Japan\u2019s recent efforts in cyberspace reflects its\u00a0ambition to have\u00a0a more proactive military posture and expand the scope of the US-Japan alliance.\u00a0Under the current Abe administration, Japanese policy-makers have significantly enhanced Japan\u2019s cyber-defense capabilities due to the growing cybersecurity tensions between the United States\u2019s relationships with China, Russia, and North Korea.<\/p>\n
Given Japan\u2019s position as a central US diplomatic, economic, and military ally, Japan\u2019s actions are increasingly critical to the strategic balance in the region. Moreover, Japan\u2019s growing capabilities to cyber challenges has strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance responses to security challenges and cyber threats from China along with other actors.[1]<\/a><\/p>\n Against this backdrop, Japanese policy-makers are pursuing multilateral cyber cooperation with everyone while avoiding a direct cyber dialogue with China. Due to numerous incidents of cyber-conflict and lingering distrust, China-Japan relations in cyberspace are leading to heightened geopolitical tensions and spillovers into existing contentious areas. Japan’s recent move to\u00a0fundamentally restructuring cybersecurity through national institutions implies a\u00a0broader trends of assertiveness in its overall security trajectory. These ambitions underline Japan’s development as a key player across all realms of security issues in the Asia-Pacific.<\/p>\n Japan-China relations continue to be constrained due to lingering misconceptions, historical animosity, and territorial disputes, which weaken existing cooperation and deter potential collaboration in cybersecurity and other domains. One of the main issues hindering the bilateral relationship is Japan\u2019s unwillingness to confront their history of aggression in World War II. This controversy arises whenever Japanese leaders go to the Yasukuni Shrine to commemorate to modern Japan\u2019s war dead.[2]<\/a> Currently, the Yasukuni includes 1,054 Class-B and Class-C war criminals, and 14 Class-A war criminals. Leaders’ visits anger Japan’s\u00a0neighbors —\u00a0where many of the war crimes took place. Among the heated disputed issues are the so-called “Comfort Women,” who were kidnapped and used as sex slaves by the Japanese military; horrific incidents like the Rape of Nanking; and the Diaoyu\/Senkaku Island territorial disputes between China and Japan.[3]<\/a><\/p>\n Because the\u00a0majority of the Japanese public learns very little about Japan\u2019s aggressions in World War II, the Japanese public tends to be\u00a0fed up with\u00a0China\u2019s repeated demand for an apology.[4]<\/a>\u00a0A recent Japan-China joint opinion poll report found that the views on Japan-China relations among Japanese and Chinese have worsened. Some 71.9% of the Japanese surveyed said the current relationship between the two countries is bad, while 78.2% of the Chinese surveyed expressed similar sentiments.[5]<\/a><\/p>\n On the cyber frontier, Japan has begun to securitize and militarize its cybersecurity strategy in response to a series of incidents that\u00a0revealed Japan\u2019s cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Since 2009, Japan has experienced an increased volume of advanced persistent threats (APTs) attacking\u00a0its critical infrastructure – all attacks in which China is likely\u00a0the main offender.[6]<\/a>\u00a0As a result of rising concerns over China\u2019s growing cyber capabilities, Japan moved responsibility for cybersecurity to military institutions, namely the Japan Ministry of Defense (JMOD) and Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).<\/p>\n Under the current Abe administration, cybersecurity has become the core of Japan\u2019s national security policy.[7]<\/a> Thus, Japan aims to create more centralized institutions for cyberspace in order to build comprehensive cyber defense capabilities in preparation for the Tokyo Olympics 2020 and for the overall Asia-Pacific security.<\/p>\n In conjunction with the development of a national security strategy, Japanese policy-makers have also stressed the importance of international cooperation in cyberspace. Japan has made an effort to play\u00a0a leading role in strengthening international norms and increasing cyber awareness. In 2006, Japanese policymakers first raised the necessity of a global cybersecurity cooperation with the publication,\u00a0First National Strategy on Information Security<\/em>.[8]<\/a> However, Japan did not officially acknowledge cyberattacks as a national security threat until 2013 under its\u00a0Cyber Security Strategy.<\/em>\u00a0Under this strategy, Japan\u00a0defined cyberspace as a global commons in need of protection.