


1. Numerous Geopolitical Theories have been proposed to try to explain how and why states and peoples take, maintain and lose power. In this question you will discuss two different Geopolitical Theories. First, give a historical example of one Geopolitical Theory. Next, discuss how a different Geopolitical Theory might and/or might NOT apply to a 21st century example of a power struggle. (Note - you are discussing TWO different theories, using ONE example for each.)


For each example:

- Define the theory (name, whose, when, where, premise)
- Discuss a historical power struggle in terms of the theory. (Who, when, where, how, why, rationale, opposition/obstacles)
- On the map provided clearly mark and label the location the original theory and the location of your example.



2. You have read about and discussed the issue of the Kurdish people, their goals and challenges in reaching those goals. Answer the following questions focusing on the Kurdish people.

- Define the political geography concepts of *nation*, *state* and *stateless nation*.
- Describe the *situation* (Human Geography key term) of the Kurds and mark it on the map provided.
- Discuss the aspirations of this group and the obstacles they face. What do they want? What stands in their way?
- Discuss the wider geopolitical implications for major world powers in light of these aspirations. What obstacles are posed by their immediate neighbors and world powers?



EUROSCEPTICISM: THE ROOT CAUSES AND HOW TO ADDRESS THEM

I. DEFINITION


-Euroscepticism*: is a concept (*Ogden Richard*), that is to say a mix between a term, a meaning and some referents. Euroscepticism is synonymous to Euro realism, Euro pessimism, EU skepticism. This is among everything a **catch word**, created by the Times in 1985. It describes **a continuum** from a **HARD VERSION** - The European idea is entirely rejected - to a **SOFT VERSION** : only some of the European policies /institutions are criticized¹.

-Cause *: the producer of an effect, result, or consequence.

II. STATISTIC DATA AND PROBLEMATIC

Nota bene: The use of opinion polls cannot be seen as a perfect representation of mass opinion as Gaxie explained it. As far as people feel concerned by the questions, answers get sense. But if not, people do not get a very definite opinion. Their views can sway from one moment to another in time since they do not always understand correctly the meaning of the question.

Evolution of Euroscepticism in France, long term (chart 1):




Graphic 1: From the European Commission's website on Public Opinion

¹ Szczerbiak, Paul A. Taggart 2002

The “good thing” answer is decreasing from 1973 to 1980 and from 1988 to 2008. The answer “a bad thing” is constantly increasing from 1988 and is sharpening since the 2000’s. The answer “neither a good nor bad” is remaining more or less stable during the studied period.

Evolution of Euroscepticism, short-term (chart 2):



Graphic 2: From the European Commission’s website on Public Opinion

The image of the EU has deteriorated. From 2003 to 2010 the “fairly positive” image of the EU is stable, but then it is decreasing. The “neutral image” of the EU has been growing slowly since 2003, and is overtaking the “good image” at the end of 2013. The “fairly negative” image has been rising generally since 2008. By the way, it corresponds to the beginning of the economical crisis. Finally the “very positive” curve is being overtaken by the “very negative” from 2010. There are few “neutral” opinions on the image of the EU.

French Euroscepticism does exist and had been evolving in the long term as well as in the short term.

What structural and short-term factors fuel Euroscepticism? How to explain the growing phenomenon of Euroscepticism in France? How the national background affects the configuration of Euroscepticism? How to transform the Euroscepticism trend to “Eurooptimism”?

III. VARIETY OF EUROSCEPTICISM IN FRANCE

In France there are mainly **3 types of Euroscepticism**:

1. **The Nationalist type (SOFT-MEDIUM EUROSCEPTICISM)**. This euroscepticism is composed by De Gaulle's descendants, and on the left side by the communists (Mélanchon nowadays) or one part of the socialists. They accept cooperation, but they are against integration. It has always been a problem for them to have a large and really integrated EU because it represents a threat to the nation and to sovereignty.
2. **The Euro-critic and disenchanted type = a utilitarian Euroscepticism (SOFT-HARD EUROSCEPTICISM)**. This kind of Euroscepticism is disappointed by the EU system and the way EU is conducted. One part is reformist; they aspire to change the EU system. They criticize the lack of democracy, the lack of transparency, and austerity policies etc. The other part is just disappointed, marked by apathy. Their attitudes toward the EU reflect their positioning toward the national political system.
3. **The populist type (HARD EUROSCEPTICISM)**. Euroscepticism is an extension to their national anti-system attitude. Rejection of centralization, elitism and bureaucracy are applied to the EU through their Eurosceptic position.

IV. STRUCTURAL AND SHORT-TERM CAUSES OF EUROSCEPTICISM

Factors of Euroscepticism in France are both structural and temporary.


A. **STRUCTURAL FACTORS:**

- a. **National specificities and resistances regarding the EU construction.**

Political analyses are clear: the historical French background has always been partly tied to -for one side of the society- a sovereigntist's conception. The European Defense Community, a plan proposed by French politician René Pleven, failed to obtain the French ratification in 1954. De Gaulle imposed his vision of the EU through blockades in 1966. This political conduct led first doubts on the spill-over theory concerning the EU. Also, unlike Italia, the Communist party also rejected integration and pro-federalist orientations concerning the EU.

Another French specificity pertains to the utilitarian behavior that a lot of people get about the EU. Part of the population thinks the EU integration in terms of economical and social gain and

loss². This is really particular to France; the Maastricht Treaty was discussed in 1992 for economic and social reasons only. It is not the case for other countries where debates focus on values (abortion, secularism). A majority of the French citizens expects direct benefits of the EU. But the EU redistributes direct returns to few citizens: Erasmus students, farmers, and some people working on cultural projects. The EU financing is always complementary to national financing. Except people working in the administration field, citizens do not see the so-expected direct repercussion of the EU in their lives. Another explanation is the fact the EU is always presented as an economic object by politicians and the media that pretend to generate wealth for each EU members. Its diplomatic (Peace, influence in the International Relationship, Commune Defensive entity, etc) or cultural (Erasmus, Educational projects), and social aims (Gender equality at work: Defrenne, etc) are little relayed in the French public sphere. This relation to the EU corresponds also to the fact few people identify themselves as European above all (*see graph3 below*): generally speaking the national, regional, local or ethnic identities come first³.



Graphic 3: from the European Commission's website on Public Opinion


The last specificity of France is its concern about the Social⁴ sphere. As we can see below, matters for social losses in France are far higher than the average. According to Catharina Sorensen's thesis France has a certain level of Euroscepticism on social matters. This tendency remains stable in the long time perspective. Thus, the vestige of the Jacobinic tradition generates to some extent reluctances toward economic liberalism. In numerous polls, the call for

² see Cecile Leconte, *Understanding Euroscepticism*

³ See Kauffmann

⁴ see Catharina Sorensen PhD thesis on Euroscepticism

additional social actions and programs within the EU is evocated. This characteristic enlightens us on the specificity of French Euroscepticism.



Graphic 4: Graph from Catharina Sorensen, *Euroscepticism: a conceptual analysis and a longitudinal, cross-country examination of Public Scepticism towards the EU*, PhD Thesis

b. EU's incapacity to generate identity and massive support.

On the other hand, the EU itself does not succeed in generating a pro-european feeling upon citizens.

The EU institution and its disfunctionments gave arguments to Eurosceptics : democratic deficit, lack of information/communication to citizens (ex: the TAFTA), lack of transparency, complexity of the bureaucratic system, gap between EU-citizen's socio-cultural origin and MEP's socio-cultural origin (white male elites, ...), difficulties to promote a common european feeling of belonging. Some policies did not find support in society or within specific professional groups: the conditioned ecological subventions for farmers is an illustration of it.

Also, the EU is an Unidentified Political Object. Its frontiers are changing every decade, there is no common language or common culture. The membership feeling is harder to construct than at national level. The EU has to work in that direction, to build an un-natural but fundamental feeling of identity.

