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Cover photo taken by Siqiao Xie, Jackson School Student

Letter from the Editor

This issue of the Jackson School Journal of International Studies celebrates excellent student writing on international affairs from the spring, summer, and autumn quarters of 2015. It includes exemplary papers from both upper and lower-division classes in the Jackson School as well as interviews with some of the field's most interesting professionals.

We start this issue showcasing a timely research and policy analysis paper on the Dublin System, the European Union's asylum policy. *The Deficiencies of Dublin: An Analysis of the Dublin System in the European Union* by Lauren Moses analyzes Europe's political and cultural responses to asylum seekers from North Africa and the Middle East.

Next, the issue features a final paper from JSIS 201, The Making of the 21st Century. Coauthored by Cynthia Hannon and Journal editor Anna Robert, *The Success of the British Counterinsurgency in Malaysia* explores the anomaly of Britain's successful counterinsurgency campaign in post-World War II Malaysia and its cultural consequences today.

This issue also includes our most extensive Expert Insights section to date. It starts off with an interview with Gideon Lichfeld, Senior Editor at business news publication Quartz. Next, we bring you interviews with three panelists from the Jackson School's International Policy Institute's first conference, "New Frontiers in International Affairs: A Conversation on the Arctic, Space, and Cybersecurity." Our editors sat down with global affairs leaders Paul Nicholas, David Gompert, and Marc Grossman to discuss these issues and more.

The production of this issue has seen significant changes to the editorial board. After a year of co-leading the board, Francis Wilson and I step down as Editors-in-Chief. We are excited to see where editorial board members Isabella Brown, Adam Khan, and Thomas Zadrozny will lead this publication as they take the helm together. Additionally, we welcome Camille Sasson to the board and wish Anna Robert well as she takes on life after graduation.

As always, this edition of the Jackson School Journal is the product of a collaboration between dedicated faculty, excellent student authors, and a committed and capable group of editors and reviewers. We hope you enjoy the Spring 2016 issue as much as we've enjoyed creating it.

Sincerely,

Anna Mikkelborg
Editor in Chief

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This issue of the Jackson School Journal is dedicated to Professor Jennifer Butte-Dahl, for her indispensible assistance. Her help has consistently connected us to wonderful interview candidates for our Expert Insights, and we are extremely grateful for her support.

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Lauren Moses

The Deficiencies of Dublin:
An Analysis of the Dublin System in the European Union

On November 24th, 2014 at the European Parliament, Pope Francis cautioned "We cannot allow the Mediterranean to become a vast cemetery" – referring to the perilous journey from North Africa and the Middle East to Europe taken by desperate migrants fleeing bloodshed, poverty, and political chaos. Yet the dangers do not cease once the asylum seekers reach their imagined safe haven at the southern European borders. Instead, these migrants encounter rampant xenophobia, faltering economies, and overwhelmed social systems – an overall precarious situation for human rights. Despite the intent of most migrants to seek asylum elsewhere in the European Union, the Dublin System – the EU's guiding asylum policy – confines them to these struggling countries by defining a hierarchical set of criteria for determining the Member State responsible for evaluating an asylum application. The primary criterion is the border which is first illegally crossed, rendering the outer-border countries vulnerable to a myriad of asylum applications. The member states of the EU are either unable or unwilling to address the needs of migrants causing human rights to be either consistently violated or simply ignored. In this paper, I conduct a thorough analysis of the Dublin System. I analyze its impacts and implications, arguing that the first-entry criterion confines asylum seekers to southern outer-border countries that are ill-equipped or unwilling to adequately assist and support them. The result threatens human rights and proliferates xenophobic sentiment that is taken advantage o by anti-immigration political parties.

In June 2015, Hungarian authorities announced plans to build a 109-mile wall along the border with Serbia, claiming that they "cannot afford to wait any longer" for the European Union to resolve the continent's escalating refugee crisis. Indeed, Hungary has seen more than 57,000 people irregularly cross its borders so far this year, a dramatic increase from the 43,000 who crossed in 2014.[1] Jobbik, the country's popular far-right party, has capitalized on the mounting xenophobia nurtured by the influx of refugees not only from Serbia, but also from Syria as well. While Hungary's actions are drastic, they do touch upon the broader themes of the refugee crisis in Europe – the flourishing of anti-immigrant sentiment and growing impatience with the European Union system. The case of Hungary also demonstrates the breadth of the crisis, as cause for concern has spread from the southern Mediterranean countries throughout Europe. While the origins of the crisis are multi-faceted and deserving of detail, Europe's asylum policy has been heavily critiqued as a contributor to the failure to adequately manage the influx of refugees. Moreover, critics claim that the policy

not only fails to alleviate the burden incurred by the financial and administrative costs of processing applications and hosting refugees, but in fact forces economic stagnation and flames xenophobia. At the heart of Europe's asylum policy is the Dublin System, a set of criteria established by the Dublin Convention in 1990.

The Dublin Convention of 1990 determined a hierarchical set of criteria for establishing which Member State (MS) of the European Union (EU) would be responsible for examining an asylum application, laying the foundation for the subsequent system that to this day dictates European asylum policy. Although well-intentioned in its inception, its implementation proves that "the mechanism was far from generating equitable results, both for asylum seekers and MS's that happened to be situated along the external borders."[2] These inequitable processes continue to plague outer-border EU countries, especially those adjoining the Mediterranean Sea, and propagate enduring violations of migrants' human rights. As the Dublin System continues to dominate the EU's asylum policy, it is imperative that its deficiencies are addressed to manage the influx of migrants, respect international human rights standards, and aid the economic recovery of the countries most affected by the Eurozone crisis.

In this paper, I conduct a thorough analysis of the Dublin Regulation. Firstly, I briefly define the components of the legislation. Secondly, I detail the history of the Dublin Regulation to contextualize my analysis by examining the Dublin Convention of 1990 and delineating its ensuing evolutions. Thirdly, I analyze the impacts of the Dublin Regulation, arguing that the first-entry criterion confines asylum seekers to southern outer-border countries that are ill-equipped to adequately assist and support them. This results in precarious situations for human rights and a proliferation of xenophobic sentiment that is taken advantage of by anti-immigration political parties. Throughout my paper, I utilize examples of Greece's reception of asylum seekers to exemplify the impacts I outline in the previous sections and give testimony to the human rights abuses occurring in the region. To conclude, I highlight a recent development agreed upon at an EU refugee summit in late September – a refugee quota that will distribute 160,000 asylum seekers across Europe over the next two years. While this quota will undoubtedly relieve some pressure on Italy and Greece, I question its potential to resolve enduring human rights violations and dampen xenophobic fears.

The Dublin Regulation is the cornerstone of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which is an assemblage of directives and regulations that prescribe the EU's asylum protocol. It is applied in 32 countries – the 28 EU Member States and Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, and Liechtenstein. The Dublin Regulation specifically articulates the criteria and mechanisms for determining the MS responsible for examining an application for asylum lodged by a third-country national.[3] The criteria are in descending precedence: firstly, the presence of a family member with refugee status in a MS; secondly, the existence of a valid residence permit or visa in a MS; thirdly, the frontier of the MS that an asylum applicant has irregularly crossed; fourthly, the MS responsible for controlling the entry of the alien; and finally, the first MS with which the asylum application is lodged.[4] In most cases, it is the third scenario, when an applicant has irregularly crossed an EU border, meaning "the Member State thus

entered shall be responsible for examining the application for international protection."[5]

Originally established by the Dublin Convention of 1990 in response to a significant increase in asylum applications, the Dublin asylum regime has evolved over time. In September 2003, the Dublin II Regulation replaced the Dublin Convention, and amendments proposed by the European Commission resulted in further reform – the Dublin III Regulation – in July 2013. These developments, in addition to the supplementary mechanism of the European Dactyloscopie program, constitute the Dublin System or the Dublin Regulation; I use the terms interchangeably. Although each stage of the Dublin System has been accompanied by minor modifications, the policy's essence remains consistent. Thus, in this paper, it is more pragmatic and valuable to analyze the system as a whole. However, to properly evaluate the Dublin Regulation, it is imperative to first closely examine the contexts and intentions of its predecessor, the Dublin Convention of 1990.

In the 1980s, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the collapse of communism, and chronic violence in North Africa, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Lebanon spurred migration to Europe in increasing numbers. In fact, "total net migration in the Member States rose from 1.1 million in the 1960s to almost 10 million in the 1990s, reflecting the large influx of immigrants from the rest of the world."[6] Disorder and bloodshed in these foreign countries motivated people to seek security – both physical and economic – elsewhere, although those who arrived in the EU without refugee status were considered illegal immigrants until they applied for asylum.

