{"id":7184,"date":"2022-12-07T06:00:26","date_gmt":"2022-12-07T14:00:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/humanrights\/?p=7184"},"modified":"2025-10-22T08:37:16","modified_gmt":"2025-10-22T15:37:16","slug":"whos-watching-washington","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/humanrights\/2022\/12\/07\/whos-watching-washington\/","title":{"rendered":"Who’s Watching Washington: Dangers of Automated License Plate Readers to Immigrant and Reproductive Rights in Washington State"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"[Report<\/a><\/p>\n

Download the PDF<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Introduction<\/h2>\n

In recent years, local and state governments in Washington have taken important legislative and executive action to protect vulnerable residents from rights abuses. Many of these actions, such as the so-called \u201csanctuary\u201d laws of Keep Washington Working (2019) and Courts Open to All (2020) Acts, seek to protect the rights of migrants by limiting the degree to which local authorities can collaborate with civil immigration enforcement by ICE or CBP. More recently, the language of \u201csanctuary\u201d has also been used in the context of the right to reproductive health care at both the state and local levels. On June 30, 2022, Governor Jay Inslee issued a directive prohibiting the Washington State Patrol from \u201cproviding any cooperation or assistance whatsoever\u201d with efforts to investigate or prosecute those seeking access to reproductive health care in our state.[1]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0And some local jurisdictions have followed suit. On July 5, 2022, King County Executive Dow Constantine issued an order banning the King County Sheriff and other county agencies from providing any information or assistance with efforts to \u201cobstruct, restrict, diminish or discourage\u201d access to reproductive health care.[2]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0And on July 26, 2022, the Seattle City Council voted to bar local police from assisting in investigations or executing warrants issued by other jurisdictions that criminalize seeking or assisting in abortions.[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Related report<\/strong> Leaving the Door Wide Open: Flock Surveillance Systems Expose WA Data to Immigration Enforcement<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

These\u00a0strongly-worded\u00a0directives are important statements of Washington state values. Yet research conducted in Washington and elsewhere shows that data gathered by state and local law enforcement remains accessible to both law enforcement from other states, and federal immigration enforcement agencies, through interoperable databases.[4]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0ICE documents show that federal immigration agents have deliberately increased their use of digital tools in recent years in direct response to the limitations created by local policies designed to limit collaboration with federal immigration enforcement.[5]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Although it remains to be seen whether out-of-state attempts to prosecute people for seeking, or providing, access to abortions in Washington will pass legal muster,[6]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0automatic license plate recognition (ALPR) data documenting presence at abortion clinics in our state could be deployed as a powerful tool to flaunt Washington policies.<\/p>\n

In order for\u00a0Washington to live up to its promises to provide \u201csanctuary\u201d for those exercising their lawful rights in Washington, our state and local governments must take steps to close the gaps in existing systems of digital surveillance. Towards this end, the UW Center for Human Rights has launched an effort to understand the practices of digital surveillance in our state and their potential to undermine access to the very rights protections our government has pledged to uphold. This report focuses on just one dimension of this multidimensional threat: the dangers posed by the misuse of automated license plate recognition technology by law enforcement agencies. Future reports will examine other digital tools.<\/p>\n

<\/h2>\n

ALPRs: What They Are and Why They Matter for Human Rights<\/h2>\n

The use of automatic license plate recognition (ALPR, also sometimes called LPR) is believed to have expanded dramatically in recent years, though due to the total lack of statewide regulation of this technology in Washington, there are no reliable estimates as to how many systems are currently in operation. ALPRs are typically more concentrated in urban\u00a0settings, but\u00a0are also common in rural areas;[7]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0while they are used by police, municipalities also employ them for parking enforcement, and private property owners can deploy them for any desired purpose.<\/p>\n

\"[How<\/p>\n

How Automated License Plate Readers Work<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

In Seattle, the Police Department reported in 2018 that it operated 19 vehicles with ALPR technology;[8]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Seattle Department of Transportation reported owning 99 cameras.[9]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Each camera is capable of amassing vast numbers of license plate scans. In 2017, data from the Washington State Patrol showed that in 2017, the agency\u2019s ALPR systems recorded almost 1.5 million license plate scans.[10]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

