

Brokers Beyond Borders: Moldova's Countertraffickers

Abstract

This paper presents a new analytical lens through which to examine the structure and strategies of actors and fields of actors in the arena of international aid and development. Subsequently, I illustrate this new perspective through a case study of the field of organizations fighting human trafficking in Moldova. The combination of formal network analytical methods and qualitative contextualization of the evidence make for a rich case study that is strong enough to bear the weight of a new theoretical perspective.

1 Introduction

In this paper I propose a new analytical lens through which to examine the structure and strategies of actors and fields of actors in the arena of international aid and development. Subsequently, I illustrate this new perspective through a case study of the field of organizations fighting human trafficking in Moldova.

The development landscape is growing increasingly complex, but current approaches have been unable to adequately account for this complexity without becoming mired in it. Hence, rather than engaging with the full field of actors, scholars frequently limit the scope of their analysis to include only non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or only “advocacy” NGOs (Prakash and Gugerty 2010). Other groups of scholars take a broader view of development by widening their focus to include entire coalitions of state and non-state actors working toward a common cause (Keck and Sikkink 1998, e.g.), or through stepping back to analyze the world cultural polity as a whole (Meyer 1980, e.g.). If the former approaches – of looking only at NGOs – neglect to account for a wide array of impactful players in a given development field, the latter strategies make it difficult to carefully investigate the heterogeneities within a field and how they might relate to development outcomes. In their recent review of the field, Susan C. Watkins, Ann Swidler, and Thomas Hannan call for researchers to “situate [NGOs] among the wider set of organizations and individuals attempting to meet similar needs, by mapping the key dimensions of the organizational field of which they are a part, including their overlaps and interpenetrations with other organizations and actors, from nation-states and intergovernmental organizations to churches, missionaries, and individual altruists” (2012: 304). It is my ambition to do just that.

In this paper, I propose what I call a development brokerage organization (DBO) perspective. Borrowing from network analysis, this approach places special emphasis upon triadic relationships wherein brokers connect otherwise unconnected side parties in order to facilitate the flow of goods and information between them. Whereas previous researchers have primarily limited themselves to treating individuals as brokers, however,

I advocate for the redeployment of the brokerage concept in reference to organizations. Moreover, while brokers are often thought of as reaping greater rewards due to their superior structural position, I draw from Katherine Stovel's work on the particular challenges brokers face to make the case that brokerage organizations are simultaneously presented with high payoffs and a special class of challenges, which largely stem from the difficulty of being the agent for two dissimilar principals. This is what Stovel calls the broker's dilemma. I advance the notion that – for reasons I will enumerate later on – the development context is not only dominated by brokers, but it is also particularly prone to creating deep dilemmas for the DBOs who find themselves in the middle. Thus, the emergence, persistence, and evolution of a particular development field depends not simply on the supply and demand of development goods, but also on the presence of structural gaps, the capacity of brokers to successfully span these gaps, and the particular strategies they take to stabilize their advantageous network position.

There are a number of advantages to this DBO perspective. First of all, thinking of development organizations in terms of their position within a network helps us to create meaningful classes of similar organizations that do not have to rely upon the fraught and contested terminology of NGOs, TNGOs, CBOs, and so on. Relatedly, the focus on organizational positioning allows us to think about NGOs in terms of who they have dealings with rather than tying our groupings and analyses to a set of strategies or characteristics that may not be constant across time or region. The focus on brokerage and its dilemmas is also useful for drawing attention to the ubiquity of dual principal-agent problems for development actors. Numerous scholars have explored the difficulties produced by the classic principal-agent scenario, but few have explicitly acknowledged the special challenges that emerge when brokers are put in the position of trying to serve two unconnected masters at the same time. Finally, by getting us to think relationally, the DBO approach makes it much easier to transition from a narrow concern for how individual organizations behave to a broader interest in how the various actors who comprise a field are linked together, and how these interrelations aggregate up to produce development outcomes.

The rest of this paper has the following structure: First, I will review some of the key literature on organization involved in development. Next, I will give an overview of past research linking development and brokerage. I will then present my model for applying a brokerage perspective to understanding a field of development actors. Once I have laid out my model, I will then show how such a model can be used to understand a particular case. In this paper, my case study is that of the Moldovan countertrafficking development field. In the second half of my paper, then, I will draw upon over four dozen personal interviews and a decade's worth of primary source documents to construct a coherent, compelling, brokerage-based narrative of the field's emergence and evolution. I will also show the special benefits and challenges facing different types of actors in the field, depending upon their structural position. Finally, I will detail the various strategies that are available to development organizations to stabilize their position, with certain strategies being easier to use in some positions than in others. In the end, the combination of formal network analytical methods and qualitative contextualization of the evidence make for a rich case study that is strong enough to bear the weight of a new theoretical perspective.

