{"id":9691,"date":"2026-01-08T01:35:06","date_gmt":"2026-01-08T09:35:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/humanrights\/?p=9691"},"modified":"2026-07-20T09:18:13","modified_gmt":"2026-07-20T16:18:13","slug":"roadside-assist-washington-states-continued-sharing-of-drivers-information-with-federal-immigration-enforcement","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/humanrights\/2026\/01\/08\/roadside-assist-washington-states-continued-sharing-of-drivers-information-with-federal-immigration-enforcement\/","title":{"rendered":"Roadside Assist: Washington State\u2019s Continued Sharing of Drivers\u2019 Information with Federal Immigration Enforcement"},"content":{"rendered":"

Executive summary<\/h1>\n
\"Report<\/a><\/p>\n

Download the PDF<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Today, immigrant Washingtonians are increasingly afraid to drive, as our streets, highways, and public thoroughfares have become frequent sites for immigration enforcement. These incidents, in which drivers are typically apprehended by masked, unidentified agents driving unmarked vehicles, raise multiple human rights concerns: many arrests appear to have been warrantless,[1]<\/a><\/sup> some have been violent,[2]<\/a><\/sup> and some apprehensions have involved U.S. citizens.[3]<\/a><\/sup> Unfortunately, this research shows that this pattern of abuse is happening with the assistance of Washington state institutions, despite laws and policies prohibiting such practices.<\/p>\n

Since August, the University of Washington Center for Human Rights has verified nine cases where Washington drivers were subjected to immigration enforcement while driving, following a search of their license plate number in the Washington Department of Licensing (DOL)\u2019s database by federal agents using a national data-sharing platform called Nlets, made possible through the Washington State Patrol (WSP)\u2019s ACCESS platform. In at least seven of these cases, UWCHR researchers were able to confirm that the arrests were acts of civil immigration enforcement. While state authorities now claim to have curtailed access by one of ICE\u2019s sub-agencies to DOL data via ACCESS, in eight of the nine confirmed cases discussed in this report, it was CBP, not ICE, who conducted the query. There is therefore no reason to believe that this process does not continue to date.<\/p>\n

\"el<\/a><\/p>\n

Lee el resumen ejecutivo en espa\u00f1ol aqu\u00ed<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

It is impossible to calculate how many Washingtonians may have been affected by this widespread practice. Indeed, between January 1, 2025 and November 30, 2025, federal agencies used ACCESS\/Nlets to query WA DOL data a total of 2,671,776 times, according to data provided by DOL to UWCHR.[4]<\/a><\/sup> Not all of these queries represent the use of Washington resources to conduct civil immigration enforcement; the figure includes the verification of documents at U.S.-Canadian border crossings and many other lawful purposes. But the cases verified by UWCHR researchers likely form part of a much broader pattern of federal agents tapping into WA DOL data to target Washingtonians for arrest for civil immigration violations, a practice the state has repeatedly promised to stop.<\/p>\n

This has occurred through the collaboration of two state agencies\u2014the Washington Department of Licensing and the Washington State Patrol\u2014and despite policies and state laws prohibiting it. It has occurred despite multiple previous revelations that the Department of Licensing was sharing driver data with federal immigration authorities, and multiple pledges that this would stop.<\/p>\n

It is time for accountability.<\/p>\n

Introduction<\/h1>\n
\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Download the report fact sheet<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Today, many immigrant Washingtonians express a fear of driving, in ways that impede their ability to work, attend school, access food and healthcare, and participate in the life of their communities.[5]<\/a><\/sup> This stems not only from increased immigration enforcement by federal officers in our state, but also from the inconsistent and incomplete actions taken by Washington state to ensure the privacy of driver and vehicle data entrusted to them by Washingtonians who believed the commitment, articulated since 2017,[6]<\/a><\/sup> that our state was a \u201cwelcoming jurisdiction\u201d where state officials would not collaborate with federal agents seeking to enforce civil immigration laws against them.<\/p>\n

Washington has long recognized freedom from discrimination due to immigration status as a civil right, guaranteeing immigrants rights to full participation in commerce, enjoyment of public spaces, facilities, and accommodations under state law.[7]<\/a><\/sup> Indeed, Washington was the first state in the nation to provide access to drivers licenses for all those in compliance with safety and residence requirements, regardless of citizenship;[8]<\/a><\/sup> since 2019, our state has codified into law the prohibition on motor vehicle information being used for surveillance of \u201cWashington residents solely on the basis of race, religion, immigration, or citizenship status, or national or ethnic origin.\u201d[9]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