ALPR systems consist of a camera set up to capture images of passing cars, paired with software that scans the images, converting license plate numbers into alphanumeric data that is then compared against \u201chot lists\u201d[11]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0of target vehicles. These \u201chot lists\u201d can be compiled locally by the organization or law enforcement agency operating the ALPR\u00a0reader, or\u00a0obtained from others through sharing agreements. For example, in Washington state, national target data from the FBI\u2019s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) \u201chot file\u201d is made available to local law enforcement agencies through the Washington State Patrol\u2019s ACCESS database.[12]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0When the ALPR reader detects a license plate whose number matches the number on a hot list \u2013 whether a locally compiled list or national database \u2013 a \u201chit\u201d is generated, sending a real-time notification to law enforcement.<\/p>\n

\"Four<\/p>\n

Types of ALPRs<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Because ALPRs collect data indiscriminately\u2014all<\/em>\u00a0passing vehicles are scanned\u2014the vast majority of drivers whose information is scooped up are not associated with any public safety threat.[13]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Because the license plate numbers and the geographic locations are observable in public\u2014in theory, anyone could notice a car driving down the street and jot down its license plate\u2014courts have ruled that ALPR data is public information, and therefore can be collected by or handled by anyone.[14]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

ALPR devices can be operated by branches of federal, state, and local government, as well as private parties;[15]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0the cost of the technology has plummeted in recent years, encouraging its wide adoption by not only major corporations but small businesses and even private individuals.[16]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0The data gathered is frequently shared or sold through networks established by their commercial software provider; in this way, ALPR data gathered in Washington can and does wind up in the hands of law enforcement agencies and corporations located elsewhere.<\/p>\n

Of course, information about people\u2019s movements can be useful if handled responsibly. ALPR data can help in locating stolen vehicles, responding to Amber alerts, and even solving murders.[17]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0But even promoters of this technology admit that only a small percentage of scans\u2014typically less than a fraction of one percent\u2014turn out to be relevant to public safety concerns. When\u00a0indiscriminately-gathered\u00a0data is broadly shared, and particularly when it is integrated with algorithms and data from other forms of surveillance, it becomes possible to use ALPR data to identify individual drivers and track their movements in real time.[18]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0This could permit the use of ALPR data to undermine Washington\u2019s commitment to immigrant and reproductive rights.<\/p>\n

<\/h1>\n

Threats to Immigrant Rights<\/h2>\n

ALPRs are only one in a series of technologies used by ICE and CBP to subject ever larger swaths of the U.S. public to digital surveillance in recent years; other tools include facial recognition software, app-based location data,[19]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0and even utility data to which ICE has purchased access through the CLEAR database produced by data brokers Thomson Reuters[20]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0or LexisNexis\u2019 Risk Solutions.[21]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0The availability of these private databases poses severe civil liberties concerns.[22]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0While law enforcement would need to present a warrant or subpoena to gather such information themselves in the context of a criminal investigation, purchasing the data from private data brokers like Thomson Reuters or LexisNexis allows the sidestepping of long standing due process protections.[23]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0For this reason, both of these companies are currently facing litigation over their practices: Thomson Reuters was sued in California in 2020,[24]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0and LexisNexis in Illinois in August 2022.[25]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Across the country, many localities have adopted \u201csanctuary\u201d laws to limit local officials\u2019 collaboration with federal immigration enforcement. But research has shown that by tapping into vast reservoirs of personal data offered up by private data brokers, ICE is able to effectively bypass such limitations. For example, researchers discovered that in Union City, California, despite being a sanctuary jurisdiction, officials were (perhaps unwittingly) \u201cfeeding their residents\u2019 personal information to ICE\u201d[26]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0through ALPR contracts with Vigilant Solutions, a company whose data is included in Thomson Reuters\u2019 CLEAR database, to which ICE has had access for years.[27]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

As the Electronic Frontier Foundation warns, \u201cBy matching your car to a particular time, date, and location, and then building a database of that information over time, law enforcement can learn where you work and live, what doctor you go to, which religious services you attend, and who your friends are.\u201d By applying algorithms to this data, \u201csystems can reveal regular travel patterns and predict where a driver may be in the future. The data also reveal all visitors to a particular location. [While] the data generally does not include the driver\u2019s name, law enforcement officers can use other databases to connect individual names with their license plate numbers.\u201d[28]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

