

The Russia Crucible

Russia and the European Union have one of the most complex international relationships in the world and arguably one of the most significant. Russia and the European Union are both emerging powers that will be influential in the multi-polar global arena of the twenty-first century. The European Union is argued by John McCormick in The European Super Power to be not only an emerging great power but a current a global super power. The re-emergence of Russia onto the global stage has made the EU-Russian relationship the greatest challenge to the ascendancy of the European Union. Russia's reinvigorated international presence combined with the historically difficult relationship between Russia and some of the European Union member states makes this relationship the single most divisive issue in the European Union. This divisiveness has the ability to neutralize the strengths of the European Union which McCormick argues makes Europe a global super power. The European Union has not always been divided when confronting Russia, during the 1990s the European Union exhibited more solidarity in its policies towards the Russian Federation which resulted, albeit temporarily, in luring Russia westward. Towards the end of the 1990s and into the 2000's this policy became fractured due to increased Russian assertiveness and rollbacks in democratic reform. The European Union's eastward expansion incorporated states with less favorable views of Russia and contributed to further fracturing of EU policy towards Russia.

The European Union is argued to be a global super power based upon attributes of the European Union that prove advantageous in a post-modern world. The effectiveness of the European Union's strengths is dependent upon the environment presented by the post-modern world. In John McCormick's book The European Super Power he outlines his theory of the post-modern world in which the European Union thrives.

“This book challenges the conventional thinking. It rejects the traditional view that the greatest powers are states with large militaries that consciously pursue national interests, and argues instead that power can transcend states, can be expressed without resort to force, and can just as likely be latent and implied as it can be active and explicit. It also argues that globalization and interdependence have undermined old-style power politics and replaced it with a more complex and nuanced set of international relationships, in which ownership of the means of production is more important than ownership of the means of destruction, and cooperation is more effective than coercion. In this new post-modern environment, the qualities cultivated and projected by the European Union have made it a new breed of superpower.ⁱ

McCormick further outlines the attributes of the European Union which makes it a Global Super power.

“There have been developments internal to the EU that have given it greater strength and a sharper identity. With the single market programme all but complete, and expansion to 25 member states with a total population of 454 million, the EU has become the world’s biggest economy. Most of its wealthiest members have adopted a single currency that threatens the dominant position of the US dollar. The EU has pursued a common commercial policy that has made it the colossus of international trade negotiations. The EU has adopted common policies on the development of a common foreign and security policy. There is also majority public support in almost every member state for the idea of the EU playing an assertive new international role and becoming independent of the US lead. Combined, these developments have not only encouraged the EU to become a more assertive global actor, but have *allowed* it to become more assertive.ⁱⁱ

The developments and attributes that allow the EU to work as an assertive actor are all contingent on the solidarity of the European Union. *Together*, they have a population of 454 million people; *together*, they have become the world’s biggest economy; *together*, they have adopted common policies towards energy security. All of the strengths that McCormick attributes to the European Union that allow it to function in the post-modern world are all contingent upon unity and solidarity of the EU member states.

According to McCormick the European Union is a global superpower because through its unity the European Union is able to flourish in the post-modern world. However, EU foreign

relations with Russia frequently divide EU member states and this negates the strengths of the EU which are contingent on its unity

“Even before the war in Georgia in 2008, Russia had emerged as the single most divisive issue for the EU since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. EU disputes over Russia have reinforced mistrust and negative stereotypes between EU Member States, hampered the development of relations with eastern neighbors as well as Moscow, and made the pursuit of collective goals... more difficult.... Since the 2004 enlargement, the new EU has found it much harder to agree on a common approach to the new Russia.”ⁱⁱⁱ

This divisiveness neutralizes the European Union’s abilities to mobilize its strengths which depend upon European Union solidarity. The primary challenges for European Union solidarity towards Russia are: The complex balance of bilateral and multilateral relations and how it is exploited; the energy relationship with Russia, the institutions that guide Russian policy and its implementation; and the doubts of member states of the European Union’s willingness and ability to ensure their security Russia. McCormick argues that the European Union is currently a global superpower due to the strengths created by EU unity that allow it to flourish in the postmodern world but, the EU’s relationship with Russia frequently proves divisive for EU member states and negates the EU abilities to use its strengths. This paper will argue by illustrating the depth of divisiveness the relationship with Russia has on EU member states that until the EU can overcome the Russia crucible to its solidarity that it cannot be considered a global superpower.

History

The Russian federation has not always been such a contentious issue for the European Union and the challenges it currently poses to European Union unity have only appeared in the last decade. In the 1990s, EU members found it easy to agree on a common approach to Moscow. They coalesced around a strategy of democratising and westernising a weak and

indebted Russia.”^{iv} This policy succeeded in maintaining not only a coherent European Union foreign policy towards Russia but a united Trans-Atlantic policy as well. However, the western policy towards Russia unintentionally elicited agitated nationalist sentiments of Russian humiliation on the international stage and a feeling of alienation from the West. These sentiments originated during the Yugoslavian conflict, bloomed after the Orange Revolution and were reinforced by NATO expansion eastward. Russia’s perceived humiliations and alienation would become an impetus for more assertive foreign policies which now divide the European Union. The international disputes and conflicts in the 1990s and early 2000s have contributed largely to the souring of the EU-Russian relationship and its divisiveness among EU member states.

The European Union’s policy towards the former Soviet sphere was quite coherent, and even established the West’s primary interests with Russia.

“During the early post-Soviet period, EU policy towards the former Soviet Union was rather coherent. The ‘Russia first’ policy was at first quite uncontroversial and justified on grounds both of interests... and political values, since Yeltsin’s Russia had led the way towards both democracy at home and the peaceful dismemberment of the Soviet Union. During the 1990s, EU policy towards the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was otherwise graduated on the basis of size and proximity. Relations with Russia came first, followed by relations with Ukraine, then the other Western CIS states...”^v

The European Union prioritized its relations and goals towards the Commonwealth of Independent States on the grounds of interest, and compatibility of political values.

The “Russia First” policy that emerged in the 1990s resulted in a coherent European Union foreign policy towards the Russian Federation which yielded initial fruits. The European Union managed to incorporate Russia into several international organization which the EU hoped would assist Russia in its transformation to a democratic society, free market, and pro-western foreign policy.

“Russia... was offered new arrangements, but it was still kept at arm’s length. Bringing Russia into the G-7 (to make it the G-8) was intended to tie Moscow to the West politically and to socialize its leaders. The NATO-Russia Council was supposed to harmonize security agendas and to promote military reform in Russia. The EU-Russia “common spaces” were designed to “Europeanize” Russia economically and socially and associate it with Europe politically. The Council of Europe was, to which Russia was admitted while the first Chechen war still unresolved, was supposed to promote Western values and norms in Russia”^{vi}

Russian adoption of western values and institutions in the 1990s would in the long term prove to be incompatible with Russian national pride.

