all the way from the Central Highlands of Vietnam to northeastern India and traversing five Southeast Asian nations and four provinces of China."[37] Scott takes a horizontal cross section of mountainous regions and suggests that hill people in the isolated mountainous regions of Southern and Southeastern Asia (Zomia) have, through their geographical differences from their ruling nation-states, built their identity in an effort to remain regionally distinct and determinant of their own fates. Scott writes that "virtually everything about these people's livelihoods, social organizations, ideologies and (more controversially) even their largely oral cultures, can be read as strategic positionings designed to keep the state at arm's length."[38] Scott's analysis validates looking at how physical geography–namely, altitudinal isolation–in Uttarakhand informed the emergence of specific movements to resist state power.[39] I will further argue that these movements, in turn, generated the formation of a collective identity that was grounded in a desire for regional autonomy.

In his discussion of Zomia, James Scott writes that "the vast 'barbarian' periphery of these small states was a vital resource" in terms of both trade goods and human labor.[40] Simultaneously, such "enormous ungoverned peripher[ies] surrounding these minute states also represented a challenge and a threat."[41] Essentially, his argument for the ungovernability of Zomia revolves around the idea that:

> The main, long-run threat of the ungoverned periphery… was that it represented a

> constant temptation, a constant alternative to life within the state. Founders of a new state often seized arable land from its previous occupants, who might then either be incorporated or choose to move away. Those who fled became, one might say, the first refugees from state power, joining others outside the state's reach. When and if the state's reach expanded, still others faced the same dilemma.[42]

According to Scott, peasants both benefit from their state's attempt to make them legible, and also simultaneously become more visible to– and therefore manipulable by –the state.[43] The peasant cannot be an economic agent without identifying with the state, and therefore needs to become a standardized citizen in order to participate.

"Much of the population depends on healthy forest, and an unhealthy forest proves detrimental to the livelihoods that surround it."

While distance from the state is on one hand ideal for independence, it is also detrimental to achieving economic agency. State modernization is about standardization of people, which allows for rational economic planning. Incorporating the peasants into the state has become a requirement for the functionality of the modern state, yet the dispersal of the population in rural mountainous areas compounds this challenge. The geography that isolates the peasants from the state historically contributed to the extractive industries, but simultaneously helped foster a desire for independence.

Resource protection is the central issue that drives resistance to the state and formation of an autonomous collective identity, which here is understood as individuals' identifications and relations with the particular ethnic and geographic group of those who identify as *Kumaoni* or *Pahari*. The context in which resource protection, resistance to the state, and formation of a collective identity coalesce was established two centuries ago during colonial rule. Local interventions against and responses to colonial rule changed the geographical landscape and constituted integration of new resource management schemes. Villagers in Uttarakhand resisted British attempts at forest reservation, which included identifying certain lands as 'district protected forests' that were guarded by forest guards who managed access to the forests. Protests against the denial of traditional access, which relied on such extreme tactics as incendiarism (purposeful burning of forests), became frequent and engrained themselves in local identity expression.[44] Resistance to colonial infrastructure advancement for extraction of timber products reinforced the sentiments. Pathak argues, "the colonial policy of commercial forestry did not take into account matters dealing with the interrelationship of forests with agriculture, animal husbandry, folk culture and socio-economic needs of the people."[45] Moreover, "the policies of different Indian governments after independence followed the same path and made the same mistakes."[46]

As Nehruvian policies threatened regional autonomy and environmental sanctity,

the socio-economic dislocation resultant of Nehruvian industrialization led to the development of strategies for locals to reclaim their rights.[47] The constitution of a "network of institutions through which groups in society in general represent themselves – both to each other and to the state" was perhaps the most pertinent strategy.[48]

"While distance from the state is on one hand ideal for independence, it is also detrimental to achieving economic agency."

In Uttarakhand, women's and youth groups formed social organizations around resource protection during both the colonial and post-colonial eras.[49] Rangan observes that recent changes regarding forestry policy are the direct results of "communities struggling to overcome political and economic marginality."[50] Agarwal uses the concept of civil society to analyze how organizations effected changes in resource use: "The effective management of local natural resources, especially forests and village commons, requires the active involvement of user communities."[51] Ikelegbe's research on the Niger Delta in which "the dynamics and ramifications of the entrance of civil society into a regional resource agitation" provides an apt corollary to what I believe occurred in Uttarakhand:

> Civil society has flowered, taken over and escalated the struggle and constructed itself into a solid formation of regional resistance. Civil groups have reconstructed the agitation into a broad, participatory, highly mobilized and coordinated struggle and re-directed it into a struggle for self-determination, equity and civil and environmental rights.[52]

Most crucial to my argument is how through resistance the emergence of civil society at once influenced the outcome of resource struggles, as it also established a paradigm of regional collective identity based on the assertion of regional rights.

Resource protection and resistance initiated a collective identity by way of local civil society. Throughout a discussion of resource exploitation in Uttarakhand, Gururani emphasizes spatial tensions in identity expression in her discussion of issues of power and identity in Kumaon related to the forests.[53] She argues that "forests create cultural spaces through which social relationships and a feminized sense of self, notions of work, proper behavior, and respect are constituted along multiple relations of power."[54] Robbins argues that the application of environmental management regimes themselves creates a regional identity for the people those regimes and power relations influence.[55] He writes, "people's beliefs and attitudes do not lead to new environmental actions, behaviors, or rules systems; instead, new environmental actions, behaviors, or rules systems lead to new kinds of people."[56] Gururani and Agarwal identify protection against forest abuse as central to the collective identity formation in Kumaon.[57] For example, Chipko was a reaction

to existing environmental resource abuse.[58] The State-managed Forest Department threatened local subsistence, degraded ecology, and eroded villagers' rights to the forests.[59] The Department's decisions culminated in what Rangan depicts as a poor attempt to install processing units in the hills for the extracted products.[60] Those units could have raised employment rates and added value to regional exports and therefore would have allowed for more regional growth.[61] Instead, the people watched their environmental resources and access disappear. Chipko became a movement to protect the forest because it was a functional livelihood strategy.[62]

Response to the historical processes of Nehruvian industrialization along with the consequential desire for environmental preservation foments and strengthens regional conservation identity. In Kumaon, defense against exploitation led to a conservationist identity, which emerged in the face of "the hegemonic appropriation of resources and opportunities in space," and thus created regional resistance.[63] Sarin argues that the rebellious acts of incendiarism were actions of agency, which contributed to the formation of a regional identity based on resource use.[64] Raju argues that throughout the colonial and pre-independence era, defense against colonial exploitation led to an identity rooted in a strong desire to protect environmental rights, which emphasizes the point that environmental realities and social and historical processes are interdependent.[65] Finally, Sanjay Kumar attributes the success of the new state of Uttarakhand to both the popular movement in favor of statehood and the history of neglect in the region and most expressly highlights the region's distinct sociocultural identity as the determining factor in its success.[66] Geography, history, and resource mitigation, the scholars agree, influence collective identity formation.

When a collectively-identified group realizes a need for resource protection that may also intrinsically promote that group's rights, a social movement is born.[67] Social movement in Uttarakhand comes from a network of environmental realities and collective identity formation, and such social movement can lead to a particular type of vision of regional development separate from the mainstream.

The *Pahari* people used their subjugation to make claims for statehood grounded in notions that the larger state had a detrimental impact on hill life; regional history had created a pathos of regional suffering, the people wanted to contribute to regional development and increased local employment opportunities were necessary for self-determination.

Kumaoni civil society is very active. As a democracy, albeit one with an economy modeled off that of the Soviet Union, India has fewer features of the manipulative state Scott describes, and civil society functions more effectively than it would in a more subversive state. Civil society organizations are more empowered to provide feedback and information to the government about popular sentiment, which, along with the desire to appear more democratic, explains why the government generally promotes the growth of civil society. Interaction between civil society and government articulates on a fine balance, because the government seeks to maintain state strength, but simultaneously relies on civil society to discover subtleties of popular sentiment. Scott's ideas modulate across societies as a result of the variations in governance across nation-states. Civil society interaction with the government in Kumaon represents one articulation of Scott's joint governance. While

he does not directly address economics in the discussion, local ownership of environmental resources in Kumaon is the ultimate issue and driving factor behind the growth of the state.

Geographical factors contribute to the foundation of social movements in Uttarakhand. Rangan observes that it is "collective identification with the experience of *spatialized differences* in social and economic opportunities that gives rise to regional movements," and emphasizes the role of physical and social space on collective identity formation and movement.[68] Chipko, for example, expressed an ecological consciousness that challenged conventional approaches to resource extraction and development, and offered an alternative path for positive environmental and civil society relations. Rawat argues that social movement and identity are interrelated, and writes that there is a "historical continuity between Chipko and the contemporary efforts to empower and defend the environmental rights of Uttarakhand's local communities," which "people's institutions and the processes of empowerment, self-determination, and environmental governance that have emerged in the wake of Chipko" demonstrate.[69] While the movement officially addresses environmental rights, it simultaneously works to strengthen people's agency in social action, a view that Guha complicates with his argument in *The Unquiet Woods*. Guha argues that locals viewed Chipko as a movement to secure the subsistence that state policies and decisions had routinely denied them, and that the movement was "defensive, seeking to escape the tentacles of the commercial economy, and the centralizing state."[70] The movement fought not just for environmental sanctity and local rights, but also for an entire redefinition of the region's relation to the state. Mawdsley adds that Chipko addressed both commercial and subsistence issues and fought comprehensively for livelihood aspects with which the people strongly identified.[71]

Collective necessity, civil society action, and subsequent defined local agency were important to Chipko, which plays a fundamental role in Uttarakhand's identification. Hills activist Shamser Singh Bist spoke about agency in Chipko. He asserted that the way some politicians view Chipko insulted their cause, because "a potentially radical movement for self-determination and self-management of our resources turned into a purely conservationist one."[72] Because the state recast the movement as one limited to conservationist efforts in lieu of a struggle for agency and redefined regional rights, the movement turned to civil society to lead its success. Rangan remarks "Chipko's ascent to fame…hinged on the central role played by rural elites…who could speak from interstitial spaces created by state institutions, markets and civil society, and seize the opportunities emerging from political and economic change."[73] While agency was initially seen as a by-product of resource defense movements, it emerged here to constitute a force that was consciously recognized in and of itself. Chipko activists emphasized their collective identity when they approached invasive forestry policies 80 kilometers away and offered to help those villagers protect the forests. Mawdsley uses this anecdote to posit that by "moving beyond their immediate local needs to embrace a wider spatial and temporal perspective, Chipko was born as a meaningful social movement with regional implications."[74] Local civil society exercised its desire to protect those with whom it identified, and the region created a social movement.

The infusion of national influence into forest maintenance and accessibility spread to

matters of regional life.[75] The documentary film *Jardhar Diary* reflects the dislike of authorities' invasion of regional life. The film portrays *Pahari* awareness of their rights, opposed to their subjugation by the national authorities and limited local access to resources. In the film, the people express an aversion to national authority by drawing a parallel to seed diversity, saying, "even today we see wherever 'development' has come in, new seeds have replaced traditional seeds."[76]

Even the presence of NGOs prior to statehood has been viewed as an overbearing attempt to infiltrate and control the region. Chirag reports that it has worked closely with communities since 1987. The organization's presence so early on illustrates a larger pre-statehood presence of NGOs that while focused on regional desires also helped to effectively force positive change in daily lives. Koskimaki adds depth to the notion of NGO presence in the state, and refers to the presence of non-governmental groups working in development in the region as an "overabundance of social movement-repressing NGOs."[77] Koskimaki found that in lieu of grassroots organizations, it was the youth publics that voiced the idea that "development [was] the responsibility of a new generation of youth, who felt "abandoned by the system" and were left to do something about it themselves."[78] The engagement of young people in the villages surrounding Chirag reflects this ethos.

Rangan says "social movements in most poor regions of the world are not necessarily new," as some argue, "but rather emerge in different forms and historical circumstances from the familiar tensions between territory and function."[79] Spatial tensions, geography, historical background and the people's relations to these things breed a movement for change. Jayal alludes to movements grounded in collective identity and the power of agency that have historically bred development visions and writes that "the region of study has a strong tradition of evolving local institutions, which formulate and implement rules relating to the use of natural resources, and impose sanctions for their violation."[80] Those "evolving local institutions" embody the change the people envisioned, and create rules that emphasize their values and set rules for future actions involving natural resources.

Villagers consider M.K. Gandhi the savior of their nation and the father of national independence, which led to their own statehood. In my months in Uttarakhand, the Gandhian idea that "India is in her villages" arose several times. The trope is useful to frame how people feel about their village life: it is the essence of their India. Laal Singh called Gandhi "India's national father" and told me about the goodness in institutions created around Gandhian teachings. The infusion of national industry attempted to change the villages, and in doing so attempted to change what villagers see as Gandhi's "India." This, of all things, constituted an affront to not only their relationship with their environment but also to their conception of the sanctity of India herself.

The extended industrial disregard for the hill people amounted to exploitation without reimbursement. The local people received nothing in return for the extraction of the natural resources on which they depend, nor anything to account for the invasion of their daily lives. India depended on the hill people for national security and growth, but then disallowed them to share the benefits. To illustrate regional discontent, I borrow a source from Koskimaki:

> When it is a question of defending national security, we are known as sons of the brave, but when it is a question of [sharing in] pleasure and privilege, then those in the mountains become a burden on the country. Now the youth of the hills will not remain silent. The Himalaya is calling us. *Jai Hind!* [81]

The hills people recognized that they were regarded as simultaneously necessary for and expendable by the state. Their region had been coined 'backward' for decades, a word that "possesses a remarkable power [and] has the ability to seize upon an entity, a place, a social group, and transfix its entire character into a frozen moment of history."[82] They recognized that this view of their place as "backward," coupled with their "pathos of regional suffering," came from exploitation and a national disregard for their own regional sanctity.[83] From this realization and through a movement for statehood, the people began to call for reimbursement for their marginalization.