As the volume of asylum applications dramatically increased, administrative competencies were overloaded and resources depleted. In turn, MSs started to unilaterally implement restrictive measures, which led to a race for the most restrictive policies as constraints in one country forced migrants to neighboring countries. The deteriorating situation necessitated a coordinated approach, especially with the recent creation of the single market and the signing of the Schengen Agreement. Thus, in response to this policy incoherence, the EU held the Dublin Convention – or, by its official lengthy name, the Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining the Applications for Asylum Lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities – in 1990 to harmonize and streamline its asylum policy. It foremost sought to eliminate the "refugees in orbit" quandary, where asylum seekers are "shuffled from country to country, with all the human drama that this implies."[7] Secondly, it sought to evade the "asylum shopping" phenomenon, where asylum seekers lodge multiple applications in different countries, congesting administrative systems while attempting to better their chances of asylum approval. By obliging only one MS to examine an application for asylum, the Dublin Convention eliminated the dual dilemmas of "refugees in orbit" and "asylum shopping," and decreased the exhaustion of state resources involved in the administrative process.

The Dublin Convention entered into force on the first of September, 1997 – the seven-year delay resulting from major resistance from several national parliaments and other institutions. For example, since Ireland had never been confronted with a significant number of asylum seekers, it had to devise a complete asylum bill before being able to proceed with

the ratification of the Dublin Convention. In the Netherlands, complications arose from the inability of the Dutch government to secure judicial control mechanism under the Dublin Convention.[8]

The Dublin Convention of 1990 sought to eliminate the dual dilemmas of "refugees in orbit" and "asylum shopping." In this regard, its objectives were neither malicious nor misplaced; in fact, its endeavor to swiftly initiate the asylum process to minimize the asylum seeker's state of uncertainty is remarkable. Unfortunately, the implementation of the Dublin Regulation has produced severe inequitable impacts predominantly affecting southern outer-border countries. The most frequently cited of the Dublin Regulation's criteria to determine the MS responsible for the examination of an asylum application is country of first-entry, making the outer-borders of the EU vulnerable to relativelyoverwhelming amounts of asylum seekers. These southern European countries, bordering the Mediterranean, are "on the front lines, forced to deal with a disproportionate number of migrants arriving from North Africa."[9] However, the southern European countries are still recovering from the Eurozone crisis, a crisis that they are often blamed for causing. These countries, being the physically closest entryway to Europe from North Africa and the Middle East, are heavily affected because they are the most accessible by irregular crossing. For instance, Greece's extensive coastlines and easily passible borders make border control almost impossible.

"Unfortunately, the implementation of the Dublin Regulation has produced severe inequitable impacts predominantly affecting southern outer-border countries."

While these countries do not necessarily receive the largest gross quantity of asylum applications, the dire effects of massive migration to these countries are undeniable, particularly in Greece, a country of 11 million that has received nearly all of the irregular migration to the European Union. Until 2007, most of the migration influx was shared between Greece, Italy and Spain, but bilateral treaties – such as Italy's with Libya and Spain's with Senegal – have redirected routes towards Greece.[10] However, all these countries, which are also those most affected by the Eurozone crisis, continue to grapple with austerity measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission, and the European Central Bank, amidst massive unemployment and national debt. They are struggling to cope with a surge of irregular migrants and asylum seekers, as their infrastructures and economies are currently compromised. These conditions are culminating in precarious situations where the human rights of migrants are directly or indirectly violated, or simply ignored. These countries are hardly in a state to uphold the economic and social security of their own citizens, proving them incapable of providing adequate shelter, food, housing, and basic needs to arriving asylum seekers.[11] Housing is a particularly acute problem – around 5,000 migrants have been revealed in an estimated 500 abandoned buildings, and more than 2,000 other properties occupied by migrants have been deemed as unfit for human habitation.[12]

Additionally, thwarting migration and preventing migration-associated deaths is not costless; Italy spent €9 million a month on Operation Mare Nostrum, a search-and-rescue effort in the Mediterranean that was launched in 2013 after the drowning of 360 migrants off the coast of Lampedusa, and Greece spent €63 million in 2013 alone to prevent irregular migration – only €3 million of which came from Europe's border agencies.[13] It is clear that the southern outer-borders of Europe, particularly Greece, do not have the resources to adequately assist and support arriving migrants seeking asylum.

The voyage from North Africa and the Middle East to Europe is fraught with danger. Upon arrival to the EU, asylum seekers confront further insecurities, discrimination, and abuse. So then, why do North Africans and Middle Easterners undertake such a perilous journey to Europe? It is relevant here to briefly expand on the push-and-pull factors that attract asylum seekers to the EU.

There are various motivations for migration, including economic conditions in both the origin and destination country, network connections to facilitate migration, violence in the origin country, and family reunification.[14] To generalize, North African and Middle Eastern asylum seekers risk their lives to reach Europe to escape war, political chaos, and severe poverty. The destructive Syrian Civil War and the bloody rise of the Islamic State are ample motivations to flee to Europe, although many head to Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. Elsewhere, the collapse of governmental authority in Libya since the Arab Spring in 2011, violence wrought by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, and a resurgence of conflict in South Sudan continue to cause people to make their way to European coasts.

Despite the often horrendous and degrading experiences the asylum seekers go through reaching and staying in Europe, many see it as a better alternative to their North African and Middle Eastern homes. As conditions in Greece and Italy worsen, some migrants admit regret in their decision to move, for it was not one taken lightly; Mohammad Sharouf, a Syrian who fled the security forces of President Bashar al-Assad, explains, "In Syria, I had my fiancée, my family and friends. I had my whole life there. Do you think, had I a choice, I would have left?"[15]

In this paper, I shall refer to people escaping the violence and chaos of North Africa and the Middle East as asylum seekers due to the potentiality or realization of their formal application, while my usage of migrants refers to the general movement of people and its various categories. I include potentiality because many people initially choose to withhold an asylum application or evade documentation because they do not want to be restricted to their first country of entry. Although some may consider them illegal or undocumented instead of asylum seeking, I want to acknowledge their intention and desire to be granted asylum or protected status somewhere within the EU, regardless if their application is eventually approved or denied. This usage is concurrent with that of the United Nations Refugee Agency, who defines an asylum seeker as someone who says they are a refugee, but whose claims have not yet been definitively evaluated.

Before I delve further into the impacts of the Dublin Regulation, it is imperative to clarify that asylum seekers are not to blame for any overwhelmed European economy or social system. They are fleeing countries fraught with bloodshed and instability, undertaking

perilous journeys to obtain basic human rights of security and safety. More often than not, the asylum seeker's first country of entry is not their desired final location, but the Dublin System forces them to remain in countries with faltering economies and social systems, despite the maladies this inflicts on both them and Europeans. This understanding is indispensable to my analysis.

The influx of asylum seekers has not only placed further strain on southern European economies, but has incited acute xenophobia, aiding the ascendance of far-right anti-immigrant political parties. As governments tend to respond to negative public perceptions by introducing populist regulations and policies intended to restrict the flow of migrants, migration policies in the immediate future are at risk of being narrowed.[16] At the moment, xenophobic sentiments are not exclusionary, encompassing the categories of legal migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, and, depending on who one asks, illegal/undocumented/irregular migrants. Foreigners are seen as economic burdens, job-stealers, criminals, unsanitary and untrustworthy. Unfortunately, these sentiments are being politicized and affecting balances of power through elections.

For instance, the immigration debate weighed heavily in the elections for the European Parliament in May 2014, bolstering the political fortunes of extreme rightist parties in Britain, Denmark, France and Hungary. In particular, Marine Le Pen, the leader of France's National Front, has frequented the media spotlight, primarily due to her ambitious promise to cut the annual number of immigrants to 10,000, down from 200,000.[17] In Greece, the rise of the Neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn has made headlines with their serving of bread to the needy – on the condition that they can present a Greek nationality ID card. This anti-immigrant sentiment is not novel; the growth of xenophobia is widely seen as dating back to 2004, when the EU admitted ten countries from Central and Eastern Europe. However, it is culminating in violent physical attacks against legal migrants, asylum seekers, and undocumented migrants – the extremists make no distinction.

In summary, the most pressing and potent impact of the Dublin Regulation is its uneven distribution of asylum applicants to the outer-border countries, straining already overwhelmed economies and social systems, which in turn promotes xenophobic sentiments that politicize in parties with anti-immigration platforms. This toxic cocktail leads to precarious situations for asylum seekers' human rights. When there is a lack of housing the criminalization of migrants is prolonged, degrading holdings in detention centers. For instance, Greece's land border with Turkey has been undergoing a humanitarian crisis since 2010 because of "overcrowded detention centers, appalling hygiene and living conditions for asylum seekers, and human rights violations perpetrated by Greek authorities."[18] Doctors Without Borders, an independent medical aid organization, reports that Greek detention

"This anti-immigrant sentiment is not novel; the growth of xenophobia is widely seen as dating back to 2004, when the EU admitted ten countries from Central and Eastern Europe."

centers systemically violate the asylum seekers' rights by holding them in overcrowded, insanitary facilities that lack access to consistent or adequate medical assistance.[19] It has also been observed that "many migrants survive in appalling conditions in the heart of Athens, transforming parts of the historic centre into a dangerous and insanitary ghetto," conditions that doctors and officials have described as a "public health time bomb."