While that may sound hypothetical, it\u2019s not\u2014documents released in ACLU\u2019s California lawsuit showed that during seven months in 2018, ICE queried one nationwide license plate location database thousands of times each month. The documents include explanations for each search query, including \u201cinvestigations attempting to locate travel patterns most likely locations of interest where to locate subject\u201d and other similar annotations.[29]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Records received by UWCHR add additional evidence, revealing that ICE agents in Washington received alerts from ICE\u2019s\u00a0National Criminal Analysis and Targeting Center (NCATC) which led them to carry out arrests of people at their homes or in the community.[30]<\/sup><\/a>,[31]<\/a>,[32]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0The NCATC is a unit within ICE which uses commercial data from Lexis-Nexis[33]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0to obtain targets for raids and other operations. According to the National Immigration Project, ICE provides names and dates of birth to its commercial partner in an electronic format on a weekly\u00a0basis, and\u00a0receives back additional identifying data like biographical information and vehicle information.[34]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0In the cases reviewed by UWCHR, the consultation of these private databases was key to identifying a target for ICE arrests.<\/p>\n

By contracting out to unregulated private companies to perform key elements of its investigative work, ICE sidesteps the need for search warrants or other forms of collaboration by local governments in the jurisdictions in which it operates. This not only streamlines their process, but essentially removes their activities from the oversight of courts in our communities.<\/p>\n

<\/h2>\n

Threats to Reproductive Rights<\/h2>\n

Even in states where abortion remains legal, those seeking reproductive health services face what the Electronic Freedom Foundation warns is \u201cunprecedented digital surveillance\u201d; ALPR systems are only one dimension of this problem.[35]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0If, as some predict,[36]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0abortion-banning states begin directing their criminal justice apparatus to investigate and prosecute abortion across state lines, there is little reason to expect they would not tap into the many public and private databases that include location data gathered by ALPRs in Washington state to monitor potential targets. Indeed, they\u2019re doing this already: as the MIT Technology Review warns, activists from Operation Rescue and other groups have been recording the license plates of vehicles arriving at clinics for years.[37]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0In 2022, the legal and political landscape has just created incentives for abortion opponents to take it up a notch.<\/p>\n

Motorola\u2019s Vigilant Solutions, for example, not only shares ALPR data with ICE, but also with a host of law enforcement agencies around the country through Thomson Reuters\u2019 nationwide CLEAR database. As Thomson Reuters boasted in 2017, \u201cCLEAR LPR subscribers will now reap the benefit from\u00a0Vigilant\u2019s\u00a0vehicle location data, analytics and commercial LPR detections gathered from all over the\u00a0U.S\u2026.As part of an investigation of suspected criminal activity, law enforcement can leverage CLEAR to research people and organizations connected to the vehicle. Additionally, CLEAR LPR subscribers will have access to LEARN,\u00a0Vigilant\u2019s\u00a0investigative data platform, which provides users with insights, including: vehicle location, year, make and model search; the best location to find a vehicle; vehicle detection sharing; and the ability to virtually stakeout a vehicle location.\u201d[38]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0This \u201cvirtual stakeout\u201d function could be applied to capture data on all vehicles in the proximity of an abortion clinic, for example; overlaid with information from other databases, the data could then reveal the identities of individuals associated with the vehicles and their friends, family, or social networks.<\/p>\n