2 Relevant Literature on Development Organizations

Development NGOs

The number of organizations involved in international development has grown tremendously since the 1980s, when donor governments decided that it would be better to circumvent corrupt receiving governments by instead working through non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Since that time, development NGOs have captured the attention of scholars across the social sciences. As William F. Fisher stated in his review of the NGO literature in 1997:

The potential of the global associational explosion has captivated the imagination of a wide variety of development planners, policy makers, activists, and analysts. Economists and development planners laud the role of local associations in alleviating rural poverty and helping communities to adapt to modernization[,].... Political scientists are reevaluating the role of voluntary associations in building vibrant civil societies.... Scholars of international relations have begun to examine the impact of NGO coalitions and networks on international politics and their role in the formation of an international civil society... and some activists and analysts are reconsidering the relationship of NGOs to social movements and their ability to both empower people and contribute to alternative discourses of development and democratization.

(p.440-441, quoted in Watkins, Swidler, and Hannan 2012 p.286)

Research on these new, non-profit, non-governmental organizations has tended to fall into three general groups.

First, there has been a focus – emerging mostly from the political science literature – on trying to understand the extent to which development NGOs distributing might undermine the governments of aid-receiving countries. Essentially, the question is whether the governments of developing nations are weakened by aid or strengthened by it? Does dependency on foreign assistance undermine domestic legitimacy, capacity, and accountability? Do services provided by development NGOs inhibit governments from solving their own problems (Callaghy 1987; Bratton 1989; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Manji and O’Coill 2002; Leonard and Straus 2003; Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Brass 2012)? A second major theme of development NGO research is dominated by case studies conducted by anthropologists, and it asks questions about how well NGOs have succeeded in applying the bold, ambitious goals of development planners in the local communities where grand vision meets stark reality. A general conclusion of this branch of the literature is that development NGOs have not, in fact, typically succeeded in “empowering” individuals through the transformative, “sustainability”-focused projects and initiatives created by foreign planners (Campbell 2003; Pritchett and Woolcock 2004; Igoe and Kelsall 2005; Mosse and Lewis 2005). A third body of work dealing with development NGOs takes its lead from the seminal work of Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink on transnational advocacy networks (TANs). Scholars writing in this line of research have conceptualized of development NGOs as key players in international social movements that are “bound

together by shared values” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). Having thus presumed that development NGOs and their partners are motivated by shared grievances and normative beliefs, most of the research from this perspective focuses on the relative merits of the various tactics and strategies that these coalitions deploy (see Wapner 1995; Finnemore 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005).

Each of these three branches of the development literature places emphasis on the outcomes of development NGO efforts, either for recipient governments, recipient communities, or for the transnational social movements that advocate for them. It has been a less common practice among development scholars to focus instead on the competing incentives and difficult constraints faced by development NGOs themselves.

Development NGOs as Firms

In the past decade, however, another body of literature has emerged – largely in response to the transnational social movements literature – that has sought to delve more deeply into such questions. Authors in this camp have emphasized the parallel between NGOs and firms, with a particular focus on the role that collective action challenges and competition play in shaping NGO behavior (Cooley and Ron 2002; Sell and Prakash 2004; Smillie and Minear 2004; Bob 2005; Ron, Ramos, and Rogers 2005; Prakash and Gugerty 2010). Authors writing from this perspective have proposed a shift in the unit of analysis from the level of campaigns and movements to the level of individual organizations. Such a shift, they assert, allows for a more careful consideration of “theoretical questions that bear upon NGOs’ emergence (why, where, and when), internal organization (agency and accountability), and organizational strategies (funding and advocacy), and the relationship between emergence, structure, and strategy” (Prakash and Gugerty 2010:4). These scholars view advocacy groups as rational, purposive actors operating within the constraints of a complex policy environment wherein the struggle to survive can at times eclipse the normative objectives they purport to pursue.