Moreover, stringent border controls make it more likely that people are forced to take greater risks to migrate.[20] In the European case, this usually transpires in dangerous voyages across the Mediterranean in pathetic dinghies packed with people. The media is saturated with headlines such as "500 Migrants Feared Dead after Boat Sinks in Mediterranean," "Migrant Boat Capsizes Leaves 27 Dead," and "Deadliest Year for Migrants Crossing the Mediterranean." William Lacy Swing, the Director-General of the International Organization for Migration, explains that "limited opportunities for safe and regular migration drive would-be migrants into the hands of smugglers, feeding an unscrupulous trade that threatens the lives of desperate people," adding that "undocumented migrants are not criminals. They are human beings in need of protection and assistance and deserving respect."[21] The flimsy boats used to traverse the Mediterranean are usually overcrowded, lack minimal safety requirements, and are without sufficient food and water provisions for the voyage. Sometimes, smugglers stuff migrants in the hull of the boat, where they die from suffocation. With over 3,000 fatalities within the first nine months of 2014, Europe is now designated the most dangerous destination for irregular migrants, with deaths concentrated in the Mediterranean.[22]

Another impact of the Dublin Regulation that endangers human rights is the creation of the Eurodac, in 2003. Europa, a website that provides summaries of EU legislation, defines Eurodac as "a system for comparing fingerprints of asylum seekers and some categories of illegal immigrants," although it is typically used to track the latter. Eurodac's main objective is to facilitate the application of the Dublin Regulation, by determining the MS responsible for examining an asylum application through documentation of first irregular entry – in theory so that the asylum process can timely begin. However, Eurodac is prompting self-mutilation among migrants who want to evade documentation. Migrants are burning their fingertips with hot metal rods, using razors to slice off skin, and using superglue and even acid to disfigure skin patterns.[23] An Eritrean 27-year-old in Italy attempting to reach Britain disclosed – "I burn my fingers because then the police will not be able to work out who I am […] I have to heat up a metal rod in the fire until it is very hot – then I grip it hard so my fingertips burn off. I have to do this every month because my fingertips grow back. This is the only way to remove my history and create a better future somewhere else."[24] North African males, particularly those with criminal records, have the highest levels of self-mutilation.

Eurodac also creates perverse incentives for countries to soften their border control – by not fingerprinting migrants – so that the country will not be held accountable for the asylum seeker. For example, in 2013 German officials accused Italians of giving money to asylum seekers so that they could travel to Germany.[25] While evading documentation may allow some asylum seekers to continue to their final destination, usually the richer

north, it places them outside any legal, social or economic protection and assistance, furthering opportunities for exploitation or negligence of their human rights. This "collaboration" with the police discourages asylum seekers to report any acts of violence, especially if the police are the perpetrators. However, this lack of accountability increases the likelihood of police brutality and discrimination, as many asylum seekers in Greece have recounted.

These impacts are a consequence of the Dublin Regulation's first entry criterion. Forcing already economically struggling countries like Greece and Italy to bear the brunt of irregular crossing into the EU is at the same time unfair and overwhelming. This is resulting in xenophobic rhetoric that is being exploited by far-right political parties. This furthers the vulnerability of migrants' human rights, as these countries are ill-equipped and sometimes even unwilling, due to discrimination, criminalization, and xenophobia to assist and support them.

The consequences of the Dublin System have constrained asylum seekers in southern European countries ill-equipped or unwilling to provide adequate support and assistance. This leads to precarious situations for human rights, and hinders the ability of governments to support both European citizens and asylum seekers. Moreover, a vast majority of asylum applications are turned down.[26] Hovering at around one percent, Greece has the lowest positive-decision rate in the processing of asylum applications in Europe.

On November 24th, 2014 at the European Parliament, Pope Francis cautioned "We cannot allow the Mediterranean to become a vast cemetery," adding that the EU's failure to find an effective response to the flow of desperate migrants had caused individual countries to adopt independent measures "which fail to take into account the dignity of immigrants and thus contribute to slave labor and continuing social tensions."[28] It is clear through my analysis that the Dublin System's criteria for determining the Member State responsible for an asylum application have dramatic consequences for the outer-border countries of the EU and the asylum seekers themselves. Due to the Dublin Regulation's criterion of first-entry, these countries are often singlehandedly forced to manage the influx of asylum seekers. Their inability or unwillingness to do so produces unfavorable situations for human rights. Thus, the Dublin Regulation, as the cornerstone of the CEAS, must be reexamined and altered accordingly.

"Hovering at around one percent, Greece has the lowest positive-decision rate in the processing of asylum applications in Europe."

In 2014, Cecilia Malmstrom, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, proposed the idea of a "distribution key," in which Member States with few asylum seekers, like Poland, would take more of them.[29] If distribution was accorded in proportion to population or capacity, the system would be more equitable and would relieve pressure from the southern Mediterranean countries, bolstering their ability to recover from the lingering effects of the Eurozone crisis. In a similar vein, the aforementioned quota system agreed upon in late September 2015 will

aid in the more equitable distribution of asylum applications. While this achievement is not to be completely undermined, it is doubtful that quotas will swiftly and singlehandedly resolve the many facets of the refugee crisis, especially since the plan unfolds over a period of two years while refugees arrive daily on European coasts. Although major players like Germany, Sweden, France, Italy and Spain support the quota system, several Central European countries are openly against the measure, raising concerns that refugees will be placed in questionable safety circumstances, vulnerable to violence and discrimination. Opponents of the quotas also argue that refugees will leave an assigned country if it is not their desired final destination, which renders the quotas obsolete. This critique is also levied against the current Dublin System. Moreover, the imposition of EU legislation often sparks Euroscepticism and incompliance, which would dangerously coincide with the continued rise of the far-right. Essentially, while the implementation of the quota system is a likely boon, additional measures are needed, and sustained discussion of potential solutions is imperative.

Transfer tactics and quotas will not be enough to adequately address the xenophobic rhetoric that is exploited by anti-immigrant parties. Combatting xenophobia requires movements toward a public discourse that is self-conscious about the merits of pluralism, the value of equality and the hazards of prejudice.[30] Additionally, more sufficient economic and social support from the EU is necessary to accommodate the current asylum seekers in southern Europe, the police must be held accountable for discrimination and brutality, and the EU must fulfill its promise to contribute in search-and-rescue operations in the Mediterranean. My critique presented in this paper is not unheard of and does not fall on deaf ears. There are many critiques of the Dublin System circulating in academia and the media, especially concerning human rights. Hopefully, these will be enough to inspire change that better secures the inalienable, universal human rights of asylum seekers, refugees, undocumented migrants, and the like. ◆

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Lauren Moses is currently an International Studies major in the Jackson School on the Development track, with minors in European Studies and French. She originally wrote this paper for JSIS 324, Professor Friedman's class on Immigration. She hopes to continue her studies at graduate school in the field of International or European Studies after she graduates in Spring 2016. Her research interests include Economic Development, French and Modern European History. This past summer, Lauren was selected for a fully-funded EU immersion program in Brussels, and also completed an Economic Development/ Microfinance internship in Ghana for Global Brigades.

Edited by Thomas Zadrozny

Cynthia Hannon and Anna Robert

A Successful Counterinsurgency

The British and the Malayan Emergency

In the days following the end of World War II, the Malayan Communist Party staged an uprising to free Malaysia from colonial rule. The subsequent conflict, known as the Malayan Emergency, ended with a decisive British victory. This is one of the only examples of a successful counterinsurgency in the 20th century, a success which was due to several factors, including racial divisions in Malaysia, superior British resources and military strategy, and mounting pressure from the West to suppress the Communists as the Cold War developed. The legacy of Britain's retaliation manifests today in the form of harsh discrimination against multiple ethnic groups in Malaysia, which began with the British dividing different ethnic groups and pitting them against each other during this period of insurgency.