One of Motorola\u2019s main competitors, Flock Safety, began as a startup in 2017 but has grown precipitously by offering low-cost, solar-powered cameras that connect wirelessly to a nationwide network[39]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0made up of some 20,000 cameras and 1,800 law enforcement agencies, according to an email from a company representative.[40]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0The company\u2019s materials boast the ability not just to search by license plate number, but also color and make of car, even details like the presence or absence of specific vehicular features like a roof rack; its analytics also permit \u201cconvoy analysis,\u201d or the identification of cars apparently traveling together.[41]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Flock takes no position on law enforcement\u2019s possible use of its system for limiting access to reproductive rights: \u201cFlock\u2019s mission as a business is to eliminate crime,\u201d Josh Thomas, the vice-president of external affairs at Flock, told the Guardian recently. \u201cOur position at Flock remains consistent in response to the Dobbs decision. Our perspective is that we do not enact laws, and our mission is not specific to any\u00a0particular laws\u2026 We expect cities in California may operate differently than cities in Texas or Illinois or Rhode Island.\u00a0So\u00a0it would be inaccurate to characterize Flock as being for or against any particular issue.\u201d[42]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The practice of virtually staking out a location is\u00a0similar to\u00a0\u201cgeofencing,\u201d the practice whereby law enforcement seeks location data, typically cell phone data,[43]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0to enable it to identify all people within a given geographic boundary during a specific time. Yet while geofencing using cell phone data requires a criminal warrant to compel companies like Google to provide the data,[44]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0location data from ALPRs is often shared indiscriminately, rendering the need for warrants moot. What\u2019s more, private parties\u00a0already<\/em>\u00a0engage in geofencing to send targeted ads to people in the vicinity of abortion clinics; only one state, Massachusetts, has banned this practice.[45]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0ALPR data, if it remains unregulated, can be used by private parties, including those committed to discouraging abortion through shaming and harassment that, in the \u201cold days,\u201d relied on physical presence at clinics. It can also be used by public authorities in anti-abortion jurisdictions to build cases against seekers or providers of abortion services.<\/p>\n

In Washington state, except for Seattle\u2019s Surveillance Ordinance passed in 2017,[46]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0there are\u00a0no legal standards<\/u>\u00a0governing the use of ALPR systems[47]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0or the management of the data they generate. It is therefore extremely important to know not only who is gathering the data that permits the tracking of Washingtonians\u2019 movements, but how that data is being stored and shared, to ensure that it is not used in ways that invalidate the important rights protections our institutions have pledged to defend.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Methods<\/h2>\n

Beginning in November of 2021, UWCHR filed public records requests across Washington state\u00a0in an effort to\u00a0understand the scope, regulation and use of ALPR systems by sheriffs and police departments.[48]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Because blanketing every law enforcement agency in the state would require an exorbitant amount of labor, we instead targeted our public records requests in three ways, based on initial research into local practices.[49]<\/a><\/p>\n

First, UWCHR researchers sought to determine which Washington law enforcement agencies had contracts with Vigilant Solutions, and with whom those agencies share their ALPR data, since for the reasons discussed above Vigilant is a known vector for \u201cdata-driven deportation\u201d[50]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0and it could serve a similar purpose for prosecuting abortion. To gauge\u00a0Vigilant\u2019s\u00a0footprint in Washington state, UWCHR replicated the method developed by EFF,[51]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0and requested the user agreement governing all Vigilant contracts; the names of agencies and organizations with which ALPR data is shared; the names and agencies with which \u201chot lists\u201d of targets are shared; the net number of scanned plate images obtained and the percentage of these that generated \u201chits\u201d against local law enforcement\u2019s designated targets.[52]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Second, prior research by UWCHR led us to suspect that in some jurisdictions, law enforcement agencies have allowed ICE or CBP to tap into their ALPR systems directly.[53]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Of these jurisdictions, UWCHR requested training material, contracts and policies regarding ALPR use and associated software, and information on any technology received through Operation\u00a0Stonegarden.[54]<\/sup><\/a>,\u00a0[55]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

Lastly, since 2007, the Washington Auto Theft Prevention Authority (WATPA) has issued grants totaling $1.3M to dozens of Washington law enforcement agencies for the purpose of purchasing ALPRs. WATPA has drafted model guidelines for ALPR use in light of privacy concerns, which include regular audits to ensure compliance with local laws;[56]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0therefore, UWCHR obtained a list of all local law enforcement agencies that had received grants from WATPA to purchase\u00a0ALPRs, and\u00a0requested the original grant proposal and governing policies for ALPR system audits from each of the 29 agencies.[57]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Obtaining this information was challenging. Some agencies, such as Walla Walla Police Department,[58]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Whatcom County Sheriff, and Battle Ground Police Department, failed to respond altogether; others responded that they had no relevant records. In many other cases, such as the Police Departments of Federal Way and Edmonds, responses were incomplete. Despite explicit instructions provided in our requests, many local law enforcement agencies claimed they did not know how to access the information in their digital systems that would show with whom their ALPR data was being shared.<\/p>\n

