



**West Coast Model EU 2023**  
University of Washington, Seattle

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## Guidelines for Position Papers

Each delegate should submit a 1–2 page position paper addressing each of the issues on the agenda that pertain to their ministerial session **along with a draft resolution**. Students should use the below suggested Draft Resolution outline and [submit the document using the link on the Model EU webpage](#). *Individuals who do not submit their position paper by the **February 21, 2023** deadline will not be eligible for consideration to receive an award.* Although these positions will influence the opening speech presented by the Head of State, they should be **separate and more detailed** documents.

These papers should be written from the perspective of the country the delegate is representing, but in the third person (e.g., “Italy feels...”). Although they should not be overly inflammatory or otherwise offensive, these position papers will naturally have a strong bias. These are generally written documents; however, detailed outlines can be used to address positions or suggest solutions. The use of dates, numbers, quotes or other specific data is recommended as these serve to make your position and argument much stronger. However, be prepared to be able to back up such facts, especially if dealing with more controversial topics. A works cited is not required for the position papers; however, citations may be useful for your own research and organization. Suggested organization and questions the position paper should answer are listed below. Three examples of good responses from previous years also follow.

### **Suggested outline of a position paper:**

- I. Introduction
  - A general address of the issue(s) at hand
- II. The situation as it pertains to your country (ie. The Italian Situation)
  - Why is this issue important to the EU? Or why not?
  - Why is this issue important to your country? Or why not?
  - How is your country affected by this issue and by proposed solutions?
- III. Proposals/Solutions
  - What solutions does your country propose?
  - Are these solutions different from those proposed by the Presidency?
  - Solutions should detail:
    - i. What should be done
    - ii. How it should be done
    - iii. Why it should be done, and why these measures
    - iv. What the outcome would be

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## II. Examples of position papers from previous Model EUs

### Example 1

#### Luxembourg Agriculture Minister

#### CAP Reforms – Rural Development and Food Security

##### Introduction

Speaking on behalf of Luxembourg, we understand how imperative it is to offer common solutions for several vital issues currently facing the European Union (EU) such as the recently proposed Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms. Given that approximately 52% of the EU territory is predominantly rural and almost 170 million EU citizens reside in these areas, the CAP is a pervasive issue that significantly affects all member states in the Union. Currently, the CAP budget for the 2014-2020 timeline surmounts to 408.31 billion euros, making up 39% of the entire EU budget. The amount of funds allocated to the CAP has often been subject to criticism from several member states; however, Luxembourg believes it is critical to understand and promote the relevance of the CAP because of its multitude of benefits. In addition to encouraging younger generations to enter the agricultural sector, the CAP also spurs innovation in agriculture, stimulates economic growth and job creation particularly in rural areas, and keeps the EU competitive in the global agricultural market.

Luxembourg recommends the 2020-2026 cycle negotiations begin by acknowledging the present CAP's deficiencies and advantages. Luxembourg believes that the current challenges are vastly different than what the Union faced when the CAP was first executed to eradicate food shortages in the early 1960s. It is vital to address the disparity between wealthy and poor member states, resist market volatility, ensure safe, quality, and healthy agricultural products, and help curtail negative effects on the environment. Luxembourg is fully committed to working together to act promptly and provide effective solutions. Agriculture is an issue that crosses state borders; therefore, the EU must provide ideas that result in not only stronger states, but also notably, a more capable community. Despite the seriousness of the problems ahead, Luxembourg is confident the EU will once again prove to grow stronger by effectively addressing the shortcomings, while maintaining the favorable components, of its CAP.