B. SHORT-TERM FACTORS:

a. Economic crisis and increase of populism

The beginning of the economic crisis corresponds to the decrease of French optimism regarding the EU (*see graph 2*). Some citizens blame the EU for the economic situation or might connect it with globalization and so far with the EU. Since the crisis, people are more reluctant towards the EU; there is a tendency to withdraw into communities. France is part of that dynamic. More recently, the Greek debt crisis and the south Mediterranean debts have generated doubts on EU's capacity to generate profits. Part of French people might fear loss of their social status. To

their point of view, this impoverishment is partly caused by the EU membership. That is why the EU membership is questioned.

By connection, the economic instability paves the way for populists. This phenomenon has been proved in history. In France, the FN party shifts the blame onto the national leaders and the EU institution, using traditional arguments: lack of democracy, bureaucracy of elites, dangers of immigration, threat to French culture or to the nation. As an extension of the rise of populism, there is a rise of Euroscepticism. The FN is a protest-based party with Euroscepticism⁵. In a cultural perspective they turn away from immigration and national frontiers' abrogation enabled by the Schengen area. In a political outlook, they reject European institutions and decision making as a way to weaken the national power. At an economic level they repudiate the neo-liberal European system; they favor economic nationalism.

b. Media system and political discourses

Analyzing the political class speeches about the EU, it is obvious that European integration is not high on the French political agenda⁶. Few politicians talk about the EU. Their interventions are quite critical about the EU policies. Furthermore, the EU topic is mostly broached by the Front National (FN) party. The FN fuels a really negative discourse on the EU even if its arguments on it are not so advanced. They use a global rejection sales pitch and the French media pass it on. The role of the media is important especially as psychological analyses⁷ demonstrated. EU citizens make reasonable decisions despite their lack of information. They use references. The national political context – (more familiar to them) – serves as a yardstick to the issue of EU policy competence. The reference to the media or to the public debates is really important for them to make their opinion, much more than for the national issues. The monopole the FN got on EU's topic in the public sphere and in the media is contra productive to fabricate optimistic opinions on the EU.

V. HOW TO ADDRESS EUROSCEPTICISM IN FRANCE?

- Creating a **European identity** to enhance support for the integration.
- Setting up a real **social European model**. It is important for France, a country that got a high level of social expenditure.
- Adopting measures to **inform and educate** toward the functioning of the EU and the real costs or gains of European integration.

Nota bene: Karp “*The more people get the impression to understand EU politics, the more they have the feeling to be able to influence it and they are more optimistic on it*”. Karp verified empirically direct effect in France of educational policies upon the EU.

⁵ Taggart 1998

⁶ O.Costa

⁷ See the article of Alexandra MöBner in *Euroscepticism Image of Europe among mass publics and political elites*

These recommendations imply:

➔ **Action from the EU.** Some ideas:

- Readjusting some of the EU's financing: initiating direct funding from the EU to its citizens so people sees the direct plus-value of membership.
- Leading communication and educational campaign on EU citizenship.
- Imposing a shift in its guidelines toward more social policies.
- Creating innovative programs that develop a sense of being a member of the EU.
- Adopting striking symbols to strengthen the identity feeling.
- Putting into process participative programs with deliberation.

➔ **Action from the national political elites and media.** Some ideas:

- Developing communication and educational campaigns to explain the EU membership benefits.
- Fostering debates about the EU in the civil society with deliberative participation of citizens.
- Encouraging French political parties to grasp the opportunity to discuss about the EU in an objective way.

Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit

Significant opposition in key European countries to an ever closer EU

BY BRUCE STOKES

On June 23, people in the United Kingdom will vote on a referendum on whether to remain in the European Union or to leave the Brussels-based institution, a decision that has come to be called Brexit. The British go to the polls at a time when a new multi-nation survey from Pew Research Center finds that Euroskepticism is on the rise across Europe and that about two-thirds of both the British and the Greeks, along with significant minorities in other key nations, want some powers returned from Brussels to national governments. Whether favorable or not toward Brussels, most Europeans agree that a British exit would harm the 28-member EU. A median of just 51% across 10 EU countries surveyed have a favorable view of the European Union. A median of 42% in these 10 nations want more power returned to their national capitals, while only 19% favor giving Brussels more power and 27% favor the status quo. Nevertheless, a median of 70% in the nine EU nations surveyed that don't get a vote June 23 believe it would be bad for the EU if the UK decided to depart. Only 16% say it would be a good thing.

European publics are sharply divided along partisan lines on many of these issues. Supporters of Euroskeptical parties – especially in France, Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK – are much less likely than adherents to other major parties to have a favorable view of the European Union.

These are among the key findings from a new survey by Pew Research Center, conducted in 10 EU nations among 10,491 respondents from April 4 to May 12, 2016. The survey includes countries that account for 80% of the EU-28 population and 82% of the EU's GDP.

A double dip in EU favorability

The British are not the only ones with doubts about the European Union. The EU's image and stature have been on a roller coaster ride in recent years throughout Europe. In a number of nations the portion of the public with a favorable view of the Brussels-based institution fell markedly from 2012 to 2013 as the European economy cratered. It subsequently rebounded in 2014 and 2015. But the EU is again experiencing a sharp dip in public support in a number of its largest member states.

The institution's strongest backers are the Poles (72%) and the Hungarians (61%). In many other nations, support is tepid. Just 27% of the Greeks, 38% of the French and 47% of the Spanish have a favorable opinion of the EU. Notably, 44% of the British view the EU favorably, including 53% of the Scottish.

EU favorability is down in five of the six nations surveyed in both 2015 and 2016. There has been a double-digit drop in France (down 17 percentage points) and Spain (16 points), and single-digit declines in Germany (8 points), the United Kingdom (7 points) and Italy (6 points).

<http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexit/>

Young people – those ages 18 to 34 – are more favorable toward the European Union than people 50 and older in six of the 10 nations surveyed. The generation gap is most pronounced in France – 25 percentage points – with 56% of young people but only 31% of older people having a positive opinion of the EU. There are similar generation gaps of 19 points in the UK, 16 points in the Netherlands, 14 points in Poland and Germany, and 13 points in Greece.

The drop-off in overall EU support in key countries in the past year has been driven by a fall in favorability among older people in particular. In France, EU backing among those ages 50 and older fell 19 points. In Spain it declined 16 points and in Germany 11 points. In each case this was larger than the decline in support among those ages 18 to 34.

Europeans are divided along ideological lines in their views of the EU, but this division is not a simple matter of left versus right in each society. In some nations Euroskepticism is a right-wing issue, in others it is a left-wing cause.

In the UK, people who place themselves on the left of the ideological spectrum (69%) are 31 percentage points more likely than those on the right of the spectrum (38%) to have a favorable opinion of the EU. There is a similar 23-point ideological gap in Italy, a 16-point divide in the Netherlands and a 12-point difference in Germany. But in Spain people on the right (59%) are more likely than those on the left (35%) to favor the Brussels-based institution by a margin of 24 percentage points. The EU also enjoys stronger backing on the right in Sweden.

These ideological differences translate into large partisan divides on the issues. Not surprisingly, in the UK just 13% of those who identify with the Euroskeptic United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) hold a favorable opinion of the EU. Such views on the EU set UKIP supporters apart from the opinions of Labour Party backers (60% positive about the EU) and Conservative Party stalwarts (43% favorable toward the EU). In France, three-in-ten adherents of the Euroskeptic National Front (30%) are favorably disposed toward the EU. The country's Republicans supporters (39%) are not much more favorable toward the EU, while about half of France's Socialist party backers (51%) support the institution. In Spain, just 32% of the left-wing populist Podemos party adherents favor the EU. Not enough Germans identify with the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party to analyze their sentiment, but among Germans who view the AfD favorably, only a third support the EU. A party's criticism of the European Union does not, however, necessarily translate into disfavor toward Brussels by the party's adherents. In Italy, 58% of those who identify with the Euroskeptic Five Star Movement have a positive view of the EU. In Poland, where the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party is in a feud with the EU on a range of issues, two-thirds (67%) of PiS partisans still have a favorable opinion of the Brussels institution. Much of the disaffection with the EU among Europeans can be attributed to Brussels' handling of the refugee issue. In every country surveyed, overwhelming majorities disapprove of how Brussels has dealt with the

<http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexit/>

problem. This includes 94% of Greeks, 88% of Swedes and 77% of Italians. The strongest approval of EU management of the refugee crisis is in the Netherlands, but that backing is a tepid 31%.

