Mongol Foundations of the Russian State: Space, Life Security, Sovereignty and War from the Golden Horde to the Civil War

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Sovereignty and security

The present paper identifies three hinge events in Russian State formation from the time of the Mongol conquest to the Bolshevik victory in the civil war. By postulating the essence of any State as security and sovereignty, in the context of three event sets, a better picture of State evolution may emerge – a picture not burdened by the Eurasianist debate, but cognizant of its premises. These three event sets, as turning points in Russian State formation, can be considered as data cluster points suggesting a rudimentary trajectory of historical development.

State formation consists of two processes – achieving sovereignty and increasing security over a time period beyond than the founders’ lifetimes. Sovereignty is an organizational quality, indicating unity and integrity of a government, with effective jurisdiction over an identifiable territory and population. Security is the measure of protection possessed by, and provided to, individuals, primarily to prolong life through defense against violent actions and provision of life-sustaining materials.
Security has a fundamental meaning – prolonging life, postponing death (PLPD) of the human unit. How does the State induce security, and what other instruments or institutions have humans devised or inherited to postpone End of Life? There has been a historical contradiction between sovereignty and life security. In the Russian State, sovereignty came at the price of negating life security for large numbers of people – Subjects as well as enemies. This unequal security outcome is evident in at least three event clusters in Russian history – the Mongol conquest, Ivan IV’s expansion into the Volga basin, and the civil war between Reds and Whites after the October revolution. Each hinging event set tightened government control over population and territory, reducing and excluding external interventions and monopolizing material and human resources for the State. State sovereignty added security to some but diminished freedom for most. "Freedom" has at least three meanings. One is “freedom to act” (Freedom₁) and pursue one’s inclinations and needs. The second refers to “freedom from arbitrary control” (Freedom₂) in the sense of subjection to others. Third, is “freedom from material necessity” (Freedom₃). State formation reduces the first and second manifestations of freedom, but often has led to progress in the third.

**The Eurasianism debate**

The Eurasianist school of thought in Russia emphasises the Asian character of Russian development which began in the wake of the Mongol conquest. However, the Bolshevik revolution, hardened in the fires of civil war, marked a historical departure from whatever Asian roots had survived, and created a new type of sovereignty – a process of fashioning the nation-State by reducing or negating the
life security of millions of its own. This was done by radical reduction of Freedom$_1$ and Freedom$_2$, with promises of progress towards Freedom$_3$ for those who supported the revolution. A combination of Bolshevik revolution and war communism inspired the State formation template for Maoist China, Kim Il Song’s North Korea, Ho Chi Minh’s Vietnam, and Pol Pot’s Cambodia. The essence of that template was to maximize State sovereignty at the expense of Subject life security. It had a rough resemblance to Mongol State-building – Subjects were divided into three categories – loyalists, useful neutrals, and resisters. This last class lost significant claim to life security because of actual or potential resistance and were treated as internal enemies.

The Eurasianist persuasion explains characteristics of the Russian State as occupying a middle position between Western Europe and Asia. The perspective proposes that “that their specific traits have to do with their culture being a ‘mix’ born of the fusion of Slavic and TurkoMuslim peoples, and that Russia should specifically highlight its Asian features.”\textsuperscript{1} The paradigm begins with the Mongol conquest of Russia in the thirteenth century, and its effect on State and society development.

The States ruled by Hitler, Stalin, Mao Zedong and other dictators stand as monuments to mass elimination of Subjects by their own governments. Yet we insist that the purpose of the State is to provide protection for a population which occupies its demarcated territory. In a well-ordered and rational world, the State should be humanity’s friend, but the opposite has frequently been the case. The State should equitably reinforce the life security (PLPD)
of humans, a species having a long history of survival before invention of States. British philosopher Thomas Hobbes wrote a treatise on how men in the state of nature came together and created a sovereign entity to rule and enforce the social contract. He would protect them, but they would have to give up some of their right of self-defense. The essence of the Hobbesian State is a cooperative construction for the security of life and property of Subjects at the expense of human freedom and freedom. Moreover, the Leviathan stands as the metaphor distinguishing men from animals – we can consciously modify our behavior and create institutions as positive protections for life. We can diminish our natural incompleteness through reasoned and self-interested actions.