It is also vitally important to understand that in addition to public agencies, ALPR data is also gathered by\u00a0private<\/em>\u00a0owners of ALPR technology; at present, those private parties may share the data they obtain with whomever they want. Indeed, several ALPR companies actively promote the use of their technology by private parties. The parent company of Vigilant Solutions, Motorola, also owns another subsidiary, Digital Recognition Network, which employs private contractors to collect license plate data, encouraging them to scan shopping malls, sporting events, and workplace parking lots by day and apartment complexes by night.[59]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0More recently, Flock Safety has transformed the market by offering lower-priced ALPR technology, encouraging homeowners\u2019 associations, neighborhood groups and other private citizens to install their own ALPR readers and share data with law enforcement.[60]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Not only are researchers unable to submit public records requests to private parties who may be gathering ALPR data, but in most cases we don\u2019t even know who they are, let alone what they are doing with the data.<\/p>\n

As a result, the findings shared in this report should be understood as only a\u00a0partial<\/em>\u00a0picture of ALPR use in Washington and the human rights concerns it raises, rather than a comprehensive account of the full extent to which the technology is currently in use. It is likely, in fact, that the use of this technology is far more widespread than documented here.<\/p>\n

<\/h2>\n

Findings<\/h2>\n

Based on the documents reviewed, UWCHR researchers assessed the written policies of various law enforcement agencies regarding the storing and sharing of ALPR data. We found they varied widely across jurisdictions. Below, we describe agency practices we identified in our research, and explain why each set of considerations is relevant in assessing the dangers to immigrant and reproductive rights.<\/p>\n

Data Retention<\/h3>\n

Because ALPR data is so voluminous, and in\u00a0the vast majority of\u00a0cases involves the movements of individuals whose activities are unrelated to public safety concerns, the prompt deletion of data not identified as linked to public safety is a best practice.[61]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Fortunately, a number of Washington agencies have policies that suggest they comply with these best practices.<\/p>\n

For example, the city of Tacoma claims to retain no records of ALPR scans. Its parking authorities reported that their system automatically deletes any LPR data after no more than 24 hours unless it led to a citation action. Seattle Police Department\u2019s most recent (2019) update to ALPR policies states that all ALPR data \u201cexcept for Hits and Data Used for a Parking Enforcement Action,\u201d is deleted within 90 days.[62]<\/sup><\/a>,\u00a0[63]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

Auburn Police Department, Fife Police Department, Sunnyside Police Department, Moses Lake Police Department, Bellingham Police Department, follow a Lexipol[64]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0policy which states that ALPR data downloaded to the server must be disposed of according to the Washington State Law Enforcement Records Retention Schedule. These guidelines require that state records must be retained until verification that a significant image has not been captured or the appeals process is completed.[65]<\/sup><\/a>,\u00a0[66]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0In these LEAs, the responsibility to ensure proper data collection and retention falls to the Administrative Division Commander.<\/p>\n

Data Sharing<\/h3>\n

Across Washington, however, many jurisdictions permit the unrestricted sharing of ALPR data with a range of federal and out-of-state law enforcement agencies, and even with private networks. These secondary agencies are not bound by Washington state\u2019s \u201csanctuary\u201d laws regarding migration or reproductive health.<\/p>\n

For example, through its contract with Vigilant Solutions, the Vancouver Police Department shares ALPR detection data with a list of 664 agencies,[67]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0including ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations in Washington DC,[68]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0CBP\u2019s National Targeting Center, and a range of District Attorney\u2019s offices, police departments, and sheriffs. This grants ICE and CBP the ability to tap into local government resources to power their immigration enforcement activities. Under the Keep Washington Working Act, if ICE\/CBP were to contact local law enforcement and request help tracking a vehicle for civil immigration enforcement, local law enforcement would be barred from rendering that assistance \u2013 but thanks to the widespread sharing of ALPR data, ICE and CBP don\u2019t have to actively request the data, much less explain their intended use of it.<\/p>\n