The EU's handling of economic issues is another huge source of disaffection with the institution. About nine-in-ten Greeks (92%) disapprove of how the EU has dealt with the ongoing economic crisis. Roughly two-thirds of the Italians (68%), French (66%) and Spanish (65%) similarly disapprove. (France and Spain are the two nations where the favorability of the EU has recently experienced the largest decline.) Majorities in Sweden (59%) and the UK (55%), including 84% of UKIP supporters, also disapprove of the EU's job in dealing with economic challenges. The strongest approval of Brussels' economic efforts is in Poland and Germany (both 47%).

An 'ever closer' Europe – or not

The 1957 Treaty of Rome, the founding document of what eventually became the European Union, pledges its signatories, and all the nations that later acceded to it, "...to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe." In early 2016, British Prime Minister David Cameron negotiated an agreement with other EU governments that the founding treaty's "references to ever closer union do not apply to the United Kingdom." Nevertheless, disagreement over whether governance in Europe should be more or less centralized is at the center of the UK referendum debate on whether or not to exit the EU. The Pew Research Center survey finds that in six of 10 countries more people want devolution of EU power than support the status quo or favor giving more power to the Brussels-based institution.

Roughly two-thirds of Greeks (68%) and British (65%) want some EU power returned to Athens and London. This is particularly the view of British ages 50 and older (73%); only 51% of those ages 18-34 agree. Pluralities in Sweden (47%), the Netherlands (44%), Germany (43%) and Italy (39%) also want to curtail EU power.

Conversely, there is little enthusiasm for transferring more power to Brussels. As the British head to the polls, just 6% of the public in the UK wants such an outcome. And only 8% of Greeks favor more power for the EU. The strongest backing for an ever closer Europe is only 34%, in France. In most countries a quarter or more of the public prefers to keep the current division of power.

In a number of nations men express stronger opposition than women to an ever closer union. This gender gap is most prominent in the Netherlands (12 percentage points), with 50% of men, but only 38% of women favoring some powers being returned to The Hague. There is also a 10-point divide in the UK (70% of men compared with 60% of women want some powers returned to their country) and Sweden (52% of men vs. 42% of women).

The largest ideological gap on European division of powers is in the United Kingdom. Roughly three-quarters (77%) of people who place themselves on the right of the political spectrum favor returning some EU powers to

<http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexite/>

London. Just 40% of people on the left agree. In the Netherlands, a little over half (53%) of people on the right, but only about a third (36%) of Dutch on the left support a less centralized EU. Notably, this right-left divide is reversed in Spain, and is especially large. Half of Spanish leftists, but only about three-in-ten (29%) Spanish rightists want more power brought back to Madrid.

This ideological split also manifests itself in the views of political party adherents. In the United Kingdom, 93% of UKIP supporters think that some powers now held by the EU should be returned to national governments. Conservatives (77%) agree with them more than Labour Party (49%) adherents. In Italy, 51% of Five Star supporters want some power to revert to Rome; 37% of Forza Italia partisans and 28% of Democratic Party supporters agree. In Poland, 45% of PiS backers, but only 20% of PO adherents want some power returned to Warsaw. In Spain, 44% of Podemos partisans want some EU power back in Madrid, 37% of supporters of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) want this, and 34% of the Ciudadanos and 26% of those identifying with the People's Party (PP) concur. In France, a plurality of National Front supporters (39%) want Paris to regain some of its power from Brussels. A larger share of Republican backers (43%) want to bring powers home from Brussels, but only 28% of Socialists agree.

Is Brexit bad for the EU?

There is overwhelming sentiment across Europe that Brexit would be a bad thing for the European institution: 89% in Sweden, 75% in the Netherlands and 74% in Germany say the British leaving would be not good for the EU.

France is the only country where more than a quarter (32%) of the public says it would be positive for the EU if the UK departed.

Notably, in all nine countries where the question was asked, large pluralities of people on the left, in the middle and on the right of the political spectrum say a UK exit from the EU would be a bad thing for the EU. But the breakdown in sentiment by political party is more complex. In France, nearly seven-in-ten (71%) supporters of the Socialist and Republican parties believe it would not be good for the EU if the UK left. However, National Front backers are nearly divided on the topic. And even though the German AfD shares many of the criticisms of the EU with the UK Independence Party, two-thirds of Germans who have a favorable opinion of the AfD think it would be a bad thing for the EU if the UK left.

French are 'even more anti-EU than the Brits'

Photo: AFP

The Local

news.france@thelocal.com

30 March 2016

08:30 CEST+02:00

A study on how citizens across Europe are feeling towards the EU and migrants has revealed that the French are among the most negative, while it's perhaps no surprise which nation is the most positive.

The French, along with the Belgians, the Dutch and the Italians, harbour the most negative views of the European Union, according to the poll by Elabe, carried out for French news site Atlantico.

Only 26 percent of the French and the Italians consider that there are “more advantages than drawbacks” when it comes to being part of the EU.

For the Dutch and the Belgians it's only 25 percent.

Whereas in Britain, which is embroiled in an increasingly bitter debate on whether or not to stay in the EU ahead of June's referendum, 36 percent of people believe there are “more advantages than drawbacks” of EU membership.

On the other hand, 40 percent of French people think the opposite – that the EU has more downsides than positive aspects, compared to 37 percent of Belgians and Dutch. In Britain the number also stood at 40 percent.

Elabe's head of political studies, Yves-Marie Cann said part of the antagonism towards the EU in France, can be explained by the fact the population “had higher expectations towards the European Union, certainly more than in the UK”.

“EU membership has always been a subject of debate in the UK, whereas it's fairly new in France and has grown with the disappointments, mainly economic, that have accumulated in recent years,” [Cann told Atlantico.](#)
[Voir l'image sur Twitter](#)

'There's no real debate in France like in the UK'

The analyst said criticism had grown towards the EU in France because instead of protecting European markets as many had hoped, they saw the bloc as a “Trojan horse of unbridled liberalism” in that it increased competition between countries and between Europe and emerging markets.

He also believed the recent terror attacks in Europe have had an impact on French public opinion.

“The European Union is perceived as incapable of ensuring security within its territory and to control the external borders and to regulate migration flows.”

The political analyst believed an open debate on the merits of the EU, as is taking place in the UK, may boost the anti-EU National Front, but it would also force France's two pro-Europe mainstream parties to face up to the issue.

The survey revealed that Spain, a country that has suffered from severe austerity measures imposed under pressure from Brussels, is home to those with the most positive view of EU membership.

Some 54 percent of Spaniards believe there are “more advantages to drawbacks” of being in the EU, compared to 42 percent of Germans – who are normally the most upbeat towards the EU, given they are the bloc's most powerful country.

The survey is just the latest to show the growing anti-EU feeling in France, which in real terms could also be seen by the fact the anti-EU National Front picked up a record 6.8 million votes in last year's regional elections.

Earlier this month, [The Local reported on a survey by the University of Edinburgh](#) that revealed most French people want to follow Britain by holding a referendum on the country's European Union membership.

That survey also revealed that, unlike other European countries, the French are not too fussed if Britain stays or goes in the June 23rd referendum.

In France there are mainly 3 types of Euroscepticism:

1. The Nationalist type (SOFT-MEDIUM EUROSCEPTICISM). This euroscepticism is composed by De Gaulle's descendants, and on the left side by the communists (Mélanchon nowadays) or one part of the socialists. They accept cooperation, but they are against integration. It has always been a problem for them to have a large and really integrated EU because it represents a threat to the nation and to sovereignty.
2. The Euro-critic and disenchanted type = a utilitarian Euroscepticism (SOFT-HARD EUROSCEPTICISM). This kind of Euroscepticism is disappointed by the EU system and the way EU is conducted. One part is reformist; they aspire to change the EU system. They criticize the lack of democracy, the lack of transparency, and austerity policies etc. The other part is just disappointed, marked by apathy. Their attitudes toward the EU reflect their positioning toward the national political system.
3. The populist type (HARD EUROSCEPTICISM). Euroscepticism is an extension to their national anti-system attitude. Rejection of centralization, elitism and bureaucracy are applied to the EU through their Eurosceptic position.