Over the years, however, faith in these commitments has been shaken multiple times when investigations revealed that state authorities were, despite their promises, sharing Washingtonians\u2019 driver license and\/or vehicle registration information with federal immigration authorities. Each time, state leaders took steps to restrict federal immigration authorities\u2019 access to Washington driver data; but each time, the steps taken were partial and insufficient.<\/p>\n

Between January 1, 2025 and November 30, 2025, federal agencies queried Washington DOL data using a nationwide data-sharing platform called Nlets a total of 2,671,776 times.[10]<\/a><\/sup> While this figure includes border crossings and other lawful uses of this platform, UWCHR has identified nine cases where in locations far from the border, Washingtonians were apprehended for immigration violations as a result of DOL data-sharing through Nlets; at least seven of these cases involve civil immigration enforcement actions. It is likely that these cases represent a mere fraction of the total.<\/p>\n

These practices imperil all Washingtonians. We all want to live in a state where parents are able to drop their children off at school, where workers can reach their places of employment, where transportation and our public roadways are safe, including for those from out of state who visit to access healthcare or other rights.[11]<\/a><\/sup> The practice of handing Washington drivers\u2019 data to those who do not share Washington\u2019s commitments has turned our public roadways into hunting grounds. This represents a threat to the immediate well-being of immigrant Washingtonians, an affront to the values our state has pledged to uphold, and a betrayal of the public trust.<\/p>\n

How did we get here? Drivers\u2019 licenses for all in Washington<\/h1>\n

In 1993, Washington became the first state in the nation to offer drivers\u2019 licenses to all those who passed road safety and residence requirements, regardless of citizenship.[12]<\/a><\/sup> Since that time, our state has been joined by 18 others, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.[13]<\/a><\/sup> Many organizations[14]<\/a><\/sup> and state Departments of Motor Vehicles[15]<\/a><\/sup> have applauded these laws as promoting safety and accountability for all drivers while extending opportunities for inclusion to immigrant families. What\u2019s more, these state practices are perfectly legal under federal law; the REAL ID Act of 2005 explicitly allows states to issue drivers\u2019 licenses to all regardless of migration status.[16]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

Washington law did not initially incorporate explicit protections for immigrant drivers\u2019 data, but as federal enforcement increased in recent years, the need for such protections became evident. In 2017, then-Governor Jay Inslee issued Executive Order 17-01<\/a> ordering that \u201cNo executive or small cabinet agency may use agency or department monies, facilities, property, equipment, or personnel for the purpose of targeting or apprehending persons for violation of federal civil immigration laws, except as required by federal or state law or otherwise authorized by the Governor.\u201d[17]<\/a><\/sup> This Executive Order served as a precursor to the statewide \u201csanctuary\u201d law, Keep Washington Working, passed two years later.<\/p>\n

However, in 2018, an investigation by the Seattle Times revealed that despite the Executive Order, DOL employees were assisting federal immigration authorities in enforcing civil immigration law.[18]<\/a><\/sup> At that time, employees of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) would email the DOL\u2019s License Integrity Unit to request copies of driver license applications or drivers\u2019 photos, and DOL employees would respond with the requested documentation. When this news broke, DOL leadership tried to downplay the breach, claiming that such requests had happened 20 to 30 times per month; upon further investigation, however, it was revealed that the practice was far more widespread, leading to the release of data of as many as 900 people over email between May 2018 and January 2019, some of whom were subsequently subjected to civil immigration enforcement.[19]<\/a><\/sup> UWCHR researchers found that in fact, a significant proportion of those whose data was requested were Washington-born U.S. citizens with Latino surnames. Moreover, the DOL acknowledged that ICE and CBP were also able to freely search records in the DOL\u2019s Driver and Plate Search<\/a> (DAPS) database, which contains information about drivers and vehicles registered in our state; audit logs revealed that from 2016-2018 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) had searched the DOL\u2019s DAPS database more than 100,000 times.[20]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