[9]<\/a>\u00a0Along these lines, Japan has held bilateral and multilateral cybersecurity conferences with major\u00a0cybersecurity players.<\/p>\n Since the late 2000s, Japan has actively engaged in global cooperation on cybersecurity with the US, the UK, India, the EU, ASEAN, and even Russia. Initial cyber cooperation with the US started in the early 2000s that lead to the Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Cooperation Regarding Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense in 2006.[10]<\/a> The United States and Japan have built a bilateral framework to promote various efforts in the area of policy consultation, cyber incident response and information sharing. To promote cooperation with European countries, Japan held the bilateral Japan-UK cyber dialogue in 2012 and the Japan-EU Internet Security Forum in 2013. Moreover, collaboration efforts with India were also pursued under the 2+2 dialogue that covered foreign policy issues and security.[11]<\/a><\/p>\n Within the Asia-Pacific region, Japan\u2019s ties with ASEAN are important due to the increased investment by Japanese enterprises to ASEAN states.[12]<\/a> On 2013, Japan and ASEAN made an agreement for raising awareness as a specific cooperation issue. An annual cybersecurity conference with ASEAN has also occurred since\u00a02009. And, an ASEAN-Japan cybercrime dialogue was also implemented in 2014.[13]<\/a><\/p>\n Recently, Japan has been actively pushing cooperation with Russia economically in areas such as oil and gas development and the modernization of ports and airports in the Russian Far East.[14]<\/a> In 2013, initial dialogues on maritime and cyber defense cooperation were halted due to the northern territorial disputes. However, the Abe administration seems determined to\u00a0normalize relations with Russia, which sets a stark contrast to\u00a0the minimal effort focused on improving Sino-Japanese relations. The intentions behind Japan\u2019s expansion in defense perimeters in cyberspace will likely to be perceived by China as a threat.<\/p>\n According to the annual reports published by Japan\u2019s National Institute for Defense Studies on China\u2019s security, Japan perceives China\u2019s military rise and cyber capabilities as a threat. In 2014, the number of cyberattacks in Japan passed the 25 billion mark, with 40% traceable back to China.[15]<\/a>\u00a0Notable incidents of cyberwarfare between China-Japan were\u00a0data breaches in the defense industry and of Diet member email accounts in 2011[16]<\/a>, in which around 500 staff emails and passwords were compromised; cyberattacks on Japan\u2019s defense industry at the same year[17]<\/a>; and attacks against Japan\u2019s government agencies in 2012 over the disputed Diaoyu\/Senkaku Islands.[18]<\/a><\/p>\n Despite moments where Japanese hackers also targeted Chinese websites, Japanese offensive action has been minimal. These incidents paint a picture\u00a0where China\u2019s cyber capabilities are more offensive whereas Japan\u2019s capabilities are more defensive. The reason for Japan\u2019s lack of preemptive cyberattacks is due to its constitution, which prohibits war other than for self-defense.[19]<\/a> However, the current Abe administration is persistently pushing for a revision of the Japanese constitution by 2020.[20]<\/a><\/p>\n Japan is expanding the defense perimeter in cyberspace to relative state players while avoiding a direct cyber dialogue with China. These actions are not only likely to provide an arena of further direct tension with China, but could also prove a set path for open and broader conflict. The mutual distrust can be seen in the relative absence of a bilateral cybersecurity dialogue between China and Japan — only a trilateral cybersecurity dialogue between China, Japan, and South Korea exist.[21]<\/a> Due to various contentious issues, lack of trust, and different perspectives on cybersecurity, Sino-Japanese cooperation in cyberspace or in any other strategic domain will continue to face major challenges. Therefore, Japan and China will need to be mindful of the risks of rapid escalation and conflict in cyberspace if they are not to destabilize bilateral ties and the wider Asia-Pacific region security outlook.<\/p>\n Japan\u2019s turn to a more proactive defense position is seen in its resolve to become a major “cyber power.” The reinterpretation of Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution to “collective self-defense” is reflective of the broader trends of change and new assertiveness in its national security trajectory. Given Japan\u2019s growing testy relations with China over maritime and historical disputes, Japan’s cyberspace diplomacy through selective engagements will undoubtedly form an added source of contention. Thus, potential China-Japan cooperation in cyberspace that could possibly lead to a lessening of overall tensions is challenging and unlikely. Moreover, Japan\u2019s recent economic and cyber engagement with Russia seems to undermine the need of improving Sino-Japanese relations. Japan\u2019s evolving role as a “cyber power” will enhance the defense capabilities of the US-Japan alliance, but will potentially increase\u00a0tensions with China in this emerging strategic frontier.