A majority of the French citizens expects direct benefits of the EU. But the EU redistributes direct returns to few citizens: Erasmus students, farmers, and some people working on cultural projects. The EU financing is always complementary to national financing. Except people working in the administration field, citizens do not see the so-expected direct repercussion of the EU in their lives. Another explanation is the fact the EU is always presented as an economic object by politicians and the media that pretend to generate wealth for each EU members. Its diplomatic (Peace, influence in the International Relationship, Commune Defensive entity, etc.) or cultural (Erasmus, Educational projects), and social aims (Gender equality at work: Defrenne, etc.) are little relayed in the French public sphere. This relation to the EU corresponds also to the fact few people identify themselves as European above all: generally speaking the national, regional, local or ethnic identities come first .

...

As an extension of the rise of populism, there is a rise of Euroscepticism. The FN [National Front] is a protest-based party with Euroscepticism . In a cultural perspective they turn away from immigration and national frontiers' abrogation enabled by the Schengen area. In a political outlook, they reject European institutions and decision making as a way to weaken the national power. At an economic level they repudiate the neoliberal European system*; they favor economic nationalism.

...

Analyzing the political class speeches about the EU, it is obvious that European integration is not high on the French political agenda. Few politicians talk about the EU. Their interventions are quite critical about the EU policies. Furthermore, the EU topic is mostly broached by the Front National (FN) party. The FN fuels a really negative discourse on the EU even if its arguments on it are not so advanced. They use a global rejection sales pitch and the French media pass it on. The role of the media is important especially as psychological analyses demonstrated. EU citizens make reasonable decisions despite their lack of information. They use references. The national political context – (more familiar to them) – serves as a yardstick to the issue of EU policy competence. The reference to the media or to the public debates is really important for them to make their opinion, much more than for the national issues. The monopole the FN got on EU's topic in the public sphere and in the media is contra productive to fabricate optimistic opinions on the EU.

*What is 'Neoliberalism' **Neoliberalism is a policy model of social studies and economics that transfers control of economic factors to the [private sector](#) from the public sector. It takes from the basic principles of [neoclassical economics](#), suggesting that governments must limit [subsidies](#), make reforms to tax law in order to expand the [tax base](#), reduce [deficit spending](#), limit [protectionism](#), and [open markets](#) up to trade. It also seeks to abolish [fixed exchange rates](#), back [deregulation](#), permit private property, and privatize businesses run by the state.**
<http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/neoliberalism.asp#ixzz4UZ8PukfK>

From the Front National (National Front) website: (google translation)

<http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/autorite-de-letat/etat-fort/>

ANALYSIS

The emergence of the French nation over the centuries is characterized by the key role played by the state, a strong state that has unified the nation, contain the feudal and communitarianism, annihilate tribalization, develop our territory and gradually offer Education, care, safety and quality public services.

Under a double movement that has been increasing for several decades, from above and below, the state is today deeply weakened.

France nevertheless needs a strong state to ensure its rearmament in the face of globalization. When the European Union fails and persists in following the wrong direction, when the region is too small, the state is able to rely on the strengths of our country to spearhead reindustrialization and Of the national recovery.

This double movement of weakening of the State is thus presented:

1. Uncontrolled decentralization first (launched in 1981 and accentuated in 2004) deprived the State of strategic powers: regional transport, national roads, economic action in particular. Many, including many local politicians, feel that we have gone too far in the transfer of skills. This decentralization is a widening of the inequalities between the territories and the French, an increasing complexity of public decision-making, aggravated corruption, and the reconstitution of local spending feudalities to the detriment of a strategic state.

2. The European Union, the Trojan horse of ultra-liberal globalization: since the Treaty of Maastricht, the European Treaties have imposed the dogma of free and undistorted competition, ideally prohibit state aid to our companies, Both internal and external. In short, any form of economic patriotism.

In 2009, the State's € 6 billion aid to Renault and PSA could not be made conditional on the maintenance of activities in France due to recriminations of the European Commission. It is an incentive to relocate and destroy jobs in France. In 2011, the same Brussels Commission ruled against the European rules the project of recapitalization of the company Seafrance by its shareholder the SNCF: hundreds of jobs are thus threatened.

This double movement of weakness must find a strong political will. The strong state has several objectives essential to the prosperity of our country and of the French people:

- Respect for republican values in the face of local feudalism and communitarianism.
- The reindustrialization of France, against unemployment and relocation.
- Innovation for the future: research cooperation between private and public actors is not working well in France, and our overall research and development effort is insufficient.
- The rebuilding of public services decimated by three decades of ultra-liberal ideology: The UMP and

Frexit Is Coming

Britain's departure meant the end of an era. France's departure would mean the end of the EU.

- BY [ROBERT ZARETSKY](#)
- JUNE 29, 2016

After Grexit and Brexit, the next crisis to confront the European Union will be Frexit. It will prove to be the worst of all. While dramatic, the Greek tragedy had a limited run. While seismic, the British divorce will not necessarily upend Brussels. But for historical and institutional reasons, a French crisis would be cataclysmic. The midwife for the EU's birth, France now risks becoming its gravedigger.

The ruin and rubble of World War II had not been entirely cleared when France laid the foundations for the European Union. As former Interior Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement rightly [observed](#) last week, France is the EU's "founding nation par excellence, the only nation capable of taking the initiative to begin Europe's construction at the start of the 1950s." Behind the drab language of the EU's various treaties lay a truly heroic ideal: By ever-closer economic, monetary, and political union, the countries of Europe, led by two nations that had repeatedly been at one another's throats in the 19th and 20th centuries, would make war and material want things of the past. As the Frenchman Jean Monnet, the guiding spirit of this new Europe, declared: "Continue, continue: There is no future for the people of Europe other than in union."

By the same token, the French believe, rightly, there can be no Europe without the people of their own glorious nation. That corollary breathes life into France's traditional conception of a united Europe and thus lends vitality to the continent's abstract ideals. It also motivates Europe's traditional bouts of frustration with France. Upon coming to power in 1958, Charles de Gaulle insisted upon the necessity of a "European Europe." In principle, this meant a united Europe of equals; in practice, de Gaulle meant a Europe in which France would be more equal than the others. Tellingly, when he signed the Rome Treaty in 1958 (the future EU's act of conception), it was not because he believed in "Europe." Instead, it was because he believed in an independent and sovereign France, one yoked to the accomplishment of "great undertakings." De Gaulle accepted the EU because it ensured France's own magnificence.

A funny thing happened, though, on France's way to a future of peace and prosperity. While the former grew humdrum, the latter grew hazier. After enjoying the 30-year period of postwar growth — known as the "*trente glorieuses*" — the French economy faltered during the oil crisis of the early 1970s and never fully recovered. While successive French governments continued to lay bricks for the European project, they failed to restart the national economy — which slowed from an annual average of 4 percent during the *trente glorieuses* to slightly more than 1 percent now forecast for 2017 — just as they failed to resolve the predicament of the growing number of unemployed, which currently stands at slightly more than 10 percent.

As the foundations of a new European order were being laid, France's imperial past caught up with it as hundreds of thousands of immigrants from its former colonies in North Africa — Morocco, Tunisia, and especially Algeria — settled in the country. Recruited to fill jobs created during the *trente glorieuses*, these same immigrants found the welcome mat pulled from under their feet as France's economy slowed and then headed south by the end of the 20th century. By the turn of the 21st century, the diffuse fear of "*le grand remplacement*" — coined by the essayist Renaud Camus and positing the submersion of a white and Christian

France by Arab and Muslim immigrants — had become an article of faith among the growing number of French turning to the extreme right-wing Front National (FN).