In a morning meeting, Naveen (the animal husbandry research lead at Chirag) told me about how, of the available state funds in Uttar Pradesh, most of them were allocated to plains industry and capacity building, and little went to, for example, employment programs in the hills. The extraction and subsequent poverty of the hills region created one of the battle cries for statehood: independent statehood would bring more funds per capita than any program Uttar Pradesh could install.[84] Additionally, because of the decentralization of Indian politics, statehood would also deliver more political agency to the hills people. The hills people would have much more direct representation with the government in Delhi, as opposed to their historical fight for representation at the state level in Uttar Pradesh.

While past evolutions of local institutions demonstrate that the vision of the hills people can effect social change, scholars also discuss how defined social movements have led to a certain vision of development based on regional identity. Rangan maintains that social movement or society inform development; "Chipko and subsequent struggles, including the Uttarakhand movement for statehood, have been linked by a central preoccupation with the need for economic development in this Himalayan region."[85] Much of social movement occurs with an ultimate idea of development in mind. Rangan maintains that while development "came to be accepted by most of India's population as a legitimate activity promoted by the state," ultimately it is shaped by society as "its meanings, values, and benefits have been, and continue to be, constantly contested and renegotiated in the public realm."[86]

The *Pahari* articulated their development goals via their desire for economic growth through local employment.[87] The claims for statehood revolved around the self-determination to develop not for Uttar Pradesh or India but within the region that would become Uttarakhand. Those fighting for statehood invoked the environmental conservation of their predecessors, but spun it to make it their own and demand subsequent economic development. This shift in activism, from one for conservation rooted in a desire for agency (Chipko), to an activism rooted in a modern desire for economic growth that called for access to and use of the resources, suggests that the latter's evolution depended on the former's development of agency.[88]

Juyal and Sati articulate that the people's dependence on the environment and biodiversity has emerged in the discussion of sustainable mountain development.[89] Given the region's long history of resource extraction and exploitation, visions in the social sphere for the development of the region were critical to the people's relations and access to the environment. To reinforce their natural resource rights and access, the hill people created a vision that their region could be separate from its exploiters, and that they could better spare its resources. Statehood was a culmination of this vision. Within the people's collective identity partially rooted in plains versus hills differentiation, and the view that the region's larger governing body (Uttar Pradesh) exploited the mountains, "a post-independence discourse of internal colonialism, primarily in relation to the forests" arose.[90] Given the internal colonial discourse and a growing collective sense of regional autonomy in the wake of Chipko's success, the vision for regional development through statehood was born, and the movement for Uttaranchal's statehood found its success.

The desire for greater political agency arose from the hardships associated with government negotiations on development issues. Today, Chirag staffers constantly refer to their interactions with the government as difficult and complicated. Madhavan-ji, the director of Chirag during my stay, told me that Chirag is required to interact with the block government, and only occasionally with the state, but they try to avoid government proceedings because "the transaction cost of dealing with the government is very high."[91] Many NGOs have ongoing disagreements with the government: for example, while government officials request documentation of caste for reporting purposes, Chirag refuses to discuss caste with any of its partners or villagers it works with.[92]

The social dynamics of cooperation in development interactions are also illustrated in the decentralized process of decision-making across a variety of sectors, particularly village politics. A conversation with Basanti-ji, the head of a Gandhian ashram, taught me not just about the ideals behind a Gandhian education, but even more so about the ideas behind a Gandhian community.[93] The integrated schooling that evolved out of the Ashram's founding ideals is grounded in the idea that because of a greater awareness of collective living, the girls can better make connections between domestic and community life and become more holistic people. The methods of the Ashram, along with the way in which girls and their teachers coexist there, Basanti-ji said, are about cultivating a sense of the social fabric. This was described to me as a sense of *praim*, or love, but that this love comes with respect. As Basanti-ji stressed, the behaviors and lives at the Ashram are considered above all a *collective* responsibility.

Such collectivity is echoed in other aspects of Kumaoni life. Of several *van panchayat* meetings that I witnessed, I was surprised at a meeting about soil and water conservation to see the level of cooperation necessary to reach a decision.[94] The meeting's progress ebbed and flowed as pairs of people broke out of the conversation to discuss and then reentered. The members of the *van panchayat* gestured and spoke and disagreed and agreed about how to start their next project. The decision making process and their representation were communal: the *van panchayat* is an institution that is there for the people it represents, which illustrates the importance of collectivity in regional change.

Uttarakhand's newfound statehood and its ramifications complicate the relational nature of regional identity and independence: the establishment of statehood helped reinforce an emerging regional identity. Parallel to the region's attainment of separate statehood, a certain regional identity emerged and fused with Uttarakhand's economic claim and the political-economic ramifications of statehood. The interaction between the social and the political-economic continues to aid regional growth and development.

By 1994, Uttarakhandis – Kumaonis and Garwhalis alike – voiced their desire for separate statehood almost unanimously. With a newly conjoined political identity, Uttarakhandis had launched their definitive battle for separate statehood by 1994. The Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly accepted the movement in September 1998, and passed a bill to begin reorganizing Uttar Pradesh so as to give Uttarakhand its own statehood. India's parliament passed the bill in 2000 and Uttarakhand became the 27th state of the Republic of India.

A regional identity centered on environmental rights and access to resources emerged alongside Uttarakhand's call for statehood. Koskimaki echoes Sivaramakrishnan and articulates the discontinuities between the nation-state's motives and *Pahari* incentives around the movement for statehood.[95] Sivaramakrishnan elucidates this as he questions "models that create dualisms between peasants and the state":

> Even Guha and Gadgil (1989:177) conclude their fine study of forest conflicts in the colonial period by referring to 'two opposed notions of property and resource use: communal control over forests being paired with subsistence… state control with commercial exploitation.' The social construction of forests that underlies this formulation is clearly intended to provide the contemporary environmental movement with history and antiquity, a discursive strategy deriving from the era of freedom struggles in the colonized world (Anderson 1991). The problem that remains is how do we incorporate into this model the most recent struggles in Uttarakhand…?"[96]

The argument for statehood was intrinsically tied to the binaries between resource use by local *Pahari* people and resource exploitation by outside agencies.

The emergence of a multi-faceted Kumaoni identity actively fused with an economic and environmental argument for statehood. The economic claim focused on independence in the hopes that an independent government would better direct the wealth derived from the region's resources toward the people's needs; a more localized government could direct that money to help Kumaon. In addition to the ability to determine allocation of funds, upon independence the state government also had the agency to determine the type of development. According to a report published in 2008 by the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), the state deemed the most viable way to develop economically to be a tripartite approach to develop "brand

equity under the name of an Organic Green State," implementing high-value agriculture, and promoting environmental growth.[97] The Uttarakhand government tax exemption and tax incentive programs augmented these linkages, as discussed earlier. The state's claim of economic independence grew stronger with tax exemption-driven creation of markets and market linkages that strengthened private sector enterprise and private-public exchange in the context of value-added industries.

Armed with a stronger sense of self from the emerging Uttarakhandi identity, and evidence for the state's economic claim, the new state of Uttarakhand began to thrive. One of my stories from Kumaon illustrates the intricacies of better-directed government resources, possible because of statehood, and provides a small piece of evidence to Kumaoni growth.

Seated in the morning sun on a woven grass mat, I listened to Bina-ji as she beamed with pride and told us the story of her life-changing endeavor. Eight years ago, she told us, she applied for and received a government loan from the state of Uttarakhand to buy a cow. Her purchase of and care for the animal garnered much admiration from her neighbors, and Bina-ji knew that with this much interest there could be a great chance for good business in the acquisition of dairy animals. Inspired by her cow's milk production, Bina-ji and her neighbors petitioned the government to build a dairy. As a result of their persistence and the financial backing from the solitary cow, the government built the dairy. She has now created enough income with her cow's milk to not only repay the loan but also to purchase a goat, which in turn supplements the income from the cow's production.

Had Bina-ji been living in a disregarded region of Uttar Pradesh (as her region once was), the possibility of such a loan would have been slim. Bina-ji's story of persistence, success, and a bit of luck provides anecdotal evidence to Uttarakhand's post-independence regionalized growth, enabled by the more localized governmental decision-making and strong regional identity. The new state's government allocates money as it deems fit and determines the flow of its own resources and revenue. Subsequently, based on the many dairy animals scattered throughout the region and cared for by proud owners, the government gets to spend money on the people it knows and represents and on supplementing their livelihoods, which in turn cycle back into the state's economic independence and growth. What began as a geography-based identity of separateness linked to effective movements for social change, led to the emergence of a conservationist and rights-oriented regional identity, and ultimately informed a Kumaoni development vision focused on the environmental and economic rights of the people. ◆

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[1] Dear, M. The Postmodern Challenge: Reconstructing Human Geography. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 13*, 1988, 267.

[2] This discussion's complexity finds further pronouncement in the overlaid nature of the different geographical and political divisions of Uttarakhand.

[3] According to Rangan's research, this notion of the region as "backwards" does not appear in earlier accounts of the place, which was "not considered marginal in any way" (Rangan, 2000a, p.68-70 as cited in Koskimaki 2011, p.9).

[4] Sridhar, K. Economic Profile of Uttaranchal.

Economic and Political Weekly 37, 2002, 1843-49.

[5] Joshi, P.C. Child of the Himalayas. *Economic and Political Weekly 39(17),* 2004. 1732-40.

[6] The colonial government was "caricatured as overwhelmingly powerful, autonomous from and thriving on antagonistic relations with civil society, and single-minded in its predatory pursuits that inevitably cause ecological degradation and impoverishment of Himalayan communities" (Khilnani, 2000, p.23 as cited in Rangan, 2000).

[7] Nehruvian industry's exportation of tree resin for turpentine production damaged the forests, and clear-cutting the *banj* oak for timber and replacing it with *chir* pine instigated deforestation. Chirag staffers refer to the introduction of *chir* pine as a contributing factor to the increase in forest fires (field notes, Mauna, 6/27). As I was told during an interview, *chir* pine "is important for government turpentine and construction, but it makes work for villagers as they must clear the pine needles off the forest floor, for otherwise it contributes greatly to fire" (field notes, Mauna, 6/27). The native *banj* oak, however, creates a leaf litter that dampens the ground, lowers ambient temperature, and becomes natural compost. Consequentially, if fire damages a *banj* forest, an increase in sunlight helps open the pine cones on the forest floor and allows for a pine takeover.

[8] Pathak, S. State, Society and Natural Resources in Himalaya: Dynamics of Change in Colonial and Post-colonial Uttarakhand," *Economic and Political Weekly* 32(17), 1997, 908-12.

[9] Dear, M. The Postmodern Challenge: Reconstructing Human Geography. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 13*, 1988, 269.

[10] Author's field notes, 2012

[11] Author's field notes, Kasiyalekh, 6/22/2012

[12] Robbins, P. *Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction,* 2012.

[13] Raju, S. Contextualizing critical geography in India: emerging research and praxis. *Geoforum 35,* 2003, 539-544, and; Banerjee-Guha, S. Critical geographical praxis – globalization and socio-spatial disorder. *Economic and Political Weekly 37(44-45)*, 2002, 4503-4509.

[14] Raju, S. Contextualizing critical geography in India: emerging research and praxis. *Geoforum 35,* 2003, 542.

[15] Rangan, H. From Chipko to Uttaranchal: The environment of protest and development in the Indian Himalaya. In *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social Movement*, Peet & Watts (eds) (2004), 374.

[16] Scott, J. C. *The art of not being governed: an anarchist history of upland Southeast Asia*. Yale University Press: New Haven, 2009, 178, 196.

[17] Koskimaki, L. M. *Youth publics and embodied politics: Genealogies of development aspiration in North Indian hill towns,* 2011, p.9.

[18] Juyal, R. P. and M. C. Sati. Natural-Cultural Practices in Conservation of Traditional Crop Diversity in Mountain: A Study of Uttarakhand State, Indian Himalayas. *Journal of Biodiversity, 1*, 2010, 103-110.

[19] Mawdsley, E. After Chipko: From Environment to Region in Uttaranchal. *Journal of Peasant Studies 25,* 1998, 36-54

[20] All names of my interlocutors have been changed to guarantee anonymity.

[21] Scheper-Hughes, N. and M. M. Lock. "The Mindful Body: A Prolegomenon to Future Work in Medical Anthropology." In Medical Anthropology Quarterly. (1987). Vol. 1(1):6-41.

[22] Lévi-Strauss, C. The Sorcerer and His Magic. In Understanding and Applying Medical Anthropology, Peter J. Brown ed. 1998. London: Mayfield Publishing Company. (1963). P: 130.

[23] Pathak, S. State, Society and Natural Resources in Himalaya: Dynamics of Change in Colonial

and Post-colonial Uttarakhand," *Economic and Political Weekly* 32(17), (1997). 908.

[24] Rangan, H. From Chipko to Uttaranchal: The environment of protest and development in the Indian Himalaya. In *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social Movement*, Peet & Watts (eds) (2004), 371-393.

[25] Juyal, R. P. and M. C. Sati. Natural-Cultural Practices in Conservation of Traditional Crop Diversity in Mountain: A Study of Uttarakhand State, Indian Himalayas. *Journal of Biodiversity, 1*, (2010).103-110.

[26] Sridhar, K. Economic Profile of Uttaranchal. *Economic and Political Weekly 37*, (2002), 1843-49

[27] Rangan, H. From Chipko to Uttaranchal: The environment of protest and development in the Indian Himalaya. In *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social Movement*, Peet & Watts (eds) (2004), 371-393.