Russia initially wanted to foster closer ties with the West in the 1990s but, the tumults of the decade would incubate sentiments of wounded national pride and alienation from the West within Russia. Dimitri Trenin states that: “Russia saw itself as Pluto in the Western solar system, very far from the center but, still fundamentally a part of it. Now it has left that orbit entirely: Russia’s leaders have given up on becoming part of the West and have started creating their own Moscow-centered system”.^{vii} The war of Yugoslav succession first ignited the sense of wounded national pride and alienation from the west. The Orange Revolution juxtaposed the European perceptions of Russia and Ukraine. Originally, Russia was seen as the model for democratization in the post-Soviet world but the Orange Revolution forced Europeans to abandon this position. The Orange Revolution contributed critically to the abandonment of the “Russia First” policy which had maintained cohesion in the European Union’s foreign policy towards Russia.

Western policies including the enlargements of NATO and the European Union into former Warsaw Pact territory only agitated feelings of wounded national pride. These enlargements were also perceived as encroachments into the traditional Russian sphere of influence. The affairs of the 1990s, beginning with the Yugoslav conflict, bred feelings of alienation from the West and a sense of wounded Russian humiliation which caused Russia to

break from the West and now inspire the policies which are so divisive for the European Union. There were several other instances throughout the 1990s and early 2000s that contributed to the rift between Europe and Russia today such as Chechnya. This paper focuses primarily on the dissolution of Yugoslavia because this is the point where Russia's indignation of their treatment in international affairs by the West first emerges. NATO and EU expansion are explicated upon because of their contribution to Russia's sense of humiliation and exploitation by the West after 1991. The Orange Revolution is focused upon because it is locus point of Russia's feelings of insecurity and National humiliation and Europe's abandonment of the "Russia First" policy which was justified by Russia leading the way in democratization after the collapse of the USSR. The Orange Revolution finally rendered this position completely untenable.

The break-up of Yugoslavia and the ensuing conflict in Bosnia sparked feelings of national humiliation and alienation from the West within Russia. The conflict illustrated the friction created by the injured national pride of Russia and a pro-Western orientation. "The fall of the Western position in Russian foreign policy and the emergence of more nationalist leaders were largely played out with the Bosnian crisis as a primary backdrop".^{viii} Initially the Kremlin adopted western positions, participated in UN peacekeeping operations, agreed to UN sanctions, and seemed to ignore their traditional role as protectors of Serbia. This position quickly fell under increasing criticism by Russian nationalists who felt Russia was abandoning its Serbian brothers and that Russia was not being respected by the western powers. The criticisms of the pro-Western position gained increasing momentum in Russian political discourse which was encouraged by opposition to NATO bombings of Serb encampments. NATO airstrikes became a source of fierce Russian opposition to western policies. Russia was enraged that it was not consulted when NATO threatened to airstrikes against the Serbs in Sarajevo after a bomb

exploded in the market place. “Presidential advisor, Sergei Stankevich suggested that NATO air strikes would make it impossible for Russia to be a partner to the West”.^{ix} Russia and leverage challenging the NATO decision to use airstrikes after the Serbs attacked the UN safe zone at Gorazde and NATO responded with air strikes. Afterwards Russia resigned the diplomatic and military initiative to the West. Russian sensibilities were again challenge after NATO launched airstrikes against the Serbs in response to the attack on Srebrenica without consulting Russia. This time NATO disregarded Russian protests and concerns and continued unabated. NATO continued in this way with the Dayton peace accords which were reached with minimal Russian input. The sentiments of Russian humiliation and disregard by the West were first nurtured by the foreign policy failures and humiliations suffered during the Yugoslav war.¹

The seeds of Russian sentiments of alienation from the West may have been sown during the Yugoslav campaign but they blossomed fully in 2004. The Orange revolution in the Ukraine from November 2004 until January 2005 is a watershed for European Union policy towards Russia and Russian policy towards the West. For the European Union the Orange Revolution triggered the abandonment of the “Russia First” policy, the once unifying European Union policy towards Russia. For Russia this event was the end of attempts to associate and align itself with the West.

In November 2004 a Presidential election was held in the Ukraine between Viktor Yanukovich and Viktor Yushchenko. Initial election results yielded Viktor Yanukovich as the winner who was the candidate favored by the Russian Federation. Suspicion soon mounted about the legitimacy of the elections and Viktor Yanukovich’s victory. Outstanding voting irregularities and disparity between exit poll numbers and final counting resulted in

¹ The summary of events in the Yugoslav war was taken from Russian the article, “Foreign Policy and the West” by, Paul Kubicek.

demonstrations, sit-ins and general strikes. The fraudulent nature of the voting procedures resulted in a second election which was held under intense international scrutiny. This second election, which was accepted as legitimate, heralded Viktor Yushchenko as the new president of Ukraine. Similar anti authoritarian revolutions also occurred in Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, and Kyrgyzstan in 2003 and 2005 respectively.

For the European Union the Orange Revolution delineated a dramatic shift in eastward foreign policy priorities. The “Russia First” policy was justified on the notion that Russia displayed the most sophisticated level of democratization of the CIS states. The reforms of Putin’s first term had weakened the democratic claims of Russia and after the Orange Revolution in 2004 the notion that Russia was the most democratic state in the CIS was rendered untenable.

“The evolution of EU policies towards Russia and Ukraine has seen a distinct ‘democracy twist’ in recent years compared to the early post-Soviet period. [The] ‘Russia First’ policy was justified on... democracy arguments. ...as Russia’s de-democratizing trends contrasted with the dramatic Orange Revolution in Ukraine, this state of relations with the two large neighbors was reversed.”^x

The reversal of the foreign policy priorities of the European Union led them to abandon the “Russia First” policy and consequently a unified foreign policy.

For Russia these revolutions further inflamed feelings of Russian humiliation in areas of foreign policy. “The ‘color revolutions’ in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan made it clear that even the post-Soviet space – an area where Moscow was still dominant and felt more or less at ease – was starting to disintegrate. In late 2004 and early 2005... the self-confidence of the Putin government was at an all all-time low.”^{xi} The Orange Revolution in Ukraine proved critically damaging to Russia’s confidence also because of Russia’s particular cultural links and ties with Ukraine. “Among Russia’s relations with all the former Soviet republics, those with Ukraine are of paramount importance... because Ukraine occupies a special place in Russian history, culture,

psyche, and identity. Both states claim the one thousand year-old heritage of Kievan Rus”.^{xii} Current issues such as the Crimea and the future of the Black sea fleet are also irritants in this relationship.

The European Union’s abandonment of the “Russia First” policy also finalized Russia’s alienation from the West. The newly initiated foreign policy initiatives of the Russian Federation have since 2004 acted as a wedge for European foreign policy. The abandonment of this policy did not reveal a coherent alternative to “Russia First” for the European Union. While the European Union remained divided, Russia became increasingly incensed in its policy making by prospects of further NATO expansion. NATO expansion would codify Russia’s sense of insecurity with the west and would thus begin pursuing foreign policies which reflected this.