The waxing of supranational institutions, the waning of the national economy, the appearance of new immigrant communities, the disappearance of old industries and jobs: All of these are the tributaries spilling into the brackish bog called Frexit. As with Brexit, Frexit is fundamentally a crisis of national identity. The inability of both conservative and socialist governments to redress the growing social and economic fissures in French society, and to reinvent the republican model for the 21st century, has encouraged the retreat to nativism and nationalism. Tellingly, a 2015 [poll](#) revealed that if the 2005 referendum on the European Constitution were to be held again, 62 percent of respondents would vote against it, a 7 percent rise from the original “*non*” vote.

It is a crisis, moreover, the French government seems incapable of addressing. The day after the British vote was tallied, and the stock markets went into a tailspin, President François Hollande went before the nation and again underwhelmed it. He explained that “Europe could not go on as before,” expounded on the need to “reinforce the eurozone and democratic governance,” and exhorted Europe to take the necessary “leap” to secure its future. Stapled to the end of these oft-repeated pieties — spoken by a president with the mien of a funeral home director — was a solemn [chestnut](#): “History,” Hollande intoned, “is knocking at our door.” It remains unclear when or whether Hollande will open the door. Not only are 26 other nations huddled behind the same door squabbling over how to answer the knocking, but the weightiest nation seems in no great hurry to answer it at all. While Hollande was, in his inimitable style, urging his fellow leaders — in particular, German Chancellor Angela Merkel — to make haste, Merkel agreed that Europe must make haste, but slowly. Very slowly. After meeting with the leaders of Germany’s political parties, Merkel [appealed](#) for “calm and determination” and warned against “simple and fast solutions that would only further divide Europe.” In a word, whereas Hollande urged the principal duo of the EU, France and Germany, to take the lead, Merkel instead [emphasized](#) *gemeinsam*, or collective, action. (Over the last 48 hours, Merkel and Hollande have taken great pains to broadcast their unity. Whether this is the case in 48 days remains to be seen.)

Adding to Hollande’s woes, collective action by his own party seems as unlikely as that by the European Union. Just days before the Brexit vote, Hollande bowed to [mounting pressure](#) within the Socialist Party to hold a primary next January to choose its presidential candidate. With an approval rating only slightly better than Romania’s Nicolae Ceausescu’s on the eve of his sudden removal from office in 1989 — according to a recent *Le Monde* [poll](#), just 16 percent of French voters agree Hollande is a “good president” — the Socialist leader had little choice in the matter.

The tumult is greatest on the party’s left. Shortly before the Brexit vote, Arnaud Montebourg was unpersuasively denying reports that he planned to enter the primary race. Having been tapped by Hollande to serve as economy minister, Montebourg found himself unemployed in 2014 when the government, scrambling to meet the EU’s deficit requirements, largely swallowed its austerity demands. Not only has Montebourg since been a consistent critic of these policies, but his earlier anti-globalization sentiments — summarized in his 2011 manifesto *Votez pour la démondialisation* (*Vote for De-Globalization*) — are now crystallizing into a “*dé-europisation*” stance.

Montebourg is not the only prominent figure on the left who is, as he recently described himself, “*euro-épuisé*,” or “Euro-exhausted.” Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the perennial presidential candidate of the Parti de Gauche, has long inveighed against “the caste of Eurocrats and politics of austerity” imposed on EU member states. Not surprisingly, he welcomed the Brexit vote as a reality check for the French political class, as well as a promising harbinger of his own political prospects. “This is the beginning of the end to an era,” he [exclaimed](#). “Either we change the European Union or we leave it.”

Though he hotly refuses such comparisons, Mélenchon’s reasoning and rhetoric echo that of his ideological opposite and nemesis, Marine Le Pen. Among the ways Le Pen has transformed the party founded by her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, is to have turned inside out its relation to Europe. Fervently anti-Communist, anti-Gaullist, and thus pro-Europeanist during the Cold War, the FN began its long lurch toward its current hyper-nationalism with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The near-death of the Maastricht Treaty referendum in 1992, the full death of the European Constitution in the 2005 referendum, and its resurrection two years later in the

widely despised Lisbon Treaty (signed by then-President Nicolas Sarkozy without a referendum) showed Le Pen *père* and *fille* the electoral advantages of mining the deepening vein of popular alienation from Brussels.

In the wake of the Brexit vote, Le Pen could scarcely contain her satisfaction. At a short press conference at the her party's headquarters, Le Pen stood in front of a newly minted poster displaying a pair of hands breaking free of a handcuff made of gold stars. For those unable to interpret the image, there also ran a caption: "And Now France!" Indeed. In her opening remarks, Le Pen congratulated the British people — along with the "very brave" Boris Johnson and her "friend and ally" Janice Atkinson (a European Parliament deputy formerly with the UK Independence Party) — for reminding France that, yes, "it is possible to leave the European Union." She also abstained from playing the religion, race, and immigration cards that brought her to prominence: The French already know the hand she is holding. As a result, she mentioned the word "immigration" just once but repeated more than a dozen times the words "liberty" and "democracy" — the very values born in Europe, she has argued, but scorned by the EU and France's traditional political parties.

"Who would have imagined, just a few months ago, what has since become an imposing reality?" When Le Pen posed the question at her news conference, it was not mere rhetoric. Her conviction that Brexit has rendered Frexit, as well as her quest for the Élysée, all the more conceivable is no longer the stuff of fantasy.

In 2014, Le Pen was already promising that, if elected to the presidency, her first order of business would be to schedule a referendum on whether France should remain in the EU. Suddenly, this promise seems a bit less fantastic, all the more because she has largely succeeded in making the FN a party like the others. (In a recent and underreported finding by France's prestigious polling institute, the IFOP, the historic gap between those who say they will vote for the FN and those who do vote for it has almost entirely closed. This suggests, as IFOP director Jérôme Fourquet [notes](#), that the shame FN voters once felt is a thing of the past.) In the most recent salvo of polls from early June, in which the French were asked for their presidential preferences, Le Pen is the first over the finish line. In [nearly every poll](#), she breaks the barrier of 30 percent, leaving her competitors in the dust.

For the moment, the nature of France's electoral process — in which the top two finishers face off in a second round of voting — remains a rampart against a Le Pen presidency. Polls reveal that the only competitor she would defeat in the second round is the discredited and derided François Hollande. The candidacies of Alain Juppé and Sarkozy, the leading contestants for the nomination of the conservative Les Républicains, pose another obstacle. In a projected second round, both men would attract enough voters from the center and left to decisively defeat Le Pen. Finally, Le Pen's path to the Élysée is also mined by the French public's complex attitude toward the European Union. In an Odoxa [poll](#) taken last week, the French clearly stated that while they cannot live with the EU, they also cannot live without it. Sixty-four percent of respondents do not wish to see France quit the EU, yet at the same time only 31 percent saw the EU as a "source of hope."

Yet, as Le Pen underscored in her press conference, much can happen in the 10 months remaining between now and France's presidential elections. Juppé's Europeanism and economic liberalism can easily morph into political liabilities; by the same token, voters will not forget that Sarkozy, who now insists that the Lisbon Treaty be rewritten, had rammed through [that same treaty](#) in 2007 when he was president. Most important, if the United Kingdom manages a smooth divorce from the EU, a majority of French voters may come to see a "*grande France*" as a source of hope, just as a majority of British voters last week saw hope in a Little England.



Global politics

League of nationalists

- low class Parisians 18th
- extreme revolutionaries

BEIJING, BUDAPEST, CAIRO, DELHI, ISTANBUL, MARGATE AND PARIS
All around the world, nationalists are gaining ground. Why?

AFTER the sans culottes rose up against Louis XVI in 1789 they drew up a declaration of the universal rights of man and of the citizen. Napoleon's Grande Armée marched not just for the glory of France but for liberty, equality and fraternity. By contrast, the nationalism born with the unification of Germany decades later harked back to *Blut und Boden*—blood and soil—a romantic and exclusive belief in race and tradition as the wellspring of national belonging. The German legions were fighting for their Volk and against the world.

folk

All societies draw on nationalism of one sort or another to define relations between the state, the citizen and the outside world. Craig Calhoun, an American sociologist, argues that cosmopolitan elites, who sometimes yearn for a post-nationalist order, underestimate “how central nationalist categories are to political and social theory—and to practical reasoning about democracy, political legitimacy and the nature of society itself.”