The Mongol conquest and occupation of eastern Slavic lands was an Asian intrusion into a Christian State and permanently affected development of the Russian State by submission to nomadic warriors. Referring to the Eurasianist debate, the question is whether the Mongol conquest was a temporary setback or a major deflection of State progress. Every State inherits a legacy from its predecessors – whether tribe or failed State or colonizing power. The Russian trauma of defeat and occupation by the Mongol hordes was removed when Kazan and other lands to the southeast were won and incorporated into Muscovy’s realm from 1552. This opened the drive to the east and eventual incorporation of Central Asia and Siberia into the Russian empire. Wars have classical zero-sum characteristics, involving risk, gain and loss. Among the gains are included the winners’ individual acquisition of goods and wealth, removal of enemies, and the resulting charisma of victory. Losses include the losers’ needful things, their lives and their families. No
war ends without some damage to winners as well. These three wars were critical in the formation of the modern Russian State and costly in human life to all sides. Slaughter and destruction accompanied the Mongol invasion. Ivan IV lost many men in attacking Kazan, though fewer than the defending Tatars. Both sides suffered in the twentieth century civil war. At a conceptual level, six States were directly involved in these life and death wars: Mongols v. Kiev, Muscovy v. Kazan Khanate, and Reds v. Whites. The wars were decisive, dissolving the losing side, and consequent loss of security to the losing Subjects who were killed, enslaved, impoverished or scattered.

The Mongol conquest - Fall of Rus

Wars are rarely isolated events and most often the culmination of decades or centuries of institutional evolution. The Mongols had formed a powerful army-State out of warring tribes. The Kievan State emerged in the ninth century, defeated various Eastern Slav tribes, and prospered as the connection between Constantinople and the Baltic region. Prince Sviatoslav and his successors consolidated power and territory, making Byzantine Christianity the official State religion. The later Kievan State fragmented into rival appanages which failed to unite against the Mongol horde, were picked off individually and destroyed or subordinated.

Once united under the banner of Genghis Khan, the Mongol hordes were unstoppable, and the Russians were merely one more people to be destroyed or enslaved by the hundred thousand warriors of the Khan. After defeating the Moslem armies of Central Asia, the Mongols raided southern Russia through the Caucasus
passes, defeating Kievan and Polovtsy forces on the Kalka River in 1223. The main thrust later was into Eastern Europe, and defeat of the Rus was undertaken in large part to secure the Mongol flank when Ögedei led his forces into Poland and Hungary. Overwhelming numbers were not the only source of Mongol military success. Unit training, mobility, endurance, espionage, discipline and coordinated staffing explained victory in the face of opposing armies which were often uncoordinated and undisciplined. In 1237 a Mongol force attacked Riazan, and destroyed it after five days of fighting. Its population was massacred, and a winter campaign destroyed Vladimir and numerous towns. Frozen rivers provided highways for the cavalry, and only the spring thaw spared Novgorod. In December 1240, the city of Kiev fell and was destroyed, with many of its inhabitants. A decisive battle was fought at Liegnitz in Silesia, defeating a combined German-Polish-Hungarian force. An advance detachment even reached the Adriatic. The death of Ögedei Khan in the spring of 1242 halted the Mongol advance into Western Europe, and General Batu withdrew his forces but kept control of Russia. He established his headquarters in Sarai on the lower Volga. The Golden Horde, part of the Mongol empire, established overlordship of Russia. Under sovereignty of the Khan, the Horde invested Russian princes and collected tribute. The Mongols also required levies of Russian troops to serve in various parts of the empire. Their aura of invincibility was damaged by defeat in the battle of Kulikova (1380) but they remained in control for another century.

The Kievan State dealt with Byzantium in peace and war, and adopted the Greek form of Christianity. Subsequent Russian
concepts of kingship were strongly affected by the Golden Horde. Richard Pipes writes:

The Golden Horde was the first centralized political authority which the Russian princes met face to face. For a century and a half, the khan was the absolute master of their fate. His power and majesty all but erased from memory the image of the Byzantine basileus. The latter was a distant thing, a legend: not one appanage prince had ever set foot in Constantinople; the road to Sarai was only too familiar to them. It was at Sarai that they had an opportunity of observing at close hand the operations of absolute monarchy, of 'authority with which one cannot enter into agreements but must unconditionally obey'. Here they learned how to impose taxes on households and commercial transactions, how to conduct diplomatic relations, how to operate a courier service, and how to deal with insubordinate subjects.