In response, protests erupted across the state, and the DOL\u2019s Deputy Director resigned; eventually the Director did as well, citing personal reasons.[21]<\/a><\/sup> Governor Inslee personally apologized, stating, \u201cThe recent revelations about our state Department of Licensing’s failure to safeguard certain information …angered me. I issued an executive order nearly one year ago saying we would do all we could to protect Washington’s immigrants and refugees from blatantly discriminatory enforcement and deportation efforts. DOL fell short in meeting those expectations, and for that I apologize.\u201d[22]<\/a><\/sup> He told the press, \u201cWe really want to make clear that we\u2019re not going to allow the federal government to commandeer the use of our state resources as part of their immigration effort.\u201d[23]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

DOL leadership then put an end to the practice of sharing driver data by email, except in cases where authorized by a judicial warrant. It also terminated DAPS contracts with four federal offices, including two from ICE, one CBP unit and one U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) unit.[24]<\/a><\/sup> Additionally the agency updated the permissible use clauses included in all DAPS contracts, now expressly prohibiting the use of the database \u201cfor purposes of investigating, locating, or apprehending individuals for immigration related violations.\u201d[25]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

The ire unleashed by this scandal eventually contributed to the 2019 passage of the Keep Washington Working Act, a law prohibiting the use of state or local government \u201cfunds, facilities, property, equipment, or personnel to investigate, enforce, cooperate with, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal registration or surveillance programs or any other laws, rules, or policies that target Washington residents solely on the basis of race, religion, immigration, or citizenship status, or national or ethnic origin.\u201d[26]<\/a><\/sup> This law applies to the DOL as well as most other state and local agencies.[27]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

Yet in July 2025, despite promises now enshrined in law, an investigation by King 5 showed that federal agents were once again using DAPS to obtain driver information from Washington\u2019s DOL for purposes of civil immigration enforcement.[28]<\/a><\/sup> Searches of the DAPS database by ICE had soared in 2025, and had led to multiple arrests of Washingtonians in civil immigration cases.[29]<\/a><\/sup> In response, DOL officials initially told King 5 and community organizations that the information reported was incorrect, insisting that the database had not, in fact, been used for immigration enforcement.[30]<\/a><\/sup> But the next day, they recanted, saying that in fact, ICE had lied about its use of the database, thus violating the permissible use standards implemented in 2018.[31]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

A month later, on August 27, 2025, DOL terminated the DAPS accounts of ICE ERO and ICE HSI.[32]<\/a><\/sup> According to DOL, those accounts remain terminated to this day.[33]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

At that time, DOL issued a statement affirming that \u201cThe Department of Licensing takes our responsibility to protect Washingtonians’ information very seriously. It is important to understand that this system does not contain information about individuals’ immigration status. DOL has been a national leader on protecting our residents\u2019 information and has taken meaningful steps to limit the data in the system that could indicate someone’s immigration status.\u201d[34]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

Yet what DOL failed to acknowledge was that curtailing access to DAPS would not prevent ICE and other federal agencies from continuing to mine Washington driver and vehicle data for purposes of immigration enforcement\u2014it would just require them to use a different route.[35]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

In fact, the most common pathway through which Department of Homeland Security (DHS) accesses driver and vehicle information nationwide is via a data switchboard known as Nlets,[36]<\/a><\/sup> described in detail below. This pathway remained open until yet another set of public revelations in November 2025 prompted Governor Ferguson\u2019s office to claim it had now taken action to limit access by ICE ERO to DOL data via Nlets.<\/p>\n

This time, members of Congress under the leadership of Senator Wyden (D-OR) reached out to Democratic governors across the country to encourage them to curtail access to their state drivers\u2019 data via Nlets by federal agencies engaged in immigration enforcement. In response, Governor Ferguson\u2019s office moved swiftly to block ICE ERO\u2019s access to Nlets before Sen. Wyden and his colleagues went public with their recommendations. As a result, the Congressional letter published on November 12, 2025 notes that \u201cafter engaging with Congressional Democrats, Washington indicated that it too has now blocked ICE’s access to DMV data.\u201d[37]<\/a><\/sup> In a subsequent communications sent to UWCHR Director Angelina Godoy, DOL and WSP clarified that this took effect on November 19.[38]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

In written correspondence on December 12, 2025, a representative of the Washington State Patrol told UWCHR that while Washington had blocked ICE ERO\u2019s access to Department of Licensing data in ACCESS\/Nlets, access for Homeland Security Investigations (which is an ICE subagency) and CBP remained open.[39]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

What is Nlets?<\/h1>\n

Nlets[40]<\/a><\/sup> describes itself as a \u201cnot-for-profit computer-based message switching system that links together and supports every state, local, and federal law enforcement, justice, and public safety agency for the purposes of sharing and exchanging critical information.\u201d[41]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