It is troubling, then, how many countries are shifting from the universal, civic nationalism towards the blood-and-soil, ethnic sort. As positive patriotism warps into negative nationalism, solidarity is mutating into distrust of minorities, who are present in growing numbers (see chart 1). A benign love of one's country—the spirit

harmless

that impels Americans to salute the Stars and Stripes, Nigerians to cheer the Super Eagles and Britons to buy Duchess of Cambridge teacups—is being replaced by an urge to look on the world with mistrust.

Some perspective is in order. Comparisons with the 1930s are fatuous. Totalitarian nationalism is extinct except in North Korea, where the ruling family preaches a weird mixture of Marxism and racial puri-

silly


ty, enforced with slave-labour camps for dissidents. And perhaps you could add Eritrea, a hideous but tiny dictatorship. Nonetheless, it is clear that an exclusive, often ethnically based, form of nationalism is on the march. In rich democracies, it is a potent vote-winner. In autocracies, rulers espouse it to distract people from their lack of freedom and, sometimes, food. The question is: where is it surging, and why?

The most recent example is Donald Trump, who persuaded 61m Americans to vote for him by promising to build a wall on the Mexican border, deport illegal immigrants and “make America great again”. Noxious appeals to ethnic or racial solidarity are hardly new in American politics, or restricted to one party. Joe Biden, the vice-president, once told a black audience that Mitt Romney, a decent if dull Republican, was “gonna put y'all back in chains”. But no modern American president has matched Mr Trump's displays of chauvinism. That no one knows how much of it he believes is barely reassuring.

His victory will embolden like-minded leaders around the world. Nigel Farage of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), the politician most responsible for Brexit, has already visited Mr Trump, greeting him with a grin wide enough to see off the Cheshire cat. Viktor Orban, Hungary's immigrant-▶

Strangers in a strange land

Foreign-born population as % of total




Source: UN

chauvinism - excessive or aggressive patriotism

Stop the world

Attitudes towards globalisation, % responding

October-November 2016



Source: YouGov/The Economist *The increasing movement of products, ideas, money, jobs, culture and people around the world

► bashing prime minister, rejoiced: "We can return to real democracy... what a wonderful world."

The consequences for the European Union could be disastrous. In France pollsters no longer dismiss the possibility that Marine Le Pen, the charismatic leader of the National Front (FN), could be elected president next year. Compared with other Europeans, French voters are strikingly opposed to globalisation and international trade, and few think immigrants have had a positive effect on their country (see chart 2). Ms Le Pen promises that she would pull France out of the euro and hold a "Frexit" referendum on membership of the EU. The single currency might not survive a French withdrawal. And if French voters were to back Frexit, the EU would surely fall apart.

The rush for the exit

European elites once assumed that national identities would eventually blend into a continental bouillabaisse. But the momentum is now with parties like the FN, including Hungary's Fidesz, Poland's Law and Justice party and Austria's Freedom Party (one of whose leaders, Norbert Hofer, could win Austria's largely ceremonial presidency next month). Ms Le Pen's lan-

guage is typical. She caters to nostalgia, anxiety and antipathy to the liberal international order. ("No to Brussels, yes to France", goes one slogan.) She laments the decline of a proud people and vows to make France great again.

Unlike Mr Trump, Ms Le Pen has never called for a ban on Muslims entering the country; rather, she talks about curbing the "gigantic wave" of immigration. A lawyer by training, she defends her arguments with reference to France's rules on keeping religion out of public life. Yet her voters are left in little doubt as to which sorts of immigrants she disapproves of, and whom she counts as French. An FN campaign poster for regional elections in 2015 showed two female faces: one with flowing hair and the French tricolour flag painted on her cheeks, the other wearing a burqa. "Choose your neighbourhood: vote for the Front", ran the text.

Ms Le Pen's popularity has dragged other politicians onto similar territory. Nicolas Sarkozy, a centre-right former president, wants the job again. As soon as you become French, he declared at a recent campaign rally, "your ancestors are Gauls." At another, Mr Sarkozy said that children who did not want to eat pork at school

should "take a second helping of chips"—in other words, that it was up to non-Christians whose religions impose dietary restrictions to make do with the food on offer, not up to schools to accommodate them. France is witnessing a "defensive nationalism", says Dominique Moisi of the Institut Montaigne, a think-tank, "based on a lack of confidence and a negative jingoism: the idea that I have to defend myself against the threat of others."

Something similar is on the rise elsewhere in Europe, too. In 2010 the Sweden Democrats (SD), a nationalist party, put out a television ad that captured the popular fear that Sweden's generous welfare system might not survive a big influx of poor, fertile Muslim asylum-seekers. An elderly white woman with a Zimmer frame hobbles down a dark corridor towards her pension pot, but is overtaken by a crowd of burqa-clad women with prams, who beat her to the money. At least one channel refused to air it, but it spread online. Polls suggest the SD is now one of Sweden's most popular parties.

In the Netherlands Geert Wilders, the leader of the anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant Party for Freedom, is on trial for "hate speech" for goading his audience to chant that it wanted "fewer Moroccans" in the country. Polls put his party in first or second place in the run-up to the national election in March; its popularity has risen since the start of the trial.

Britain's vote in June to leave the EU was also the result of a nationalist turn. Campaign posters for "Brexit" depicted hordes of Middle Eastern migrants clamouring to come in. Activists railed against bankers, migrants and rootless experts; one of their slogans was "We want our country back". After the vote David Cameron, a cosmopolitan prime minister, resigned and was replaced by Theresa May, who says: "If you believe you're a citizen of the world, you're a citizen of nowhere. You don't understand what the very word 'citizenship' means."

Even before Britain has left the EU, the mere prospect has made the country poorer: the currency is down 16% against the dollar. Still, few Brexiters have regrets. In Margate, a seaside town full of pensioners, it is hard to find anyone who voted to remain. Tom Morrison, who runs a bookshop, says: "[We] should be allowed to make our own laws... At least our mistakes will be our own mistakes."

Clive, a taxi driver, is more trenchant. "All the Europeans do is leech off us. They can't even win their own wars," he says. He is glad that Mrs May has promised to reduce immigration: "We just physically haven't enough room for them... The schools are overfilled with foreigners." He adds that some of them are hard workers, but "in Cliftonville [next to Margate], you might as well be in Romania. A lot of them

Zimmer frame-walker (uk)
pram-stroller
jingoism - extreme nationalism; belligerent foreign policy

intense emotions
inactivity, depression

are gypsies." Asked if being British is important to him, he declares a narrower identity: "It's being English. English."

Vladimir Putin, Russia's president, is not sure what to make of Mr Trump. Though he doubtless welcomes Mr Trump's promise to reset relations with Russia, if America ceases to be the enemy, he will need another one. Mr Putin's core belief is in a strong state led by himself, but since he first took power in 2000 he has harnessed ethnic nationalism to that end. In 2011 he faced huge protests from an urban middle class angry about both corruption and uncontrolled immigration by non-Slavic people. He responded by whipping up imperial fervour. When Ukraine sought to move closer to the West, he then annexed Crimea and invaded Eastern Ukraine. State media portrayed him as saving ethnic Russians from (historical) "Ukrainian fascists".

With oil prices low, and after a long spell in the economic doldrums, nationalism is Mr Putin's way of remaining popular. His version involves rejecting the universal, liberal values that the West has long promoted. That is why he so eagerly supports illiberal nationalist parties in Western Europe, such as Ms Le Pen's FN. "We see how many Euro-Atlantic countries are in effect turning away from their roots, including their Christian values," he said in 2013. He contrasted this with an ethnically defined version of Russia as "a state civilisation held together by the Russian people, the Russian language, Russian culture and the Russian Orthodox Church".