Most importantly, perhaps, the Russians learned from the Mongols a conception of politics which limited the functions of the state to the collection of tribute (or taxes), maintenance of order, and preservation of security, but was entirely devoid of any sense of responsibility for public well-being.⁵

The Mongols were not merely a formidable adversary, but a forceful model for the successor State when Moscow replaced Sarai as the center of authority. Destruction of the Kievan State delivered lands and people to the Mongols. Establishment of Pax Mongolica over Russian lands created a new sovereignty, enforced by terror, a sense of God’s punishment, and a combination of population and prosperity growth. Replacing Kievan fragmentation with unitary rule had material benefits and offered a model for political order offering a more centralized State.

Ivan IV captures Kazan

During Mongol occupation, Muscovy prospered and expanded at the expense of adjoining principalities, pledging alliance and submission to the Mongols as it accumulated wealth and power. Inviting the Kievan "Metropolitan of All Rus” to take residence in Moscow further added prestige to Ivan III (Kalita).⁶ Islam became the Golden Horde’s State religion of at end of fourteenth century.⁷
The Ottomans had taken Constantinople in 1453, and advanced into the Balkans. Russia became protector of Orthodox Christianity by default after Byzantine demise. When the Ottoman Turks occupied Constantinople, the “second Rome,” some claimed Moscow to be a “third Rome” and sole protector of the Orthodox faith. Ivan III usurped the right to appoint the Metropolitan, as well as other former Byzantine privileges. But without greater territorial validation of protector claims, it would not be taken seriously by other States.

A crippling blow to the Golden Horde came from Tamerlane, who launched three campaigns and destroyed Sarai (1395). Part of the final coup came in 1390 when Timur rerouted trade routes to south of Caspian, with staggering economic losses. The remainder broke into several parts - the Kazan, Astrakhan and Crimea khanates. Around 1480, Moscow stopped paying tribute to the successor khanates. By the 1540s, the Kazan Khan was already a puppet of Moscow, but refused to carry out an act contrary to his Islamic faith. Ecclesiastics were calling for annexation of Kazan to convert the resident Tatars to Christianity. New lands were anticipated for profiting the merchant sector. Not only had its former lands and peoples fallen under Islam, but the rulers of the Golden Horde also converted to the faith of the Ottomans. Moscow’s Metropolitan Makarii called upon the Russian people to defend the true faith, and would be led by the tsar. Later, Tsar Ivan (the Terrible) commemorated the successful victory over Kazan with construction of the Cathedral of St Basil (with its nine multicoloured domes) outside the Kremlin walls.
Ivan III had temporarily conquered Kazan in 1487, and made the khanate subject to his investiture. His ally and semi-client, Mehmet Emin, died in 1518, leaving no direct descendant. Vasily III placed his thirteen-year-old candidate on the throne, but he was deposed by the Crimean Khan, with support of Poland–Lithuania. The Khan of Crimea attacked and reached Moscow in 1521. Peace negotiations followed. Vasily built a fort on Kazan lands at the junction of the Volga and Sura rivers – the start of further annexations.

Ivan IV set out on his fourth campaign against Kazan on June 16, 1552. An army of Crimean Tatars attacked his flank and were defeated. Arriving with artillery against Kazan’s muskets, the army of Muscovy laid siege for seven weeks. Sappers exploded a section of the city wall and the final assault was launched. Heavy casualties mounted on both sides, and large numbers of prisoners were taken. Surviving defenders were forced to convert, impressed into the army, or executed. In 1555, a new Russian governor and archbishop were appointed, and were jointly responsible for government. Lands were distributed to service gentry. Some of the local tribes rebelled, and required continued presence of troops. Tatars were recruited into the army, and some nobles converted to Christianity and served in the court of the tsar.

By adding to Moscow’s domain, Ivan the Terrible accepted the titles "Tsar of Kazan" and "Tsar of Astrakhan," thus giving greater substance to his claim as protector of the church. Reasons for Muscovy’s southeastern thrust were more than a Crusader’s holy mission. Kazan was weakened, and it represented the remnant of a
power who had conquered and destroyed the Kievan State. Removal of the khanate extended Russian control over the Volga and outlets to the Caspian Sea.