NATO expansion has consistently been an aggravation towards Russia and its expansions in 1999 and 2004 greatly inflamed Russia’s tensions with the West and the European Union. In 1999 Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined NATO. These states were the first former Warsaw Pact countries to be admitted into the western alliance. In the article NATO: Russia’s Dilema R. G. Gidadhubli states that: “Russia has been unhappy with the fact that while the Warsaw Pact was dissolved even before the break-up of the Soviet Union, the NATO military block representing the US and the western powers has continued to exist”^{xiii} The continued existence of NATO and its further expansion made the Russian government suspicious of western intentions. Russia is concerned that the continued existence of NATO will act to deter Russian ambitions. In 2004 NATO admitted seven new states, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania Latvia Lithuania, and Estonia. NATO expansion encroached on Russia’s perceived sphere of influence by incorporating the former Soviet states of the Baltic. “This generated strong reactions in Moscow. This was because it was felt that the NATO military facilities and armed forces

could be brought right on the Russian border”^{xiv} “Sergei Oznobishukev, the director of the Strategic Assessment Institute wrote in *Rossiskaya Gazeta* on March 30, 2004 that NATO expansion was a diplomatic failure for Russia and that it also marked a new development of events in Europe”^{xv} NATO expansion was not only perceived a foreign policy humiliation for Russia but, as a security threat from the West. This further separated Russia from the West.

Russia’s perceived orientation with Europe was crucially impacted by NATO expansion. Russian policy would become more defiant and assertive in response to a perceived NATO threat on its borders and the national humiliations incurred by NATO’s expansions. Immediately following the 2004 enlargement small scale escalations occurred between NATO and Russia. On February 24 2004 it was reported that a NATO aircraft carried out a surveillance mission near the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad crossing from Lithuania and according to Russian sources this was done despite assurances that the Baltic States would not be allowed to monitor Russian territories. On February 28 the Russian air force carried out 10 reconnaissance flights in the Baltic region. Shortly thereafter Russia also offered Belarus a number of S-300 anti-aircraft complexes free of charge.^{xvi} Russia’s saber-rattling at NATO through military demonstrations has been a recurrent theme ever since the 2004 enlargement and continues to shape security perceptions both in Eastern Europe and Russia.

2004 not only saw NATO expansion but European Union expansion as well. The European Union’s enlargement of 2004 further complicated by incorporating into the European eight countries which had endured the Cold War from the opposite side of the Iron Curtain than the original member states. On May 1, 2004 the former Warsaw pact and Soviet states of central and east Europe – the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia – joined the EU. These countries possess a differing set of experiences and

perceptions of Russia than the pre-2004 member states. Their inclusion into the European Union, and European Union foreign policy decision process, has further complicated the prospect of formulating a new, unified EU foreign policy towards Russia to replace the “Russia First” policy. The additions of Bulgaria (traditionally pro-Russia) and Romania (traditionally anti-Russia) in 2007 have added two more states to the foreign policy decision making process with a different set of experiences with Russia during the Cold War.

After the fall of the Soviet Union the West’s attempts to engage Russia and reorient her towards Europe initially seemed successful but were in fact overshadowed by other developments in 2004. The “Russia First” policy which worked as a unified European Union policy towards Russia unintentionally alienated her. The Orange Revolution inspired the West and the European Union to abandon the “Russia First” policy and has since, due partly to its own enlargement, failed to develop a unified strategy to replace it. Adoption of a unified European Union Strategy must now reconcile the new set of perceptions and experiences of the new member states that were not present when “Russia First” was originally adopted. The challenges to a united EU policy towards Russia which grew in the 1990s and solidified in 2004 are multi-faceted and complex.

The Crucible of a United European Policy

The European Union’s most significant obstacles to establishing a united foreign policy to replace “Russia First” are the varying positions, perceptions and experiences of the European Union member states in regards to Russia; the institutions that influence policy development in Russia; European Union energy security which is largely dependent on Russian oil and gas; the confidence of the new member states in the European Union’s ability and willingness to ensure

their security from Russia and its impacts on the trans-Atlantic relation and vice-versa. The divided positions of the European Union regarding these issues neutralize the strengths attributed to it by John McCormick which allow it to function in the post-modern world and even erode the topography of the post-modern world in which these strengths are beneficial.

There are three important areas that frustrates the EU from forming a cohesive foreign policy for Russia. First, the varying positions of the European Union member states. Second, the disunity of the EU concerning oil and gas imports from Russia. Third, the lack of confidence in the EU's ability and willingness to ensure the security of the new member states and member states continued reliance on NATO and the US for their security.

Structural difficulties of bilateral and multilateral foreign policies.

The European Union's enlargement of 2004 did not create an east, west division but contributed to the difficulty of crafting a unified EU-Russia policy by adding more voices to the debate and increasing the range of deviation within the debate. A simple binary division between the positions of older western states and newer eastern states would be more manageable than the actual reality. The Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations published by the European Council on Foreign Relations outlines five distinct policy approaches to Russia that incorporate both old and new member states. These five policy positions are:

“**Trojan Horses**’ (Cyprus and Greece) who often defend Russian interests in the EU system and are willing to veto common EU positions; **Strategic Partners**’ (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) who enjoy a ‘special relationship’ with Russia which occasionally undermines common EU policies; **Friendly Pragmatists**’ (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia) who maintain a close relationship with Russia and tend to put their business interests above political goals; **Frosty Pragmatists**’ (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) who also focus on business interests but are less afraid than others to speak out against Russian behavior on human rights or other issues; and **New Cold Warriors**’ (Lithuania and Poland) who have an overtly hostile relationship with Moscow and are willing to use the veto to block EU negotiations with Russia.”^{xvii}

Each of these policy positions provide different motivations for either undermining or outright vetoing of common EU policies. Additionally each of the five policy positions is positioned on a spectrum that is divided into two paradigms.

“At one end of the spectrum are those who view Russia as a potential partner that can be drawn into the EU’s orbit through a process of ‘creeping integration’. They favour involving Russia in as many institutions as possible and encouraging Russian investment in the EU’s energy, even if Russia sometimes breaks the rules. At the other end are member states who see and treat Russia as a threat. According to them, Russian expansionism and contempt for democracy must be rolled back through a policy of ‘soft containment’ that involves excluding Russia from the G8, expanding NATO to include Georgia, supporting anti-Russian regimes in the neighborhood, building missile shields, developing an ‘Energy Nato’ and excluding Russian investment from the European energy sector. Neither of these approaches has replaced the 1990s model of ‘democratising’ Russia.”^{xviii}

To further complicate the development of a unified European Union foreign policy towards Russia, member states’ positions are not always constant and tend to oscillate between categories. Poland, as a “New Cold Warrior”, does not have an immutably obstructive and openly hostile relationship with Russia.

“... the Polish foreign minister Radek Sikorski, for example, has made a far greater effort than his predecessor to brief Russia on Poland’s missile defense talks with US. ... By going to Moscow, Sikorski also sent a signal... that Poland wants to have a productive relationship with Russia. ... Warsaw is gradually changing the Central Europeans’ image from that of Russophobes to constructive partners...”^{xix}

The Czech Republic’s decision to be the second of the United State’s sites, along with Poland, for the missile defense shield illustrates a fluctuation from “Frosty Pragmatist” to “Cold Warrior”. These examples are not meant to dispute the Power Audit’s definitions but to illustrate that member states’ policy positions are not immutable. The fluctuation of member states’ positions should illustrate the vast complexity of developing a unified European Union Strategy towards Russia.

The range of variation between member states' assessments of Russia is not the sole difficulty of a united EU policy towards Russia. All of the member states have centuries of historical bi-lateral relations with Russia. Since the European Union is not an entity which has replaced the member states, EU foreign policy has not replaced the foreign policies of member states. EU foreign policy and the foreign policies of the member states must coexist.