The biggest piece that is missing from this literature is a more complete appreciation of the effect of and consequences for the broader development context as a whole. That is, while the NGOs-as-firms literature does a good job of exploring the competing incentives and deep conflicts of organizations trying to do development, it yet has little to say about how these challenges vary depending upon an organization’s position within a development network or upon that network’s structure. Moreover, it has not yet been able to present a systematic model for connecting the collective action strategies deployed by NGOs to macro-level consequences for development.

The World Polity Literature

The contribution of sociologists to the literature on international development and the NGOs that power it has been limited, with the major exception of the world polity literature built upon the novel contributions of John Meyer and his colleagues (Meyer 1980; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997; Boli and Thomas 1997; Beckfield 2003). This literature considers the emergence of a global civil society, wherein the forms and behavior of development NGOs are largely structured by the global institutions that have govern the world cultural process. From this macro-level perspective, the institutional environment becomes the center of analytical focus, as it is what gives purpose to states, NGOs, firms, and individuals alike (Berman 1987; Falk, Kratochwil, and Mendlovitz 1985;

Weiss 1989). This focus on how global institutions provide scripts and models for appropriate local action helps to explain the surprising degree of isomorphism of structure and strategy among international NGOs even across regions and despite great variation in funding sources (Boli and Thomas 1997: 184-7; Chabbott 1999: 223; Ghodsee 2006). Inefficiencies and sub-optimal outcomes are a frequent concern of this literature, which tends to emphasize the “intensive decoupling” and “structuration” that result as states and development agents become more responsive to the “exogenous world culture” than to “local, cultural, functional, or power processes” (Meyer et al. 1997: 173).

Just as the recent NGOs-as-firms literature, then, the world polity literature gives a good deal of theoretical consideration to questions of how development shapes NGOs, rather than focusing exclusively on how NGOs shape development. Missing from the theories of world polity, however, is a precise elaboration of how the dominant global institutions are propagated and replicated from the level of governance agencies and nation states down through the aid chain until it reaches the level of community organizations and private citizens. Absent, too, is a full appreciation for the uncertainties and challenges faced by development NGOs. By focusing on the stability achieved through the production of legitimate and appropriate “myths,” the world polity literature’s emphasis vis-à-vis development NGOs has centered almost entirely upon the relationships that these organizations have with those higher up the aid chain, while neglecting to consider the difficulties of simultaneously maintaining relationships with those lower down the aid chain as well.

Development NGOs as Organizations

In their recent review article, Susan Watkins, Ann Swidler, and Thomas Hannan (2012) present a new sociological approach to understanding development NGOs. To start, they join the NGOs-as-firms perspective in calling for an analytical focus on NGOs themselves, and in refuting the assertion that these groups are a more altruistic, cooperative type of social organization. They go beyond the firms perspective, however, by drawing from James D. Thompson’s work on *Organizations in Action* to assert that NGOs are merely a special type of organization, which is unique in large part due to the “special uncertainties they face due to the environments in which they operate, the goals they pursue, and the social and material technologies they employ” (Watkins et al. 2012: 287). After highlighting a number of common features of the development landscape through an analysis of uncertainties in NGO environments, goals, and technologies, Watkins and her colleagues propose a series of new avenues for sociological research into development, many of which have motivated this paper.

First, they call for development researchers to try to better understand development NGOs by “[situating] them among the wider set of organizations and individuals attempting to meet similar needs, by mapping the key dimensions of the organizational field of which they are a part, including their overlaps and interpenetrations with other organizations and actors, from nation-states and intergovernmental organizations to churches, missionaries, and individual altruists” (p.304). Next, they call for the advancement of better methods for producing a sample frame of development organizations, in order to facilitate more systematic analysis. Particular attention should be paid, they say, to “the brokers in development... [whose] imaginations, aspirations, and uncertainties determine the practical strategies that play such a large role in what NGOs

actually do” (p. 304). Further on, they call for more attention to “networks of funding and influence through which NGOs activities are organized and regulated” ; “better sets of explanations of why some NGOs become more specialized... and others seem to thrive by not committing themselves firmly to any specific expertise” ; better theoretical elaboration of “the relationship between the degree of uncertainty of the technologies NGOs use and their goals” ; an accounting of “in whose eyes NGOs seek legitimacy” ; and a mapping of “the reference groups of the diverse occupants of the NGO organizational field” (p. 305-306).