[28] Rangan, H. From Chipko to Uttaranchal: The environment of protest and development in the Indian Himalaya. In *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social Movement*, Peet & Watts (eds) (2004), 371-393, and; Juyal, R. P. and M. C. Sati. (2010). Natural-Cultural Practices in Conservation of Traditional Crop Diversity in Mountain: A Study of Uttarakhand State, Indian Himalayas. *Journal of Biodiversity, 1*, 103-110.

[29] Pathak, S. State, Society and Natural Resources in Himalaya: Dynamics of Change in Colonial and Post-colonial Uttarakhand," *Economic and Political Weekly* 32(17), (1997), 908.

[30] Mawdsley, E. After Chipko: From Environment to Region in Uttaranchal. *Journal of Peasant Studies 25,* (1998) 2.

[31] Author's field notes, Reetha, 6/20/2012

[32] Rangan, H. From Chipko to Uttaranchal: The environment of protest and development in the Indian Himalaya. In *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social Movement*, Peet & Watts (eds) (2004), 371-393

[33] Pathak, S. State, Society and Natural Resources in Himalaya: Dynamics of Change in Colonial and Post-colonial Uttarakhand," *Economic and Political Weekly* 32(17), (1997), 908.

[34] Rangan, H. From Chipko to Uttaranchal: The environment of protest and development in the Indian Himalaya. In *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social Movement*, Peet & Watts (eds) (2004), 371.

[35] Scott, J. C. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed.* Yale University Press: New Haven. 1998.

[36] Scott, J. C. *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. Yale University Press: New Haven. (2009).

[37] Scott, J. C. *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. Yale University Press: New Haven, (2009). p. ix.

[38] Scott, J. C. *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. Yale University Press: New Haven, (2009). p. x.

[39] *Ibid,* 1998, 2009.

[40] Scott, J. C. *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. Yale University Press: New Haven, (2009) p. 5.

[41] Scott, J. C. *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. Yale University Press: New Haven, (2009) p. 6.

[42] *Ibid*, p. 6

[43] *Ibid.;* Scott explains the changes made by nation-states to their peripheral spaces as attempts to make their society "legible – and hence manipulable – from above and from the center" (1998, p. 2). Legibility, according to Scott, involves social simplifications that refashion society and the environment (1998, p. 3). Scott articulates his discussion of legibility through a discussion of "fiscal forestry," as he writes:

In state "fiscal forestry," however, the actual tree with its vast number of

possible uses was replaced by an abstract tree representing a volume of lumber or firewood. If the princely conception of the forest was still utilitarian, it was surely a utilitarianism confined to the direct needs of the state. From a naturalist's perspective, nearly everything was missing from the state's narrow frame of reference… From an anthropologist's perspective, nearly everything touching on human interaction with the forest was also missing from the state's tunnel vision. (Scott, 1998, p. 12). The experience of fiscal forestry in Uttarakhand post-national independence illustrates one way that the nation state attempted to make the hill region and *Pahari* people legible.

[44] Sarin, M. Empowerment and Disempowerment of Forest Women in Uttarakhand, India. In *Environmental Issues in India,* Mahesh Rangarajan (ed): (2007). 483-506.

[45] Pathak, S. State, Society and Natural Resources in Himalaya: Dynamics of Change in Colonial and Post-colonial Uttarakhand," *Economic and Political Weekly* 32(17), (1997). 911.

[46] Pathak, S. State, Society and Natural Resources in Himalaya: Dynamics of Change in Colonial and Post-colonial Uttarakhand," *Economic and Political Weekly* 32(17), (1997). 912.

[47] Pathak, S. State, Society and Natural Resources in Himalaya: Dynamics of Change in Colonial and Post-colonial Uttarakhand," *Economic and Political Weekly* 32(17), (1997). 908-912.; Mawdsley, E. After Chipko: From Environment to Region in Uttaranchal. *Journal of Peasant Studies 25,* (1998). 36-54.

[48] Shaw, M. Civil Society and Global Politics: Beyond a Social Movements Approach. *Millenium – Journal of International Studies, 23,* 3, 1994. 647.

[49] Sarin, M. Empowerment and Disempowerment of Forest Women in Uttarakhand, India. In *Environmental Issues in India,* Mahesh Rangarajan (ed): (2007). 483-506.

[50] Rangan, H. From Chipko to Uttaranchal: The environment of protest and development in the Indian Himalaya. In *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social Movement*, Peet & Watts (eds) (2004), 373.

[51] Agarwal, B. Environmental Management, Equity and Ecofeminism: Debating India's Experience. *Feminism and 'Race,' Bhavani*, 410. (1998).

[52] Ikelegbe, A. Civil society, oil and conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria: Ramifications of civil society for a regional resource struggle. *The Journal of Modern African Studies, 39*, (2001). 437.

[53] Gururani, S. Forests of Pleasure and Pain: gendered practices of labor and livelihood in the forests of the Kumaon Himalayas, India. *Gender, Place and Culture-a Journal of Feminist Geography, 9,* 3, (2002). 229-243

[54] Gururani, S. Forests of Pleasure and Pain: gendered practices of labor and livelihood in the forests of the Kumaon Himalayas, India. *Gender, Place and Culture -a Journal of Feminist Geography, 9,* 3, (2002). 237.

[55] Robbins, P. *Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction,* 2012.

[56] Robbins, P. *Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction,* 2012, 22.

[57] Gururani, S. Forests of Pleasure and Pain: gendered practices of labor and livelihood in the forests of the Kumaon Himalayas, India. *Gender, Place and Culture-a Journal of Feminist Geography, 9,* 3, (2002). 229-243; Agarwal, B. Environmental Management, Equity and Ecofeminism: Debating India's Experience. *Feminism and 'Race,' Bhavani*, (1998). 410.; Nationalized timber companies have degraded areas of forest while closing the forest to locals, and using migrant labor as opposed to local labor. In response, "some extreme villagers took to forest arson to try to prohibit the industry from reaping the rewards. If local people

could not also benefit, then nobody could, the idea went" (Author's field notes, Reetha, 6/28).

[58] The Forest Department exploited the forests in a way that harmed local use of the forests (Mawdsley, 1998) and stole employment opportunities from local villagers by employing migrant laborers (Tucker, 1993). The Department compounded this and charged higher prices for timber and timber products in the hills where they had been extracted than it charged to large industries in the plains (Das & Negi, 1983).

[59] Mawdsley, E. After Chipko: From Environment to Region in Uttaranchal. *Journal of Peasant Studies 25,* (1998). 36-54, and; Guha, R. *The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalaya.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press. (1989).

[60] Rangan, H. From Chipko to Uttaranchal: The environment of protest and development in the Indian Himalaya. In *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social Movement*, Peet & Watts (eds) (2004), 371-393

[61] Mawdsley, E. After Chipko: From Environment to Region in Uttaranchal. *Journal of Peasant Studies 25,* (1998). 36-54

[62] Chipko exemplifies a movement for environmental rights against resource exploitation and displays how environmental realities shape state-society relations through social movement. Blaikie and Brookfield posit that there is a "constantly shifting dialectic between society and land-based resources, and also within classes and groups within society itself" (1987, p. 17). Chipko fought against the reality that "the state's management of the forests offered few dividends for the local people in this already economically marginalized area, and further, that it was degrading the ecological base upon which local people depended" (Mawdsley, 1998, p. 4). Not only was Chipko rooted in environmental justice and resource protection, but it was also out of collective need and relations to the forest – a vital part of the regional collective identity. The movement for autonomous resource rights strengthened collective identity, civil society and consequent notions of agency around environmental protection, rights, and access (Mawdsley, 1998).

[63] Raju, S. Contextualizing critical geography in India: emerging research and praxis. *Geoforum 35,* (2003). 542.

[64] Sarin, M. Empowerment and Disempowerment of Forest Women in Uttarakhand, India. In *Environmental Issues in India,* Mahesh Rangarajan (ed): (2007). 483-506

[65] Raju, S. Contextualizing critical geography in India: emerging research and praxis. *Geoforum 35,* (2003). 539-544.

[66] Kumar, S. Creation of New States. *Economic and Political Weekly 37,* (2002). 1843-49.

[67] Rangan, H. From Chipko to Uttaranchal: The environment of protest and development in the Indian Himalaya. In *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social Movement*, Peet & Watts (eds) (2004), 371-393, and; Guha, R. *The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalaya.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press. (1989).

[68] Rangan, H. From Chipko to Uttaranchal: The environment of protest and development in the Indian Himalaya. In *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social Movement*, Peet & Watts (eds) (2004), 347.

[69] Rawat, R. Chipko's Quiet Legacy: Forest Rights, Women's Empowerment, People's Institutions, and New Urban Struggles in Uttarakhand, India. *York University*, (2004). p.11.

[70] Guha, R. *The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalaya.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press, (1989). p.196.

[71] Mawdsley, E. After Chipko: From Environment to Region in Uttaranchal. *Journal of Peasant Studies 25,* (1998). 36-54.

[72] Mitra, A. Chipko Today. *Down to Earth.* (1993). P. 36

[73] Rangan, H. From Chipko to Uttaranchal: The environment of protest and development in the Indian Himalaya. In *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social Movement*, Peet & Watts (eds) (2004), 382.

[74] Mawdsley, E. After Chipko: From Environment to Region in Uttaranchal. *Journal of Peasant Studies 25,* (1998). 3.

[75] Mawdsley explains this influence of the authorities on daily Kumaoni life, as she writes:
It was only following the expansion of the road system after 1962 that the penetration of the state and its adjuncts (administrative, developmental and disciplinary) could significantly accelerate in the hills. Accompanying this 'space-time compression' were immense and complex socio-cultural and economic changes. By the 1970s/1980s, the state had, in some form or other, penetrated many aspects of daily life, albeit highly unevenly in depth and spread. (Mawdsley, 1998, p.10 as cited in Koskimaki, 2011, p.11)

[76] *Jardhar Diary*, DVD, Earthcare Productions (Producer), & Bose, K. (Director). (2002). India: Earthcare Productions.

[77] In a more recent bout of development, contractors from Delhi were installing a power grid, however a man in the film explains that the power grid contractors "are in cahoots with the timber company" to have the power lines purposefully bisect an area the timber companies already want to cut in, to create a reason for felling the trees (*Jardhar Diary*).

[78] Koskimaki, L. M. *Youth publics and embodied politics: Genealogies of development aspiration in North Indian hill towns*. (2011). P: 4

[79] *Ibid*, p. 4.; Rangan, H. From Chipko to Uttaranchal: The environment of protest and development in the Indian Himalaya. In *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social Movement*, Peet & Watts (eds) (2004), 372.

[80] Jayal, N.G. Democracy and Social Capital in Central Himalaya: Tale of Two Villages. *Economic & Political Weekly, 36*, (2001). 655.

[81] JC Tiwari, Uttarakhand Sangharsh Vahini, Gopeshwar, 1978 *as cited in* Koskimaki, L. M. *Youth publics and embodied politics: Genealogies of development aspiration in North Indian hill towns*. (2011). P: 1

[82] Rangan, H. Of Myths and Movements: Rewriting Chipko into Himalayan History. Verso, London: New York. (2000). P: 66

[83] Koskimaki, L. M. *Youth publics and embodied politics: Genealogies of development aspiration in North Indian hill towns*. (2011). P: 4

[84] Author's field notes, 6/22

[85] Rangan, H. From Chipko to Uttaranchal: The environment of protest and development in the Indian Himalaya. In *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social Movement*, Peet & Watts (eds) (2004), 372.

[86] Rangan, H. From Chipko to Uttaranchal: The environment of protest and development in the Indian Himalaya. In *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social Movement*, Peet & Watts (eds) (2004), 376.

[87] Prior to statehood, Sivaramakrishnan elucidated the idea that:
Those who inherited the chipko legacy are conducting a violent agitation against the Forest Conservation Act of 1980, seeking development, self-determination, and forest clearance in a way that fundamentally breaks with much of their past and yet remains encapsulated in the modern debates of nation-states." (1995a, p.32 as cited in Koskimaki, 2011, p.5).
The Forest Conservation Act of 1980 made livelihood practices much more difficult for hill people, to a point where they demonized the protected forests for inhibiting their livelihoods.

[88] It is important to note here that although the motivation for and perhaps success of social

movements depends on the foundations established by their predecessors, adjustments to the messages regarding resource use and social tensions are vital. As Madhavan-ji once explained, "over time, cultural practices have to change, because they were designed based on the context of different realities" (field notes, Chirag, 6/19).

[89] Juyal, R. P. and M. C. Sati. Natural-Cultural Practices in Conservation of Traditional Crop Diversity in Mountain: A Study of Uttarakhand State, Indian Himalayas. *Journal of Biodiversity, 1*, (2010). 103-110

[90] Mawdsley, E. After Chipko: From Environment to Region in Uttaranchal. *Journal of Peasant Studies 25,* (1998). 4.

[91] Author's field notes, Chirag, 6/19

[92] Author's field notes, Chirag, 6/19

[93] Personal communication, conversation with Basanti-ji, 7/14

[94] Author's field notes, Meora, 7/9

[95] Koskimaki, L. M. *Youth publics and embodied politics: Genealogies of development aspiration in North Indian hill towns.* (2011).