##### The Situation in Luxembourg

Despite being the smallest geographic state in the EU, Luxembourg still utilizes 54% of its land for farming purposes. Nevertheless, Luxembourg has struggled to cultivate food in several rural areas due to infertile soil. As a result, Luxembourg has become a state reliant on, and structured towards, large-scale farms. Supplementing to these conditions, Luxembourg has also adapted by shifting its focus towards livestock production, which now accounts for 80% of total agricultural profits. Luxembourg's self-reliance on livestock has allowed the state to produce 40% more beef than it consumes. The state's dedication and specialization in the livestock industry has led 56% of Luxembourgers, in comparison to 35% of other EU citizens, to prioritize the welfare of farmed animals as one of the main responsibilities of farmers to our society. Furthermore, due to the growth in the cattle industry, there has been a proportional increase in dairy production. The dairy industry now accounts for nearly 55% of Luxembourg's agricultural products and is produced by 2 major and 6 minor dairies. This centralized manufacturing structure parallels the prominence of larger, and fewer, farms. Luxembourg centralizes its agricultural production in order to best utilize its natural resources and labor force, and ultimately produce more environmentally safe products. Luxembourg would like to remind all members that the assurance of good quality, healthy, and safe agricultural products should be a main objective of the EU in terms of agricultural and rural development policy.

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Luxembourg is concerned that it, along with other smaller member states, could suffer some significant losses as a result of the rural development proposal to restrict direct subsidies received by large farms. Luxembourg depends on larger farms due to its smaller population, geographical size, and limited areas of fertile soil. On the contrary, the other proposed policy of increasing the amount of money paid to newer member states would have less adverse affects on Luxembourg's agricultural industry as it already is among the largest net contributors to the CAP budget in terms of gross national income. Luxembourg urges its fellow members, particularly new member states, to take the steps necessary to sustainably grow their agricultural sectors as it would result in a more productive, successful, and stable Union. Pertaining to the second agenda item, strengthening food security, Luxembourg is ready to discuss different ideas to improve food security not only throughout Europe, but also for all states neighboring the Union.

### **Proposal 1: Rural Development Program Reforms**

An asset of the CAP stems from the partnership it creates between the institutions of the EU and the member states. The European Commission has control over how much a state receives for direct payment and rural development; however, once that amount is allotted, states have more discretion over the distribution of those funds. The Presidency could potentially threaten this system by its proposition to introduce a cap for the direct subsidies received by large farms. Luxembourg feels this proposal requires more clarity as to how this cap would be established. If the cap would be the same for each member state, then Luxembourg views it as a one-size fits all solution, which is doomed to fail to account for the different circumstances and agricultural structures in each member state. Instead, there should be an underlying structure where around 60% of direct payments and market measures are distributed in uniform payments per hectare. Then, the remaining funds under this category could be reserved for states with an abundance of smaller farms that utilize fewer hectares to give them additional aid. Luxembourg is confident this option would be more versatile and benefit more states than the proposed resolution.

As noted, Luxembourg supports the proposal to administer more funds to newer member states in comparison to older member states. The distributions should be reoriented to be more pragmatic towards a state's level of self-sufficient production, food prices, employment levels, competitiveness in the market, etc. Instead of contributing more funds than necessary to wealthy states, Luxembourg proposes the use of more need-based aid, which would help reduce the disparity among national economies and eventually strengthen the stability of the euro.

It will prove difficult to gain the confidence of all EU members to enforce a proposal where particular wealthier states, some being predominant beneficiaries of the CAP, would willingly give up a portion of the funds they receive to newer member states. Instead, we could establish an opt-out system where states could choose not to participate in one policy only if they dedicate more resources and funds to another issue area. For example, Luxembourg could voice its intentions of violating the policy of establishing a cap on direct subsidies given to large farms; however, Luxembourg would then have to counterbalance its actions in other areas like dedicating more agricultural development funds to newer member states. The outcome of this proposal would still accomplish the objective of giving more aid to smaller farmers, but not at the expense of smaller states that rely on larger farms. In this instance, the EU would be able to promote other areas of growth instead of allocating more funds than deemed necessary.

### **Proposal 2: Increased Food Security**

One of the most pressing issues that has and will continue to challenge us as a Union is climate change. As a result of climate change, our community is witnessing more erratic weather conditions, which negatively affect the Union's agricultural production. As noted by the Presidency, "as the world population grows, and climate change threatens food production"; it has become essential for us to find new innovative ways to maintain our food production, while also promoting environmentally friendly