NGOs as Development Brokerage Organizations (DBOs)

Traction can be gained on many of the above questions through applying the principles of brokerage to an analysis of international development organizations. In the next section, I will elaborate upon how I propose to reappropriate network analytical concepts and theories dealing with brokerage in order to gain more analytical leverage into the study of development organizations. The first key distinction of this proposed perspective is to avoid the problematic and contested label of NGO and to trade it for a broader conceptualization of development actors as falling into one of three categories: donors, beneficiaries, or development brokerage organizations (DBOs). A second critical distinction is that I will focus more on an organization’s position within the network of development actors than upon its attributes. Thus, I hypothesize that a development organization’s behavior will be more closely associated with its position than with its characteristics.¹ These two divergences from the normative modes of analysis are tremendously helpful in facilitating a more systematic study of the complex modern development landscape. Moreover, this new approach holds the potential to more formally explain the source of the uncertainties recounted by Watkins et al.; to provide an elaboration of the mechanisms by which the global world culture is propagated; and to understand more clearly when and why NGOs behave like firms, as well as when and why they don’t.

3 Brokerage and Development

Previous Research on Brokerage and Development

Myriad researchers have talked about brokerage concepts without engaging directly with the theory on brokerage found in the social networks literature. Numerous authors, for instance, have used empirical cases to demonstrate principal-agent challenges such as information asymmetries and the difficulty of effective monitoring (Cooley and Ron 2002; Gibson et al. 2005; Easterly 2006); ambiguous yet ever more ambitious goals from principals (Li 2007; Escobar 2011); and the great potential for fraud and corruption (Clayton, Oakley, and Taylor 2000; Cohen 2008; Fisman and Miguel 2009). And yet few authors have conceived of a dual set of principal-agent problems pulling in opposite directions as envisioned by the brokerage perspective. Alexander Cooley and James Ron (2002) do address the issue of multiple principles, but on the donor side of the equation

¹ Although it should be noted that sorting out the direction of causality here is extremely difficult. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on demonstrating that there is a clear correlation between structural position and organizational form and function. Future research can undertake the challenge of determining under what conditions the latter determine the former or vice versa.

only. And Clifford Bob (2005, 2010) even talks about dual markets – Market 1 with NGOs and direct beneficiaries, Market 2 with donors and NGOs – for the supply and demand of human rights-based development goods. While Bob does an admirable job of laying out the market forces that lead to inefficiencies in the provision of needed goods, his analysis could have been further sharpened through the deployment of a brokerage perspective that would have helped him distinguish between different types of development actors, specify more precisely the sources of the tensions they feel, and discuss in a more general way how these tensions are resolved. One last important contribution of note is Sarah Lister's analysis of NGO partnerships (2000), in which she highlights the tensions that emerge when NGOs are caught between the dual principals of donors and beneficiaries. As with Bob, however, she focuses only on one type of development actor, whereas I propose a more comprehensive approach that brings all the actors in a given development field under a singular theoretical purview.

There are some development scholars, meanwhile, who have engaged directly with formal brokerage concepts in their research. At least since Eric R. Wolf's dissection of the development of the Mexican state (1956), political anthropologists have been interested in the role of so-called cultural brokers who typically span the divide between central authorities and local communities. These brokers (a.k.a. translators, guides, fixers, or go-betweens) are seen as crucial transporters and implementers of centrally planned but locally administered development strategies (Olivier de Sardan 2005; Lewis and Mosse 2006; Merry 2006). Often, empirical studies in this tradition have focused on how the personal interests of these brokers impede program implementation (Boissevain 1966; Kaler and Watkins 2001; Hillmann 2008). Though at times these development brokers have actually helped the state to consolidate its authority (Kettering 1993; Gay 1994). What is common across all of these analyses is that the unit of analysis has always been the individual as broker. And for good reason. As Lister discovered, "inter-organizational relationships for NGOs are frequently based upon personal relationships" (2000: 236). Moreover, the methodological individualist perspective (Arrow 1994) reminds us that there can't be any purposive action without individual purposive actors. In other words: organizations don't link people, people link people.