“...the foreign policy of the EU is neither all encompassing nor exclusive. This implies that member states maintain their own national foreign policies, which may in part be defined and developed with no or minimal involvement from the EU. The label ‘EU foreign policy’ only includes national foreign policies in so far as these are developed at least to some extent through interaction with the EU mechanism.”^{xx}

Additionally, the member states' foreign policy positions and goals differ between the multi-lateral and bi-lateral relationships with Russia.

Using Germany as an example the dichotomy between bi-lateral positions and multi-lateral positions can be illustrated. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Germany and Russia have had a much more prosperous relationship than the majority of European Union member states. In response to the implementation of the “Common Strategy”, Germany recognized that its “privileged” bi-lateral relationship with Russia needed to be secured from its multi-lateral relationship via the EU.

“...rather than heralding a new era in EU-Russia relations, critics pointed to the vague and declaratory nature of the Common Strategy and its lack of policy and substance. Much as Germany had feared, the Common Strategy had been diluted by the disparate agendas of the Member States. In attempting to combine the interests of the those states such as Germany and the Scandinavian states who were keen to develop a coherent policy on Russia and those such as the south west Mediterranean states who had no direct interests in Russia and wanted to avoid any potential for a redirection of the EU's financial resources, the Common Strategy has moved away from the original German intentions of setting out a clear set of political objectives. The disappointment surrounding the Common Strategy was to have an important impact on the Red-Green Coalitions' foreign policy thinking on Russia and begins a sublet shift towards a two-level game which saw the bi-lateral and multi-lateral relationships with Russia developed in parallel. Given the problems being encountered within the German economy, Russia

was considered too important to be left to the vacuous rhetoric contained within the Common Strategy and increasingly typical of EU foreign policy statements. The bi-lateral policy level would be used to fill the vacuum and to progress relations with Russia in a more pragmatic manner.^{xxi,}

This process began under Gerhardt Shroeder's presidency but has not abated since he left office.

Merkel has proven to be far less preferential to Russia and a stronger advocate for closer EU-Russian integration than her predecessor. Despite this tendency to distinguish Germany's bi-lateral relations from her multi-lateral relationship with Russia is still present.

For example, during the Lufthansa cargo dispute between Germany and Russia, Germany decided to handle it bilaterally as opposed to bringing it into the European Union forum².

“Berlin opined that EU involvement would not provide any additional leverage, but only further politicize the dispute”^{xxii} Germany also significantly downplayed the incident as to keep it from the EU level. The parallel between bi-lateral and multi-lateral foreign relations of EU member states further complicates defining an EU foreign policy towards Russia and the spheres in which it will occupy.

The maintenance of separate bi-lateral and multi-lateral relationships with Russia creates yet another complication that must be negotiated before a new united EU policy towards Russia can be established. The member states of the European Union, each possess their own bi-lateral relationship with Russia. These bi-lateral relationships must be accounted for when developing a multi-lateral relationship in the EU. Sometimes it is unclear when issues should remain bi-lateral or when they should be elevated to the EU level. Germany prefers to limit elevating its issues

² Mathias Roth outlined the dispute in his article “Bilateral Disputes between EU Member States and Russia. The dispute concerned transit rights of Lufthansa Cargo through Russian airspace. On October 28, 2007, Russia announced a ban on Lufthansa to use transit hubs in Russia. The Russian government would not renew these rights after they expired that summer. The Russian government stated that the contract had required Lufthansa to switch its hub to Krasnoyarsk or Novosibirsk but Lufthansa had made no moves to do so. The dispute was settled bi-laterally with Krasnoyarsk designated as the new hub.

with Russia to the EU level in order to optimize the benefits of its bi-lateral relationship with Russia, while other member states do not. Elevating issues to the EU level tends to increase its politicization. For Germany politicizing its issues in its relationship with Russia is a hindrance but, other member states see the politicization of their disputes with Russia as a boon.

The division between states who see politicization of their issues an EU level as beneficial and those that don't usually tends to be one of capability. "EU officials report that in particular the larger member states often deem it more promising to resolve disputes on a bilateral basis. Besides possessing well-established bilateral channels to address problems, larger member states face lower incentives for EU involvement owing to the limited gains of additional leverage... EU officials report that smaller member states tend to exert stronger pressure on Brussels owing to the relatively larger gains of leverage and a perceived powerlessness to resolve the issue bilaterally."^{xxiii}

The most obvious separation in regards to willingness to elevate issues to an EU level falls between France, Britain and Germany and the rest of the member states. France, Britain, and to a lesser extent, Germany or the "Big Three" possess vastly superior means to act bilaterally than do the other European Union member states which contributes to a preference for bi-lateral action. "These differences in power and capabilities give rise to a different status in the world and, in the EU, to different possible routes of intervention and to different 'responsibilities' and expectations both within the country in question and in third countries."^{xxiv} The other member states, while often times desiring the added capabilities of the European Union, are also discouraged from elevating their issues with Russia to the EU level by the "Big Three". "The smaller and medium-sized member states fear that they will be dragged along in the largest member states' power games."^{xxv}

This paradigm creates a problem for raising issues to the EU level. Firstly, member states which have fruitful relationships with Russia and significant capabilities to pursue their interests bilaterally prefer to do so. Secondly, other member states sometimes prefer to politicize their

issues with Russia by elevating them to the EU level. This can work to the detriment of the EU because oftentimes member states threaten to obstruct EU initiatives in order to gain EU support for bilateral disputes with Russia. Lastly, when the “Big Three” wish to elevate their issues to the EU level the smaller member states become concerned with being chained to larger states’ interests. The problems of a united European Union foreign policy stance towards Russia include the balancing of bilateral and multilateral relationships, and the lack of consensus concerning what precipitates the elevation of issues to the EU level.

Energy

The Russian crucible to EU solidarity in energy relations is the most critical. The European Union member states have been effortlessly wedged apart in this arena by Russian policies and further damned themselves by their responses to Russian bullying by frantically scrambling for bilateral deals. The inability or unwillingness to cohesively confront Russia has forced some member states to resort to threatening blocks and vetoes to EU initiatives which slows the EU diplomatic process which encourages more member states to abandon ship and seek bilateral deals with Russia. This is nothing less than a death spiral of self sustaining disunity and it is the most critical obstacle to European unity and ascendancy.

As to be expected, the disunities in perceptions of Russia, bilateral and multilateral policies, and perceptions of what constitute an EU issue have not gone unnoticed by Russia. Russia’s foreign policy makers will not hesitate to exploit any advantage they can find when pursuing foreign policy strategies. This is doubly true when dealing with the European Union. “Moscow’s strategic use of bilateral disputes poses a particular challenge for the EU. While it is not suggested that the Kremlin artificially fans ever dispute as part of a grand ‘divide and rule’

strategy, Moscow has exploited existing disagreements in various ways.^{xxvi} This strategy is often employed in issues of energy.