Nlets explains its work in plain language: \u201cImagine that you are a California driver on your way to Arizona. Since the drive is long and boring, you start to speed and are then pulled over by a state trooper. Because you are from California, you present your California driver license to the trooper. However, the trooper and dispatch in Arizona do not have direct access to the DMV information that California has about you, so they run a Nlets check to securely access that information. To accomplish this, the request is sent to dispatch by way of a Nlets query. Nlets first receives the query from the agency and checks to make sure it is a valid request. This is done by validating the Originating Agency Identifier… to make sure the agency that is requesting the information is authorized to receive it. Once the validation is complete, the request is forwarded to California. California receives the request and pulls the information that is needed by the out-of-state trooper and sends an automated response back to Nlets. Nlets receives the response from California and then forwards the information back to the dispatcher in Arizona that made the initial request and ultimately the information gets back to the trooper that pulled you over. While this might sound like a lot of steps, the process is extremely quick, averaging about 1.5 seconds in total. What’s more, this happens all day, every day.\u201d[42]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

Of course, it makes intuitive sense that law enforcement officers in one state might need to access information held by their counterparts in another state about a suspect whose activities have crossed state lines. But as the National Immigration Law Center explains, \u201cNlets\u2019 publicly available resources describe a system for sharing criminal justice and \u2018public safety\u2019 information. But its uses extend far beyond that, enabling the sharing of driver\u2019s license, vehicle registration, and biometric, biographical and other information in the service of civil immigration enforcement. And it is closely linked with commercial businesses that gather and share personal information in unregulated ways.\u201d[43]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

While this report focuses on Nlets\u2019 role in sharing WA DOL data for purposes of immigration enforcement, the fact that the network itself is so shrouded in secrecy\u2014despite serving a function in the apparent interests of public safety\u2014is itself grounds for concern. Indeed, the fact that UWCHR has received such disparate numbers from WSP and DOL in requests for information about ACCESS and Nlets\u2019 role in sharing Department of Licensing data from our state suggest an urgent need for transparency about the obscure, and yet apparently far-reaching, role of these networks.[44]<\/a><\/sup> Below, we describe what we have learned to date about these agencies\u2019 role in sharing driver and vehicle data and its role in immigration enforcement in our state.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Figure 1: Chart showing how federal immigration enforcement agencies including ICE (and its sub-agencies ERO and HSI) and CBP access Washington Department of Licensing data through Nlets. Locally, Nlets queries are routed through a platform called ACCESS, administered by the Washington State Patrol.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

In each state, a specific law enforcement entity is designated to provide access to Nlets through a \u201cswitch\u201d; in Washington, this service is provided by the Washington State Patrol through an interface known as ACCESS.[45]<\/a><\/sup> Nlets\u2014and ACCESS\u2014are not themselves databases, but switchboard-like systems through which users can query information held in other institutions\u2019 systems of records, including federal databases such as the FBI\u2019s National Crime Information Center (NCIC), state departments of motor vehicles like Washington\u2019s DOL, and the records of an as-yet-undisclosed list of private companies.[46]<\/a><\/sup>, [47]<\/a><\/sup>, [48]<\/a><\/sup> Responses to such queries are almost immediate: in 2020, Nlets boasted a message response time of 1.79 seconds.[49]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

Each agency which uses ACCESS does so through an Originating Agency Identifier (ORI) which is issued by the FBI.[50]<\/a><\/sup> Each ORI is a unique, nine-character alphanumeric code that identifies the specific law enforcement agency submitting the query; the first two digits identify the state in which the agency originates, and the third, fourth, and fifth digit indicate either the county in which the agency is located, or the initials of the federal agency of which they are a part.[51]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

Users of Nlets obtain information by querying member agencies\u2019 data repositories through \u201cmessage keys.\u201d[52]<\/a><\/sup> The network permits dozens of types of queries using these message keys, of thousands of databases maintained by local, state, and federal agencies across the nation. An Nlets user could input the name, driver license number, or license plate of a person of interest and obtain copious amounts of information about that individual, ranging from their criminal history; to what mobile devices are registered to their name; to whether they have hunting or fishing permits; are believed to be affiliated with a gang; are listed as an \u201cImmigration Violator\u201d in a set of records exclusively maintained by ICE at the FBI\u2019s National Crime Information Center[53]<\/a><\/sup>; and more.[54]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