The British Empire colonized Malaysia in the late 1700s, wresting control from the Dutch. They then proceeded to rule the region until Japan's invasion in 1942, after which the Japanese Empire occupied the country.[1] At the end of World War II, a defeated Japan pulled out of Malaysia. However, in the twelve days between Japan's retreat and Britain's reclamation of the colony, the Malayan Communist Party took control of the country.[2] They would clash with their returning British rulers from 1945 until 1963, a period referred to as the Malayan Emergency.[3] Ultimately, Britain oversaw one of the only overwhelmingly successful counterinsurgency movements in the 20th century, retaining their authority without destroying their colony, even as the insurgents sought to overthrow them. During the same period, several major powers failed in their counterinsurgency attempts. The French were unable to defeat rebels in Algeria, Portugal lost Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique; and the United States abandoned the struggle in Vietnam. Despite similarities in tactics among both colonizers and insurgents across these conflicts, as well as similar geography in some cases, Britain stands alone as a rare success story of counterinsurgency in the 20th century. Unlike other occupiers, Britain owed its victory to extreme racial divisions in the population of Malaysia, which, due to its extraordinary ethnic diversity, was unable to unite against the British occupation. Moreover, the British possessed superior resources vis-a-vis the Malaysian insurgents, and were spurred on by mounting pressure from the West to suppress the Communists, in keeping with the Cold War's containment mentality. The impact of Britain's success persists today in the form of significant ethnic divisions. Muslim Malays are favored by government policies over Chinese-Malays, Indian-Malays

and Austronesian (indigenous) Malays.

Britain's primary advantage over the insurgents came from exploiting Malaysia's ethnic diversity. This diverse population came as a result of centuries of trade. The Strait of Malacca was a popular trade passage between the East and West, bringing many Arab, Chinese, and Indian traders into the region for over 1500 years.[4] These circumstances resulted in a highly diverse population reflected by the current demographic situation: 50.4% of Malaysia's population is Muslim Malay, 23.7% is Chinese, 11% is indigenous Malay, 7.1% is Indian, and 7.8% is comprised by other ethnic groups.[5] Ethnic identities and ethnic group relations are shaped largely by historical experience and should be viewed in the context of the historical development and formation of an ethnic group. While objective components, such as language or customs are components of ethnic identity, the subjective experience of ethnic identification defines ethnic group relations. An analysis of the ethnogenesis of a few of the diverse ethnic identities reveals the way in which the British exploited tensions between the ethnic groups that continue today.

Prior to 1946, Malays were divided geographically and identified with the domains of their respective sultanates. In order to centralize control over these disparate Malay states, the British facilitated Malay nationalism in an attempt to unite the different regions through the Malayan Union scheme. This strategy ostracized non-Malay ethnic groups, such as the Chinese-Malays, and gave Malays political dominance over other ethnic groups. Today Malays in Malaysia identify as one ethnic group, the Melayu, tracing their ethnogenesis to the nationalism constructed and encouraged by the British. On the other hand, the Chinese-Malay ethnogenesis was a response to the political dominance of the Malays. Early Chinese immigrants were politically oriented towards China rather than Malaysia and separate ethnic groups, such as the Hokkien and the Cantonese, actually competed with each other. In fact, intermarriage between the groups was looked down upon. However, the competing groups integrated to create a meta-ethnic group in response to British sponsored Malay dominance and now identify as Chinese, or Huayu.

In a similar way, in order "to avoid being edged out economically and politically in an emerging new state," indigenous groups called for unity in response to the politically and economically well-established Malay and Chinese. The British unification of Malaysia highlighted these ethnic differences and created incentives for Malaysians to identify as members of distinct ethnic groups. The nature of economic and political development following the formation of the Malaysian state benefited certain ethnic groups, forcing others to consolidate and seek government acceptance and approval. The British aggravated these divisions to their advantage during the counterinsurgency, contributing to their eventual victory. [6]

The different ethnic groups were wary of each other and could not unify behind either the Malayan Communist Party guerrilla fighters or the British Commonwealth soldiers. The seeds for this disunity were were sown in the 19th century. Under British rule, ethnic groups were significantly and intentionally divided. Starting in the mid-1800s, "primary and secondary school education was almost entirely ethnically segregated" by the British government.[7] Different groups were socialized to distrust the others. Much of this distrust came through stereotypes that the British built up,

such as Malays being "lazy liars" and the Chinese "greedy pigs."[8] Ethnic tensions were exacerbated by Britain's explicit stereotyping and creation of social hierarchies among the groups. The British grudgingly respected Chinese businessmen, but considered them untrustworthy and their culture inferior. They were still ranked socially higher than Malays, who were in turn higher than both Indians and indigenous Malays.[9] Japan's 1942 takeover changed this status quo. The Indians and some Malays rose in power, the former because the Japanese wanted to be on good terms with India and the latter because they needed locals to serve in administrative roles after the invasion. For the first time since falling under a foreign nation's rule, these groups were able to participate in their own governance.[10] The Japanese invasion did not benefit all ethnic groups. Reflecting Japan's antagonism towards China in World War II, Japanese occupying forces rounded up many Chinese-Malaysians and slaughtered them, with an estimated death toll of 400,000.[11]

The deep divisions between ethnic groups is the primary difference between the Malayan Emergency and other attempted insurgency movements. For example, the French Algerian insurgency possessed a far more homogenous population, which allowed them to muster a unified front against the French as they fought for dominance in the 1950s and 1960s.[12] In the Vietnam War as well, similarity in ideology and race allowed the Viet Cong insurgency to fight on without worrying about internal divisions. A similar situation occurred during the Portuguese Colonial War, where relatively nationalist insurgencies in Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique were able to expel the Portuguese colonial regime.[13]

On the other hand, the lack of unification among the Malay population was a major boon to the British counterinsurgency. The majority of Malaysia's Chinese supported the communist takeover, tempted by the taste of power they felt under the British yet resentful of their mistreatment under both the British and Japanese regimes. Some Indians, indigenous Malays, and Malays also supported the communist insurgents for similar reasons. There was a popular willingness to try any form of government that provided an alternative to the oppressive British regime. However, while most Malays opposed Malaysia's status as a colony, some did not believe communism was the proper channel for Malaysia to escape British rule and flourish as its own nation.[14] Other factions within the ethnic groups simply preferred British rule to Communist rule and supported the counterinsurgency for its own sake. The British knew that success could be achieved by further dividing the population. In 1949, two years after the Malayan Emergency began, Britain sent General Harold Briggs to put down the insurgency. He implemented the Briggs Plan, which further divided the population. Its purpose was to defeat the Malaysian Communist Party (MCP) by cutting it off from its supporters. To accomplish this goal, they relocated certain ethnic groups, mainly the Chinese and some of the indigenous Malays, to camps called "New Villages."[16] This

"Other factions within the ethnic groups simply preferred British rule to Communist rule and supported the counterinsurgency for its own sake."

forced migration was a significant blow to the insurgents, as the population became even more divided. This artificial physical separation of the different ethnic groups in the 1950s created the geographic separations we see today in Malaysia. The Chinese and indigenous Malaysians were specifically targeted throughout the 1950s because they made up the bulk of the insurgents as both guerrilla fighters and as farmers providing the fighters food and shelter.[17] Without the support of other groups, the rebels, hiding in the jungles, began to starve.

One disadvantage the British faced was a lack of familiarity with the territory compared with the fighters on the side of the Malayan Communist Party. Additionally, many insurgents possessed training in guerrilla warfare, skills learned during their efforts to repel the Japanese invaders. Chin Peng, the leader of the MCP, had even received some British military training. Thus, the Malaysian insurgents were somewhat familiar with British strategy, creating a relatively level playing field at the tactical and strategic levels.[18] Some might even say the Malaysians held a significant strategic advantage much like the Viet Cong did in the Vietnam War due to their superior knowledge of the terrain – the British soldiers were not used to fighting in jungles and were susceptible to various diseases.

However, the adaptive nature of the British fighting forces neutralized the primary advantages of the insurgents. The British Commonwealth troops' superior training allowed them to conduct themselves in more organized formations, though they were not overly rigid in their military tactics. They were highly adaptive when it came to approaching different situations.[19] They learned that attempting head-on fights would be useless against the MCP guerrilla fighters. They got faster at responding to sneak attacks. General Briggs realized that the 13 infantry battalions stationed in Malaysia would not be enough to enforce the Briggs' Plan. Thus, reinforcements were called in from the Royal Marines, the King's African Rifles, and the Special Air Services (SAS).