The end of the Byzantine empire and collapse of the Golden Horde liberated Muscovy from the two imperial powers limiting her expansion. As these weakened, Ivan III appropriated the title of tsar and his grandson, Ivan IV, formalized the practice in 1547 by designating "Tsar of all Russia" the title of Russia's rulers. Nonetheless, the Russian frontier remained open and vulnerable. The Crimean khanate remained a powerful military State until 1783. Towns and villages near the borders of Crimea, Poland and Lithuania were constantly subject to incursions and raids for slaves. Ivan IV launched a series of reforms in 1565 to unify the independent Moscow State. Resistance from the boyars was met by terror and elimination of opponents (1569-1574). In dealing with peoples of Central Asia, it was useful for the Russian monarchy to defer to the Chinggisid principle and play upon its tentative status as the Horde's successor.13

The collapse of the Byzantine and Mongol empires were defining events for Russian security and sovereignty. Subservience to Sarai in military, diplomatic and economic affairs was no longer necessary for Muscovy, and the weakened and diminished khanates were unable to resist onslaughts of Ivan IV. Ivan III and his successors arrogated church appointments to Muscovy. Religious and political sovereignty were mutually complementary, and increased during the fifteenth century, but while retaining a formal Chinggisid State protocol. A century later, European exploration
and maritime development reduced traffic on overland routes. Central Asia, once a land version of the Mediterranean Sea as both barrier and highway, was succumbing to economic decline brought about by factors beyond its control.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{The Russian civil war}

The third event-set is the Russian civil war – a conflict whose outcome determined sovereignty and security of the Russian State as well as regional and global issues. A victory for the Whites would have smothered the communist revolution and set back political fortunes of millions. According to Lenin, the civil war was not merely a clash between two ideological camps, but part of anticipated world revolution – an Armageddon of the proletariat against the capitalist bourgeoisie.

\begin{quote}
From the instant World War I broke out he denounced pacifist socialists, who demanded an end to the fighting. True revolutionaries did not want peace: "This is a slogan of philistines and priests. The proletarian slogan must be: civil war." Trotsky stated this even more bluntly: "Soviet authority is organized civil war."\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

Lenin, Trotsky and their comrades believed that their revolution was the opening shot in world revolution, and that the Great War exposed fundamental capitalist contradictions for all to see. When it became apparent that there would be no world proletarian revolution, the idea and practice of war communism emerged to defend the revolution in one country. For several years the fate of the country awaited determination by the war outcome. The Soviet heartland was roughly the area ruled by Ivan IV in the fifteenth century before the conquest of Kazan. Opposition consisted of White forces led by former tsarist generals, with some aid from the Allies and various local forces. Their long-term vision was vague
nationalism, but victory might have resulted in breakup of post-imperial Russia, given post-War nationalism in the heartland’s periphery.

The Bolshevik attitude towards the civil war went through three phases. The first was belief that their struggle was the spark to ignite global proletarian revolution, and the Russian base would be secured by uprisings in Western Europe. Thus Trotsky’s territorial giveaway at Brest-Litovsk was touted as only a temporary concession. The second phase was realization that revolutions outside Russia were failing. War effectiveness necessitated installation of former tsarist officers and non-coms to lead the army, with Order Number One cancelled to re-establish discipline. Only a professionally-led Red Army could defeat the professionally-led Whites. The third phase came when the Red leadership saw the need to re-organize its social and economic base along more military lines. War communism then contributed to Stalin’s totalitarian State - with absolute sovereignty reinforced by unforgiving ideology, and a disciplined monolithic party and secret police with precedents in Ivan IV’s Oprichnina and tsarist Okhrana in later years.

In 1917 the Bolsheviks captured the Russian State riding the wave of popular resistance to an unwinnable war, and a hunger for land and peace. They were led by a disciplined and determined cadre, and supported by an alliance of soldiers, workers, peasants and intellectuals. In response to what was seen as a coup d’état, the Whites comprised a counter-State to the Red State - one which did not seek restoration of the monarchy, but placed the army in a prominent position as backbone of the State, and more oriented to
Western Europe. Bolshevik victory over the Whites gave them most of the old Russian empire, and also confirmed their sense of besiegement by foreign powers, resistance in the Ukraine, and continued counter-revolutionary elements within the State. Such lessons strengthened totalitarian proclivities in subsequent years.