The multilayered structure of European Union foreign policy compounds the discordant influences of energy security and energy relations with Russia. The differing institutional relationships within Russia and the European member states are often times fractious and further cement differing positions. The balance between bilateral and multilateral foreign policies makes the energy question regarding Russia one of the most difficult arenas for the European Union to decisively deploy its economic incentives, soft power, and its normative power.

The relationship between the oil and gas sector with the Russian government entangles political and economic issues and generates difficult conditions for the European Union to navigate with solidarity. Russia's unique version of the rule of law in the oil and gas sector creates befuddling situations for the EU. These aspects of Russian energy sector encourage unpredictable implementation of energy policy. This unpredictability creates dissenting positions within the EU regarding the reliability of Russia as an oil provider. The lack of EU consensus creates anxiety within member states about their own energy security which they assuage by scrambling to secure bilateral deals with Russia. Russia does not discourage this activity which reinforces its preferences and perceptions of international affairs regarding the EU. The bilateral scrambles endanger the diversification of energy supplies and further bind the European Union to Russian energy. This most divisive of arenas crucially requires solidarity but, critically undermines it.

Unlike in the EU member states, there is a strong institutional linkage between the Russian government with oil and gas companies. Oil and gas industries are intertwined with government and the elites from both are frequently interchanged.

“Notwithstanding the privatisation process, there are close relations between the state and private companies. Lukoil president Alekperov was a former government official and a deputy in the Soviet oil industry. Sibneft chief Abramovich is the governor of Chukota, which is an energy-rich region on the Barents Sea. Yukos chief Khodorovsky was a leader in Komsomol (the youth wing of the Communist Party) and in 1993 he briefly served as deputy minister of power. The former prime minister of Russia, Viktor Chenuyrdin, was the chief of Gazprom. Anatoly Chubais was a deputy prime minister and was closely associated with Boris Yeltsin and his ‘family’, a group which was closely linked to the Kremlin.”^{xxvii}

The virtually seamless divisions between Russian oil and gas and the government are fairly confusing to the Europeans. The pairing of Russian energy industries with the government was undertaken for several reasons but the feelings of national humiliation and alienation from the West were certainly contributors. “The renationalization of the energy sector in accordance with the principle of “national champions” was officially undertaken for the Russian people to benefit from natural resources and through the belief that production-sharing agreements, signed during the 1990s, were “neocolonial”.”^{xxviii}

The coupling of Russian government with Russian oil and gas is seen by the government as being of necessary benefit to the Russian Federation. Russia’s primary leverage on the international stage is its oil and gas reserves and coordinated control by the government allows it to benefit both economically and politically. The perceived need for governmental control is accentuated by the fact that Gazprom accounts for 8% of the Russian annual budget. This relationship is not just centered on the state’s benefits from control of the oil and gas industries but also the belief that success of Russian oil and gas industries is also dependent upon the government. “For instance, according to Mikhail Fridman, the multibillion-dollar joint venture deal between British Petroleum and Tyumen Oil would not have been possible without the support of the Russian government. According to some analysts, when this joint venture

company starts production, it will be a locomotive for the Russian economy.”^{xxxix} The relationship between the Russian government and the oil and gas industries is symbiotic not parasitic.

The intermingling of the government and resource industries adds an extra dynamic to Russian foreign policy which can blind-side EU member states. The coalescence of political and economic policies domestically is mirrored internationally as well. “As reflected by the increasing state control over Russia’s strategic industries, the Russian *energy sector* straddles the boundary between the economic and political spheres [and] [i]n several cases, Russian economic restrictions are clearly *politically motivated* and aim at influencing political decisions or penalizing governments defying the Kremlin.”^{xxx} The complications for the EU posed by the symbiotic relationship between economic gains and political gains in Russian foreign policy are significant.

“Since energy exports are of crucial importance for the Russian budget and one of Moscow’s primary sources of power, Russian energy policy seeks to maximize both economic and political gains. Although these objectives frequently overlap, for instance in the case of Gazprom’s acquisition of profitable and strategic downstream assets, political considerations can take the precedence in other cases. For example, expensive, offshore infrastructure projects (like South Stream gas pipeline or the Baltic Pipeline 2) mainly serve the political objective of circumventing traditional transit states such as Ukraine and Belarus. In 2007-08, the dispute over Lithuanian Mazeikiu refinery was of particular relevance for EU-Russian relations. After the Polish energy company PKN Orlen had acquired a majority stake in the refinery at the expense of Russian competitors, Transneft cut crude oil supplies delivered through the Druzhba pipeline in July 2006. As Transneft stonewalled Lithuania’s requests for resuming supplies, Vilnius eventually took the step of formally blocking EU-Russian negotiating directives in early 2008 to leverage EU pressure for reopening the pipeline. Further energy disputes displaying a mix of economic and political objectives include the struggle over the Sakhalin-2 project in 2006 and Transneft’s supply cut against the Latvian Ventspils oil terminal in 2003.”^{xxxi}

For the European Union it can be unpredictable when political goals will supersede economic goals or vice versa in its dealings with Russia. This unpredictability substantially diminishes the EU’s diplomatic abilities. Furthermore, the EU can find itself paralyzed when member states try to invoke EU leverage and support by blocking EU initiatives. The confusion that the dual-

pronged policy goals of Russia unleash on EU member states can cripple a united EU diplomatic response.

In its energy relations with Russia the EU can be caught unawares not only by the entangled economic and political interests in Russian energy policy but also by the unreliable legality in which the Russian energy sector operates. Russia and the EU play the game with different rulebooks and these discrepancies oftentimes work to the disadvantage of the European Union. "...The EU is all about supranational rules of economic and political conduct and dispute settlement by ordered legal procedure, whereas Russia is showing itself to be all about raw power, with little or no regard for any overarching international framework"^{xxxii} Russia's refusal to play by the "rules" contributes to the confusion of EU, and EU member states' policy and also illustrates the struggle of adequately mobilizing its normative abilities caused by the ruptured policy positions of the member states.

The problem is not that Russian oil and gas companies flagrantly disregard the law, it's that there is not a functioning legal system in which they operate. The legal institutions in Russia that regulate its energy sector do not perform the necessary functions required by the rule of law. "One of the most important of these is to provide a reliably clear and predictable framework, on the basis of which people and organizations can plan their activities so as to minimize conflict..."^{xxxiii} There are several examples of where the laws in the Russian oil and gas sector do not provide, reliable, predictable and clear frameworks.

The first example regards the issuance of licenses by the Russian government to oil and gas companies for the development of new resources in Russia. The companies must apply to the government, frequently their owner, by submitting proposals.

"There are two observations to be made here. The first is that, as opposed to a single-criterion system, a tender process invites conflict, for it is always possible to dispute that

the “best” proposal has been accepted: the proposals submitted by companies cover several aspects of the field’s development, thus there can be – and often is – real uncertainty as to which proposal was better or whether in fact one could say that one was in fact better than all the others.... Second, and worse, sometimes the result of the tender has been rejected and a company that has not even participated in the process has been awarded the license. In other case, officials have decided that the company awarded the license by the tender commission is not the “right” one, the results of the tender have been annulled, and the license gone to the “politically correct” company.”^{xxxiv}

Proposals being selecting solely on the basis of which one is “best” is indicative of unclear legislation since there is no criterion that defines what the “best” proposal should entail. It is not hard to imagine that these laws are intentionally written without clarity to allow the Russian government the freedom to strategically issue licenses without the bothers of inconveniently specific laws.