methods. With this in mind, Luxembourg urges all member states to allocate a larger portion of their direct payment and rural development funds to encouraging more widespread sustainable farming methods. Dating back to the 2013 reform, the EU established a policy where farmers would not “receive their full entitlement of income support payments” unless they “adopted more environmentally sustainable farming methods”. Farmers received their full entitlement by maintaining permanent grassland areas, growing a minimum amount of crops, and using at least 5% of arable land for the benefit of biodiversity. Additionally, this Union decided to provide additional support for those farmers that went beyond these measures. Looking towards the 2020 reforms, Luxembourg recommends the members of this Union increase the requirements of farmers to receive their full entitlement. Specific criteria can be further discussed, however, potential criteria could range from requiring 10% of arable land for biodiversity or helping provide guidance to the European Commission as to how they could incentivize the future generation of European farmers. With only 6% of farms managed by farmers under 35, Luxembourg believes this issue should be prioritized as it affects the future success and sustainability of the EU. Since more than 75% of the CAP budget, 308.73 billion of 408.31 billion euros is based on direct payments, we should continue to promote our farmers to evolve and advance in order to receive additional aid. Luxembourg recommends this Union should utilize its funds to educate farmers on new techniques and technology to produce more efficiently while also creating widespread marketing campaigns targeting younger generations to farm. This way, consumers will be less frequently priced out of food because even though sustainable farming methods tend to be expensive, the aid could help maintain the quantity of farmers and also prevent them from having to increase their prices.

In addition to these domestic efforts, Luxembourg encourages the Union to concentrate on the goal of strengthening food security internationally. In 2015, Luxembourg’s net overseas development assistance was the fourth highest based off gross national income. Leading behind Sweden, UAE, and Norway, Luxembourg is dedicated to providing substantial foreign aid. In this age of globalization, the EU markets, economies, and sectors are more intertwined than ever. Luxembourg would like to remind all members that the EU is the largest importer of foodstuffs globally by a large margin. The EU has granted further connections between our farmers and non-EU farmers by giving developing states preferential access to EU markets. In 2015, the Union has imported 3.4 billion euros of agri-food products from the least developed—more than the other five major importers (USA, Japan, Russia, China, and Canada) combined. To continue this progress, Luxembourg proposes to establish a category within the CAP where states would contribute to funds that would only be used for food-aid related matters to the neighboring states of the EU. Instead of each state committing the same amount to this “Agricultural Neighborhood Policy”, the amount of contribution for each state would be based on their Gross Domestic Product. In this respect, the donations would be more unique and accountable to the economic state of a country instead of a uniform approach. We need to further solidify our commitments to developing states because, as mentioned, the success of their food production directly affects the EU based on the substantial supply of products we import. These funds could also be used to provide grants for farmers in these developing countries to also utilize new technology and farming methods in response to climate change. The outcome would be beneficial for all parties involved and would guarantee better food security and relations in the future.

## **Conclusion**

Luxembourg understands the difficulty in creating comprehensive solutions that benefit the interests of all member states; however, we would like to remind our community that it is vital, now more than ever, to work together and promote a unified Europe. We must persevere beyond the challenges that try to cripple us in order to maintain our strong position in the international arena. The fate of the European Union along with other integrated regions depends on how we respond to the issues at hand. In conclusion, Luxembourg aims to have fruitful dialogues with all member states at this summit. We

firmly believe we are stronger together than apart and hope to leave this summit with thorough resolutions and positive relations.

## **Example 2**

### **Italy Head of Government**

#### **Youth Unemployment**

#### **Introduction**

As the European Union continues to battle consistently high youth unemployment rates, Italy calls attention to the need to design effective employment policies not only aimed at those under 25, but also their counterparts aged 25 to 29, a group which could prove to be a long-term liability if continually ignored. In statistical terms, “youth unemployment” has traditionally referred to the age bracket 15-24 years. However, this definition has proved overly simplistic, particularly in the European region post-economic crisis. Those in their late 20s, and even their early 30s, have been disproportionately affected, and this demographic may become even more susceptible to longer periods of unemployment, as they have fewer options to return to training or education, especially because doing so they are not registered as unemployed and therefore can lose unemployment benefit entitlements. In this area, expansion of the Youth Guarantee to this age group is essential.

In general, the most likely predictor of someone’s employment future is his employment past. Youth unemployment also leads to a dangerous “scarring” effect, including lower pay, higher unemployment, lower mental health, and even reduced life chances. Research suggests that those who are unemployed from ages 25-29 are more susceptible to this “scarring,” and as such, maximizing opportunities and protection for this group is essential not just to care for their present, but to protect Europe’s future.