The Bolshevik heartland was far more urbanized, industrialized and populated than the peripheral parts of the old empire. Road and rail mileage was much greater than in outlying areas to the south and east, giving them relatively efficient lines of internal communication and transportation. Despite revolutionary vision of a Stateless future, the leadership was forced to reconstruct a centralized sovereign State to survive. Without an effective army to defend itself, and a government to administer laws and commands, gains would be eradicated. The revolution was transformed into war, and could only survive if successful in battle. Like Genghis Khan, Lenin and Trotsky had to convert an impoverished and family-oriented society into a fighting force to overcome internal and external enemies. Democracy and total rejection of old ways were tried and failed as bases for military organization. War communism was the principle which resurrected State sovereignty within Russia. Instead of the tsar, Lenin reigned. In place of the ecclesiastical and aristocratic supports, the communist party promulgated a secular vision of the future, insured conformity, and punished non-conformists. World proletarian revolution had failed, and once again Mother Russia was threatened with a new “Time of Troubles.” Poland invaded and took Kiev. While not a major factor, Allied assistance to the Whites indicated
their opposition to the Bolsheviks. Finland and the Baltic republics broke away.

Anarchy and chaos appeared to be the future unless drastic measures were undertaken. The Bolshevik vision of a Stateless future was abandoned in favor of constructing a new sovereign State – one which would pretend to be a federation of republics, but in fact was an absolute and centralized dominion. The essence of war communism was a group of dedicated revolutionaries against some of Russia’s social sectors, even though the Bolsheviks claimed to represent them. Peasants had little surplus grain. But Moscow’s Food Levy took what it needed and hardly calculated peasantry requirements for food and seed.

*War Communism began with a grain monopoly. But it broadened to include a comprehensive range of state controls on the economy. It aimed to abolish private trade, to nationalize all large-scale industry, to militarize labour in essential industries, and at its height, in 1920, to replace money with universal rationing by the state. Because it was a model for the Stalinist economy it is important to explain its origins and decide where it fits into the revolution’s history.*

**Life security**

A State is not only a set of institutions, army, government and officials, but it must control territory and people. The State which exercises significant control over its population consists of rulers and Subjects. The designation “citizen” is reserved for persons subject to laws, and having considerable freedom of movement and property, as well as formal means of influencing government. Where institutions exist for citizens to exert some control on government, emergence of civil society often follows. When a State fails or dissolves, like imperial Russia in 1917, most Subjects will seek protection and security in their original life-communities –
families, clans or tribes. This phenomenon was visible with soldiers and workers abandoning their units and work places to be closer to rural roots and food supply. Later, when the advantages of war communism were apparent to the Bolsheviks, destruction of long-standing rural life-communities became policy, replaced by collective farms. Engineered famine and mass relocation of ethnic groups significantly contributed to the dissolution of life security props.*

**Conclusion - Conundrum of the State**

Asia and Europe have been at war since at least the Greco-Persian wars in the early 5th century BC. The Battles of Marathon and Salamis were hinge events avenged by Alexander’s victory over Darius III in 331 BC. Emperor Diocletian divided the Roman Empire into East and West in the late third century AD, Byzantium remained the major power in the eastern Mediterranean and Constantinople remained the gateway and buffer between Europe and Asia until 1453. An alliance with the Mongols had protected the Byzantine empire from the Golden Horde’s onslaught after invasion of the Middle East, Russia and Eastern Europe. As the States of Western Europe entered an age of global exploration and maritime expansion, Asian threats receded, and invaders were colonized and commercially invaded. Ivan IV’s expanded control of the Volga region down to the Caspian Sea had elements of a continental counterpart to European maritime imperialism.

* In post-liberation China, the rural people’s communes sought to accomplish the same purpose.
Twentieth century Asian revolutionaries abandoned traditional State-forms and sought to re-create either a liberal or a Bolshevik State in their own country. In China, Sun Yat-sen and Jiang Jieshi led bourgeois revolutions based on a program of military unification and democratization, followed by economic development and integration into global markets. The other route was inspired by the Russian revolution and its instrument of a highly disciplined communist party with radical program and adaptive ideology. The Nationalist revolution might have succeeded if the international system of trade and commerce had not collided with protectionism and tariff walls, and had the Japanese not intervened and tried to force China into a subordinate and semi-colonial status. Expectations of continued prosperity and political order under the Western European umbrella did not materialize, and the Bolshevik model, adapted to China’s peasant society, and combined with appeals to anti-Japanese patriotism, fueled the success of Mao Zedong’s guerrilla forces. During the nearly three decades after 1949, the Soviet model of proletarian dictatorship, and imitations of war communism dominated the Chinese approach to State-building. Soviet central planning was rejected as the Chinese communists became more radical. Mao’s death and Deng Xiaoping’s reforms marked partial departure from the Bolshevik template.