Britain's superior resources provided another advantage over the communists. The British possessed more food, manpower, and means of communication, all key assets in fighting long-term battles. In total, about 40,000 British soldiers were deployed, facing approximately 8,000 insurgents at the Malayan Emergency's peak.[20] With the addition of more soldiers, air support, and spies, as well as the introduction of more military leaders with jungle-fighting experience, British forces pushed the Malayan Communist Party further back into the jungles and cut them off from their supply routes. The British also leveraged superior communication methods such as radios to coordinate troops; a tool the rebels did not possess. The British also scattered pamphlets across particularly conflict-ridden regions, offering monetary rewards to rebels who turned in their weapons. Some pamphlets also encouraged Malays and indigenous tribes to report to British troops to receive medical aid and food, thus drawing their support away from the insurgents.[21]

The Malaysian insurgents were forced to rely primarily on word-of-mouth to communicate, whether between guerrilla forces or between people in towns. They had no continuous access to printing presses to spread propaganda, let alone military radios. Communication was an even greater problem for the insurgents after the forced migrations. The "New Villages" were remote, and information could be scarce. The increased allocation of troops and especially the continuous segregation

of ethnic groups under to the Briggs Plan proved to be a highly successful counterinsurgency strategy. Additionally, due to the variety of opinions and the groups' ingrained mistrust of each other, they could not unify against the better-organized, more powerful British. Had it not been for this segregation, Malaysia's future may have followed Guinea's, where Guinean insurgents successfully fought for their freedom from France in an asymmetric conflict.[15]

What makes the British success even more surprising is the fact that it took three years of communist insurgency before there was a significant investment in a counterinsurgency. Britain did not bother to send in any military leadership or even more troops until 1949. Even as the insurgents attacked British soldiers, killed British plantation owners, and then vanished into the jungle, British colonial representatives were left to flounder without military support for two years. Finally, General Briggs was appointed to Malaysia and the urgency to defeat the Malayan Communist Party insurgents heightened dramatically.[22] This rapid change in approach towards the Communists is likely due to the advent of the Cold War. 1947 is commonly considered the year that relations between the West and the Soviet Union began to sour. The United States and its allies, including Britain, began viewing the Third World as a battleground against communism. George Kennan's theory of containment was published during those first two years of fighting in Malaysia, further spurring the necessity of action being taken to prevent communism worldwide. The MCP's attempted revolt was finally taken seriously by Britain as the Cold War increased tensions between the East and West. This convinced the British government to appoint one of their top generals, Briggs, and assigned thousands more soldiers to their rogue colony. The Commonwealth troops' newfound sense of urgency and ferocity caught the rebels off guard. While the conflict would last another two decades, the Red Scare lent an essential intensity to the British counterinsurgency. By 1960, it was clear that the counterinsurgency had won.[23]

On the whole, the British counterinsurgency in Malaysia is generally considered a success. However, victory for the British colonial government did not come cheaply. Malaysia's economy was nowhere near as strong as it had been prior to the conflict. Chinese and Indian workers made up most of the agriculture labor force, and as the British moved people into the "New Villages" the farming industry was disrupted. Domestic food production dropped, and the economy began to fall with it.[24] However, it was better off than the aftermath of the Philippine-American War, an insurgency in the 19th and 20th centuries in which an estimated 4,200 Americans and 265,000 to 1 million Filipinos died.[25] By contrast, only about 1,800 soldiers and police officers and 6,000 communists and their supporters died during the Malayan Emergency.[26]

Still, both sides knew if they continued fighting, it would only lead to unnecessary bloodshed that would last for years to come. In the late 1950s, Britain began to push Malaysia towards independence.[27] The British did not want to deal with this sort of drawn-out fight in the region again. The counterinsurgency drained resources Britain wanted to focus against the USSR. Malaysia gained independence from Britain in 1957. The Malaysian government modeled their administration after Britain's, as illustrated by the dual power of the Prime Minister and a constantly rotating king, with a new one chosen every five years from one of nine

existing royal families from different regions of Malaysia.[28] This dual power comes from the need to bridge the separations felt between the ethnic groups as they scrambled to form a single nation, a task made even more difficult by Britain's forced migration.

The effects of the British Counterinsurgency are still felt in Malaysia more than half a century later. The aforementioned "New Villages" have grown into towns and cities, mainly populated by the Chinese who were originally placed there.[29] Discrimination and segregation of ethnic minorities is still rampant, due to continuing government policies that discriminate in favor of Malays in areas ranging from employment to education. Affirmative action procedures used by universities, backed by Article 153 of the Malaysian Constitution, ensure the majority of the student population is Malay and that the majority of scholarships go to Malays, leading Chinese-Malays, Indian-Malays, and indigenous Malays to protest this ethnic discrimination.[30] The New Economic Policy (NEP) is also a point of contention with many in Malaysia. The NEP guarantees a 7% discount on housing for Malays, while non-Malays receive no housing assistance. Other economic policies in Malaysia follow similar patterns of discrimination.[31]

The political situation in Malaysia reflects current ethnic relations, an extension of the ethnic relations established under British rule and exacerbated during the counterinsurgency. The Democratic Action Party (DAP), an ethnically Chinese party, is challenging the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the party that has ruled the country since independence. This comes after the dissipation of the Pakatan partnership, a coalition made up of the DAP; the People's Justice Party (PKR), a multi-ethnic party; and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), a religious ethnic Malay party. The fragility of this partnership and the division of the political parties along ethnic lines reveal the ethnic tensions that still exist in Malaysia today, tensions which trace their roots to British colonial policies during the Malayan Emergency.[32]

Colonial history inevitably leaves its mark on postcolonial countries. However, in the 20th century, Britain left a very unique stamp on Malaysia's history – compared to the colonial wars of other contemporary empires, Britain's actions in Malaysia represent one of the only examples of a successful colonial counterinsurgency. Its victory in Malaysia resulted in a complete reclamation of control from the rebels, while ensuring that the colony survived the process more or less intact. Even at the end, Britain's decision to establish Malaysian self-rule came from the knowledge that it would simply step down in name, but would still hold tremendous political and economic sway over the nation, retaining de facto control over the former colony. ◆

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Edited by Francis Wilson and Anna Mikkelborg

Expert Insights

For this edition of Expert Insights, the Jackson School Journal had the pleasure of interviewing Gideon Lichfeld, Senior Editor at the business news publication Quartz. With 16 years of experience at The Economist and postings around the world, Mr. Lichfeld is a true paragon of international journalism. In this interview, he spoke with the Journal about his wide ranging experience and shared his predictions regarding global developments and the future of the journalism industry.

In addition, the Journal is particularly pleased to present a special edition of the Expert Insights section, featuring a set of three nuanced and informative interviews. Last October, numerous experts in the field of global affairs visited the Jackson School of International Studies as part of the "New Frontiers in International Affairs: A Conversation on the Arctic, Space and Cybersecurity," the inaugural conference of the Jackson School's International Policy Institute. This conference involved panels discussing some of the most pressing issues facing the United States today, and the Jackson School Journal was fortunate enough to sit down with several of the conference's distinguished delegates.

In our first interview, Paul Nicholas of Microsoft's Global Security Strategy and Diplomacy Team describes how his experience as Director of Cybersecurity at the White House prepared him to meet the security challenges facing the private sector.

The Journal also interviewed former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence and AT&T vice president David Gompert. In this conversation, Mr. Gompert draws upon his wide range of experience in national security and policy making to provide insight on key international issues, as well as his view on the role of academia in policymaking.

Finally, the Journal had the opportunity to speak with Marc Grossman, Vice Chairman of the Cohen Group and former diplomat. In this interview, Mr. Grossman discusses some of the most important challenges facing the Middle East and South Asia, and offers practical advice for young students interested in pursuing a diplomatic career.

Q&A with Gideon Lichfeld

Jackson School Journal: You spent 16 years at *The Economist* and then you broke off and started *Quartz*; can you explain some of the differences between your various roles at the Economist and your current experience at Quartz?

Lichfield: The main difference is that when you're working for a weekly print publication you're focused on a set format - you have to only think about the journalism. Someone else has already thought about the problem of reading and distribution. When you're working digitally, you have to think about the whole thing at once, the product as well as the journalism, and how the two work together. That's what being at *Quartz* is about - it's learning what to think about when I write a story. What can you do in terms of the framing and the packaging to make it more likely to spread? What's its life cycle going to be like on the internet? How are people going to interact with it? You start having to think about the story as an entity with its own life, rather than about the publication as a whole. You think about the publication as a whole to the extent that there is a common sensibility, a common brand, but each item, each thing that you publish, is its own thing as well, and you have to think about its survival in the harsh world of the internet.

Jackson School Journal: The opening statement of *Quartz* says that it is geared at business people who need this information. How do you feel that *Quartz* is specifically beneficial for that audience?

Lichfield: We think about everything we write as aimed at a particular audience, which is this fairly global, relatively cosmopolitan, reasonably affluent readership of people who are interested in business issues. We think of them as the same kinds of people who read *The Economist* or the *Wall Street Journal* or the *Financial Times*, and indeed our audience surveys suggest that they are the same people, demographically. But we think about when are they getting their information, when are they reading and on what are they reading? So, we designed it from the outset to be something people read on a mobile device. We assume that it may reach them not because they go to qz.com and open it up and see what's there like you do with a print magazine, but that it reaches them because somebody recommended *Quartz* on social media, and it reaches them at various times of the day. So, we are just conscious of when it's reaching them and how it's reaching them because that affects things like how we publish and when we write the headlines and those sorts of things. And so even though we are trying

to write about the same sorts of issues as those publications, we are also thinking about, with each individual story, how it fits into their day, and how it competes with everything else on their phone for their attention.