But then, just as transnational social movement theorists have gained insights from focusing primarily on tactics employed by advocacy coalitions; and just as NGOs-as-firms theorists have endowed organizations with the ability to act in a rational, purposive manner; and just as Watkins and her colleagues have sought to explain development outcomes through examining the contextual factors surrounding organizations; so, too, is it a productive endeavor to redeploy brokerage theories that have heretofore been reserved for the analysis of individual relationships and behavior to organizations, organizational relationships, and organizational behavior. A careful examination of what organization-level pressures weigh upon brokerage organizations can shed a great deal of light on how organizational behavior is constrained and directed and on how development outcomes are ultimately determined. While it is important to remember that individuals are the only actors who are really making decisions, this is not to say that organizations cannot and should not sometimes be treated as agentic actors in and of themselves. Just as a firm's board of directors can make collective decisions that are not merely equivalent to the sum of their individual preferences, DBOs of all stripes can and do act purposively in ways not precisely predicted by the strict aggregation of the interests of their managers and staff.

Which is not to say that individuals acting as brokers should be ignored. To the contrary, it would be great for scholars to focus more on the role that individuals – or even coalitions – play in brokering between organizations and populations. Nevertheless, the vital role that organizations play in brokering the flow of information and resources in a development context deserves serious and rigorous attention.

Before further discussing my proposed application of brokerage theories in a development context, it would be prudent to first give a brief overview of the major concepts and theories that have been developed around brokerage in the social networks literature.

Brokerage Structure and Broker Benefits

Brokers perform the common function of facilitating the flow of goods, information, opportunity, or knowledge between otherwise unconnected side parties (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 141). That is, they fill a “structural hole” (Burt 1992). Scholars of brokerage have found that this middle position tends to bring gains to brokers (e.g., Simmel 1950, Marsden 1983, Burt 2010) through two primary mechanisms: dependency² and information advantage³ (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 144). Particularly in a political context, brokers’ power stems from their capacity to identify situations wherein one group desires the resources possessed by another and then to facilitate transfer accordingly (Gould 1989). The stronger the broker’s monopoly on access to such resources or information, the more dependent side parties become upon the broker, and the more powerful is the broker’s position in the network (Emerson 1962, Blau 1964).⁴ Likewise, every new linkage and successful transaction that a political broker makes has the potential to consolidate the broker’s information advantage. As this mechanism has the possibility of yielding increasing returns, there are strong incentives for such brokers to persist in their role as facilitators, even when these roles are highly conflicted and demanding. Given this combination of increasing returns to and high costs incurred by certain types of political brokers, scholars may find useful leverage here to help explain the growing power stratification of development organizations.

Actor Variation: Middlemen and Catalysts

Although all situations of brokerage are structurally similar in that they identify and span gaps in a network, there are at least two separate types of brokerage: one that trades upon the durability of these gaps, and another which seeks to close them. Simmel (1950) was the first to develop the classical view of a broker as a *tertius gaudens* (third who enjoys) who trades upon the hostilities of others or even fuels such hostilities in a *divide et impera* (divide and conquer) strategy. Katherine Stovel and Lynnette Shaw refer to this type of broker as a middleman, since “the broker remains in the middle of otherwise unconnected actors” (2012: 146). Obversely, there are other brokers whom David Obstfeld

² Dependency refers to the ability of brokers to extract profits or promises from side parties who rely on their mediation.

³ Information advantage refers to the broker’s superior access to resources or information as a result of being in the middle.

⁴ See also Linton Freeman’s (1977) conception of betweenness centrality.

(2005) calls *tertius iungens* (third who joins) whose main objective is to bring otherwise unconnected actors into contact with each other, with the result being a new network connection where one previously did not exist (Xiao and Tsui 2007). These actors can be thought of as catalyst brokers (Stovel, Golub, Milgrom 2011), insofar as they “alter the rate of interaction among actors and are minimally affected by the interaction” (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 146). While catalysts do not enjoy the same capacity to extract profits or promises from side parties as do middlemen, they may still benefit from status gains that accrue from becoming ever more centrally embedded in a growing web of relations, thereby increasing the catalyst’s power and influence. “Under such conditions, the reputational and status returns to catalyst brokerage are likely to be increasing” (ibid: 146). Appreciating the increasing returns to this type of brokerage may help researchers to unpack the positive feedback processes (Pierson 2004) underlying the highly stable norm for intra-sectoral partnerships between development organizations (Lecy et al. 2010).

Broker Challenges

An even more recent innovation in the brokerage sub-field is the conceptualization of brokers as not only uniquely privileged but also uniquely burdened by their position within a social network.