The high point of Soviet-Bolshevik influence on Asia occurred during the 1960s. Variations of war communism occurred in China, Vietnam, and North Korea, as adapted to their predominantly peasant societies. The two and a half millennia conflict between Europe and Asia decidedly tilted in favor of Western Europe and later the US, since the early 1500’s. A combination of Russian
imperial presence in Asia and the revolutionary success of the Bolsheviks introduced a shortcut to modernization.

Communist movements in east Asia misread the lessons of Bolshevism. It was most successful as a State-building enterprise, creating a new sovereignty over Subjects by making war on those who either opposed or failed to support. However, Bolshevism did not enhance life security nearly as much as promised or expected, relying more on terrorism and intimidation as persuasion (agitprop) failed. Economic development tended to stagnate after initial high growth of industry, and only facilitation of market incentives seemed to stimulate growth conducive to economic security.

To summarize, ample evidence for an early Asianized Russian State can be derived from the hinge events of Mongol conquest and Ivan IV’s thrust into the Volga region. Initiated by Peter I’s “Window to the West,” the Russian empire became an intimate part of the European State system. The 1917 revolution and subsequent civil war were a departure from Russian history and a creative new phase that provided a model of State-building for parts of Asia. That model has proven its limitations, and now those States (except for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) have incorporated elements of capitalism into their economies, but stop short of granting full democratic citizenship and its attendant rights to their Subjects. Bolshevism and war communism pointed the way to achieving sovereignty, but at the expense of equal life security.

The Mongol intrusion and occupation of Rus was the high tide of Asianization. Ivan IV’s capture of Kazan and expansion to the Caspian Sea was a military counterattack against the Asiatic State
but was accompanied by incorporation of some of its features. Peter I sought to diminish Asian influences and make his country a major Western power. Russian inversion of Asianization occurred in the twentieth century, as Bolshevik war communism’s policies of terrorism, repression of resistance, secret police, control of economy, land reform, and food confiscation were adapted in postwar communist regimes. Sponsorship and success of communist takeovers in Mongolia, China, North Korea and Vietnam convinced Lenin’s heirs that the chief Russian product – communist revolution and a highly centralized State – could transform Asian societies according to the Bolshevik template created by Stalin and his fellow revolutionaries. Moreover, global organization of national communist parties demonstrated the “market” for a Soviet model of political action. The imposition of Soviet hegemony on countries of the cordon sanitaire was more successful than in Asia in terms of integrating economies and armies with Moscow. By the time of Gorbachev, defects of the Soviet system were plain for all to see, and the Chinese market reforms under communist rule offered an alternative model. Bolshevik revolution and its offspring in war communism established the sovereignty of the Soviet State, created a pattern for East Asia, but failed to relieve the life security anxieties of most people subject to that sovereignty. With regard to Eurasianist theory, the civil war and its aftermath began an era of Euro-rejection in Russia and of an experiment in political russianification in selected Asian countries. The experiment failed, but its effects are still visible in one-party States. Passive Eurasianism was followed by active Russianization abroad. Rejection by East Asia and dissolution of the Soviet Union may have stimulated Moscow to enter a new era of State consolidation – hegemony over
the Ukraine and Crimea, and primacy over the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean.


2 Riasanovsky, 69

3 *Ibid.,* 70.

4 Ivan III of Moscow renounced his, and Russian, allegiance to the khan in 1480, and the Mongols failed to challenge his action seriously. Later yet, Russia expanded to absorb the successor states to the Golden Horde: the khanate of Kazan in 1552, of Astrakhan in 1556, and, at long last, that of Crimea in 1783. Riasanovsky, 71.

5 R. Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime,* 74-75.


8 Halperin, 23.

9 Pipes, 72.


11 Madariaga, 95.


13 Halperin 1420, 102.


16 *Ibid.,* 111