Jackson School Journal: Returning to the subject of *The Economist*, you were a correspondent in Moscow, Mexico City, and Jerusalem; in all of those cities, in all of these amazing places, how did you choose which stories to pursue, and how did you develop a network of contacts or correspondents in order to keep on top of all events that were happening?

Lichfield: I'll start with the second question first. The way that you develop a network in a place like that is you go with a couple of names that someone has given you and you talk to them and ask them to suggest other people to talk to. Everybody you meet you try to get them to suggest other people to talk to, and you build it out. In all of these places, there is a network of foreign journalists and people are usually fairly friendly and helpful at least in getting you started, and then you just try to be gregarious and try to just go out and talk to as many people as possible. Answer all the invitations you are sent, and just be curious and cultivate their curiosity as you talk to people. Over time you learn the country and you form your networks and that's basically it. As far as choosing the stories, that becomes a combination of things that you hear that seem interesting to you, from the conversations that you're having with all of these people, plus conversations with your editor. Story ideas just kind of bubble up. Then there's a conversation about which of these is actually going to be interesting for the publication I'm working for. There's no great secret to it.

"The biggest advantage of being able to speak the language, is hearing people say in their own words what it is that they're thinking about and picking up the nuances of how they say it."

Jackson School Journal: According to your LinkedIn profile you speak over seven different languages. How did these languages affect your role and the stories that you told either at *The Economist* or at *Quartz*?

Lichfield: It's hard to say. Being able to speak the local language obviously allows you to meet people and hear things that you don't otherwise. I'm not sure I could point to stories that I did and was only able to do because I spoke the language, but I felt like it gave me a feel for the place and how people think and what their preoccupations are. The biggest advantage of being able to speak the language, is hearing people say in their own words what they're thinking about and picking up the nuances of how they say it. Most of which doesn't necessarily make its way directly into the stories you write - all of that is far too secondary and subtle - but it does inform your outlook.

Jackson School Journal: So did you know Russian before you went to Moscow? Did you know these languages before you were given these correspondent positions or did you learn while you were there?

Lichfield: I mostly learned on the job. Spanish I had to learn from scratch and luckily Spanish is an easy language. Russian I had studied some, so I had a basis. I did some intensive study once I got to Russia and again learned it on the job. I actually spoke Hebrew at home, so that was easy. Arabic I learned some as I went along; I still never got very good. I happen to have a good head for languages - there's a lot of things that I don't have a good head for, but language isn't one of them.

Jackson School Journal: In January, you wrote an article on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Do you have any predictions about the tone of US involvement after the 2016 elections?

Lichfield: I'm trying to think of all the different candidates and what their policies might be. My assumption is that US policy towards Israel after 2016 will be either one of two things. If a Democrat is elected, there will be a sort of continuation of what there is now: a kind of limp insistence on the peace process without any real conviction and lip service to the two-state solution. If a Republican is elected, America will move towards acceptance of the Israeli belief that there is no real point in peace talks. The situation in Israel and Palestine is not conducive to peace talks at the moment. The Israeli leadership and the Israeli public basically have lost any interest in the peace process. There are parts of the Palestinian leadership that still want peace, but more for their own political legitimacy than anything else. Moreover, that leadership is far too weak and divided to really implement anything, so there isn't really the structure or the will to make anything serious happen. I feel as if the current US administration has taken the view that it should nonetheless push for something to happen even if they know that it's very unlikely to work. A future US administration, especially if it's a Republican one, might say "Fine, basically we will give up trying to push the peace process because we recognize that at this point it is impossible."

Jackson School Journal: In this article you also alluded to a Palestinian resurgence, saying that, although the Arab League had previously turned its back, it is now giving Palestine more support and moving forward with a more honest relationship...

Lichfield: Yes, and I saw something the other day that said that the first Palestinian passport had been issued, the first official passport from the state of Palestine! What is true is that the Arab League has become more sympathetic to the position of the Palestinian leadership in the West Bank, effectively saying "Yes, we recognize that this peace process is going nowhere so we are going to support Palestinian statehood." But that doesn't imply a higher chance of peace talks. The Palestinian leadership in the West Bank recognizes that it's not getting anywhere with the peace process, putting

its legitimacy at risk, and it is therefore trying to assert Palestinian independence as an identity through international institutions such as the UN.

Jackson School Journal: In 2003, you wrote an article about Russian President Vladimir Putin that was published in *The Moscow Times*. You compared him to a qubit, an analogy meant to illustrate that he was neither completely reactionary nor completely reformist. 12 years later, can you make any predictions about Russia's behavior?

Lichfield: What has changed since then is that we have seen very clearly which one of the two Putin is. The two years that I spent in Moscow were a sort of transition of understanding, in general, about Putin. At the beginning, 2002, people were still unsure, and there was a lot of discussion, you know, is he really authoritarian, or is he just a rather firm reformist? Over the two years that I spent there, it became very clear that he was really an authoritarian. That crystallized with the arrest of Mikail Khodorkovsky and the breakup of the Yukos Oil Company. In the years we've seen since then, he's become more and more authoritarian. It's very clear that Russia is now a very corrupt and very autocratic regime, and is increasingly repressive. This begs the question, how stable is it? Putin has been in power for effectively 15 years now. He sits at the top of a pyramid of competing factions in the Kremlin. He's been fairly good at keeping those in balance with one another, but if and when he dies or is pushed out, there will be a power struggle between those factions to take control, which could lead to a lot of political instability and general chaos. In addition, over the next few years we are going to see the Russian economy continue to decline. As quality of life falls, there may be more social unrest. The opposition in Russia is very weakened and fragmented right now, but there may be some kind of growing movement of social unrest. In addition, there are political tensions in the south of Russia, and all of this points to a situation that could end up very unstable: Not in the sense that there will be a revolution and a new regime again, but rather a lot of instability and a lot of economic uncertainty. This is very worrying when you have a very large country with nuclear weapons.

Jackson School Journal: You've said before that during the two years you spent in Moscow, there was a particular attitude towards journalism that was more restrictive. Did you feel restrictions yourself and did you change your tone depending on whether you were writing for *The Economist* or *The Moscow Times*?

Lichfield: The time that I was there, I certainly didn't feel threatened or that I had to be careful what I wrote. I think that was because as a foreign correspondent a) I had a certain amount of protection just by being a foreigner, and b) the authorities weren't really bothered by journalists who said generally bad things about Russia. The journalists who got into trouble and were killed, which happened then and is happening now with increasing frequency, tended to be Russian journalists who didn't

have a foreign government supporting them or the name of a foreign newspaper behind them, and who got very deep into local issues. They would unveil specific things done by a local governor - they would say how much money he had stolen or who he'd had killed. Journalists who did that were in severe risk and severe danger, and still are.

Jackson School Journal: You have a scientific background and in 2012, you wrote that journalism should be held to scientific standards, or should be pushed towards being held to scientific standards. Now that a few years have passed, do you see a movement in journalism towards these higher standards, citation systems, etc. and has the rapid dissemination of news, facilitated by social media, hurt the possibility of greater scientific accountability or improved it?

"I don't think that we're anywhere near a systematic organization of fact and data, that would let journalism operate like a science..."

Lichfield: I don't think journalism has become more scientific in general. What's happening on the internet and social media pulls in both directions. Social media does make it a lot easier for lies or mistakes to spread. There's that old saying "a lie, once made, has gotten halfway around the world before the truth has put its shoes on." That's still true. It is also true that because of social media, errors can be caught and the inaccuracy can be disseminated just as easily. So social media gives people the power to be aware of something that is incorrect and correct it. However, we're not anywhere near a systematic organization of facts and data that would let journalism operate like a science, and I'm not sure that we'll ever get there. However, as time goes by, people gradually become more aware of the extent to which information online is untrustworthy and so they get better at filtering for themselves.

Jackson School Journal: Final question, how much of an emphasis is there on personal integrity and dedication to the truth in journalism today compared to the past?