Another example of the deficits that riddle the legal institutions of the Russian energy sector can be found in environmental protection laws. The symbiotic relationship between the Russian energy sector and the Russian government has camouflaged the border between political goals and economic goals. It is effortless to envision the conflict between political objectives and economic objectives regarding environmental protection laws. This obfuscation of these realms in Russian policy and the potential conflict of interests that stringent and effective environmental protection laws would create have naturally resulted in ineffective laws with unreliable implementation.

“There are laws in Russia aimed at environmental protection, including laws setting maximum levels of dangerous emissions, and sometimes – rarely – these laws are enforced. But it does not matter if they are enforced, because the penalties are very low so low that it is much cheaper to continue to pollute than it is to pay the fine levied. There is even reason to doubt that compliance was ever intended, as often the permissible level of emissions is so low that the industry in question could not possibly simultaneously operate and meet the legal standard.”^{xxxv}

This set of laws illustrates the proclivity of the Russian government for drafting laws that are ineffective and unreliably implemented for the benefit of the state. The Russian government can reliably expect the revenue obtained from these fines because companies cannot function at the legislated “legal” standards. This is institutionalized bribery.

Yet another set of laws exemplifies the Russian government’s penchant for selective enforcement of its already unclear, ineffective, and unreliable laws.

“One of the continuing sources of conflict arises from Gazprom’s refusal to allow independent producers of gas, which in total account for 15 percent of the annual production of gas from Russia, access to the export pipelines.... The law explicitly provides that Gazprom must allow other companies access to its pipeline network. But as is so often the case in Russia, the law just does not matter – Gazprom merely ignores it and is allowed by the authorities to do so.”^{xxxvi}

As opposed to the European Union which practices universal enforcement of its laws, The Russian Federation practices selective enforcement. This selective enforcement which is illustrated by legal access to pipelines and environmental laws results in the Russian government overlooking or even condoning violations of the law by oil and gas companies. On the other hand, companies that are seen as unfavorable or possess assets coveted by the Russian Government can be targeted with a surgical strike of selective legal enforcement. The European Union and its member states struggle to account for the nature of Russian law concerning its energy sector. As opposed to the EU and its member states, Russian law is intentionally crafted and implemented as a tool or amazingly precise surgical weapon, in pursuing its conjoined political and economic goals.

The implementation of Russian international energy policy, which is heavily influenced by intertwined economic and political objective and peculiar legal institutions, proves problematic for European unity. Russian policy is perceived as not only under handed but heavy handed as well in its dealings with near abroad especially with Ukraine and raises fears of energy

bullying and a Russian “energy weapon”. “...Russia’s state-controlled energy company, Gazprom resorted to an eleventh-hour pressure tactic which seemed like blackmail and made Russia look like a threat to global energy security”^{xxxvii} The Ukrainian oil crises of 2006 and 2009 accentuated European concerns of Russian bullying and seemed politically and economically motivated. “...the Russian state has used oil and gas as a political weapon to increase its influence within the CIS states and in particular with the central Asian states, Byelorussia and Ukraine.”^{xxxviii} The afore mentioned Mazeikiu refinery dispute and, Transneft supply cut against the Latvian Ventspils oil terminal and the struggle over the Sakhalin-2 project are all examples of politically motivated energy bullying by Russia. The fears of Russia using its resources as a political weapon have divisive consequences for the EU by separating the interests of states with less leverage and higher dependence on Russian oil and gas from states with more leverage or those less dependent on Russia for its energy concerns.

The European Union’s response to Russia’s use of its natural energy as a political weapon has been very counterproductive to EU unity and buttresses Russia’s preference for divisionary energy policies towards the EU. The EU response to Russian bullying of Ukraine and the Baltic states has been to lessen its reliance on these states as transport hubs to the delight of Russia. A de-emphasis of Ukrainian importance by the member states furthers Russia’s policy goal of no longer having to rely on Ukraine. The European Union seems to have justified to Russia its heavy handed tactics and proven that they have fruitful results.

A second Russian goal that has been encouraged by the EU’s response to the bullying of the Baltic States and Ukraine, is that of engaging EU member states individually. “Russia has sought to bilateralise both its deals and its disputes with EU member state, putting a strain on EU solidarity and making Russia the stronger power.... It is after all, natural for Moscow to deal

with individual EU member states because it is how it sees international politics...^{xxxix} The bullying of the Baltic states has caused them to respond by attempting to mobilize EU leverage on their behalf. The Baltic States pursue this, as we have previously seen, by threatening to block and even veto EU initiatives. This practice divides the member states further from one another. “The more countries like Lithuania, Poland and Estonia block EU decisions on Russia, the more other EU member states – and particularly the big ones – are likely to accept Moscow’s bilateral approaches.”^{xl} The EU’s response to Russia’s energy tactics have helped Moscow achieve its goal of dealing with EU member states bilaterally. The German-Russian Nord-Stream pipeline is just one example of Russian successes in pursuing individual energy relationships with EU member states. Russia is proving successful in this goal and has made it appealing for the EU member states as well. “Russia has sweetened its various bilateral deals by promising the respective EU countries that each will become a ‘European gas hub’. It has made such promises to Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia and Turkey. Some politicians in these countries argue that delays in forging a European energy policy justify bilateral deals with the Russians.”^{xli}

The success of Russia with engaging the European member states individually has raised concerns in the EU about Europe’s dependency on Russian oil and gas and of alternatives for diversifying its energy imports. One strategy the European Union has for doing this is by building a pipeline which will bring non-Russian oil into Europe, Nabucco. Russia however, may have already out maneuvered the European Union regarding this project. “In March 2007, Hungary’s prime minister, Ferenc Gyursány, expressed a sudden interest in an alternative Russia-controlled project, called Blue Stream II. Bulgaria’s enthusiasm for Nabucco also seems to be waning, as is Turkey’s”^{xlii} Russia’s successes in engaging EU member states bilaterally has

very possibly already killed the Nabucco pipeline and ensured Europe's dependence on Russian energy.

Security

Hard security concerns of the EU member states, especially those of the new member states vis-à-vis Russia are also of eminent concern to European Union solidarity. Some states tend to prefer delegating their hard security anxieties vis-à-vis Russia to NATO and the US while others wish to emphasize the role of ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy). The European Union's divided opinions on this matter will continue to disrupt EU solidarity. The continuance of the perceived necessity held by some member states of NATO and the United States for security assurances and the hesitation to delegate these responsibilities to the EU works to the detriment of European Union solidarity and the maintenance of the trans-Atlantic relationship. Second only to Russia, the United States also possesses an uncanny ability to divide the European Union and increased reliance upon the US further enhances that ability and increases its implementation. The trans-Atlantic relationship is also jeopardized because the United State's interests are not longer met as the guarantor of European security. The inability of the European Union to assure its member states' security from Russia will rollback the conditions of the post-modern world where the European Union can thrive as a global super power.