As regards reproductive rights, many of the jurisdictions with which Vancouver shares ALPR data are in states that criminalize abortion, including in some cases out-of-state abortion. For example, at least 52 police departments and sheriff\u2019s offices are identified as being in the state of Texas alone, where the notorious \u201cbounty law\u201d rewards private citizens who sue others for aiding or abetting abortion.[69]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0This means that personnel from those departments and organizations would be able to access information in real time about vehicles as they move through Vancouver, Washington. In addition, Vancouver receives \u201chot lists\u201d from 40 sheriffs and police departments across Texas; while the agency did not provide UWCHR a copy of its policies regarding response to a notification of a hit on these hot lists, this could result in incidents where Vancouver deputies pull over vehicles on the basis of suspicion of criminal activity from other states, including those states that define traveling to Washington to receive reproductive health care as a crime.[70]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0This raises grave concerns about the possible misuse of ALPR data to erode rights Washington state has sought to uphold through recent policies and directives.<\/p>\n

By contrast, Mercer Island Police Department also contracts with Vigilant, but does not share ALPR data with any external parties, as its system sharing report indicates.[71]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

In July 2022, Benton County\u2019s Board of Commissioners voted to purchase 10 ALPR readers from Flock.[72]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0This appears to be part of a multi-jurisdictional effort at coordinating ALPR use: according to records received by UWCHR from Richland Police Department, earlier in 2022, Kennewick Police Department reportedly took the lead in applying for a WATPA grant to purchase Flock ALPRs for the Police Departments of Richland, West Richland, Kennewick, and the Benton County Sheriff.[73]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Despite this, in response to a September 2022 request from UWCHR researchers, however, Benton County Sheriff\u2019s office said they “do not have\u00a0a\u00a0Automated License Plate Recognition device,\u201d making the current status of this collaboration unclear.[74]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Many law enforcement agencies in Washington appear to be transitioning to Flock. In a July 22 email to Richland Police Department, Flock salesperson Mack Larkin said that in Washington, Liberty Lake Police Department and Yakima Police Department had live Flock systems up and running, while Airway Heights Police Department, Moses Lake Police Department, Othello Police Department, Pasco Police Department, the Spokane County Sheriff\u2019s Office, Tukwila Police Department, Union Gap Police Department, and Wapato Police Department, had already signed contracts. He further claimed that Anacortes Police Department, Arlington Police Department, Des Moines Police Department, Kent Police Department, Lake Forest Park Police Department, and Sunnyside Police Department were, at that time, reviewing possible Flock contracts, and \u201canother 20+ agencies here in WA\u201d were \u201cworking towards getting Flock\u201d. He cited the connection of Washington\u2019s Flock customers to some 1,800 law enforcement agencies nationwide as a selling point.[75]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

In some cases, CBP and ICE agents have direct access to ALPR databases, allowing them to tap into the systems directly to monitor people\u2019s movements without being shared through Vigilant, Flock, or other service providers. For example, in response to a public records request by UWCHR researchers, Okanogan County Sheriff\u2019s Office provided a list of individuals with direct access to ALPR systems;[76]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0the list includes 6 CBP agents, whose systems permissions allow them to access Modified Hotlists, Dispatcher, Data Mining and Dashboard services. This means CBP agents could create their own \u201chotlist\u201d of targets on Okanagan’s system\u00a0in order to\u00a0trigger a notification when such vehicles are detected. While Okanogan County\u2019s ALPR services were originally provided by Leonardo,[77]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0a March 2022 email exchange between law enforcement agents in Post Falls, Idaho, Okanogan County, Washington, and CBP agent Aaron McNair show that the county now contracts with Vigilant\u2014a switch McNair celebrated because \u201cthe Vigilant system is something we use on a regular basis!\u201d[78]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

In May 2022, CBP Agent McNair contacted Okanogan\u2019s Chief Criminal Deputy, Laura Wright, asking for access to the new ALPR system because \u201cI would like to have it email me license plates as it detects them.\u201d[79]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0In June, Deputy Wright set multiple CBP officers up with user accounts to directly access the County\u2019s new Vigilant system.[80]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0In September 2022, Okanogan County Sheriff\u2019s Office told UWCHR they had been unable to connect their ALPR trailer to the Vigilant system, rendering it inoperable, but that some of their patrol vehicles were equipped with ALPR cameras which send and receive data from Leonardo.[81]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