Lichfield: Personal integrity comes from being honest and straightforward. The classic American news anchors in the days before the internet built up personal integrity by being that face that was seen on the television set every night. No one could displace them from that role because there were only so many channels and slots. By being in every American home, news anchors built up an aura of integrity. What has happened in the internet era is that suddenly there's a whole lot of competition. Everybody is trying to put out their point of view, and the people who had gained their integrity and their reputation by being on TV haven't necessarily competed very well in this new marketplace because they assumed that their status was unassailable. Then, new voices like bloggers came along

and developed their own followings and, in some cases, greater credibility. This made those previously unassailable news anchors look less impressive. So, regarding the question of where personal integrity comes in today, I think it comes from writing online, being honest, being yourself, being clear about your opinions and where they come from, and admitting your mistakes when you make them. I think that the blogger Andrew Sullivan was a very good example of that. If you read a piece that he wrote when he shut down his blog, "the Daily Ditch", he talks about how blogging is being as truthful as you can about what you think is true, but at the same time accepting that nothing that you write is necessarily the last word. Opinions can change and mistakes can be uncovered. The former great American news anchors had a certain air of infallibility to them, and that is what the internet punctured. Bloggers today, if they are doing a good job, don't claim to know everything. They try to show where their ideas come from. They are also willing to be proven wrong, and they engage with the public in a dialogue. I feel like that dynamic leads to the rise of personal integrity.

Interview Edited by Evelyn McCorckle

Q&A with Paul Nicholas

Jackson School Journal: You've had a very extensive career in both the public and private sectors. You were the Director for Cybersecurity at the White House and before that, you worked in several government agencies before moving to Microsoft in your role in Global Security and Diplomacy. Could you talk a little about what prompted the switch from government work to the private sector?

Nicholas: Something that I learned working in government and the White House was that we face a very real and present security threat - but it's hard to address it or solve it directly with the government resources we currently have. The private sector appealed to me because I felt like the resources and possibility of actually coming up with solutions to these threats were available there. Another thing that drew me to the private sector was that, when working in the government, you get a very high level overview of how it works, but it's very focused on just one system. At Microsoft, instead of working with one government, I can work with many governments and different actors globally.

Jackson School Journal: What are your thoughts on the OPM attacks? [Reader's Note: This refers to the major cyber-attacks against the Office of Personnel Management that occurred in the summer of 2015.]

Nicholas: It's a great example of the big challenges that many governments are facing today. What is the proportional and appropriate response? It goes back to the idea of cybersecurity norms. There isn't a framework within the international community to respond to this, so we have to start creating one. It's also an example of how there are lots of things that happen that are short of warfare, but just as threatening to national security. You have to figure out a way to protect Internet users globally, not just domestically. I think the bottom line is that we need a normative framework in order to be able to address attacks like this appropriately.

Jackson School Journal: Building off of that question, what do you see as some of the biggest issues in cybersecurity today?

Nicholas: I see three fundamental issues as being key to the field of cyber-security right now. The first is, of course, security. Governments worry about security at the international level, and one of the ways governments try to deal with security is

to implement compliance frameworks across the board. These make you feel secure, but don't actually work that well in practice because if these frameworks are similar, hackers can find the seams easily. The second is about controllability. If a country realizes that a foreign technology product can actually threaten their national security, how do they go about regulating this type of technology? What is the appropriate response? Finally, there's the issue of transparency. We want to understand where things come from and how to deal with this. This isn't just related to governments, but citizens and the community (global and national) all want this. At a high level, these issues are really about trust.

Jackson School Journal: Finally, for our readers who are interested in going into the fields of cybersecurity and national security policy, what type of background and preparation would you recommend to them for working in this type of area?

Nicholas: I think a background in economics is extremely useful. Understanding economics is key to understanding actors and issues on the global stage today. Soft power matters and you have to understand how that works. I would also recommend a strong liberal arts background. Such a background can really help challenge you to be a critical thinker, evaluate issues, and be able to assimilate different perspectives. Always question your own assumptions – it's very easy to fall into "mirror imaging," which is assuming that countries think a certain way, when this may not be the case. Often, this is how strategic surprises happen - from assumptions that turned out to be false.

Interview Edited By Irena Chen

Q&A with David Gompert

Jackson School Journal: We're interested in your initial education – you transitioned from a BS in engineering at the Naval Academy to a MPA at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. What inspired you to change from an engineering background to public affairs, and how have these different foundations assisted you in your career?

Gompert: Well at the Naval Academy, you could only get a degree in engineering – it was practically the age of wooden ships – and it was impossible to graduate without a degree in engineering. However, I was interested in political science, international affairs, and history, and it was that interest that I carried forward when I left the navy and went to graduate school at Princeton. However, I would like to add that I am grateful for that engineering degree because it enables me to understand technology. What I have tried to do in my career, whether it has been in the private sector, government, or research and teaching, I've tried to work at the intersection of technology and global affairs. In almost every case of my writing and my professional life I've tried to bring together an understanding of what technology implies for politics, and I would also say that throughout my education I have placed a very strong emphasis on economics.

Jackson School Journal: So as advice for students reading the Journal, how do you imagine today that a student can gain that broad experience in today's educational system?

Gompert: My advice to students is to work on critical analytic skills rather than to try to fill up a bag with facts, which are highly perishable in today's world anyway. So I would encourage undergraduates to develop the ability to perform analysis, to think critically about the future in ways that are not predictive but exploratory, and to be able to deal with complexity and uncertainty rather than just attempting to deploy the facts that you happen to learn in a classroom textbook. It certainly has been my experience at RAND, where I think the people who contribute the most to the research that RAND does in national security and in other fields are the people who have those analytic skills, rather than those people who have deep but narrow expertise.

Jackson School Journal: A great deal of your research and writing focuses on the topic of deterrence. Since you first started working in public policy, how do you think that the concept of deterrence has evolved, and what do you see the future of deterrence being as non-state actors exert greater influence on the global stage?

Gompert: Let me first address the question of nuclear deterrence – I know a lot of people worry about non-state actors acquiring nuclear weapons – radiological weapons, dirty bombs, and so on. Actual nuclear weapons, fissionable nuclear material are less of a concern because I have yet to see a non-state actor with the industrial capacity, the resources, and the technical capacity to produce the necessary material and to weaponize and deliver it. Therefore, the actors who are most likely to possess nuclear weapons will continue to be states. States are much more deterrable than non-state actors because states have territory, resources and population, things that can be destroyed, so they are deterrable. I do worry however about cases like North Korea, where the regime could place relatively little value on the survival and wellbeing of its population and enormous emphasis on its own survival and therefore in a crisis that could involve the extinction of the regime, North Korea might well threaten to use nuclear weapons as a last resort to ward off conventional threats against it. There are certain states, and I would put North Korea at the very top of that list, who might be difficult to deter under those sorts of extreme conditions. I would not put Iran in that category. Iran is a deterrable state, It is rational, it's shown every indication particularly in the negotiations over the nuclear program in return for the relaxation of sanctions in a very rational way, and has much to lose by threatening the use of nuclear weapons. So those fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence still apply to nation states, which are the primary actors in the nuclear field, but may not apply in some cases to states like North Korea.

Jackson School Journal: As a follow-up question, many commentators have referred to the apocalyptic rhetoric of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and have used such rhetoric in order to equate the threat posed by a nuclear Iran to that posed by a nuclear North Korea. Do you believe that is an incorrect conclusion?

Gompert: I do, because of the structure of the Iranian state. The Iranian state does have a hardline military and theocratic faction, and you might be more likely to see extreme thinking about the possibility of threatening or even using nuclear weapons from this group. However, we've also seen that there are other elements like the presidency that act as a more normal state actor that looks after the interests of the state, the nation, and the Iranian people – as seen by the outcome of the negotiations. So I think that the loose talk of [Former President] Ahmedinajad might be reflective of how

he saw the world, but he's no longer in power and I don't think he reflects the way that this complex thing called the Iranian state functions, and how it would make decisions involving the possibility of using nuclear weapons and possibly facing nuclear retaliation.

Jackson School Journal: Today's conference demonstrated the interaction between the public, private, and academic sectors. As someone with experience in technology, the intelligence community, and the state department, how do you see academics fitting into the policy paradigm, and what unique skills can they contribute?

Gompert: Well here I'm a bit of an outlier, because when I've been in government, I've always thought that a lot of the analysis and advice received from scholars and academia in general was too tactical, and too actionable. It is as if academics think that they might know better than the government what the government should be doing that day with regard to the targets being struck. They might well be better informed or smarter than the government, but when I've been in government, what I have valued is not the outside world – whether it's the press or the think tanks or the university community – questioning tactical judgments, but rather trying to find patterns, trends, that I was unable to think of because I was so consumed by immediate problems. I don't disagree that academic work and research and opinions have to be relevant - but their relevance may lie in their ability to think about things that go beyond the horizon of the policymaker. The best contribution from the academic world is to complement, rather than gripe.

Jackson School Journal: As a follow up to that, based on your experience in both think tanks and academia, do you believe that the greater government and media attention given to think tanks will force academia to adapt in the future or can academia provide its own unique insights?