For catalyst brokers, the low, albeit increasing, returns to brokerage are complemented by few structural or cognitive tensions. The only major downside for these catalysts is that their role as brokers can be short-lived, since once a connection is made between side parties, there is sometimes no more need for a go-between. Stovel and her collaborators (Stovel, Golub, and Milgrom 2011; Stovel and Shaw 2012), however, have drawn greater attention to challenges faced by middlemen brokers. In general, these challenges can be traced to the fact that middlemen are simultaneously serving as agents to two sets of principals who, by definition, are somehow – socially, ideologically, geographically, e.g. – durably isolated from each other. Moreover, the very presence of a broker implies that there is a low flow of trustworthy information between the two side parties, making it infeasible for them to enter into direct negotiation. Thus, not only do middlemen have to serve two masters, but there are often large divides separating the two side parties. All of which means that neither of the standard tools for bringing an agent to heel in a typical single-principal scenario – i.e. close monitoring of the agent or realigning her incentives to be more in harmony with the principal’s – are viable options for side parties hoping to keep a broker honest. Compounding, the greater the divide between a broker’s clients, the greater the potential for brokers to exploit their position of advantage to extract profits and promises. Taken together, these elements of structural disequilibrium – dissonance among their dependents, low information flows, and the opportunity for exploitation – can present brokers with the dilemma of how to maintain their precarious position even as they persist in extracting profits and promises from their principals.

4 Applying a Brokerage Perspective

Development Fields

Before proposing any sort of generalizable model, it is important to be extremely clear when it comes to terminology. To this end, I should make explicit exactly what I mean

when speaking of a development field. For my purposes, a development field consists of all actors (individuals and organizations) working on a specific development issue within a specific territory.

By actors, I refer primarily to collective actors (organizations), but also in some cases to individuals. Included in this definition are all donors (collective and individual, public and private), all aid recipients (collective and individual, public and private), and all intermediaries between the two (generally but not exclusively collective, private actors).

By development issue, I am purposely invoking a rather loose conceptualization that can accommodate variations in how a field is construed over time and place. The key factor for determining the boundaries of a particular field depends upon the understand of the actors in that field as to where those boundaries lie. To use the example of the issue that defines the field under examination in this paper – that of human trafficking – at any given place or time, this field could include actors who specialize in, inter alia: children’s rights, domestic violence, migration, criminal justice, corruption, job creation, legal assistance, or trafficking as such. Who is in and who is out can be determined by who is competing for the same funding, who is collaborating on the same projects, and who self-identifies or is identified by others as working in that particular issue field.

Territory, meanwhile, can theoretically be as broad or as narrow as makes sense, but generally the best demarcation when it comes to development is at the national level. Along with the requirement of there being an issue field that is commonly defined throughout the territory in question, there must also be a shared institutional environment. Above the national level it is rare to have true collaboration, competition, or a shared institutional environment. A more likely alternative to the national-level unit of analysis might be a regional territory below the state level, particularly if there is a good degree of independence from federal authorities and institutions.⁵

Side Parties: Donors and Beneficiaries

A core element of the DBO analytic perspective is the presence or absence of structural holes in the development field. Before discussing where such structural holes exist, however, it is important to discuss who the side parties are on either side of these holes. For the purposes of my model, these side parties can be split into two general groups: donors and beneficiaries. For convenience of reference, I will at times refer to

⁵ Both in my definition of what a field is and of what goes on within it, there is a great deal of harmony between my conceptualization of a development field and the definition of a field promoted in the burgeoning new sociology literature on the general theory of fields. Just as with Neil Fligstein’s and Doug McAdam’s Strategic Action Fields (SAFs), my development fields have flexible boundaries and a shared institutional environment. Also, within each development field, power and resources are heterogeneously distributed among actors, each of whom acts strategically to maximize their own allotment (Fligstein and McAdam 2011:3-5). Development fields are also commonly characterized by governance structures (ibid. 6), and they require a great degree of social skill to navigate (ibid 7-8).

Whereas the SAF approach focuses on change and stability within fields, however, my focus is different. SAF scholars use fields to focus on power struggles and their implications for change or stability of the overall field, but the DBO perspective focuses instead on how the structural composition of a modern development field leads to the emergence and persistence of strategies and structures that are common features of the contemporary development landscape.

donors as the left-hand or left-side parties, while right-hand or right-side parties will at times be used to refer to beneficiaries.

Furthermore, within each group of side parties, there are three tiers or levels (see Figure 1 below). The first, or uppermost level is comprised of Top Tier Donors on the left and Top Tier Beneficiaries on the right. In the middle are the Mid-Level Donors and Mid-Level Beneficiaries. Finally, at the lowest level are the Individual Donors and Individual Beneficiaries.