In the past, Okanogan County and other Washington state jurisdictions, including Richland Police Department and Spokane County Sheriff, have had cross-border data-sharing agreements with the Police Department of Post Falls, Idaho.[82]<\/sup><\/a>,[83]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0Under the terms of the Northern Idaho License Plate Recognition Project referenced in these agreements, ALPR data collected by devices in Washington was stored on the Post Falls Police Department server, and shared with all parties who entered into agreements with Post Falls Police Department.[84]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0The present status of this agreement is unclear: Post Falls Police Department told UWCHR that its system had gone down in February 2022, and that since then they were no longer the using ALPR system,[85]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0and the agreement was no longer in effect.[86]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Okanogan County Sheriff\u2019s Office also told UWCHR that it had discontinued dealings with Post Falls, creating its own Vigilant account instead.[87]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

It is unclear whether data-sharing might persist between other Washington jurisdictions and Post Falls. A March email from Post Falls Police Department indicates that, \u201cAfter careful consideration of all ALPR vendors, and mitigating factors, we have selected Vigilant Solutions from Motorola to be our ALPR Vendor. As we transition to Vigilant, we will keep the BOSS server operational\u00a0so as to\u00a0allow all participating agencies the ability to either choose their own vendor or go with Vigilant.\u201d[88]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

When UWCHR asked Post Falls in July 2022 to clarify which company provided their ALPR services, Post Falls Police Department claimed, implausibly, that they did not know which company was involved, and did not have a written contract.[89]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0In November of 2022, Laura\u00a0Claffey, public records officer of Post Falls Police Department, confirmed that the department has subscribed to Vigilant services but that the system is not functional at this time.[90]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Lastly, when asked to clarify the existence and nature of their data sharing with Post Falls, Spokane Police declined to respond despite multiple public records requests, emails, and phone calls by UWCHR\u2019s Director throughout the month of August 2022. At the time of this writing, these requests remain pending.<\/p>\n

If<\/em>\u00a0data sharing across state lines continues, Idaho law enforcement may be making determinations about the sharing of ALPR data gathered in Washington. Idaho currently bans abortion in most circumstances, and has passed an anti-abortion law modeled on Texas\u2019 \u201cbounty hunter\u201d law allowing family members to sue abortion providers for up to $20,000.[91]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Sen.\u00a0Patty Murray has spoken out about Eastern Washington clinics straining to attend to the needs of out-of-state patients;[92]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0at Planned Parenthood Spokane reportedly as many as 78% of the clinic\u2019s patients in July 2022 came from Idaho.[93]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Workers at Planned Parenthood Spokane have also reported being harassed and intimidated and even followed home by protestors.[94]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Yet if data revealing their regular daily movements, and that of their patients, is stored across state lines, those responsible for administering that data have no legal responsibility to uphold Washington\u2019s commitment to reproductive rights.<\/p>\n

Transparency<\/h3>\n

Alarmingly little is known about the extent of ALPR use by private and public entities in the state of Washington; this makes it difficult to carefully assess the risk they pose to human rights. One key part of the problem is the secrecy that surrounds this technology. While in part this secrecy is due to a lack of regulations requiring reporting of the technology\u2019s use, in part it also appears to be caused by many\u00a0law\u00a0enforcement agencies\u2019 reluctance to share information about their practices\u2014as the aforementioned responses from Spokane and Post Falls Police Departments suggest.<\/p>\n

In part, this secrecy is encouraged by the companies with whom law enforcement contracts. Vigilant, for example, reportedly includes non-disclosure agreements in its contracts with law enforcement,[95]<\/sup><\/a>,[96]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0requiring agencies to obtain permission from the company before making public any reference to\u00a0Vigilant\u2019s\u00a0LEARN system[97]<\/sup><\/a>\u2014despite the fact that\u00a0Vigilant\u2019s\u00a0services are paid by tax dollars.\u00a0Vigilant\u2019s\u00a0training materials also recommend that police not include reference to the use of ALPR data in any written reports.[98]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0The company reportedly also bars contracting public agencies from \u201cprovid[ing] ANY information, including interviews, related to LEARN products or its services to any member of the media without the express written consent of LEARN-NVLS.\u201d[99]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0This could explain Post Falls\u2019 claim that they did not know the name of the company with whom they were doing business, although previously-released emails had shown it to be Vigilant.<\/p>\n