Further, as the European Union seeks to maximize opportunities for youth in its goal to minimize youth unemployment, cross-border mobility in job placement is vital. This means that it is imperative that the EU recognize the current disparity between the theory and practice of crossborder employment within the EU. In theory, there are no barriers stopping an individual from one member state working in another state. The Treaty of Rome provides for freedom of movement of workers and affords individuals the opportunity to set up and manage companies in all member states. However, obtaining educational and professional recognition outside one’s home state is much more complicated. There is currently no international mandatory EU regulation of academic degrees, making it difficult for some to be selected for jobs for which they are academically qualified, and even more challenging for students who wish to undertake part of their studies or training in another member state, which could limit their employment opportunities later on. Universal recognition of degrees will also make it more attractive for those who hail from outside the European Union to study in the EU, providing further economic benefits.

#### **The situation in Italy**

Since the onset of the financial crisis, the rise in unemployment in Italy has almost exclusively affected those under 35, and of particular concern are those aged 25-29. For this age group, employment has decreased 12% and unemployment has increased 10% since 2008, while those over 55 have increased employment by 12%. Measures published in February 2014 reported in Italy a 25-29 unemployment rate of over 20%, compared to about 14% for age 30-34 and 11% general unemployment. Trends suggest that these numbers are bound to be even higher at present. Italy, in fact, has the highest incidence of

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unemployment among 25-29-year-olds as compared to the unemployment rate of 20-64-year-olds, being nearly twice as likely to be unemployed.

Furthermore, in Italy, scarring has a pronounced effect, with 50% of those unemployed between ages 25 and 29 having been unemployed for longer than 12 months. This number continues to rise. These statistics illustrate the clear disparity between those aged 25-29 and the general population, and the need to expand the Youth Guarantee to provide for their needs.

Italy itself has already extended the benefits of the Youth Guarantee to all those aged 25-29 and is currently beginning to see the benefits of this decision. In almost all EU member states, though the unemployment rate for those aged 25-29 is lower than that of those aged 15-24, it is significantly higher than those aged 30-34 and higher still than total workers aged 20-64. The situation is direst in countries with already low employment rates (Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal) but significant differences can also be seen in more stable countries like France and Denmark.

Concerning cross-border mobility and degree recognition, Italy is a proud signatory of the Bologna accords and ratifier of the Lisbon Convention, and is committed to maximizing opportunities for cross-border recognition of academic degrees. Italy's educational framework has been compatible with that of the Bologna Process since the Process's inception, offering the 3+2 program Bachelor's and Master's degree equivalents eligible to be recognized across the EHEA. This is of vital importance as currently about 60,000 Italians move abroad every year, seven out of 10 taking a college degree with them. The largest number of immigrants goes to the United States, which does not further the EU goals of better job placement and decreased unemployment within the EU. If a degree recognition program were adopted, these educated Italians would be encouraged to migrate within the EU to seek out jobs, internships, or educational opportunities for which they are already fully qualified. It is vitally important that youth from other member states are afforded the same opportunity in Italy.

## **Policy Recommendations**

Recognizing that this group is underrepresented across the EU, Italy supports a universal expansion of the Youth Guarantee for those aged 25-29 in all member states, to be implemented by the end of 2015. Thus the unemployment of those aged 25-29 will factor into the allocation of the Youth Unemployment Initiative budget. Though national sovereignty is important, the risks involved with allowing 25-29-year-olds to be unaided by economic policy are simply too great. The vulnerable state of the EU economy cannot support a 'lost generation' of chronically unemployed who depend for extended periods of time on unemployment benefits, and the time to act is now.

Italy also calls attention to the dependence upon inconsistent and at times outdated statistics for this group. It is essential that more research be done to provide insight into specific demographic qualities of those aged 25-29 and conditions that may contribute to their disproportionate unemployment level. Therefore, Italy recommends that Eurostat be directed to begin gathering research that has already been conducted by Eurostat and private groups, beginning new research, and creating a base of statistics (similar to those created for ages 15-24) reporting on economic status and other conditions, so that the EU may better understand this group and formulate more effective policy initiatives. Because this is a small group and an issue somewhat limited in scope, funding for this initiative will be taken from the existing Eurostat budget. The process will begin in 2015.