[96] Sivaramakrishnan, 1995a, p.32 *as cited in* Koskimaki, L. M. *Youth publics and embodied politics: Genealogies of development aspiration in North Indian hill towns.* (2011). P: 5

[97] Mittal, S., Tripathi, G., & Sethi, D. ICRIER Working Paper No. 217: Development Strategy for the Hill Districts of Uttarakhand. (July 2008). P: ii

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Graffiti and Street Art Resistance in the Middle East

A re-imagination of power

Power is neither static nor isolated, but rather exists as an exercise of submission and resistance, and as contours in continual flux. Understanding one's position within a power matrix is the first initializing step in renegotiating the claims one can make to power, and later to renegotiating one's ability to partake in power's privileges. Power relies on its symbols in order to make itself known in society and among individuals. Resistance, as a practice that makes claim to power, also relies on symbols to delineate where power is contested. Protest art-primarily graffiti and street art–is one such practice of resistance to power as it usurps the symbols of the state. As an informal, unregulated practice, protest art is both a symbol of resistance as well as a site of resistance that articulates where power's trajectory is interrupted, identifying the needed location to instigate political change. Western influence has exercised cultural and political hegemony in its discourse, both political and cultural, toward the Middle East. In places with oppressive regimes like West Bank, Palestine and Cairo, Egypt, protest art also has amplified demands for democratic legitimacy by providing the necessary images of resistance toward both Western hegemony and local, authoritarian governments, creating symbolisms that remove power from its abstraction and identify one's position within power's matrix. Using protest art as deployments of political and social visibility in defiance of oppressive regimes, these public/private interfaces critique, challenge, and renegotiate the narrative of absolute power by the state as well as cultural and political hegemony of outside, mainly Western, influences. By exploring the linguistic practices of Arabic and examining media interpretations of Middle Eastern protest through the usage of the term "the Arab street," graffiti usage in the West Bank and street art production in Cairo offer an understanding of how these cultural productions function as democratic discourse and as a resistance to power.

Power is omnipotent in our daily lives. We maneuver through the everyday according to the power structures that are forced upon us, as well as those we oblige ourselves to obey. Either by violence inflicted by those in possession of the greatest force mechanisms, through the invisible operative of a panopticon compliance, or by the privileges extended through the accumulation of

capital and knowledge, power is everywhere. Yet it is simultaneously elusive. Being omnipotent means power is an abstraction, and it is because of this that power, especially political power, relies on symbols and structures to shape its habits and communications in order to reinforce the individual's position within its matrix.[1] Where we stand in relation to the state and where and when we move; what we say and when we remain silent; where we look and when we refrain from looking all contribute to the interplay of political power in our daily lives.

It is when resistance is activated that power becomes visible—its shape, its contours, its scope, and its limitations. Since the Treaty of Versailles and the creation of the current nation-state system of the Middle East, power dispersals have traversed through coercive rule, military occupation, and among multiple sites of cultural and religious narratives.[2] As socio-political change unfolds rapidly in various sites of the Middle East, cultural and religious narratives take on special importance in resistance movements as they represent what U.S. political science scholar Charles Tripp describes as "contours of power." Contours of power are sites of change where the authority of the state is confronted by claims of the individual to the legitimacy of that authority.[3] As sites of resistance, contours of power remove political power from the abstract and place it, sometimes violently, within the individual agent's view.

Making political power visible creates the necessary space to manifest change. As the writer Gloria Anzaldúa has stated, "nothing happens in the 'real' world unless it first happens in the images in our head."[4] Images, then, imagined and real, are interlocutors of the relationship between power and resistance. Street art and graffiti are important images that identify spaces where the state and agent accost each other. Graffiti, an ancient practice defined literally as "images or texts scratched into walls", are most often seen as signatures or texts of artists who spray paint, or "tag," their initials, nom de guerre, or socio-artistic identity onto a public structure such as bridges, walls, even the street.[5] Street art, however, became a method of protest as recently as 1966, and is a practice of image and figure production versus the textual writing of graffiti.[6] While separately graffiti and street art have different aesthetics, they both share a common ambition; collectively they are cultural productions that serve as visual signatures of the individual over public structures that craft a dialogue between the power struggle of the agent and the state.[7] In places like the Middle East where authoritarian rule is pervasive, graffiti and street art, collectively referred to here as protest art, can become one of the few available resources by which individuals can voice dissent and mobilize social behavior to shift power's dynamic.[8]

Defiling the physical surfaces of the state by expressing dissent against an authoritative regime is a contentious political act. Street art and graffiti in the Arab Middle East take on additional significance in the relationship between power of the state and resistance of the people because not only are they cultural productions, as all protest art is, but they also underscore challenges to authoritative legitimacy—especially graffiti due to the specialized religious origin of written Arabic.[9] Existing in and on public spaces, graffiti and street art highlight rather than simply identify the contestation for power in a given regime because of their semi-permanence. They interrupt power's abstraction by delineating sites where symbols of the individual usurp those of the state, giving opportunity to visualize and then instigate change.

Recognizing that it takes additional mobilizations and power consolidations beyond those of an individual to generate active social rebellion, protest art is an initial conversation toward these mobilizations, as well as a discourse that supports and guides a government's interregnum. As open commentary concerning the relationship between the state and society, protest art is worthy of attention. Beyond that, though, it is my aim to address power directly, to help conceptualize it as Tripp does, as contours rather than lines, a volume instead of a weight, a phenomenon that has an ability to expand and contract in relation to the resistances it encounters. As interruptions to the state's hold on power, protest art helps better identify where contours exist—the pull of the state, the push back of the agent.

Graffiti and street art are familiar cultural objects, easily overlooked in Western societies. One may incur a fine for producing them in a liberal democracy, but in other locations, these practices can mark one for prolonged imprisonment and government-authorized physical harm. By taking street art and graffiti out of a Western context and placing it in the West Bank, Palestine and Cairo, Egypt, I offer a counter-narrative to the astigmatic discourse that synonymizes the Middle East with terrorism. I have chosen the West Bank and Cairo to discuss the political potential of individual agency in order to demonstrate that even under the most oppressive regimes, power is not static, and that it is possible for change, even transformation, to take place.

As a Western writer, however, I take extra precaution writing about Middle Eastern political expression. To avoid the practice of "othering," I first ground my examination through the lens of Edward Said's criticisms of Orientalist practices in political discourse. Said's seminal work in post-colonial thought exposits Orientalism outside of the academy to articulate it as a "political vision of reality."[10] In his analysis of Western political discourse pertaining to the Middle East, Said uses such theories as Gramsci's cultural hegemony and Foucault's knowledge power, and offers insight into how both these applications of power—cultural elitism and knowledge accumulation—have been used by imperial powers such as Europe and the United States to position themselves in a state of superiority over their subject of interest, namely the cultures, religions, languages, and daily practices of those living in the location given the name "the Middle East." The practice of othering as described by Said is a product of cultural hegemony, where one understands her political or social identity and practices as positionally superior to those who do not identify in the same way. This normative application toward inquiries of the Middle East sets up the volley of binary comparison: irrational versus rational, depraved versus virtuous, immature versus mature, different versus normal.[11] In short, the political version of reality that Orientalism describes is a cultural discipline that articulates power, a superior "us" versus an inferior "them," a practice known as "othering."[12] Situating my understanding of Said by ways of eco-feminist and queer theories, I have done my best to empathize with my subject matter and avoid the habits of othering as described by Said.

I also offer a brief history of graffiti and its origins in contemporary discourse, in order to better contextualize some of its more current applications. As a non-Arabic speaker, I felt it important to contextualize calligraffiti—Arabic graffiti writing—by examining linguistic practices of Arabic in order to better imagine

the nuances of language that inevitably get lost in translation. I do this by offering a glimpse into the term "the Arab street" as an Arabic linguistic practice vis-à-vis U.S. English, especially as the term is deployed in U.S. media sources. By doing so, it is my intent to show how that term, "the Arab street," has been negatively re-conceptualized through Western media, influencing how an average U.S. media consumer might interpret the Middle East. In this way, I hope to support my greater project of identifying where and how power is negotiated by the various claims made upon it, to show that power is a borderless concept, and that how the U.S. media portrays Arab nations is connected to how the U.S. shapes its military and foreign policy responses.

I then turn to the West Bank, where I use the principles of Orientalism to illustrate that Palestinians are not only in a political posture of resistance against their occupier, Israel, but also to the larger Western world. I finally turn my attention to Cairo, where I look more toward street art production. I examine various works of Cairiene street art produced in the aftermath of Hosni Mubarak's regime fall and how these works resist power based on one's position to the state while simultaneously to one's social position as well, shifting the contours of power to yet a further degree and creating further catalysts for change.

Structures of the State

The structural differences between protest art production sites in West Bank and Cairo are significant and play an important part in their selection for my analysis. The West Bank has an extremely condensed landscape, smaller than the state of Delaware. Its population density hovers slightly above 400 people per square kilometer, and its city centers are surrounded by agricultural land. Protest art here is a much more visible, and therefore dangerous, production for the individual actor. Cairo, on the other hand, is a landscape of urban sprawl, populated by over eleven million people with a population density hovering around 40,000 people per square kilometer.[13] Anonymity is an easier achievement here and creates a greater opportunity for street art murals and complex works of color than in the West Bank.

However, what makes the West Bank a unique observation site is the presence of the separation wall that continues to expand the borders of Israel into Palestinian-designated corridors, such as in the case of the panel-by-panel demarcation of East Jerusalem. A foreboding state structure that overrides the landscape of ancient olive groves (see Figure 1), the separation wall, often called the apartheid wall or barrier wall, becomes the primary government symbol around which Palestinians have unified their outrage. Cairo, by contrast, is a city with colonial imports in architecture and urban planning from the nineteenth century Great Transformation that have made some quarters of the city indistinguishable from those of Paris.[14] In fact, Tahrir Square has been called by Egyptian writer Samir Raafat a "faux Champs de Mars," and in this way is a more typical urban environment associated with graffiti and street art.[15]

Orientalism and the Origins of Graffiti

The origins of graffiti as it is known today has a history rooted in the European Romantic Period, a time between late eighteenth century and mid-nineteenth century noted especially

for its revolutionary activism and influence on contemporary notions of nationalism and self.[16] To keep a nation-state cohesive in new liberal democracies of the Enlightenment, methods of control other than violence had to be explored. This enabled a changing sense of self for the individual that mechanized Orientalism to emerge in Western discourse, one anchored by knowledge accumulation.[17] It was French and British scholarship in the late eighteenth century that translated the ancient languages of Sanskrit and Avestan that helped accelerate European cultural hegemony over Eastern societies by making it suitable to scrutinize and examine the abundant new "discoveries" of the Middle East—for societies to be labeled, defined, and pictorialized as new opportunities for othering.[18]

Cultural studies of ancient art in this period aided the establishment of the Western Romantic Hero as the model character within Western thought by materializing, either in artifact or human form, the "other," making fashionable to the bourgeois the interaction with cultural artifacts, including those of archeological discovery. In the early years of the Romantic Period cultural tourists to ancient Pompeii noticed writing on the walls of the city's newly excavated ruins.[19] These texts became the "discovery" of what was named graffiti, and by the late nineteenth century inquiry and categorization of these writings transcended cultural curiosity and became institutionalized as a form of academic pursuit, one that has been revived in recent decades as discourses of social intervention.[20] Depending on where they are produced in the world will determine graffiti and street art's political potential. Regardless of location, however, all protest art is political as it is displayed upon the icons, structures, and symbols of the state.

Figure 1: Contours of Power, The Separation Wall, West Bank, Palestine[21]

Arabic and Elegiac Humanism

The practice of writing is a practice in history making by leaving a trail of memory that does not diffuse into collective consciousness. To write something down is the method by which memory is shaped. As a technology, however, writing is not available to everyone, which means each written language carries within itself an inherent political power. Journalist Rachel Aspeden poetically describes written Arabic as "a volatile 1,500-year-old blend of religion, magic, politics and art."[22] Her description invites discussion of the role memory and text play upon each other within a language that has a millennia-and-a-half year history. Arabic calligraphy and memory create an interplay, a needed location for a religion that has limits on iconography, especially the prohibition by the Prophet Muhammad from having his picture rendered. Having the Prophet visually out of reach for Muslims generated a fevered precision of Arabic calligraphy, as well as provided a guided venue for expressing passion for a beloved religious figure.[23] Coming from the mouth of God and interpreted through the most important angel in the Islamic canon, the Archangel Gabriel:

96:3 Read! Your Lord Is the Most Bountiful One 96:4 who taught by pen, 96:5 who taught man what he did not know.

With a commandment from God to master the written word, alongside a prohibition by the Prophet for his image to be imprinted, Arabic calligraphy in this sense, and at risk of sounding blasphemous, can thus come to be imagined as the face of God. Religion and art intersect; an interface of unique religious and cultural meaning is crafted through the Arabic written word.

Divine or not, Arabic calligraphy has a well-established pedigree, making calligraffiti an aesthetic as well as political practice, and those who use calligraffiti in protest deploy what Simon Frasier University's Director of World Literature Ken Seigneurie, identifies as inherent traces of an elegiac humanism. Differing from human rights discussions or language that commits to progressive ideals, elegiac humanism is more an exercise of memory than a practice structured around extemporaneous speech.[24] It is a practice of remembering that shapes the interpretation of the present, and as an instrument of memory the calligraffiti artist remembers the past as a blending of consciousness between a "sense of sacred dignity" coupled with "the brutality of his treatment at the hands of the authorities."[25] The *Intifada*, or "uprising", which began in December of 1987, was two waves of organized and deliberate political and violent resistance by Palestinians against Israeli occupation and its abuse of power as an occupying force.[26] Notice the presence of calligraffiti in both the image of mourning and the image of resistance.