In China a similarly ethnic, non-universalist nationalism is being pressed into service by the Communist Party (see briefing). The party seeks to blur the distinction between itself and the nation, and to prop up

its legitimacy now that economic growth, long the main basis of its claim to power, has slowed. Soon after becoming president in 2012, Xi Jinping launched the "Chinese Dream" as a slogan to promote the country's "great revival". A "patriotic education" campaign extends from primary school all the way up to doctoral students.

The government often blames "hostile foreign forces" for things it does not like, including protests in Hong Kong or Xinjiang, a far-western province where Uighurs chafe against Han rule. State television tries to make other countries look stupid, dangerous or irrelevant. Anti-Western rhetoric has been stepped up. In 2015 China's education minister called for a ban on "textbooks promoting Western values" in higher education.

China's glorious victory over Japan has become central to history lessons (though in fact it was the communists' rivals, the Kuomintang, who did most of the fighting). In 2014 three new national holidays were introduced: a memorial day for the Nanjing massacre, commemorating the 300,000 or so people killed by the Japanese there in 1937; a "Victory Day" to mark Japan's surrender at the end of the second world war; and "Martyrs' Day" dedicated to those who died fighting Japan.

My enemy's enemy

Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the jingoism, many Chinese now see international affairs as a zero-sum game, believing that for China to rise, others must fall. A recent poll by Pew found that more than half of those asked reckoned that America is trying to prevent China from becoming an equal power; some 45% see American power and influence as the greatest international threat facing the country. Chinese

antipathy towards the Japanese has also increased considerably.

The propaganda has been so effective that the government is no longer sure that it can control the passions it has stoked. In 2012 protests erupted across China against Japan's claims to islands in the East China Sea: shops were looted, Japanese cars destroyed and riot police deployed to protect the Japanese embassy in Beijing. The government now censors the angriest online posts about nationalist topics.

Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, Egypt's authoritarian president, uses all the resources of the state to promote the idea that he is the father of his country. His regime blames Islamists for everything: when heavy rains caused flooding in Alexandria last year, the interior ministry blamed the Muslim Brotherhood, a banned Islamist group, for blocking the drains. Last summer, after splurging \$8bn on expanding the Suez Canal, he declared a public holiday and sailed up the waterway in full military regalia, as warplanes flew overhead. State television broadcast shots of the new canal to the bombastic theme tune of "Game of Thrones", a television show.

A similar story is playing out in Turkey, a country that only a few years ago appeared firmly on course to join the EU. Now its president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, vows to build a "New Turkey", bravely standing up to coup-plotters and their imaginary Western enablers. He recently attended a mass rally celebrating the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. He accuses Turkey's duplicitous Western allies of trying to "pick up the slack of crusaders". Such rhetoric is intended to justify the arrests of 36,000 people since a coup attempt in July.

In India ethnic nationalism, never far beneath the surface, is worryingly resurgent. Since 2014 the country has been ruled by Narendra Modi of the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The party seeks to distance itself from radical Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) groups, which criticise it as "soft" on Pakistan, Muslims and those who harm cows (which are sacred to Hindus). And Mr Modi is urbane, pro-business and friendly towards the West. But he is also a lifelong member of the RSS (National Volunteer Organisation), a 5m-strong Hindu group founded in 1925 and modelled loosely on the Boy Scouts.

Members of the RSS parade in khaki uniforms, do physical jerks in the morning, help old ladies cross the street, pick up litter—and are occasional recruits for extremist groups that beat up left-wing students. And last year Mr Modi's minister of culture, Mahesh Sharma, said that a former president was a patriot "despite being a Muslim". The minister remains in his job.

Hindutva purports to represent all Hindus, who are four-fifths of India's population. It promises a national rebirth, a return to an idealised past and the retrieval of ▶▶

to add fuel to a fire


high-sounding, little meaning

civilised, cultured

lifting weights

Enough to go around?

Attitudes towards globalisation against change in GDP per person




Sources: YouGov/The Economist; World Bank; UN

Zero sum game - if one side wins (loses) the other side must lose (win) by equal amounts

This island's mine

Countries' demography compared with supporters of nationalist parties, October–November 2016, %



Source: YouGov/The Economist

an "authentic" native identity. Its adherents see themselves as honest folk fighting corrupt cosmopolitans. They have changed India's political language, deriding "political correctness", and calling critical journalists "presstitutes" and political opponents "anti-national". The RSS also exerts huge sway over education and the media. Some states and schools have adopted textbooks written by RSS scholars that play up the role of *Hindutva* leaders and marginalise more secular ones.

The BJP has made a big push to control the judiciary by changing rules for appointments, but has met strong resistance. It does not control most states in the east and south. Many of the educated elite despise it. And banging on too much about Hinduism and not enough about the economy is thought to have cost it a state election in Bihar last year.

So India will not slide easily into Turkish-style autocracy—but plenty of secular, liberal Indians are nervous. The police, especially, are thought to favour the ruling party. A reporter nabbed by cops for the "crime" of filming angry crowds outside a bank in Delhi this week says they threatened him with a beating and said: "Who gave you permission to film? Our government has changed; you can't just take pictures anywhere you like any more."

Nations once again

Inquiring after the roots of nationalism is like asking what makes people love their families or fear strangers. Scholars have suggested that nations are built around language, history, culture, territory and politics without being able to settle on any single cause. A better question is: what turns civic nationalism into the exclusive sort? There are several theories.

In rich countries, pessimism plays a role. As chart 3 shows, slower growth lowers support for globalisation. Inequality hurts, too. Educated people may be doing just fine, but blue-collar workers are often struggling. Mr Trump did remarkably well among blue-collar white voters. One of the best predictors of support for Brexit or Ms Le Pen is a belief that things were better in

the past.

In developing countries, growth is often faster and support for globalisation higher. But people still have woes, from rapacious officials to filthy air. For the new nationalist strongmen such as Mr Sisi and Mr Putin, nationalism is a cheap and easy way to generate enthusiasm for the state, and to deflect blame for what is wrong.

The new nationalism owes a lot to cultural factors, too. Many Westerners, particularly older ones, liked their countries as they were and never asked for the immigration that turned Europe more Muslim and America less white and Protestant. They object to their discomfort being dismissed as racism.

Elite liberals stress two sources of identity: being a good global citizen (who cares about climate change and sweatshops in Bangladesh) and belonging to an identity group that has nothing to do with the nation (Hispanic, gay, Buddhist, etc). Membership of certain identity groups can carry material as well as psychological benefits. Affirmative action of the sort practised in America gives even the richer members of the racial groups it favours advantages that are unavailable to the poorer members of unfavoured groups.

Nationalists dislike the balkanisation of their countries into identity groups, particularly when those groups are defined as virtuous only to the extent that they disagree with the nation's previously dominant history. White Americans are starting to act as if they were themselves a minority pressure group.

Lastly, communication tools have accelerated the spread of the new nationalism. Facebook and Twitter allow people to bypass the mainstream media's cosmopolitan filter to talk to each other, swap news, meet and organise rallies. Mr Trump's tweets reached millions. His chief strategist, Steve Bannon, made his name running a white-nationalist website.

For Mrs May's "citizens of nowhere", all this is deeply worrying. But they should not despair. Liberals can use social media, too. Demagogues fall from favour when their policies fail to bring prosperity. And

greedy ←

2. culture

demographic trends favour pluralism.


In many countries the university-educated population—typically cosmopolitan in instinct—is rising. In the post-war period about 5% of British adults had gone to university; today more than 40% of school-leavers are university-bound. In Germany 2m citizens were in tertiary education in 2005; a decade later that number had risen to 2.8m. The share of 18- to 24-year-old Americans in that category rose from 26% in 1970 to 40% in 2014.

And immigration, which has done much to fuel ethnic nationalism, could, as generations are born into diverse societies, start to counter that nationalism. The foreign-born population of America rose by almost 10m, to 40m in the decade to 2010. In Britain it rose by 2.9m, to 7.5m, in the decade to 2011. Western voters aged 60 and over—the most nationalist cohort—have lived through a faster cultural and economic overhaul than any previous generation, and seem to have had enough. Few supporters of UKIP and the FN are young; the same is true for Alternative for Germany, another anti-immigrant party (see chart 4).