An important step in continuing to reduce unemployment rates for those aged 25-29 will be the sharing of best practices. Due to a much higher difference between 25-29-year-olds and the general population in EU periphery states than central/core members, a dialogue must be undertaken in the proximate EU

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meeting on the Youth Guarantee for an open sharing of ideas between low-stress and high-stress countries. Research on best-practices, case studies, and the statistics to be gathered by Eurostat will be documented in an EU report on economic policy for this group, to be published no later than 2016.

To foster cross-border mobility, an agreement of recognition within all EU member states of comparable higher education degrees is clearly needed. It is the responsibility of the EU to further standardize the system of values for various higher degrees, so that they may be universally recognized throughout the EU. Italy believes that the existing Bologna Accords are the most efficient framework for increasing cross-border recognition of academic degrees. Therefore, Italy recommends mandatory assignation of the Bologna accords by all EU member states.

However, Italy is also aware of the necessity of a review of those policies already enumerated in the Bologna accords. It has been argued that certain policies or riders that were introduced in the original Accords interfere unnecessarily with universities' educational systems without increasing productivity or standards. Italy recommends an investigation into the existing Bologna Accords under the existing framework of the Lisbon Recognition Convention and its sub-bodies the Committee of the Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the European Region, and the European Network of Information Centres on Academic Mobility and Recognition (the ENIC Network). This review shall be conducted during 2015 and discussed in the Bologna's 2015 meetings and forums, and in 2016 a summit shall be held including all signatories of the Bologna Accords (that is, all member states) to finalize and ratify suggested changes in the Accords.

It is also essential for maximum coordination that the Bologna Accords define categories and evaluations of competency for not just Bachelor's and Master's equivalents, but doctorate degrees as well. This shall be discussed at the next Bologna Policy Forum to be held in May 2015. A defined set of qualifications for a doctorate degree will be recommended and voted upon no later than 2016.

As the Bologna Accords become universally enforced throughout the European Union and are continually reviewed to maximize effectiveness, clarity and productivity, more of the European Union's young people will be afforded the employment opportunities they deserve, in whatever county they may be found. More students will be likely to study abroad, which increases employment opportunity later in life. Furthermore, the EU's educational system will increase in competitiveness and draw students not just from the EU, but from around the globe. Increasing cross-border recognition of academic degrees through the aforementioned policies will aid EU youth and provide a much-needed economic boost.

## **Example 3**

### **Sweden Head of Government**

European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy

#### **I. Introduction**

The nation of Sweden values European integration and international security, which have been two constant themes of the European project. As the EU has demonstrated greater economic unification in recent decades, the need to amalgamate its defense to protect these values has also risen. Reform of the EU's CFSP will be essential to maintain and further cultivate the economic power the institution has secured. The nation of Sweden has historically remained neutral in terms of military alliances; however, the nation strongly supports further integration of the CFSP, as the need for securing European interests

increases.<sup>1</sup>

Along with European alliance, the EU must also partner with regional allies to achieve security. It is Sweden's assertion that Turkey, along with other non-member states should be allowed to participate within CFSP operations. Although threats to democracy in Turkey are cause for concern, the nation's integral role in global security cannot be overlooked.

Sweden strongly believes that although most international matters should be first subjected to diplomacy and peaceful negotiation, there are situations that warrant an immediate military response. Therefore, as the international community continues to combat terrorism, civil war, and insurgent groups, there is an unavoidable need for the unification of defense within the EU. It is Sweden's belief that as member states take a vested interest in collective security, and comprise obligatory battle groups, the EU can thrive.

## II. The Situation in Sweden

Sweden can identify two foreign relations initiatives that are essential to European prosperity. The first of these initiatives is to promote cooperation and development within the European Neighborhood and surrounding regions. The second is to combat Islamic extremism and insurgency in the Middle East.<sup>2</sup> Turkey has acted as a key European ally throughout the implementation of these initiatives. As thousands of displaced people have poured into the European Continent due to conflicts such as the Syrian Civil War, Turkey has supported the EU's refugee resettlement efforts by accepting over 3 million people.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, Turkey's position as a gateway to the Middle East, as well as their continued efforts within defense communities, such as NATO, cannot be ignored.