Calligraffiti not only sanctifies mourning, by being a political discourse it moves the practice of morning outside the private realm and into the public sphere. These mourning practices are a bodily experience, evidenced in the tradition of physically visiting sites of memory production, mimicking the ancient literary practice of "standing by the ruins" where the site of grief originates.[27] As calligraffiti creates an embodied experience of memory, its textural language—the writing on the walls as it were—is a continuation of Arabic's elegiac humanism to a physical space, one outside the body. Calligraffiti becomes a threshold, then, into everyday lives, identifying sources as well as places of resistance as they are intertwined with bloodshed,[28] where

hard surfaces of the state are transformed into ironical reminders that the impermeability of power is as much fallacy as a can of spray paint and the imagination of the individuals who wield the direction of the nozzle.

"Street art and graffiti in the Arab Middle East take on additional significance in the relationship between power of the state and resistance of the people because not only are they cultural productions, as all protest art is, but they also underscore challenges to authoritative legitimacy..."

West Bank, Palestine

Graffiti, long-evolved from the classical ruins of antiquity and not long ago considered culturally taboo, once again has fallen under both scholarly and artistic purview as contemporary examples of how marginalized populations disregarded or ignored by their governments become politically activated.[29] However, the risk of othering still exists in this renewed attention to protest art production. In 2007, the internationally renowned street artist Banksy and the London-based organization *Project on Walls* organized an awareness campaign in Bethlehem, Palestine. Over a dozen international street artists working alongside local Palestinian artists created works of art with a condition of sale requiring collectors interested in purchase to actually travel to Palestine and bid in person. Their intent was to draw the attention of those "who wouldn't ordinarily take an interest in Israel's illegal occupation of Palestine," namely fine art collectors.[30] West Bank Palestinians' lives are fragmented by intrusive check points, the bulldozing of homes, and a 25' encroaching concrete wall considered illegal by international law, one which separates them from their neighboring communities, their agricultural lands, and access to consistent wage earning, education, and water for irrigation and sustenance.[31]

However, gratitude for Banksy's attention was not always expressed. In one exchange with a Palestinian man, Banksy was told, "You make it (the wall) look beautiful… We don't want it to be beautiful. We hate this wall. Go home."[32] This exchange offers a platform for discussing protest art in the Middle East because many of the causes of rebellion and revolution from which these creative works stem come from a tension that some would call Western influence, and others, interference. For one example, many criticize the United States for providing subsidies to Israel that finance the resettling of the Jewish diaspora onto agricultural homesteads once owned, occupied, and worked by Palestinians.

Despite Banksy's charitable intent, the link between *Project on Wall*'s condition of sale and the cultural tourism of nineteenth-century Pompeii cannot be overlooked. Both required economic privileges of those who could afford travel and private art collection and both required the spectacle of other's misfortune—preserved in ash in Pompeii, a daily reality and political struggle for survival in occupied Palestine. Does traveling to purchase a work of art, one made to commodify the political realities of an oppressed people, do more to help Palestinians in the long run, or does it simply re-imagine the other, this time in *keffiyeh* instead of toga? The exchange between Banksy and the Palestinian man also

confronts the practice of cultural hegemony embedded in Orientalism, and issues a resistance within the power dynamic among East and West.

This power dynamic is not restricted to cultural practices. Cultural hegemony after all serves a greater pursuit: political power. Media practices help establish and disseminate this greater political aim by synonymizing "the Middle East" with fear-inducing reactions of "terrorism." How this is done can be partially explained by revisiting the structural differences between the West Bank and Cairo and defining what is meant by "the Arab street." University of California Berkley linguistics professor Terry Regier and American University of Beirut philosophy professor Muhammad Ali Khalidi address the subtext connoted by the term in their empirical study of its use in U.S. media outlets.[33] Their study reveals two significant findings. One, over time, a gradual replacement of the phrase "Arab public opinion" with "the Arab street" was initiated by the U.S. media, and showed a dramatic increase in replacement value starting in 2001.[34] The marked increase of term-swapping coincides with the hyper-flow era of global circulations of news, enabled by digital technologies.[35] This becomes comment worthy in light of the fact that previous to 1987, the year of the first Palestinian *Intifada*, "the Arab street" was not a consistently used metaphor. Instead, the term found purchase in media discourse only once technologies were able to accelerate information reproduction. More importantly, and speaking to the second significant finding of the study, "the Arab street" originally carried a synonymous sub-textual meaning as "Arab public opinion," but with repetitive replacement during a time when the U.S was initiating a "global war on terror," the former expression morphed into a placeholder term for a particular, radical ideology. This ideology proclaims that the Arab street is the only location in which political acts can be carried out because of the conclusion that "The Arab world has not established a public sphere of the type generally associated with modernity and with 'mature' societies endowed with a vibrant political culture."[36]

A counter-narrative exists to the significance of the Arab streets, however, one from an Arab perspective and which will be explored momentarily. First, though, it is important to summarize that there is a questioning of political authenticity conducted by U.S. media and news outlets when "the street" in the Middle East gets reported. It is also important to glean from the study that the Arab street is a metaphor used to position those in the Middle East who partake in protest activism as being dangerous, unpredictable, and separated from legitimate political processes.[37] A telling example of this global positioning of power occurred when the *Economist* declared the "death of the Arab street" after the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan post September 11th, and when then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice counseled in the London-based pan Arab newspaper Al-Hayat "that because the Arab people are too weak to demand democracy, the U.S. should intervene to liberate the Arab world from its tyrants."[38] As the world remembers WWI upon its 100th anniversary, this international commentary revives a memory of imperialist discourses of the mandate system: "To those colonies… which are inhabited by people not yet able to stand for themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world…."[39]

From Arab sources, however, the word "street" is applied across statehoods instead of ethnicities; U.S. streets, British streets, South

African streets are all articulated separately, not reference collectively by ethnicity.[40] The Arab street, though, connotes political instability and terrorism in U.S. linguistic practices, and reduces the political potential of its participants. Reiger and Khalidi's study document this phenomenon of Western news outlets replacing "the Arab street" with "Arab public opinion," and while the replacement may seem inconsequential, upon closer examination one can identify the political power struggle instigated by the subtle, continual instance of the term. Not only does it reposition the location of agency, removing political potency away from individuals and sourcing it to inanimate structural objects such as concrete buildings and transportation infrastructure, "the Arab street" also erases two previously discreet geo-political locations, each with unique dialects, histories, economic realities, and governmental regimes, and lumps them into a homogenized category, the Middle East—a region that spans two continents and covers over 6 million square kilometers.[41] As anti-colonialist thinker Franz Fanon has said, "As soon as I *desire* I am asking to be considered."[42] The desire to be seen politically is a desire protest art articulates. Removing individual agency has powerful repercussion to the stability of democracy because once the individual is ignored, violent rebellion often becomes the bullhorn of authenticity used by both the central government and those in resistance to it. The Arab street, therefore, should be understood for what it is, as a location where resistance is exercised, not as a convertible term for radicalism.

Shaping Resistance

The desire for democracy is articulated daily in the West Bank, literally written on the walls of the state, making declarations of participation and demanding visibility. U.S. anthropologist Julia Peteet accounts of Palestinians telling their own stories, using graffiti as a primary mobilizing method.[43] During the 1987 *Intifada* in the West Bank, second only to strikes, graffiti was the most ubiquitous expression of resistance.[44] It was, as one Palestinian shared, "a reading of the street." Instead of weakness or an inability to articulate political aspirations, Peteet's local investigations showed a vibrant capacity for resistance. Figure 2 demonstrates this capacity by encouraging pride in Palestinian identity through the stencil of a woman wearing a *keffiyeh,* a traditional Palestinian scarf and symbol of Palestinian nationalism made popular by Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in the 1960s. The calligraffiti below the image, "There is no voice greater than the voice of the *Intifada*," also encourages loyalty to the Palestinian struggle for independence. "The Arab street", then, became the political surface upon which graffiti recorded and shaped resistance. Other readings of the street included: "The UNL [United National Leadership] calls upon you to unite because there is strength in unity"; "Nonpayment of taxes and tickets is a national obligation and an act of struggle"' or simply, "Monday is strike day."[45] Some graffito took on more ideological pursuits: "Palestine from water to water," or, "Morals or else…."[46] For a population severely restricted in public access to books or media, these graffiti served as a substitute newspaper, organizing communities and sharing new information.[47] Articulating the most current information regarding the operations of the *Intifada*, these graffiti interrupt Israeli's ubiquitous claim to power and instead visually delineated where power was contested and the reasons why.

Figure 2: "There is no greater voice than the intifada"[48]

Cairo, Eygpt

At the time of this writing, the 2012 Egyptian Revolution has yet to sustain a government interregnum. Having gone through a series of elections and attempts at consolidation, the country only recently approved its newest Constitution in June, 2014, making the document the second attempt in as many years to articulate a united Egypt. The ousting of Mubarak in 2011 led only to the brief tenure of the Muslim Brotherhood Presidential candidate Mohamed Morsi before he, too, was replaced in a coup by Field Marshal Abdel Fatah Sisi, the then-Minister of Defense appointed by Morsi. This anfractuous democratic regime building was witnessed and in part facilitated by protest art, as evinced in "He Who Never Delegates, Never Dies" by Omar Picasso. [See Figure 3]. The work is a stylized representation of Mubarak as he is juxtaposed by a visible line of demarcation to the receding facial profiles of Sisi's predecessor Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, Secretary-General Amr Moussa, and Mubarak's Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik. Produced in Tahrir Square in 2013, even without the calligraffiti that eventually surrounded the faces, the image tells spectators of Cairo a singular message: elite political duplicity does not make democracy.

Figure 3: "He who Never Delegates Never Dies"[49]

Another example of Cairiene street art, this time close by on Mohamed Mahmoud Street, is the work "Pyramid of Crisis," by Hanna El Degham. [See Figure 4]. Here, the commanding figure is a woman veiled in black who flanks the pyramid's right side, holding out in front of her an empty gas canister, one with "change" written in red calligraffiti across the front. Other women foreground the demands of the *abaya*-clad woman, similarly holding their own cooking canisters in defiant stances. During a 2012 gallery presentation of Cairiene graffiti, Degham explained how she got the idea for the work. After reading news reports on the day of parliamentary elections, instead of voting, women waited in long lines to purchase cooking gas.[50] "Pyramid of Crisis" can be construed as both commentary on the political infrastructure that limits necessities and creates disruptions to political processes, as well as a critique of the gendered expectations that link women to domestic spheres instead of a broader political one. While in this case the calligraffiti of "change" does help inform the image, even without textual assistance it is visually

interesting, creating a stylized representation of an imagined perspective to real-life events. The stark fullness of the figure in black *abaya* holding an empty gas canister speaks to the domestic responsibilities of cooking, while her pointed white shoes indicate heels or the Western "ladies pump," a demarcation of class. The image stands on its own, offering vibrant political and social criticism, interrupting the flow of both regime power and gender power by resisting and then countering any expectations of a female political passivity.

Figure 4: "Pyramid of Crisis" [51]

Gender Visibility

Practices of protest art are practices in visibility, which cannot help but to invite questions of gender visibility in the Middle East. In the West Bank, graffiti was produced overwhelmingly by men, even when communicating ideas specifically about women ("Morals or else…").[52] However, serving a function much like a newspaper, graffiti is a social exercise with multiple publics, and it would be unrealistic to assume that women were not part of daily resistances in relation to street art production. Peteet shares one example of a Palestinian mother who used the daily conversations on the wall surrounding her village as a launch point for political discussion with her children, one way to shape ideas about social topics, like gender, that "did not always neatly fit" into the overt narratives of Israeli occupation. The rich sub-narratives that expanded from these graffiti texts were, to use another simile from Tripp, like "capillaries of power" and became teaching opportunities the mother instigated with her children. Their discussion created space where even the marginalized within the marginalized—what cultural theorist Alexander Galloway calls the "repressed of the repressed"—can shape resistance forces in ways that evade state surveillance and provide strategic advantage in agency push-back to the state.[53]

By contrast, in Cairo where political resistance faces authoritarian versus occupying regimes, female agency has gained momentum in protest art production, and is starting a new, more diverse public conversation from both men and women on gender rights. Take for example Figure 5, "Nefertiti with a Tear Gas Mask", created by the artist el Zeft. This image captures the memory of Egypt as a land of Pharaohs while simultaneously recognizing the power of female political leadership. The image shifts power in both political and social directions; a developing nation is reminded and inspired by their own experience with imperial greatness, and a woman's political power is publically displayed and used as a mobilizing symbol for resistance. A more contemporary figure that offers an empowering message of gender equality is featured in Figure 6, "During Battles I Will Be Behind You, Protecting You," found on the Greek campus of The American University of Cairo. Here,

a female revolutionary demonstrates loyalty and fierceness side by side with her male compatriot, interrupting assumptions of female inferiority.[54] These images are starting a more diverse public conversation on gender rights, reinforcing a new narrative of female political participation, and disrupting and relocating the voice of Cairiene resistance from one that is male-centric to human-centric.

Figure 5: "Nefertiti with a tear gas mask" [55]

This is not to say that women are ubiquitously welcome on the streets of Cairo to protest, though. A telling example of gender tension comes through that of the "Blue Bra Girl," a woman who in December of 2011 was stomped, dragged, kicked, beaten, and stripped from her *abaya*, exposing both the flesh of her stomach and also the bright blue bra she was wearing.[56] Becoming a rallying cry for protest, street art sprang up throughout neighborhoods in Cairo immediately following the well-broadcasted event. Images of blue bras, immodest in their reference to what they are supposed to be covering, usurped the walls of public and traditionally conservative male spaces. The incident of the public beating and bodily disclosure of a veiled woman punctured the Cairiene consciousness. A physical price of flesh paid for the message of the Blue Bra Girl to be heard, and while she survived the attack, no one knows if she is still alive or where she is. She is either dead, hiding in fear of religious or social repercussion, or she simply needs the privacy trauma victims often seek out in order to reclaim personal integrity. Whatever reason, the anonymity of the Blue Bra Girl has transcended into the realm of myth. But the incident offers a message of empowerment, as well. In the mythology of gender, women only have bodily experiences related to sex and childbirth. As with Figure 6, The Blue Bra Girl is there as a reminder that women are in the fight, too.