Other Washington law enforcement agencies were also less than forthcoming in their responses to requests for information. Yakima Police Department, for example, released 2018 data to EFF researchers showing that the City had a contract with Vigilant enabling the sharing of ALPR data with a whopping 489 agencies nationwide, one of which was itself a network with 521 member agencies, the names of which Vigilant has declined to disclose.[100]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Yakima officials publicly insisted that they don’t share data with ICE directly[101]<\/sup><\/a>\u2014which is entirely possible, but immaterial since they appear to do so indirectly through Vigilant. The Yakima Police Department told UWCHR in November 2021 that, \u201cWe no longer utilize the Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) system. We did not renew our contract with them, so we haven\u2019t used it or had access to any part of the system for the past couple of years.” Yet just months earlier on local talk radio, Yakima police officers had claimed new cameras were purchased with Vigilant in 2021 and that the technology has been in use for years.[102]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0And in April 2022, local media reported that Yakima was the first law enforcement agency in Washington to use Flock readers, and that it was encouraging businesses and private citizens in the city to invest in their own ALPRs and connect them to law enforcement\u2019s Flock system.[103]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

This lack of transparency may also manifest itself in most agencies\u2019 apparent failure to comply with requirements to conduct regular audits of their ALPR systems. Language requiring the performance of regular system audits to ensure appropriate usage is included in most of the policies reviewed by UWCHR, yet most agencies were unable to find records of such an audit ever having been performed. For example, Fife Police Department reported that \u201c…no formal audits have been performed since the system was acquired;\u201d[104]<\/sup><\/a>,[105]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0Edmonds Police Department responded that \u201cno audits were located,\u201d and many others simply declined to provide records of audits, despite WATPA\u2019s policy recommending that all participating agencies perform audits at least once per year to ensure compliance with examining LPR data security.[106]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0WATPA itself has also performed no audits, despite retaining the capacity to do so under its interagency agreement with the law enforcement agencies receiving grants.[107]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Conclusions and Recommendations<\/h2>\n

While companies marketing ALPR technology tout them as invaluable tools for law enforcement, many law enforcement agencies in Washington told us otherwise. When asked what ratio of scans\u00a0actually generated\u00a0a \u201chit\u201d indicating a vehicle of interest, many law enforcement agencies reported vanishing rates of return. Bellingham Police Department, for example, reported 0.000027% of scans identified wanted vehicles;[108]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Monroe Police Department reported a hit rate of 0.00032%;[109]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Bremerton Police Department returned a hit rate of 0.00189%.[110]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0These low rates of efficacy are not unusual: the ACLU estimates that nationwide, less than 0.2 percent of plate scans are linked to criminal activity or vehicle registration issues.[111]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Perhaps for these reasons, multiple law enforcement agencies including Walla Walla Sheriff\u2019s Office, Sunnyside Police Department, Lake Stevens Police Department and Everett Police Department reported they had discontinued use of systems originally made available to them by WATPA grants. And\u00a0Bellingham Police Department, in its report to the WATPA after the systems were purchased, wrote,\u00a0“We continue to have technological problems with all our vehicles…. 20% misread rate\u2026;\u201d[112]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a028000 reads with about a 20% misread occurrence;\u201d[113]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0and, \u201cOfficers were originally enthusiastic about it, but that declined because of all the technical problems.\u201d[114]<\/sup><\/a>,[115]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0While marketed as a tool to solve crimes\u00a0in order to\u00a0make communities safer, unregulated ALPR systems may in fact create new vulnerabilities that threaten a wide swath of Washington\u2019s population.<\/p>\n

Today, the gathering of ALPR data in Washington state is entirely unregulated, meaning that anyone can set up a camera, pair it with low-cost ALPR software, record their neighbors\u2019 movements, and sell the data. There is no registry of ALPR systems in use by private associations in our state, no way to know how that data is managed or into whose hands it falls. Even for\u00a0publicly-owned\u00a0ALPR systems, the responses by many Washington law enforcement agencies to the lawful inquiries by UWCHR researchers should give us pause. Policies governing the retention and sharing of ALPR data are poorly understood and ill enforced, if they are enforced at\u00a0all;\u00a0as a result, many Washingtonians\u2019 data winds up in the hands of private groups and law enforcement agencies beyond the reach of our state\u2019s laws.<\/p>\n

If our state is committed to making sure its pledges to provide sanctuary are upheld, we can begin by:<\/p>\n