The Swedish Government is aware of and alarmed by recent internal threats to Turkey's democracy. President Erdogan has made persistent efforts to silence political opposition since his election to Prime Minister in 2002. Now as president, Erdogan has used his position to eradicate dissonance to his administration. Sweden strongly disavows the imprisonment of journalists, lawyers, protesters, academics, and politicians that is taking place under President Erdogan.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, Sweden asserts that Turkish participation in the CFSP is likely an important tool to prevent future autocratic acts, in addition to being opportunistic for European interests. Turning away from Turkey at this time will only inhibit European guidance, leaving the nation susceptible to other regional authorities.

Sweden's historical neutrality in no way excludes the nation from intervening when fellow member states are in need. In fact, Sweden's current foreign policy relies on creating coalitions with organizations such as the EU or NATO. As the EU expands, there is a need to have fast-acting units, that can be deployed with ease. However, this need cannot be realized due to the ineffectual nature of Europe's current battle groups.<sup>5</sup> In fact, the EU's existing battle groups have not been deployed in years due to their inadequacy. Therefore, Sweden favors all member states entering into obligatory battle groups, and expanding those groups to fit the EU's security requirements. The responses from these units do not need to be inherently militant. Moreover, within this reformation, Sweden would like to see these

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<sup>1</sup> Aggestam, Lisbeth. "The European Internationalist: Sweden and European Security Cooperation." Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge. 203. 2007. Web. 10 Jan. 2018.

<sup>2</sup> "EU Relations with the Rest of the World." Government Offices of Sweden. N.p. Web. 10 Jan. 2018.

<sup>3</sup> Akedmir, Aysegul. "Syrian Refugees in Turkey." The Conversation. N.p. 26 Sept. 2017. Web. 10 Jan. 2018.

<sup>4</sup> "Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey's pugnacious president." BBC News. N.p. April 17, 2017. Web. 10 Jan. 2018.

<sup>5</sup> Deutsche Welle. "Debate surrounds future of EU battle groups | Europe | DW | 01.06.2013." DW.COM. N.p. 6 Jan. 2013. Web. 10 Jan. 2018.



groups trained as multipurpose units; utilized for a variety of efforts such as development projects and natural disaster aid, in addition to military operations.

### **III. Proposals & Solutions**

The nation of Sweden proposes that Turkey be allowed membership into the CFSP. Sweden supports Turkish CFSP membership by 2020, with full voting rights by no later than 2025. Sweden recognizes the immediate internal threat to Turkish democracy; however, Turkish CFSP membership may prove to be the solution to this threat. First, their regional placement creates an immense geopolitical advantage for the EU. Turkey's proximity and ties to the Middle East provide avenues for European influence in the region. Additionally, Turkey has been a reliable resource in other EU relationships. As one of the EU's largest trading partners, and a firm ally in the NATO coalition, Turkey's rapport cannot be over-looked. Lastly, Sweden does not believe that further Turkish isolation is conducive to promoting democracy or European integration. Alienating Turkey will only give way to Russian influence, and limit Europe's regional abilities.<sup>6</sup>

Sweden asserts that EU foreign policy is not complete without rapid response units. It is imperative for the protection of European interests that there are obligatory battle groups. Therefore, Sweden proposes that all states contribute a proportional number of participants to EU battle groups. These battle groups should be ready for military response, with an emphasis on cooperation with NATO, European NATO members, and the Eastern Partnership.<sup>7</sup>

### **IV. Closing Remarks**

As the EU continues to thrive in the capacity of a major geopolitical and economic power, Sweden believes European defense should expand to accommodate that growth and ensure protection of foreign and domestic interests. Sweden believes that this can be achieved by a stronger, more unified Europe. This unification will come in many forms; however, security will be on the forefront of that alignment.

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<sup>6</sup> "The Swedish Committee on European Union Affairs" EU-nämndens uppteckningar EU Committee Records 2017. N.p. Web. 5 Feb, 2018.

<sup>7</sup> "Swedish Committee of Foreign Affairs." (2015). Verksamheten i Europeiska unionen Operations in the European Union in 2015. N.p. Web. 5 Feb. 2018.