Figure 6: "During Battles, I will be behind you, protecting you"[57]

Negotiated Power

At the beginning of the Revolution another work, *Tank vs. Bike* by artist Ganzeer, captured the negotiation of power in what French historian Michele Foucault meant by an ever-changing, ever-rearrangement of our discourses.[58] A kind of call-and-response, this life-sized wall mural began as a tank facing an approaching boy on a bicycle delivering bread. Meant to represent the conflict between State and Citizen, within nine months after February, 2011, when protests became bloody,

the mural transformed in real-time by a series of anonymous contributors as events of the revolution unfolded. After one demonstration, an addition was made to the mural of an image of protesters being run over by the image of the tank, a representation of an actual condition of death witnessed by protesters. The blood in Tahrir Square was transposed to the blood of those being run over by the tank in the mural. The mural then becomes a place of elegiac reflection and remembrance, as well as resistance, marked as such in the artist's inscription: "Starting tomorrow I wear a new face, the face of every martyr. I exist." But then, responding to the defiance of the artists, authorities came to the site, painted over the message and the boy on the bicycle, left the image of the tank unmarked, and wrote, "Army and people are one. Egypt for Egyptians." Another artist came and painted on the newly-whited surface the head of a monster in a military uniform eating a woman, both in a pool of her red blood. [See Figure 7]. The authorities came back, but this time left the body of the monster while blacking out its face.

The Egyptian artist Bahia Shehab had just finished a museum project in Munich, Germany, commemorating Islamic art in Europe. Her commissioned work traced the word "No" back through the near-1,500 year legacy of Arabic calligraphy used in artwork.[59] "In Arabic, to say no, we say 'No, and one thousand times, no.'" As a citizen of Cairo, Shehab vocalized her outrage at the disregard for human life she was witnessing and began stenciling her thousand historical no's in protest. "No" on the military uniform of the monster; "No" on the tank of destruction; "No" on the blood of the innocent; "No" on the whole wall.[60] [See Figure 8]. The visual dialogue between protesters, artists, and agents of the state provide a strong example of what Foucault meant by saying no one ever owns power. Rather, power is a multi-directional negotiation.

"Figure 7: Tank versus Bike" [61]

Conclusion

Understanding resistance to unchecked power requires a relinquishment of antiquated models defined by binary oppositions of East/West, us/other. War and peace are, in part, determined by formal and informal decision-making processes, which gives compelling reason to increase scrutiny into the informal practices of the everyday. As an informal, unregulated practice, protest art helps articulate contours of power, where the state and agent meet and confront each other.[62] Graffiti, street art, public displays of protest, these are refusals to be silent, emphasizing that power can never be completely monopolized by one entity. Scrawling messages onto the consciousness of the state, graffiti and street art refreshes democracy with every shake of the spray can by conveying the voices of the everyday and the ability to resist. Because it is deployed on public property, protest art symbolizes the mixed domain where the state, society, and the individual intersect. As sites of public/private interface, protest art can be understood as a powerful conceptualization tool

to identify where discourse between the state and agency manifest: existing on physical structures, protest art identifies physical locations where power is being contested; as a cultural practice, it articulates an ability to identify power, distort it, and reshape its contours.Protest art demarcates active, alive spaces where evolving narratives of the people make claims to both their governments and to each other.[63]

Figure 10: Bahia Shebab's "One Thousand No's"[64]

In response to physical violence and the extension of power the state has over the corporeal body, Arabian poet Khalil Mutran once wrote "that is your [only] power/And in it is our protection from you. So thank you."[65] Threats of physical violence may silence people for a time, but this time is finite. To be political means to be seen, and within systems of power that refuse to acknowledge the voice of its people, street art production amplifies, not simply substitutes, dissent. Protest art tells us something about us and our daily relationship to power. It also removes political power from the abstract and provides a nexus for the material and the imagined. And just as rebellion and resistance have many voices, these many voices give critically important reasons to avoid the reductivism of Orientalism. Inclusion, the invitation of all people to participate in the negotiation of power is one way to morph, flatten even in some areas, the topographies and contours of power.

In West Bank, Palestine, power is shaped by a colonizing and occupational regime that mimics past atrocities such as twentieth-century Apartheid in South Africa and the tragically ironical Jewish ghettos of pre-WWII Nazi Germany. For Egypt, a military regime will publicly strip and beat a veiled woman in the streets, showing the disparity of power between those who carry guns and those who carry the only weapon they have, yet a weapon still the same, their personhood. Bodily resistance is political resistance, and the articulation of positional places within power are critical for self-awareness, reflection, and public participation. Because, most importantly, understanding and articulating one's place within power's matrix is the beginning negotiation in which to change that position. Protest art is one such articulation, a dynamic practice that forces a dialogue between those who wield power and those who make claims to it. ◆

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[25] Ibid, 498.

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Edited by Adam Khan

Seah Yujia

The Development of the National Referral Mechanism

Assessing China's counter-trafficking strategy

Given the sheer volume of migration across its borders, human trafficking within and across China's borders has become a cause for concern in the international community. In response to the trafficking situation in China, the Chinese government has developed several legal frameworks criminalizing trafficking-related activities and national plans of action to combat trafficking in persons. These measures, including its most recent plan of action, which set forth more in-depth provisions on the identification and protection of trafficking victims, have been perceived to be non-compliant. In the 2013 US Trafficking in Persons Report, which ranks countries across the world on their efforts to combat trafficking, China was demoted to the lowest rank. Despite being a signatory to leading regional and international agreements to combat trafficking, there is a significant level of inconsistency between its national referral mechanism and its apparent commitment to these regional and international initiatives. This paper seeks to identify the key factors which contribute to the non-compliant nature of China's national referral mechanism by examining the push and pull factors which account for the rise in domestic, more specifically interprovincial trafficking, as well as international trafficking. By examining the effects of its one child policy, the unbalanced economic development of its coastal region and its role in the global economy, this paper argues that China's non-compliant NRM took a backseat to both domestic and international economic considerations, and now lacks the capacity required by international conventions to combat the proliferation of trafficking activities resulting from these economic reforms.

The human trafficking situation in China has drawn universal attention owing to the sheer volume of migration taking place within and across its borders. The Chinese Minister of Commerce (MOFCOM) estimates that there are some 147.35 million migrants living in China and in 2009 alone, approximately 745,000 Chinese were officially registered working abroad.[1] At the same time, international trafficking of Chinese citizens to countries such Thailand and Malaysia as well as countries in Africa, Europe and America is on the rise. Moreover, persons from Vietnam, Russia, Korea and Myanmar have been trafficked into China itself.[2] Within China, the "floating inter-provincial population" is estimated to be 47.79 million people each year.[3] Domestic trafficking is equally, if

not more pronounced, particularly among women and children. In response to the dire human trafficking situation in China, the Chinese government has developed several legal frameworks and national plans to be implemented across its provinces. While its national referral mechanism (NRM) and commitment to leading anti-trafficking international agreements indicate an interest in stepping up multilateral cooperation, its efforts still proved insufficient. In 2013, China was downgraded to Tier 3 of the US TIP report after being placed on Tier 2 Watch List for nine consecutive years and receiving two consecutive waivers in 2011 and 2012.[4] Its NRM was deemed non-compliant and the Chinese government was criticized for not making any significant efforts to meet these standards. There is a high level of inconsistency between China's NRM and its professed commitment to international anti-trafficking standards. By examining the effects of its one-child policy (OCP) and economic development on migration flows, this paper argues that China's NRM has taken a backseat to economic development and as a result, now lacks the capacity required by international conventions to combat the proliferation of trafficking activities resulting from these economic reforms. According to the OSCE, a National Referral Mechanism (NRM) is a cooperative framework, which formalizes the collaboration between government agencies and civil society. An effective NRM identifies key state actions and outlines their specific roles and duties in protecting and promoting the human rights of trafficked persons.[5] China's NRM is headed by the Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference System (IMCS) for Anti-Trafficking in Women and Children, which is comprised of representatives from 33 ministries and agencies including the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Committee of Communist Youth League and All-China Women's Federation.[6] The IMCS was gradually established at a provincial level through the Provincial Anti-Trafficking in Women and Children Inter-Departmental Joint Conference (PJC).[7] The roles and duties of the IMCS, PJC and cooperating ministries and agencies are specified in the China National Plan for Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children. On a multilateral level, China has signed and ratified relevant international conventions such as the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons and ILO Convention 182 on the Elimination of Worst Forms of Child Labour.[8] It is also a member of the COMMIT Process (Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region), which includes Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.[9]

At the heart of China's non-compliant NRM is the narrow definition of human trafficking which is defined in Article 240 of The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China as "any act of abducting, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching or sending, or transferring a woman or a child for the purpose of selling the victim."[10] The law also criminalizes any perpetrator who rapes or causes grievous injuries to the woman who is abducted and trafficked, or entices the victim to engage in prostitution. This narrow definition excludes male adult victims from being referred to as victims of human trafficking and thus, denies them access to basic human rights and legal and social services accorded to victims of human trafficking under MCA guidelines.[11] Furthermore, other trafficking offences such as forced labor, hazardous work environment, and unlawful detention are criminalized under separate articles.[12] Persons trafficked for the purpose of labor exploitation that

are likely to work in dangerous and life-threatening conditions or detained by their traffickers are not referred to as victims of human trafficking and are thus denied access to these services and human rights protections. The limited legal framework criminalizing trafficking profoundly impacts the efficacy of China's NRM. Law enforcement agencies and civil society organizations' duties within this framework fail to address labor trafficking or trafficking of male victims.[13]

China's NRM pales in comparison to those of other members of the COMMIT Process. Thailand's 2008 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, for example, comprehensively punishes and prosecutes all forms of human trafficking, including forced labor and trafficking of male adults. The act also sets out legal requirements for national actors to coordinate with NGOs to provide victims with social welfare and assistance.[14]

When compared to the definition of the Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, China's definition also appears narrow and non-compliant with the actions, means and purposes expressed in the Palermo Protocol, rendering its commitment ineffectual.[15] The convention was intended as an instrument of international cooperation to eliminate "safe havens" where organized criminal activities could take place by promoting the adoption and basic minimum measures which include the establishment of domestic criminal offences that would facilitate efficient international cooperation in investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases.[16] However, China's Criminal Code does not prohibit commercial sexual exploitation involving coercion or fraud, nor does it prohibit certain forms of trafficking such as debt bondage, allowing these trafficking activities to persist and proliferate.[17] This discrepancy presents clear evidence of the inconsistency between China's NRM and its professed commitment to international anti-trafficking standards.

One-Child Policy and Domestic Trafficking

Despite the obvious limitations in China's NRM, it was very clearly developed to address the more urgent problem of domestic trafficking of women and children caused by gender imbalances in the country. The strict and coercive enforcement of the "One-Child Policy (OCP)" introduced in 1979 had created a skewed sex ratio of 118 boys to 100 girls in the country.[18] In rural villages, the imbalance is more severe with the population of males outnumbering that of females by 20 to 40 percent.[19] Coupled with the cultural preference for males, this policy has created a demand for the trafficking of women for the purpose of forced marriages and sexual exploitation, while baby boys are trafficked for adoption. About 90 percent of China's internal trafficking cases involve women and children who are trafficked from poorer provinces such as Yunnan and Henan to wealthier provinces in the East. 90 percent of the victims trafficked domestically were trafficked for commercial exploitation.[20]

Given that China's laws criminalizing offences relating to the trafficking of women and children and laws protecting the rights of women and minors were only introduced in the 1990s, the implementation of its NRM through provincial channels has arguably achieved moderate success in coordinating anti-trafficking efforts between provinces. Each PJC is required to sign letters expressing the intent to cooperate with major provinces and municipalities in an effort to curtail cross-border crimes.[21] Anti-trafficking target forces set up by the Chinese authorities in the year 2000 identified and arrested over 300 trafficking gangs

in Yunnan and working groups sent out by the Provincial Public Security Department solved over 2,600 abduction cases between the years 2000 and 2004.[22] The number of women and child trafficking cases that were prosecuted in court increased as well.[23]

This success, however, is limited and looks poised to decline. The economic disparity between provinces and across the region has intensified migration flows between, within, and across China's borders, intensifying trafficking for the purpose of marriage, adoption and sexual exploitation. Yet, recent revisions to its NRM did not include provisions to address these developments. Infant girls are frequently kidnapped or bought from poor parents, particularly migrant workers, and sold to childless families in more prosperous regions or to be raised as brides for men in poor farming families.[24] Women and children from neighboring Asian countries are also trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor.[25] For instance, Vietnamese women are trafficked into Southern villages, whereas women fleeing poor economic conditions in North Korea are deceived and even encouraged to marry rural Chinese men in Northeastern provinces.[26] In addition, Chinese women are also trafficked to lucrative sex industries situated in more developed economies in Hong Kong and Macau. Migration in socialist-transitional economies such as China's is a result of a combination of market forces and government intervention.[27] Hence, in considering the factors which contribute to the nature of China's NRM, it is important to consider how state-driven economic reforms were prioritized without consideration for their impact on the human trafficking situation.