But youngsters seem to find these changes less frightening. Although just 37% of French people believe that "globalisation is a force for good", 77% of 18- to 24-year-olds do. The new nationalists are riding high on promises to close borders and restore societies to a past homogeneity. But if the next generation holds out, the future may once more be cosmopolitan.

at ease in many different

cultures



Difference between India and Turkey?

economies

← political leader, appeals to popular desires, prejudices, not rational arguments

← 3. technology

Neo-National Parties in Europe 2016

APHG @ RHS


Steve Pfaff

Professor, Sociology Department, UW

J. Magidman, RHS

Ideological Location of Major Radical Right Parties in W. Europe as reflected in party manifestos, 1970-2010

(source: Eger and Valdez 2014)



Setting the Stage

- What is populism? Can you define it in a sentence? What words or images come to mind when you hear the words “populist” or “populist movement?”
- Please take a couple of minutes to write down on the paper provided.



Setting the Stage

- **What specific questions or curiosities do you have about the rise of populism or populist movements across Europe and Russia? What do you want to learn today, personally and professionally?**
- **Please write down on the paper provided**



Essential & Compelling Questions

- Why has populism risen in Europe, including Russia, and how has this affected political, economic, and social policies?
- What role does refugee resettlement and immigrant integration play in shaping politics (and populist movements) across Europe?
- What role does the media play in influencing public opinion around political issues across different European contexts?

1980s - Parties broke with the Conservative and Christian Democratic parties of the center right

- They embraced

- nationalism,

- criticized immigration (esp. from non-European countries),

- opposed international treaties and transnational governance (EU)

- called for lower taxes and a reduction of the welfare state.

In Europe today

- Lingering effects of the Great Recession of 2008
- Dissatisfaction with the EU
- Migration Crisis **led to...**

Era of Populism and Nationalism

- Brexit vote of summer 2016

Why? Some History

- Post WW II Western Europe - “Golden Age” of the welfare state capitalism.
- Extreme parties of 1930s out of favor (Fascists, Communists)
- Most choose either **Social Democratic** and **Labor** parties on the center-left, or **Christian Democratic** and **Conservative parties** on the center-right.
 - Unprecedented peace and prosperity
 - High rates of economic growth
 - Political stability,
 - Policy consensus across parties – COOPERATION!
 - Social peace between labor and capital.

Life in Western Europe 1950s-60s

- Expansive welfare state promising
 - Universal healthcare,
 - Retirement
 - Unemployment insurance,
 - Active labor market policies
 - coordinated wage bargaining between government, business groups and labor organizations.
- Welfare states became popular
- Societies became more inclusive and tolerant.
- Labor shortages (low-birth rates!!!) were offset by encouraging large-scale immigration from the Mediterranean and Middle East regions.

Problems, late 60s

- Oil crisis of 1970s hurts industry, jobs
- Increased immigration as colonies gain independence
 - Tensions – job competition? Perceived higher crime rates?
- Parties increase European integration to stimulate trade, investment
- Less-educated working classes feel left behind

Beginning of Euroscepticism

Benefits to EU

- Travel abroad easily
- Work abroad easily
- Trade
- Investments

Negatives to EU

- Loss of sovereignty
- Excessive regulations
- No voice in law making

Established parties miss the signs of economic insecurity, social frustration.

New parties formed – neo-nationalism (“new” nationalism)

- social security, pensions and welfare are good, so long as benefits are restricted to citizens.
- restrict immigration, encourage repatriation (“go home!”)
- favor national citizens in the receiving of welfare benefits.
- This position has been called “welfare chauvinism”.



Neo-Nationalist Parties in Europe

- “Welfare chauvinism”
- Anti-EU messages,
- Strong anti-immigration themes
- Promise to restore security and law-and-order against crime and Islamic terrorism.


Electoral Success

- Since the late 1980s in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway.
- Mid-2000s in the UK, Sweden, and Germany, and Eastern Europe in such countries as Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

Electoral Support for Neo-nationalist parties in Europe 2010



Rise of nationalism in Europe: Results of most recent national elections



In many countries nationalists got higher scores in European Parliament elections and opinion polls

Explaining Success by Neo-Nationalists

- Draw voters from lower-skilled workers, people in the lower-middle classes, rural residents, and senior citizens.
- Embrace populism: exploits voters who have a growing sense of dissatisfaction with the political elite as an out-of-touch, insulated ruling class, whether in their national capital or in Brussels and Strasbourg.
- Appeal to the declining middle classes and workers who suffer from globalization and fear competition for jobs.

2007 DPP Election Poster relating to Cartoon controversy


“Freedom of Speech is Danish, Censorship is Not”



The case of Denmark and the Danish People's Party

- One of the most successful neo-nationalist parties in Europe.
 - Surprising given that DK is a highly developed welfare state with one of the highest rates of taxation and social expenditure in the world.
- So what does the DPP call for? Core party platform:
 - Denmark is not a country of immigration and immigration must be severely limited.
 - Does also not accept a multi-ethnic Denmark and calls for active policies of assimilation.
- DK must bolster old-age pensions and social security.
- Stricter law and order policies, including restoration of border controls.
- Abolish hate speech laws that “discriminate” against national conservatives.

2015: “We Guarantee: No to mosques in Danish towns!”



NEJ til stormoskeer i danske byer!


GARANTI

Som et lyn fra en klar og fredelig dansk sommerhimmel besluttede politikerne i Københavns Kommune forleden at opføre en stormoske midt i byen.
Kun Dansk Folkeparti stemte imod!
Pengene kommer bl.a. fra terror-regimet Iran, men dét var der ingen af de andre partier, der bekymrede sig om.

Om tre år er yderligere en kæmpemoske - på Amager og finansieret af diktaturstaten Saudi-Arabien - en realitet, hvis borgerne ikke siger stop.

I andre danske byer ligger der planer.
Vi giver dig en garanti: Jo flere repræsentanter fra Dansk Folkeparti, der kommer i dit byråd ved valget den 17. november, jo mere modstand mod islamismens højborg, også i din by.

stem dansk-også lokalt

 **Dansk Folkeparti**
www.danskfolkeparti.dk Tlf. 3337 5190 E-mail: df@df.dk

The case of Denmark and the Danish People's Party, cont'd

- Retain the Krona against the Euro.
- Oppose transfer of sovereign powers to Brussels.
- Oppose EU membership for Turkey.
- Support Danish monarchy and national traditions.
- DK should increase defense and domestic security spending. Foreign policy support for the USA, Israel and against Islamism and global Islamic threat.

2015: “Ask the People: Popular Referendum on EU Now!”

**SPØRG
FOLKET**

**Folkeafstemning
om Europagten nu!**

 **Dansk Folkeparti**



DPP Election results

Election	% popular vote	# parliamentary seats
1998	7.4	13
2001	13.2	22
2007	13.8	25
2011	12.3	22
2015	21.1	37

Night Wolves - Russia



Praised Putin for “restoring Russia’s greatness”, Received an Order of Honor for his “active work in the patriotic upbringing of the young”

Greece - Rise of Neo-Nazi Party



- Golden Dawn (“Chrysi Avgi”)
- Grew out of failed military dictatorship of 1967-74
- Virulently anti-immigrant, “patriotic,” and “nationalistic”

Once marginalized party...



- ... Not taken seriously with miniscule popular support (under 1% in 1990s, 2000s)
- Under economic crisis support grows –high as 14%
- 3rd most popular party in Greece today

Conclusion

- Neo-nationalist parties are not the right-wing parties of the past.
- They have combined welfare chauvinism with hostility to immigration & multiculturalism.
- They offer a populist return of the power to the people, against the established political classes and transnational agencies (esp. the EU).
- They draw support from older people, lower-skilled workers, the declining middle classes, less educated citizens, and rural areas.
- Especially appealing to citizens who regard themselves as the “losers” of the global economy and transnationalism.
- Effectively exploited the lackluster response to the Great Recession and anxieties about mass immigration and Islamism.
- While these parties have made the most electoral headway on the European continent, similar arguments and sources of voter support evident in the “Brexit” campaign and Trump’s ascendency in the USA.