The European Security and Defense Policy which was created in 1999 is intended to enable the European Union to ensure its security. "Reflecting the Blair-Chirac agreement, it declared that 'The [European] Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by the credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises'."^{xliii} Many critics of ESDP have claimed that it is meant to

rival or counter NATO and The United States while its supporters claim that ESDP is meant to compliment US and NATO operations. This debate is not far removed from the politics of the European Union member states and is particularly heated when concerning Russia.

As discussed earlier, the member states of the European Union have differing positions concerning their threat assessment of Russia. The EU member states exhibit a similar range of stratification regarding their preferred security provider. Many European Union member states hesitate to rely on the European Union for security guarantees towards Russia and instead continue to rely on the US-NATO security shield. The range of views varies significantly between member states as to who should guarantee their security.

“The key challenge here is to understand the range of views across the EU as to the precise nature of national institutional preference with respect to NATO and ESDP. At one extreme might come a country such as Denmark, the only one with an opt-out from ESDP, which clearly considers that NATO is the only security actor with which it wishes to be associated; or Poland, which, although obliged by the terms of accession to accept the ESDP chapters of the *acquis communautaire*, has tended in practice to prioritize NATO almost to the exclusion of any real involvement with ESDP, although there are already clear signs that the balance is shifting in the other direction. At the other end of the spectrum might be positioned countries such as Finland and Ireland which have traditionally refused to be associated with NATO and have contributed in significant ways to the definition of a European Security policy. Between these two positions, different EU member states can be situated at various points across the space.”^{xliv}

The countries of Denmark and Poland which gravitate away from ESDP and towards NATO fall into the category of “Frosty Pragmatists” and “New Cold Warriors” outlined in A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations. An in depth study to determine the relationship between member states threat assessments of Russia and their support of NATO or ESDP would be enlightening but is not the aim of this paper. Positions regarding NATO and ESDP is a critical issue which must be resolved before the European Union can pursue a unified security policy whether it lie with NATO and the US or ESDP.

Those member states which prefer to rely on the United States and NATO for their security concerns regarding Russia also have differing threat assessments of Russia.

“Countries in Europe’s north and east worry that Moscow is blundering into a confrontation with the alliance... Their calls predate, but have intensified since the conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, which scared allies in Central Europe in particular.”^{xlv} The countries which gravitate away from ESDP and towards NATO generally fall into the category of “Frosty Pragmatists” and “New Cold Warriors” outlined in A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations. An in depth study to determine the relationship between member states threat assessments of Russia and their support of NATO or ESDP would be enlightening but is not the aim of this paper. A correlation between high threat level assessments of Russia and a preference for NATO-US security assurances and waning confidence in ESDP appears evident.

The division of EU member states who wish to continue to defer NATO and the United States for security guarantees regarding Russia between those who prefer ESDP strains the Trans-Atlantic relationship which often times divides Europe.

The preference of some EU member states for the maintenance of the US-NATO security guarantee for Europe may prove disruptive for the trans-Atlantic relationship as the United State’s interests evolve to the post-Cold War world, specifically US interests in its relations with the EU. The United States is less enthusiastic to underwrite European security regarding Russia than it was during the Cold War and expects Europe to carry its own weight.

“For Washington, Europe is no longer an object of security concern as it was during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. It is therefore time, in American eyes, for the transatlantic relationship to evolve into something of greater practical utility. As Obama put it on his first presidential trip across the Atlantic: “We want strong allies. We are not looking to be patrons of Europe. We are looking to be partners of Europe.” This was not simply an outreach to Europe – it was also a challenge.”^{xlvi}

Even though recent developments, such as the proposed missile defense shield to be based in Eastern Europe, seem to symbolize a continuance of US security assurances in Europe in the short term, in the long term US interests in providing for European security will diminish.

As stated previously, The United States, like Russia, has the ability to divide the European Union and will actively utilize this tool in its agendas. Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Witney in their power audit of EU-US relations quotes Obama's top diplomat for Europe, Philip Gordan as saying:

“We want to see a strong and united Europe, speaking with one voice. In the best of all possible worlds, that one voice will be saying what we want to hear ... If it is not saying what we want to hear, then we would rather that voice was less united. For the foreseeable future we will have to have relations with the EU and with nations. You go to the place that can deliver.”^{xlvii}

The United States, like Russia does not hesitate to pragmatically divide Europeans in achieving its objectives and will pursue bilateral relations with EU member states if that best serves its needs. The United States would prefer to deal with a United Europe but will not subsume its other international interests to foster a cohesive EU. The increased emphasis of some European Union member states on the United States for their security concerns is counter to US interests in the Trans-Atlantic relationship and reduces the relationship's appeal to the US. Secondly, increased reliance on the United States for security increases the United States' influence over EU member states and consequently will increase its divisive ability among the EU.

This dynamic significantly handicaps Europe's abilities as a global actor in EU-US relations and EU-Russia relations. The United States' interests concerning EU and Russia relations are quite clear. “America wants to see a united, self-confident Europe dealing effectively with Russia...”^{xlviii} Europe's inability to act in solidarity regarding security towards Russia marginalizes the importance of the trans-Atlantic relationship to the United States which

is the most important relationship for Europe. The United States also takes advantage of European divisions regarding security and Russia. “On issues such as Russia, where Europe is crucial but lacks consensus, divide-and-rule is the usual approach”.^{xlix} This perpetuates the difficulties for a united EU policy towards Russia. The lack of security consensus allows the EU to be divided by the United States concerning Russia for short term interests which diminishes the US’s interest in the EU in the long term.

Finally, the lack of confidence in ESDP to provide for member states’ security vis-à-vis Russia threatens to rollback the conditions of the post-modern world in which McCormick argues the European Union can flourish. McCormick’s criterion for a post-modern world (cited at the beginning of this paper) include the emphasis of “latent” or “implied” power and the de-emphasis of actually implementing that power. As cited earlier the Georgia-Russia war has inflamed military security concerns of the Eastern European countries regarding Russia. In its war with Georgia “Russia conducted a 20th century military campaign.”¹ The increasing fear in Eastern and Central Europe of a 20th century military campaign and its increasing lack of confidence in the European Union to provide for their security poses the risk of undermining the importance of latent or implied power and may increase the need for actual military implementation if the situation deteriorates further. Without united confidence in the European Union’s ability to protect the security of its member states the “New Cold Warriors” may indeed get their new cold war which would effectively roll back the conditions of the post-modern world in the area in which EU thrives.

Conclusion

The challenges in creating a united European Union foreign policy strategy are numerous and complex. The end of the Cold War ushered in a period of cohesive western policy in the

form of “Russia First”. The international events of the 1990s and early 2000s worked to unravel this policy. The events following the dissolution of Yugoslavia inseeded Russia with feelings of alienation from the West and feelings of national humiliation. These sentiments which would grow throughout the decade and tinge Russia’s foreign policies would also cultivate reluctance in rejoining the West and cultivate foreign policies which would prove divisive for the EU. The Orange Revolution would bring these sentiments to fruition and the disruptive nature of Russia’s policies would solidify into the situation of today. For Europe the Orange Revolution ushered in the formal abandonment of “Russia First” and a cohesive European strategy towards Russia. The addition of NATO and EU expansion would further aggravate these issues in the EU and aggravate negative attitudes in Russia.