State Policy, Regional Development and Interprovincial Migration

Trafficking for the purpose of labor exploitation has increased due to the unprecedented surge in internal migration induced by unbalanced economic development and relaxed migration policies. A series of household registration reforms involving the relaxation of the 'hukou' system gradually increased the autonomy of the rural population and led to an initial influx of migrant labor from less-developed interior states to more developed Eastern provinces.[28] In the late 1970s, China's transition from a centrally planned economy to a social market economy was marked by preferential development policies and massive inflows of foreign investment in selected coastal states. As the economies of the coastal provinces skyrocketed, their fast-growing export-oriented sectors caused an ever-increasing demand for cheap labor. On the other hand, labor markets in interior provinces experiencing low levels of economic growth faced a surplus of rural labor. This imbalanced supply and demand has resulted in a massive migration to the eastern provinces. From 2000 to 2005, provinces such as Zhejiang and Jiangsu, situated in the Yangtze River Delta (one of the main growth poles), became the biggest recipients of low-skilled and low-educated migrant labor, whereas three of the most populous and agricultural provinces in China, Anhui, Sichuan and Henan, lost much of their low-skilled labor.[29]

These interprovincial migration flows parallel the source and destination provinces for human trafficking for the purposes of forced labor and sexual exploitation, indicating the contribution of unbalanced economic development to an increase in trafficking crimes. A lack of employment opportunities in less developed rural provinces has combined with China's boom in manufacturing and construction, resulting in mass rural-urban migration and the creation of lucrative trafficking opportunities for recruiters. Victims tend to come from poor rural areas in China and have access to limited opportunities, making them vulnerable to traffickers who deceive them with attractive, well-paying jobs in the more prosperous areas of China, but later deliver these victims to the sex or

forced labor industries.[30] In Yunnan for instance, traffickers are shifting their focus from villages to urban labor markets as increasing number of women migrate for work; it is estimated that 60 to 70 percent of abductions by traffickers now take place in these labor markets.[31]

"China's Criminal Code does not prohibit commercial sexual exploitation involving coercion or fraud, nor does it prohibit certain forms of trafficking such as debt bondage, allowing these trafficking activities to persist and proliferate."

The establishment of open economic zones in the coastal provinces has led to increased irregular migration for the purpose of forced labor. Yet in order to absorb the surplus of rural labor and unemployment in less developed provinces, China's NRM remains limited in its capacity to combat the trafficking of women and children resulting from the OCP.

World-Economic System and International Trafficking

While the majority of human trafficking in China takes places within its borders, the development of the global economy and the division of labor between the core and peripheral states have created economic imperatives for the migration of people across China's borders, leading to an increase in international trafficking as well. According to Wallerstein's World Systems Theory, more advanced and developed regions such as the US and Europe are positioned at the core, while less developed transitional economies such as China are positioned at the periphery.[32] This has led to the influx of foreign direct investment into export-oriented industries located in China's coastal provinces, generating a demand for cheap labor from China's rural population as well as those of its neighboring countries.[33] Owing to the demand for cheap labor to support its economic reforms, a rising number of lower wage workers from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar are being trafficked into southern Chinese provinces such as Guangxi and Guangdong to work in sugarcane fields, garment workshops and construction sites.[34]

Similarly, developed economies in the world economic system also face a shortage of labor for low-paid, low-skilled and insecure jobs due to declining fertility rates and rising levels of education.[35] Across the region, rapid industrialization in Asian Tigers such as Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and, increasingly, Thailand and Malaysia, have also emerged as labor-deficient countries demanding cheap labor.[36] At the same time, prospects of higher earnings in capitalist and more developed economies have lured Chinese nationals across borders into the US, and Europe, as well as Hong Kong, Japan, and South Korea. Low- and medium-skilled Chinese workers migrate voluntarily to other countries for jobs in coalmines, beauty parlors, construction, and domestic work. Some subsequently face conditions indicative of forced labor, such as withholding of passports and other restrictions on movement, non-payment of wages, physical or sexual abuse, and threats.[37] Unlike in the case of interprovincial migration, most of these victims are emigrants from highly developed provinces such as Fujian and Zhejiang.[38] Unlike interprovincial migration which is motivated by poverty, irregular migration in and out of China stems from the increased awareness of economic opportunities available elsewhere, a product of China's own development (Skeldon, 2000).

Trafficking routes in the region also indicate that both the origins and destinations of trafficking victims have shifted from less-developed countries like China to more-developed countries such as Japan and the US.[39]

The inconsistency of China's NRM and the standards set out in international agreements stems from China's willingness to let its anti-trafficking efforts take a backseat and pursue the economic imperatives of an open economy. This utilitarian approach is perhaps best observed in China's forceful deportations of North Koreans who are trafficked to China as economic immigrants instead of recognizing their rights as victims of human trafficking so as to avoid being seen as accepting of North Korea's political and economic ideologies.[40]

Policy Recommendations

In order to effectively combat all forms of human trafficking, the Chinese government must begin by revising trafficking laws in order to criminalize all forms of trafficking, in accordance with the minimum standards set forth in the Palermo Protocol and COMMIT Process. From a broader perspective, China needs to strike a balance between its rapid economic expansion and stricter migration policies. The Chinese government also needs to step up monitoring and regulation of its labor markets and border controls. Tighter regulation of migration within and across China is a step towards combatting irregular migration and trafficking for the purpose of forced labor.

Implementing policy to combat human trafficking in China is further complicated by the elusiveness of triads or 'snakeheads' who, with their local dialect and codes of conduct, make it extremely challenging for law enforcement agencies to penetrate.[41] In addition, the situation is exacerbated by the Chinese government's tight controls over civil society organizations, restricted access of foreign anti-trafficking organizations and systemic lack of transparency.[42]

In addition, the high levels of corruption and complicity of local government officials who, in many cases, participate in the sexual exploitation of women, make it even more difficult to combat the trafficking industry on a national level.[43] Morover, national agencies tend to lack adequate funding in implementing national plans of action. Clearly, improvement across law enforcement, judicial and legislative bodies as well as a degree of investment in local and regional anti-trafficking agencies is critical. The government also needs to engage local NGOs more effectively to alert the public, particularly those situated in vulnerable rural villages about the dangers and risks of trafficking.

In conclusion, by examining the relationship between economic development and interprovincial and international migration flows, the inconsistent nature of China's NRM vis-à-vis the minimum standards in international conventions such as the Palermo Protocol can be attributed to the immense weight placed by national policies on economic development rather than investing in the development of social policies and human rights. This has led to the persistence of an outdated and narrow definition of human trafficking, thus impeding China's ability to comprehensively and effectively combat all forms of trafficking. ◆

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[3] The 'floating inter-provincial population' refers

to the number of Chinese moving between provinces each year.; UNAIP. 2010. Mekong Region Country Data.; SAIS. 2010. Country Reports: The Protection Project.

[4] Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so are placed at Tier 3 of the US TIP Report. Tier 3 includes countries such as Iran, North Korean and Zimbabwe.; U.S. Department of State. 2013. 2013 Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington: U.S. Department of State.; "U.S. Downgrades Russia, China for Lack of Anti-Trafficking Efforts." CNN. Last modified June 20, 2013, accessed March 24, 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/19/us/us-trafficking-russia-china/.

[5] OSCE. 2004. National Referral Mechanisms, Joining Efforts to Protect the Rights of Trafficked Persons, A Practical Handbook. Poland: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

[6] The IMCS is made up of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Central Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC), Central Office for Comprehensive Management of Public Security, Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Personnel, Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Health, the National Population and Family Planning Commission of China, State Administration for Industry and Commerce, Civil Aviation Administration of China, State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, Office of Legislative Affairs of the State Council, National Working Committee for Children and Women under the State Council, State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Committee of Communist Youth League, All-China Women's Federation.

[7] Provincial Implementation Plan on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children of Fujian Province (2008-2012)

[8] U.S. Department of State. 2013.

[9] UNAIP. 2010. Mekong Region Country Data; UNAIP. "COMMIT Memorandum of Understanding." UNAIP, last modified October 29, 2004, accessed March 25, 2014, 2014, no-trafficking.org: http://www.no-trafficking.org/reports_docs/commit/commit_eng_mou.pdf.

[10] According to Article 240, Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China,
Whoever abducts and traffics in a woman or a child shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years and not more than ten years, and concurrently be sentenced to a fine. Under any of the following circumstances, the offender shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years or life imprisonment, and concurrently be sentenced to a fine or confiscation of property. If the circumstances are especially serious, the offender shall be sentenced to death, and concurrently be sentenced to confiscation of property:
being a ringleader of a group engaged in the abduction of and trafficking in women or children;
abducting and trafficking in three or more women and/or children;
raping the woman who is abducted and trafficked in;
enticing or forcing the woman who is abducted and trafficked in to engage in prostitution, or selling such woman to any

other person or persons who will force the woman to engage in prostitution;
for the purpose of selling the victim, kidnapping a woman or a child by means of violence, threat or anesthesia;
for the purpose of selling the victim, stealing an infant or a baby;
causing severe bodily injury or death or other serious consequences of the woman or child who is abducted and trafficked in or of their relatives; or
selling a woman or a child out of the territory of China.
"Abducting and trafficking in a woman or a child" refers to any act of abducting, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching or sending, or transferring a woman or a child for the purpose of selling the victim."

[11] Ibid.

[12] Article 240, Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China; Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA); Article 244, Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China; Article 134, Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China; Article 238, Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China

[13] Tiefenbrun, S. 2008. "Human Trafficking in China."

[14] According to the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act (B.E. 2551/2008), the offence of human trafficking involves three elements:
The action of procuring, buying, selling, vending, bringing from or sending to, detaining or confining, harboring, or receiving any person;
By means of the threat or use of force, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power, or of the giving of payments and benefits to achieve the consent of the person;
For the purpose of having control over another person for exploitation.
Where the trafficking involves children (a person under the age of 18), the second element of the offence is not relevant because a child cannot provide consent.; Article 33, 2008 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, Thailand

[15] The UN Protocol to Prevent Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons defines human trafficking as: An action, consisting of: Recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons;
By means of: Threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or position of vulnerability, giving or receiving payments or benefits to achieve consent of a person having control over another;
For the purpose of: Exploitation (including, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of other, or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the removal of organs).

[16] The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime is the main international instrument in the fight against transnational organized crime. It is further supplemented by three Protocols, which target specific areas and manifestations of organized crime, namely
the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children;
the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air;
and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (UNODC, 2014).; Gallagher, A. 2001. "Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis." Human Rights Quarterly 23: 975.; UNODC. "United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto." United Nations Office on Drug and Crime, accessed October 21,

2014, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/treaties/CTOC/#Fulltext.

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[22] Chu, C. Y.-Y. 2011.

[23] UNAIP. 2010. Mekong Region Country Data

[24] SAIS. 2010.

[25] U.S. Department of State. 2013.

[26] Lee, J. J. 2005. "Human Trafficking in East Asia: Current Trends, Data Collection and Knowledge Gaps." International Migration 43: 165.; SAIS. 2010. Country Reports: The Protection Project.

[27] Ye Liu, J. S. 2014. "Interprovincial Migration, Regional Development and State Policy in China, 1985-2010." Applied Spatial Analysis 7 (47): 47.

[28] The 'hukou' system placed restrictions on interprovincial migration by requiring every citizen to register as a resident of his or her usual place of residence. Entry barriers to local *hukou* vary from one city to another, but all serve to prevent temporary migrants from settling down permanently in destinations due to exclusion from government-provided welfare services. Large and well-developed cities such as Beijing and Shanghai tend to impose more stringent controls over the acquisition of local *hukou* status.; Ye Liu, J. S. 2014.

[29] Ibid.

[30] SAIS. 2010.

[31] Yunnan Province Women's Federation. 2002. Yunnan Province Situation and Trafficking in Women and Children: A Rapid Assessment. Yunnan: International Labour Organisation.

[32] Sorinel, C. 2010. "Immanuel Wallerstein's World System Theory." Annals of the University of Oradea, Economic Science Series 19 (2): 220.

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[34] Epstein, G. 2010. "China's Immigration problem." Forbes, July 19, 2010, 26.

[35] Skeldon, R. 2000. Myths and Realities of Chinese Irregular Migration. Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

[36] Asian Tigers refer to the economies of Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, which experienced exceptionally high growth rates of more than 7 percent a year during the 1970s and 1990s. The term also includes other well-developed economies in the region such as Thailand and Malaysia.

[37] U.S. Department of State. 2013.

[38] Skeldon, R. 2000.

[39] Lee, J. J. 2005.

[40] SAIS. 2010; U.S. Department of State. 2013.

[41] SAIS. 2010.

[42] Tiefenbrun, S. 2008. "Human Trafficking in China."

[43] Ibid.

Seah Yujia is a senior at the Singapore Management University, studying at the School of Economics, with a second major in Political Science. Yujia has a keen interest in researching issues in areas related to human security and socioeconomic development. She plans to pursue a JD in international law and career in academia in the future.

Edited by Anna Mikkelborg

Expert Insights

This section shifts away from student work in order to provide a professional perspective of someone working in the field of International Studies. For this edition of Expert Insights, the Jackson School Journal had the pleasure of interviewing two new Jackson School faculty members, professors Daniel Bessner and Rebecca Weber, who will both be teaching JSIS courses this upcoming winter of 2014.

Q&A with Daniel Bessner

Jackson School Journal: Let's start by learning a little more about you. Could you tell us about your academic career ?

Bessner: In college I went to Columbia and I interned at the Council on Foreign Relations my senior year, which got me oriented towards US foreign policy. I majored in modern European history and I became really interested in bringing history to bear on US foreign policy and US foreign relations. However, I guess I would say that my interest in security and foreign policy really began in graduate school when I became involved with the American Grand Strategy Program at Duke University. The idea essentially was that academics could bring their knowledge to bear on US foreign relations and create a better grand strategy. I originally applied to graduate school to pursue a degree in European history and I became really involved in seeing how the insides of European history and American history affect US foreign policy.

Jackson School Journal: We often learn about the Cold War as something that was very reactionary and although the US was becoming less isolationist it was still very inner looking, but your book seems to contradict this a bit.