Each organization or individual belonging to one of these six side parties can belong to one and only one of them. Unlike DBOs, which can bounce around to different positions in the network from project to project, donors and beneficiaries are defined in my development field model in such a way that it is practically impossible for them to change their structural position. Following is a brief definition and description of each of the six possible types of side parties:

Top Tier Donors

These are collective actors without a physical presence inside of the territory where aid is being disbursed.⁶ These donors include all and only those organizations entirely funded by and affiliated with nation states. This includes government ministries, state development agencies, and multi-lateral organizations such as those affiliated with the United Nations.

Top Tier Beneficiaries

These are collective and individual actors residing at the federal level of the aid-receiving government entity. These include national-level ministries, agencies, and bureaus, along with the officials and bureaucrats who occupy offices and hold positions at these levels. As with all beneficiaries, in order to qualify as a beneficiary,

Mid-Level Donors

These are collective actors with a physical presence outside of the aid-receiving territory. These donors include all and only those organizations not primarily funded by or officially affiliated with nation states. These include NGOs large and small, private foundations, churches, and private enterprises. Essentially, any non-governmental collective actor who is financing aid to the development field under analysis.

⁶ My conceptualization of donors differs somewhat from that common to either development theory or praxis. In my model, in order for an organization or individual to be considered a donor, it must have be located physically outside of the territory wherein the development field is located. That is, if an organization has an office of any kind inside of the territory of the development field, then I do not consider this organization to be a donor in my model. Instead, whatever organization outside of the country is funding or supporting that organization would be considered a donor and the country office would be reckoned a DBO (more on this later). Thus, while the United National Children's Fund (UNICEF) can be considered a donor, the UNICEF office located in Chisinau, Moldova is not a donor in my model, but a DBO. Even embassies, consulates, and development organizations belonging to donor nations are counted as DBOs if they are physically located within the territory in question. In situations where organizations or individuals native to host countries are donating significant sums of money to development efforts, I contend that there this is something other than international development, and thus it would fall outside of my model.

Mid-Level Beneficiaries

These are collective and individual actors residing at the regional and municipal level of the aid-receiving territory. These include all aid-receiving municipal governments and their office holders, along with municipal-level community organizations such as businesses, hospitals, churches, legal clinics, orphanages, and so forth.

Individual Donors

These are individual actors who reside outside of the aid-receiving territory and who give money directly to a development organization with a physical presence inside of the aid-receiving territory. Importantly, individuals can only act as donors in my model if they make a direct contribution to an organization with a physical presence in an aid-receiving country. That is, if they donate to the Red Cross in America and the Red Cross U.S. then donates to the Red Cross Moldova, then that funding would enter the field at the Mid-Level Donor level rather than at the Individual Donor level.

Individual Beneficiaries

These are the individual actors who are the eventual target population of most types of aid. These can include populations of individuals as during an awareness raising campaign, or they can include victims or potential victims of whatever malady the development aid is intended to treat or prevent.

Structural Holes in Development


In order for brokerage to happen, there must be 1) a structural hole, and 2) demand from parties on either side of that hole to exchange goods or information across it. Figure 1 contains a heuristic representation of the flow of foreign aid goods and services from donors on the left to recipients on the right, and the three types of structural holes that dominate the modern development landscape.⁷ These holes represent gaps for which there is demand for brokerage from parties on both side.

For the most part, prior to the 1980s, development was driven by bilateral assistance from donor countries directly to recipient countries. Thus, there was basically a single structural hole between broker and donor (i.e. Structural Hole #1 in Figure 1), which was typically filled by an in-country embassy or perhaps an in-country office of a multilateral organization. A visual representation of the development landscape of yesteryear from a brokerage perspective, then, would consist primarily of the top row and right-most column of Figure 1.

As donor governments became more reluctant to deal exclusively with rapacious recipient governments, however, they began to turn their sights toward lower level beneficiaries. Although these secondary structural holes (Structural Hole #2 in Figure 1) had always technically existed, there had not previously been demand for someone to broker the exchange of goods, services, information, and psychic and reputational awards

⁷ In Figure 1, ties are intended to show the flow of aid from left to right, from high to low. These ties generally represent development aid in the form of money, technical assistance, services, or information. The two red ties signify the distinguishing relationships for structural holes #1 and #3. That is, structural hole #1 is distinct from structural hole #2 in that there is a tie to top tier beneficiaries on the right. Similarly, structural hole #3 is distinct from structural hole #2 due to its tie to individual donors on the left.