<\/p>\n [1]<\/a> \u201cCybersecurity Strategy Advice for the Trump Administration: US-Japan Relations,\u201d The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies<\/em>, February 12, 2017.<\/a><\/p>\n [2]<\/a> Reiji Yoshida and Mizuho Aoki, \u201cAbe Visits Yasukuni, Angering Beijing and Seoul,\u201d The Japan Times Online<\/em>, December 26, 2013.<\/a><\/p>\n [3]<\/a> Kallie Szczepanski, \u201cWhat Is So Controverial about Japan\u2019s Yasukuni Shrine?,\u201d ThoughtCo<\/em>, accessed May 6, 2017.<\/a><\/p>\n [4]<\/a> Mariko Oi, \u201cWhat Japanese History Lessons Leave out,\u201d BBC News<\/em>, March 14, 2013, sec. Magazine.<\/a><\/p>\n [5]<\/a> \u201cPolls Show Sino-Japan Public Sentiment Worsens; Direct Interaction Key to Improvement,\u201d Www.genron-Npo.net<\/em>, accessed May 6, 2017.<\/a><\/p>\n [6]<\/a> Kallender, Paul, and Christopher W. Hughes, \u201cJapan\u2019s Emerging Trajectory as a \u2018Cyber Power\u2019: From Securitization to Militarization of Cyberspace,\u201d Journal of Strategic Studies<\/em> 40, no. 1\u20132 (January 2, 2017): 118\u201345, doi:10.1080\/01402390.2016.1233493.<\/p>\n [7]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n [8]<\/a> \u201cThe First National Strategy on Information Security – \u2018Toward the Realization of a Trustworthy Society\u2019\u201d (Information Security Policy Council, February 2, 2006).<\/a><\/p>\n [9]<\/a> Kyoungsik Min and Seung-Woan Chai, \u201cAn Analytic Study of Cyber Security Strategies of Japan,\u201d International Journal of Security and Its Applications, 10 (2016): 37\u201346.<\/p>\n [10]<\/a> \u201c\u9632\u885b\u7701\u30fb\u81ea\u885b\u968a\uff1a\u65e5\u672c\u56fd\u9632\u885b\u5e81\u3068\u7c73\u56fd\u56fd\u9632\u7701\u306e\u60c5\u5831\u4fdd\u8a3c\u3068\u30b3\u30f3\u30d4\u30e5\u30fc\u30bf\u30fb\u30cd\u30c3\u30c8\u30ef\u30fc\u30af\u9632\u5fa1\u306b\u304a\u3051\u308b\u5354\u529b\u306b\u95a2\u3059\u308b\u4e86\u89e3\u899a\u66f8\uff08\uff2d\uff2f\uff35\uff09\u306e\u7de0\u7d50\u306b\u3064\u3044\u3066,\u201d accessed April 22, 2017.<\/a><\/p>\n [11]<\/a> \u201cJapan & India Strengthen Cyber-Security Cooperation,\u201d Infosecurity Magazine<\/em>, October 22, 2012.<\/a><\/p>\n [12]<\/a> \u201cJapan Shifts Investment From China to Southeast Asia,\u201d Bloomberg.com<\/em>, May 30, 2016.<\/a><\/p>\n [13]<\/a> \u201c[Press Releases] The Inaugural ASEAN-Japan Cybercrime Dialogue,\u201d Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan<\/em>, accessed April 22, 2017.<\/a><\/p>\n [14]<\/a> Sputnik, \u201cRussia, Japan Could Sign Deals on Over Dozen Joint Projects During Abe\u2019s Visit,\u201d accessed April 22, 2017.<\/a><\/p>\n [15]<\/a> Arthur Herman, \u201cJapan\u2019s Cyberthreats — Lessons from the US – by Arthur Herman,\u201d accessed April 22, 2017.<\/a><\/p>\n [16]<\/a> \u201cChinese Hack Attack Suspected at Japanese Diet | International,\u201d Before It\u2019s News | Alternative News | UFO | Beyond Science | True News| Prophecy News | People Powered News<\/em>, accessed May 7, 2017.<\/a><\/p>\n [17]<\/a> \u201cJapan\u2019s Defense Industry Hit by Its First Cyber Attack,\u201d 2011.<\/p>\n [18]<\/a> Bill Gertz, \u201cCyber Blitz,\u201d Washington Free Beacon<\/em>, accessed May 7, 2017.<\/a><\/p>\n [19]<\/a> \u201cInsights Into Japan\u2019s Cybersecurity and Other Global Views,\u201d Private WiFi<\/em>, March 26, 2013.<\/a><\/p>\n [20]<\/a> Motoko Rich, \u201cShinzo Abe Announces Plan to Revise Japan\u2019s Pacifist Constitution,\u201d The New York Times<\/em>, May 3, 2017.<\/a><\/p>\n [21]<\/a> \u201cFirst Cyber Dialogue between Japan, PRC, and ROK,\u201d SSRC SHIELD Security Research Center<\/em>, accessed April 22, 2017.<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Japan\u2019s recent efforts in cyberspace reflects its\u00a0ambition to have\u00a0a more proactive military posture and expand the scope of the US-Japan alliance.\u00a0Under the current Abe administration, Japanese policy-makers have significantly enhanced Japan\u2019s cyber-defense capabilities due to the growing cybersecurity tensions between the United States\u2019s relationships with China, Russia, and North Korea. Given Japan\u2019s position as a<\/p>\nJapan-China Relations<\/h2>\n
Deterring China: Future Sino-Japanese Cybersecurity Cooperation Face Challenges<\/h2>\n
Japan\u2019s Expanding Global Strategy for Cybersecurity\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/h2>\n
Conclusion<\/h2>\n
Endnotes<\/h2>\n