\"Nlets<\/p>\n

Figure 2: Depiction of Nlets functioning from a 2023 training slideshow.[55]<\/a><\/sup> <\/em><\/p>\n

While Nlets (and its Washington switchboard operator, the WSP\u2019s ACCESS) therefore serve as entry-points to a vast array of data, they are particularly useful to federal immigration agencies as ways to obtain information about drivers and vehicles. We know this because federal authorities have said so, multiple times, in documents and court proceedings.[56]<\/a><\/sup> For example, in a 2020 letter, Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf wrote, \u201cDMV records have long been used by ICE law enforcement personnel to verify or corroborate an investigatory targets\u2019 Personally Identifiable Information (PII), which can include their residential address, date of birth, height, weight, eye color, hair color, facial photograph, license plate, and vehicle registration information. Moreover, ICE’s expeditious retrieval of vehicle and driver ‘s license and identification information has helped identify targets, witnesses, victims, and assets.\u201d[57]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

Documents submitted in court proceedings in New York state include a 2019 statement by ICE that \u201cDMV photograph information is used to compile photograph line ups to be used in the field or during interviews, and while conducting facial recognition searches to identify individuals or targets. Furthermore, license plate number identification is used in tracking with both automated license readers and physical surveillance. The ability to retrieve vehicle and driver\u2019s license\/identification information in near real-time assists in identifying possible targets, witnesses, victims, and assets…The ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) Targeting Operations Division (TOD) uses driver\u2019s license\/DMV searches in varying ways to establish targetability, confirm identity and residence, and determine other relevant information, such as a subject\u2019s last known location.\u201d[58]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

In recent months, federal immigration enforcement agencies have made use of ACCESS\/Nlets to query Washington DOL data about vehicles, primarily by conducting searches for information using license plate numbers. There are multiple \u201cmessage keys\u201d enabled for such queries, from RQ (Registration Query), RNQ (Vehicle Registration Query by Name), to QV and QW, which allow a user to input a license plate number or Vehicle Identification Number and receive all \u201cperson files\u201d relating to the vehicle\u2019s registered owner, including civil warrants issued by ICE.[59]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

Recently, federal immigration officers gave sworn testimony in federal district court in Portland, Oregon, that they were conducting enforcement by travelling to areas they believed to be \u201ctarget rich\u201d and randomly running license plates of vehicles they came across to find out their owners\u2019 names, which they then checked against DHS databases. If the information returned suggested the vehicle\u2019s owner lacked documentation, they conducted an arrest right away, typically with no prior warrant.[60]<\/a><\/sup> Records reviewed by UWCHR researchers, including ICE documents and records of Nlets queries using ACCESS, show that similar tactics appear to be being deployed by immigration agents in Washington. (See \u201cConfirmed cases,\u201d below.)<\/p>\n

What all of this means is that ICE, CBP, and other agencies involved in immigration enforcement in our state, can stake out a given location\u2014perhaps a Latino business or a Home Depot\u2014and, using ACCESS\/Nlets, run the license plates of all vehicles they see at that location to find out the name of their registered owner. They can also drive through our communities, noticing vehicles that appear to be involved in construction, or which have drivers whose appearance captures their attention, and run the license plate numbers for those vehicles through ACCESS\/Nlets to find out their owners\u2019 names. Once they have a name, they can look up that person\u2019s immigration status,[61]<\/a><\/sup> and proceed to arrest the driver while in traffic, or travel to their registered address to arrest them on a subsequent day.<\/p>\n

\"1)\"\"Figure 3: Depiction of how ICE and CBP use Nlets as a tool for surveillance, querying license plates and cross referencing drivers\u2019 information with other databases to determine whether to subject someone to immigration enforcement.<\/em><\/p>\n

It would be equally possible for agents to use automated license plate readers to virtually stake out a given location, obtain the license plate numbers of passing vehicles, and run those numbers against databases without being physically present on site. However, this does not appear to have been the tactic used in the cases reviewed to date by UWCHR.<\/p>\n

Confirmed cases<\/h2>\n

To date, UWCHR has confirmed the following nine cases in which immigration arrests followed queries by Originating Agency Identifiers (ORIs) associated with ICE or CBP of Washington drivers\u2019 data via Nlets and the Washington State Patrol\u2019s ACCESS system:<\/p>\n