Gompert: The latter, clearly, because so many think tanks are so close to government. Even if they are non partisan, they are so close to government because they are primarily concentrated on Massachusetts Avenue. They do not have enough distance to offer judgements that are really of value to government. Moreover, many of these think tanks are not objective and not independent, because they are dependent on funding from certain political or industrial sources, So I think that the think tank industry, as it has developed in the United States, is not adequate, and I have found that universities, because they have greater distance, sometimes geographic distance and intellectual distance, from the center of power and policy-making, actually can have better and more independent ideas than the think tanks do. Now, I want to add that the RAND corporation prides itself on its nonpartisan, a political, fearcely

independent, and objective approach. But not all think tanks are like RAND – a lot of them are simply outposts where government people go when they leave government, or are basically doing the bidding of one or more political parties.

Interview Edited by Francis Wilson

Q&A with Marc Grossman

Jackson School Journal: Having worked extensively in Turkey and the region, how do you view the current crisis in Syria?

Grossman: First of all, thank you so much for this opportunity to speak with you. There is, as you say, an enormous crisis in Syria that is unfolding on several levels. I think the first and most important thing that everyone can do is to just start getting focused on this question of refugees and not just people who are leaving Syria but people who are fleeing Syria for a variety of reasons. You can see it's come to increasing public attention because people are now reaching Europe, but Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, have for years now been hosting an enormous number of refugees and I don't think the international community has done nearly enough to support those countries as they take on this burden. The first issue for Syria is a humanitarian one. Secondly, there is an enormous humanitarian crisis inside Syria itself, with regards to internally displaced people. I happen to think there is also a place where perhaps more countries rather than fewer can come together and start considering how to aid the internally displaced in Syria. The third issue is how to bring this war to an end, which I think will take a lot more diplomacy. I don't think recent Russian actions are going to increase the capacity of people to reach peace anytime soon. I think there has to be an effort, I do hope it can be led or forcefully supported by the United States of America to try and bring this conflict to an end because it is tearing not only Syria apart but surrounding countries. There is ISIS (Daesh) and all these terror groups, so the sooner this can be brought to an end, the better.

Jackson School Journal: I was reading your bio and saw that you were the United States Ambassador to Turkey. In your role as the American envoy to Turkey from 1994-1997, did you think that there was a refugee crisis prior to that?

Grossman: Well from my perspective, and the reason why I feel strongly about what is going on in Syria, is the fact that I had the good fortune and honor to serve in Turkey previously as the Deputy Chief of Mission from 1989-1992. At the end of the Gulf War there was an enormous flow of refugees out of Iraq and into the mountains between Iraq and Turkey. 500,000 people, mostly Kurds, fled Saddam at that time, pushed their way into the mountains of

Turkey, and were dying in the thousands every day. Turkey and the United States as well as other countries led one of the most successful refugee returns since the Second World War: 500,000 people were coaxed out of those mountains and brought back down. That led to the first no-fly zone in Iraq in order to get those people home because we realized they were from Dohuk, Sulaymaniyah, and other cities along the border. So we decided that the right thing for the United States and our allies and friends (very much supported by Turkey) to do was to set up this no-fly zone so that Saddam had to stay below a certain geography, allowing all those people to return. I recognize my bias here. Just because it worked once doesn't mean it will work again. But when people talk about setting up some kind of protected zone in Syria, I think it's something that needs consideration.

Jackson School Journal: In your role as Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, how did you navigate these complex political landscapes with actors from both government and non-government entities?

Grossman: It was very difficult. It was a real challenge, but it was an honor to have been recalled to the government as the special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan. My view was simple, really. We were given our instructions very clearly from the President and the Secretary of State, who said that our number one priority at that time was to support the military surge that was going on from 2010-2011. We also needed to support the civilian surge which was happening at that time. We had around 1,200 people from the State Department and other government agencies out there in Afghanistan, working on sustainable development and different projects, and rule of law, all of the different things that would be good in the long term for Afghanistan. We were called on in those years to complete a diplomatic surge so that the region supported a secure, stable, prosperous Afghanistan inside a secure, stable, prosperous region. We were also asked to see if we might talk to the Taliban, not about the future of Afghanistan, but whether they would be willing to talk to the [Afghan] government. So we developed a series of confidence building measures. It failed in the end, but we tried to get a direct contact with the Taliban. My view was that the key was to focus on the diplomatic work that had to allow us to fight the Taliban and try to talk to them at the same time. At the same time, we had to get the region to take responsibility for Afghanistan. The other piece of it was of course Pakistan, where we were also trying to bring US-Pakistan relations back to some useful level. You recall that 2011 was a horrible year for US-Pakistan relations. We tried to normalize that relationship between the two countries by the end of 2012. Now you can see that there is a more normal relationship between the two countries.

Jackson School Journal: From your perspective, how has the role of diplomacy changed since you began your career with

the State Department?

Grossman: I think a big shift occurred before 9/11, which was when the Berlin Wall fell. Before the Berlin Wall went down, basically the United States and the Soviet Union were in this competition around the world, and wherever you were, be it Pakistan or Chile, things that were important locally were also important as they connected to this larger struggle. But what happened to many diplomats, not all, was that they came to see the job as one of reporting and observing and then sending back information to Washington so that other people could make decisions about what to do next. And once the wall fell, there was a really big change in our diplomacy, I think mostly for the positive, where people were doing programs, and they were more active, and they were involved in communities and really connecting to people. And I think that makes the job more fun, more interesting, and more attractive. After 9/11, there was also a big change because people were so focused on protecting the United States and defeating extremism. But I think that these things come together – the lines intersect, if you'll allow me – we're never going to defeat extremism if we don't go into communities and do projects and programs that counter this narrative of violent extremism. That doesn't mean that we don't have to fight them - believe me we do - and the military aspect of this is extremely important. But long term, the diplomatic piece of countering violent extremism is important as well.

Jackson School Journal: What advice can you offer to future diplomats or young professionals pursuing a career in international affairs?

Grossman: Well, I first I think that pursuing a career in international affairs at the moment has to be one of the most exciting prospects around, because everything that we do today in all of our lives is more and more connected to international affairs. I think a Canadian diplomat coined this phrase, saying that it's really not international affairs or domestic affairs anymore, it's "intermestic" and I think that there's a lot to that. Everything is all connected, so being well versed in international affairs and languages and cross-cultural communication and how to do business with other people is all so important. The other thing is that the opportunities are all so enormous – when I joined the Foreign Service, basically if you wanted to live abroad, serve overseas, or serve your country, you joined the military or the foreign service. But now, people have opportunities in international business or NGOs, which hardly existed when I started in the foreign service 40 years ago. I mean, think how education has transformed. Universities now have campuses in Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and all over the world. And I think that people starting today are so lucky that they have all of these opportunities. I hope that people will still hope to be foreign service officers, who also have special opportunities. I think that people who are starting their careers today are going to be pioneers in something really new. Whoever is sitting here 40 years from now giving an

interview to a UW student will have had such a different career than I had, which is such an exciting prospect. I had a great career and loved every minute of it.

"The relationship with Canada is about individuals - it's not just about big thinking or grand strategy - it's also about salmon fishing and water and land and pollution and indigenous peoples."

But will it be the same 40 years from now? No, it will be different because of social media, because of communities, and because foreign policy more and more impacts individuals. You can see this particularly in the Pacific Northwest: Think of the relationship with Canada: The relationship with Canada is about individuals - it's just not about big thinking or grand strategy - it's also about salmon fishing and water and land and pollution and indigenous peoples. For example, you can say that the Trans Pacific Partnership is a theoretical trade agreement but Washington state is the single largest benificiary. Who's going to benefit here? Agriculture: cherries, apples – those are going to be among the biggest beneficiaries of the TPP. So I think what's really exciting now about international affairs, whether you're doing it in the private sector or the public sector, is the impact that policy has on individual human beings.

Jackson School Journal: Finally, what is the role that you think diplomacy can play in today's world?

Grossman: Well, I'm biased. I think that diplomacy is really important, because there are fewer and fewer problems that can be solved militarily. I am absolutely in favor of a strong military, because without a strong military, diplomacy is weak, and I am in favor of using military force. But many of today's problems need a diplomatic solution, and people need to try to solve them diplomatically. Many of your readers may have a different view or may agree with me, but I think what President Obama did and our negotiators and allies did in this agreement with Iran, really shows what diplomacy can do. But that diplomacy was backed by sanctions, and force, and by unity among us and our allies. We didn't just walk in one day and say "Hey, let's negotiate this agreement." The Iranians knew they were facing a unified and strong front. Think about the issues out there – climate change, for example, must have a diplomatic solution. The arctic, cybersecurity, migration – all of these issues are issues that are going to have to have some kind of diplomatic solution in the future.

Interview Edited By Iman Farah

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