Bessner: The major goal of the book is to demonstrate that the Cold War didn't emerge out of nowhere in 1947, that it wasn't just a reaction to the Soviet Union's actions in 1945-47 or to US policy makers' view of the Soviet Union that formed before, during, and after World War II. Instead, you need a much larger perspective in order to understand the ideological framework that allowed something like a very long Cold War to happen or even begin. What I show is that the collapse of democratic central Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century was really important for how American liberals understood the US and its role in the world, particularly that the US represented something they called "Western Civilization" or "Judeo-Christian Civilization." Such a worldview was a moral one bent on defeating things that were anti-humanity. At first, that thing was Nazism and fascism, and then they transferred those beliefs about the Nazism onto the Soviets Union because Stalin had already taken a number of terribly crucial actions. The main idea is that in events like the Cold War there are hinge points in history where ideological frameworks are very crucial for understanding how international relations developed, and that it's important for scholars and also practitioners to understand the importance of the history of ideas to US foreign policy and foreign relations.

Jackson School Journal: What do you think accounted for the rise of these defense intellectuals during this time?

Bessner: There's a long history in the US of using experts for policy-making purposes, stretching back to the Progressive era. You see it with economists being used in Dollar Diplomacy and during the late 19th and early 20th centuries throughout the Latin American/Caribbean regions, and even the use of lawyers and business people. But, what happened in the Cold War is that a bunch of different strands came together. First and foremost, during World War II hundreds if not thousands of social scientists entered state administrations. They left universities in their home countries-actually one of the major founders of the Jackson School [George Taylor] worked at the office of War Information with individuals like Hans Speier, one of the intellectuals that I studied for my book. In World War II the US was fighting a global war for the first time in its history (they had participated in World War I primarily in Europe and also only started in 1917) and it required area experts, people who knew the language, had knowledge about the culture, society, and politics of other nations.

As a result it asked social scientists to enter the state administrations and the people that I focus on were actually German exiles who were really important for the development of liberalism in New York City in the 1930's and were part of this cohort that transformed how American foreign policy makers understood how social science could be useful for their own purposes. After the Cold War a lot of these foreign policy makers were interested in keeping these individuals around, so they helped create institutions like the RAND corporation where they helped form institutions like the Council on Foreign Relations and Brookings Institution to focus more on using social science knowledge, in addition to creating academic institutes like the Jackson School or the MIT Center for International Studies, which could bring academic knowledge to their own foreign policy making.

"The main idea is that in events like the Cold War there are hinge points in history where ideological frameworks are very crucial for understanding how international relations developed, and that it's important for scholars and also practitioners to understand the importance of the history of ideas in shaping US foreign policy and foreign relations."

Jackson School Journal: How did you first become interested in this field of work?

Bessner: I became interested in foreign policy through my internship with the Council on Foreign Relations and then through the American Grand Strategy Program. I also became interested in the exiles since my advisor in graduate school, Malachi Hacohen, studied exiles and that phenomenon. Through him, I became interested in exiles and sort of how their experiences in other nations

affected the American experience or American culture and various other things about the United States. What I hoped to do during my graduate studies was to combine these two interests in the history of exile, the history of transnational flows. With my background in foreign relations I focused on the individual Hans Speier, who was both a German academic and an exile who nevertheless became an important foreign policy person and member of the foreign policy establishment during the early Cold War.

Jackson School Journal: What was it like to intern for the Council on Foreign Relations?

Bessner: I really enjoyed it. I was an intern with their public relations department so I basically copy-edited, read and did a little bit of research. It was mostly not a research position but I did a little bit for all the publications that came out. What was most interesting for me was that it provided me access to see how think tanks operated in the American foreign policy establishment. It was really great to meet the members, people with academic backgrounds who themselves came to affect American foreign policy or who sought to affect foreign policy. It was a way to see how ideas themselves and ideas created in these nonpolitical spaces come to affect foreign policy.

Jackson School Journal: Do you have any advice for Jackson School students in general or those who might want to pursue a similar career path?

Bessner: My number one advice would be to *learn languages*. It's really important to learn and be familiar with a language. If the opportunity presents, say if you're interested in being someone who works for the State Department who specializes in let's say in Mexico, spend time in Mexico and learn about the politics, and its society so that you're not just speaking from an American perspective. If you really embed yourself in these other societies, that will give you a much better sense of the language and build your cross-cultural skills. I also would advise to think broadly about career paths. Degrees from the Jackson School and any one of the area studies or general studies or the Jewish studies can be used for a lot of purposes. Don't limit yourself – you could work at think tanks, in the government, as a journalist, as a research analyst, as a consultant, you could go into academia… it provides you with a broad swath of career choices that are otherwise unavailable to people without that international studies background.

Jackson School Journal: Do you have any recommendations for any news or other resources that you follow, especially those that pertain to your area of study?

Bessner: The best for German would be Der Speigel or just the national newspapers are good. I would try to keep on top of magazines like Foreign Policy and to go to a lot of talks here. The opportunities you have as an university student are probably not repeated elsewhere in society so while you're here I would really try to take advantage of talks you're interested in. Podcasts that I use include Blogging Heads, they have a lot of really good and interesting stuff on international affairs and

BackStory with the American History Guys which is just a really cool podcast for those interested in history. As for reading lists… really just read broadly and don't just read the New York Times. Twitter's a really good way to get news information and to get news sources. If you curate your Twitter following well you could have a good sense of foreign news really quickly and domestic news as well.

Interview by Sarah Foster

Jackson School Journal: Could you start with a brief description of the focus of your research?

Q&A with Rebecca Weber

Weber: My research explores the tricky relationship between national sovereignty and international cooperation through a history of U.S. military basing in Latin America during World War II. When U.S. strategists first tried to build military bases in Latin America on the eve of global war, few Latin American leaders were prepared to consent. Before the war, a tide of nationalist popular politics swept Latin America, often tinged with anti-U.S. sentiment provoked by decades of U.S. military intervention in the region. In the 1930s, to lessen those tensions, the Roosevelt administration committed to a policy of non-intervention in Latin America, but a lot of people in the region eyed this policy with suspicion. In this context, the proposal to build U.S. bases in the region was contentious. To evade the initial obstacles to U.S. defense construction posed by both popular and diplomatic opposition, the U.S. War Department contracted the airline Pan American Airways to secretly build and expand airbases across Latin America under the guise of commercial expansion. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, popular support grew in Latin America for more active cooperation with the United States in defending the hemisphere. After that time, U.S. bases were built in a more "above board" fashion, under the banner of inter-American cooperation in the defense – and bases proliferated. But the basing projects were advanced hastily and the terms of basing were improvised along the way. Not surprisingly, conflicts over governance quickly emerged. My book project reconstructs the ad hoc governance arrangements that were negotiated at base sites in Cuba, Panama and Brazil and examines the struggles by local actors who tried to preserve national sovereignty in the face of the U.S. military presence. I focus in particular on conflicts over governance that cropped up in the realms of labor rights, discrimination, gender relations and the sex industry, and criminal jurisdiction over U.S. troops.

Jackson School Journal: How did you first become interested in this field of work?

Weber: I was originally thinking of different ways in which I could look at US-Latin American relations besides doing just a political history or a policy history, and I got interested in Pan American Airways somehow. It was the United States' first international airline and its first routes began in Latin America: the first route was between Florida and Cuba. It then grew to encompass all of the Americas and then during World War II it expanded to Europe and Asia. I was just sort of thinking about how aviation shrinks the distance between places, and Pan Am was really active in the war and had always been regarded by some in the region as an agent of US foreign policy even though it was a commercial enterprise. So I was interested in the

collaboration between business and government in projecting US power in Latin America. And then I learned about the Airport Development Program, the contract the War Department had with Pan-Am to build these airfields under the guise of commercial expansion – that really got my attention! So I looked around and there hadn't been anything written on it, which I was really surprised by. I just thought it was such an interesting story. I didn't know at the time how it might contribute to the field but I wanted to learn more, so that was where I started. And then as I went into the archives and started to learn more about the experience of the Brazilian workers who were hired in the Amazon to build the airfields, and that sort of thing, it started to become much more about the places where the bases were built than about Pan Am as an airline.

Jackson School Journal: What would you say is the relevance of this history to today, especially in regards to US - Latin American relations or bases?

Weber: Well, with regards to bases, I'm struck by how often I see headlines on conflicts concerning US bases around the world today that resonate with the kinds of conflicts that came up at these very early experiments in US overseas basing. Criminal jurisdiction is a big one. That was one of the sticking points in trying to negotiate an extended military presence in Iraq: who could police the behavior of US troops? I think that the ability to police the behavior of anyone within a national territory is one of the defining features of national sovereignty so to compromise that I think feels like a very big compromise of national sovereignty, particularly when it's at the behest of a power like the United States. That was certainly the case in Latin America during World War II, and similar issues seem to arise in Okinawa, Japan. In Latin America there are fewer US bases then there are in a lot of other regions of the world and part of that today has to do with a resurgence of nationalism and sort of a leftward movement in Latin American politics where a lot of popular leaders are rising to power in part by rejecting US influence, particularly the US military presence in Latin America. For instance, there was a major US military base in Ecuador that was closed down by the president [Rafael Correa] and he has since also expelled US military attachés. I think that the military presence that the United States does have in Latin America today often relies on its very informality. For example, there are US troops that will operate at Latin American military bases rather than having official US bases. Part of that has to do with the difficulty of convincing the public that having US military bases in Latin America is acceptable. I think that in some sense a lot of the same issues are continuing to arise but the informality of arrangements today makes the ways in which national leaders may be compromising national sovereignty at the request of the United States less visible to the general public.

Jackson School Journal: Could you go over your academic career for us?

Weber: I was an undergraduate at Duke University and I created an interdepartmental major in literature and history, and I had a second major in Spanish. I learned Spanish in college – I had studied French prior to that, so that was very new – and I did a summer of research in Santiago [Chile] for my honors thesis in addition to a semester when I studied abroad in Madrid. When I graduated I moved

to Buenos Aires, Argentina, where I had an internship with a human rights organization that had an archive of different materials that documented the last military dictatorship in Argentina, and the human rights atrocities that were executed during the dictatorship. I worked with them on a multimedia graphic exhibit that commemorated the anniversary of the coup that brought that dictatorship to power. I spent nine months working with them, and then at the end of that nine months the exhibit went up and it traveled around Argentina. Then I stayed in Argentina for another year doing freelance documentary work and translation. After that, I moved to Boston for a year for a documentary fellowship where I worked with Latin American immigrants and refugees who were living in the area. We did some "know-your-rights" activism, educating undocumented immigrants about what their rights were and what they should do if they encountered an immigration official or if they were stopped by police. And then I returned to Argentina for one more year, and during that time I applied to grad schools. I went to grad school at UC Berkeley – I was in the History Department – and I studied Latin American and US History.

Jackson School Journal: Do you have any advice or next steps for Jackson School students in general, or maybe those who want to pursue work similar to yours?

Weber: Yes – I'm so happy that I moved abroad after college! I was very fortunate that I was able to find a way to do that financially. I was awarded a grant to do the internship with the NGO in Argentina, so I recommend that students look into any kind of fellowships or grants that might be available through the university or external sources. I also have a lot of friends in Argentina who made a living either teaching English or doing translation services or a handful of other odd jobs so that they could pay the bills while they were exploring a new place and solidifying their language skills and taking time to travel. I really valued the three years I spent there and they truly helped me find out what direction I wanted to go in professionally, aside from just being a really cool life experience. If any 21 year old who is about to graduate from college came to me and said, "I'm thinking about moving abroad, is that irresponsible?" I would say "No! You should do it! You can make it work!" I would say also if you're considering going for a PhD then it is a really good experience spending some time immersed in the place where you're going to focus your studies. It will also make you a stronger candidate when it comes time to apply. I suspect that a lot of Jackson School students may be interested in getting involved in the nonprofit world or considering a master's degree, and I think if you can get international experience in the process then that's ideal.

Jackson School Journal: What do you hope to add to the Jackson School in the coming years?

Weber: I am really looking forward to building and creating new classes that are oriented towards US-Latin America relations or the relationship between the United States and the world. The Jackson School has such a strength in area studies so I think it will really be a great addition for people who are concerned with area studies to think about the influence the United States has had in their regions for better or worse. I'm also looking forward to developing relationships with undergraduates that are interested in these sorts of things, or who have questions about what to

do after college or how to decide what's next. I think that will be really rewarding.

Jackson School Journal: Do you have any recommended reading lists or news sources for news and topics in Latin America, especially related to your area of research?

"I think that the ability to police the behavior of anyone within a national territory is one of the defining features of national sovereignty..."

Weber: Let's see. I'm on a couple of list serves where I get sort of news updates from all over the place. For example, there's a UC-Cuba initiative, so people who are involved in the University of California system who do any kind of research in Cuba will often circulate news either that they've written or received. I think there's something cool about having your community contribute to the news you're reading. I also subscribe to a few Google News Alerts, particularly because as a historian I really like to stay on top of what the contemporary relevance of my historical research is and to think about what I'm looking at in the past through the lens of the present. So I have a Google News Alert for US military bases and one for status of forces agreements, which is anything involving questions of jurisdiction and the terms of US military presence overseas. I'm considering doing a second project about international disaster relief, so I also have a news alert for anything that comes up, which as you can imagine is a lot. And there's one other daily news compilation that comes out, I think it's called Just the Facts. It's a list of news articles on Latin America drawn from all different sources in English and Spanish. I get an email, I'm not sure who curates that list, but it certainly makes my life easier!

Interview by Sarah Foster

Appendix: Bibliographies

Identity Politics in Kumaon

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