References

-
- ⁱ McCormick, John. *The European Super Power*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 2.
- ⁱⁱ McCormick, John. *The European Super Power*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 4.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Andrew Wilson, Nicu Popescu and Pierre Noël. "The Future of EU-Russia Relations: A Way Forward in Solidarity and the Rule of Law", *European Council of Foreign Relations*, (2009): 4.
- ^{iv} Mark Leonard & Nicu Popescu. "A power audit of EU-Russia Relations", *European Council on Foreign Relations*, (2007): 1.
- ^v Emerson, Adyin, Noutcheva, Tocci, Vahl & Youngs, "The Reluctant Debutant", *Center for European Policy Studies*, (2005): 16.
- ^{vi} Trenin, Dmitri. "Russia Leaves the West." *Foreign Affairs*, 85, No. 4 (2006): 90.
- ^{vii} Trenin, Dmitri "Russia Leaves the West." *Foreign Affairs*, 85, No. 4 (2006): 87.
- ^{viii} Kubicek, Paul. "Foreign Policy and the West", *Political Science Quarterly* 114, No. 4 (Winter, 1999-2000): 550.
- ^{ix} Kubicek, Paul. "Foreign Policy and the West", *Political Science Quarterly* 114, No. 4 (Winter, 1999-2000): 552.
- ^x Emerson, Adyin, Noutcheva, Tocci, Vahl & Youngs "The Reluctant Debutant", *Center for European Policy Studies*, (2005): 20
- ^{xi} "Trenin, Dmitri. "Russia Leaves the West." *Foreign Affairs*, 85, No. 4 (2006): 92
- ^{xii} ^{xii} Kubicek, Paul. "Foreign Policy and the West", *Political Science Quarterly* 114, No. 4 (Winter, 1999-2000): 557.
- ^{xiii} R. G. Gidadhbli. NATO: Russia's Dilemma. *Economic Political Weekly* 39 (2004): 1885-1887.
- ^{xiv} R. G. Gidadhbli. NATO: Russia's Dilemma. *Economic Political Weekly* 39 (2004): 1885
- ^{xv} R. G. Gidadhbli. NATO: Russia's Dilemma. *Economic Political Weekly* 39 (2004): 1886
- ^{xvi} R. G. Gidadhbli. NATO: Russia's Dilemma. *Economic Political Weekly* 39 (2004): 1887
- ^{xvii} Leonard, Mark & Nicu Popescu. "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations". *European Council on Foreign Relations* (2007): 2.
- ^{xviii} Leonard, Mark & Nicu Popescu. "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations". *European Council on Foreign Relations* (2007): 2-3.
- ^{xix} Valasek, Thomas. "NATO, Russia and European Security", *Centre for European Reform*. (2009): 25.
- ^{xx} Keukeleire, Stephan and Jennifer MacNaughtan. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 29.
- ^{xxi} Timmis, Graham. "German Ostpolitik Under the Red-Green Coalition and EU-Russia Relations". *Debatte* 14 (2006): 306-307.
- ^{xxii} Roth, Mathias. "Bilateral Disputes between EU Member States and Russia". *Center for European Policy Studies*. (2009): 18.
- ^{xxiii} Roth, Mathias. "Bilateral Disputes between EU Member States and Russia". *Center for European Policy Studies*. (2009): 24.
- ^{xxiv} Keukeleire, Stephan and Jennifer MacNaughtan. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*. (Palgrave Macmillan. 2008), 131.
- ^{xxv} Keukeleire, Stephan and Jennifer MacNaughtan. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*. (Palgrave Macmillan. 2008), 130.
- ^{xxvi} Roth, Mathias. "Bilateral Disputes between EU Member States and Russia". *Center for European Policy Studies*. (2009): 3.
- ^{xxvii} Gidadhbli, R. G. "Russia: Oil and Politics". *Economic and Political Weekly*. 38 (2003): 2025.
- ^{xxviii} Gomart, Thomas. "EU-Russia Relations: Toward a Way Out of Depression". *Center for Strategic & International Studies*. (2008) 11
- ^{xxix} Gidadhbli, R. G. "Russia: Oil and Politics". *Economic and Political Weekly*. 38(2003): 2026.
- ^{xxx} Roth, Mathias. "Bilateral Disputes between EU Member States and Russia". *Center for European Policy Studies*. (2009): 5-6.
- ^{xxxi} Roth, Mathias. "Bilateral Disputes between EU Member States and Russia". *Center for European Policy Studies*. (2009): 5.
- ^{xxxii} Keukeleire, Stephan and Jennifer MacNaughtan. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*. (Palgrave Macmillan. 2008), 245.

-
- ^{xxxiii} Keeping, Janet. "Where Law Does Not Rule: The Russian Oil and Gas Sector". *International Journal* 62 (2006/2007): 69
- ^{xxxiv} Keeping, Janet. "Where Law Does Not Rule: The Russian Oil and Gas Sector". *International Journal* 62 (2006/2007): 73
- ^{xxxv} Keeping, Janet. "Where Law Does Not Rule: The Russian Oil and Gas Sector". *International Journal* 62 (2006/2007): 77
- ^{xxxvi} Keeping, Janet. "Where Law Does Not Rule: The Russian Oil and Gas Sector". *International Journal* 62 (2006/2007): 78
- ^{xxxvii} Russia Trenin, Dmitri "Russia Leaves the West." *Foreign Affairs*, 85, No. 4 (2006): 93.
- ^{xxxviii} Gidadhubli, R. G. "Russia: Oil and Politics". *Economic and Political Weekly*. 38(2003): 2025.
- ^{xxxix} ~~„xxxix~~ Mark Leonard & Nicu Popescu. "A power audit of EU-Russia Relations", *European Council on Foreign Relations*, (2007): 14.
- ^{xl} "A power audit of EU-Russia Relations", Mark Leonard & Nicu Popescu, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2007, page 52.
- ^{xli} Barysch, Katinka. "Russia, Realism, and EU Unity". *Centre for European Reform*. (2007): 7.
- ^{xlii} Barysch, Katinka. "Russia, Realism, and EU Unity". *Centre for European Reform*. (2007): 6.
- ^{xliii} McCormick, John. *The European Super Power*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 75.
- ^{xliv} Howorth, Jolyon. *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 147.
- ^{xlv} Valasek, Tomas. "NATO, Russia, and European security." *Centre for European Reform*. (2009):1.
- ^{xlvi} Shapiro, Jeremy and Nick Witney. "Towards a Post-American Europe: A Power Audit of EU-US Relations." *European Council on Foreign Relations*. (2009): 11.
- ^{xlvii} Shapiro, Jeremy and Nick Witney. "Towards a Post-American Europe: A Power Audit of EU-US Relations." *European Council on Foreign Relations*. (2009): 44.
- ^{xlviii} Shapiro, Jeremy and Nick Witney. "Towards a Post-American Europe: A Power Audit of EU-US Relations." *European Council on Foreign Relations*. (2009): 14.
- ^{xlix} Shapiro, Jeremy and Nick Witney. "Towards a Post-American Europe: A Power Audit of EU-US Relations." *European Council on Foreign Relations*. (2009): 12.
- ^l Secrieru, Stanislav. "Illusion of Power: Russia after the South Caucasus Battle". *Center for European Policy Studies*. (2009): 1.