Figure 1: Structural Holes in a Modern Development Field




across these gaps. Beyond what can be seen in Figure 1 this second type of structural hole is actually comprised of a number of subsidiary holes, which emerged as DBOs straddling that gap in turn sought brokers to fill the gaps between them and the beneficiaries who were to be the eventual aid recipients. Globalization further fueled the demand for more and more brokers to help transfer development aid goods across structural holes between private citizens in different countries who were becoming ever more aware of each other (Structural Hole #3 in Figure 1).

Development Brokerage Organizations: DBOs

Figure 2, below, depicts the basic model for DBO entry into the development field. Whenever there is a structural hole with demand for brokerage, there will be a DBO seeking to enter the field and facilitate the transaction of development goods, services, and information across the gap. Generally conceived, a DBO is any organization that spans a structural hole in a given development field. Even as there are three types of structural holes, I also conceive of there being three types of DBOs to fill each of those respective holes: Behemoths, Bulldogs, and Butterflies. Given that the motivations and characteristics of side parties will change dramatically between development fields, it is important to use a concrete case in order to illustrate the particular benefits, challenges, and stabilizing mechanisms that cluster around a particular type of broker. Therefore, I will discuss the benefits and challenges faced by each types of DBO in the context of my case study on Moldovan countertrafficking DBOs later on in the paper (see Figures 3, 4, and 5 for example). For now, however, I will make a few general points.

Figure 2: Basic Model for Brokerage in International Development



First of all, as a point of clarification, it is important to note that an individual DBO can span more than one hole. While Behemoths, Bulldogs, and Butterflies are ideal types, in reality, any given organization can span a different hole from project to project, or sometimes even within the same project. A Behemoth in one country may be a Bulldog in another. Within a particular development field, however, it should be possible to give a development organization a score based on the extent to which it occupies one type of hole or the other. Some DBOs may split their time somewhat equally between two or more gaps, but many will spend much of their time in just one type of structural hole.

A second general point is to emphasize the real gains in clarity that flow from using a DBO model of a development field. As the development landscape has grown ever more complex, researchers have become increasingly incapable of appreciating the complexity of a development field without becoming mired in it. By seeking to isolate the organizational characteristics and behaviors that arise from DBOs' shared location at the center of a network of interconnected brokerage relationships, the brokerage perspective is ideally suited to cut through much of this complexity without failing to appreciate it.

Another real advantage of the DBO model of a development field and the accompanying classification of brokerage organizations is that it allows for analysis of development organizations without being pulled into the contentious territory of trying to decide who is what and why. That is, it is much easier to determine an organization's position relative to an established typology of brokers and donors than to decide whether it is an IO, INGO, TNGO, NGO, NPO, NGDO, or advocacy organization. Almost all of these labels are frustratingly imprecise and based upon frequently shifting or hard-to-measure characteristics, which are highly context dependent: as P.J. Simmons put it, "Defining NGOs is not an exercise for the intellectually squeamish" (1998: 83); and many of these terms

remain contested by scholars and practitioners alike (Martens 2002; Willetts 2002; Lecy et al. 2010). And yet, even if what we call these groups may be trivial, discovering a reasonable, reliable, and reproducible method for grouping and analyzing the organizations that lie at the heart of development is critical for the accumulation of insights across studies. If our definitions are too narrow, then we might not think of ways that our findings can be more generally applied. Conversely, it is also a common problem for researchers to define actors much too broadly, with the result being that appropriate scope conditions are not applied to conclusions.⁸ One of the many challenges here is that the same organization can play a different role depending on factors such as where they are, who the other players are, and what sector of development they are participating in. The beauty of the brokerage perspective specifically, and of a network analytical approach in general, is that it allows for variation in actor role depending on their context within a network.

DBO Benefits

The benefits to brokerage generally include information advantages over side parties; control over the development agenda, due to the dependence of the broker's side parties upon the broker's superior vision and position; access to social and financial resources; and reputational rewards. All of these advantages are to some degree mutually reinforcing, particularly the latter two: greater access to resources bolsters an organization's reputation, which can then lead to greater access to resources, and so on. For a contextualized discussion of how different DBOs enjoy different benefits within the field of Moldovan countertrafficking organizations, see Table 1 and Section 9 below.

DBO Challenges

As discussed above, however, the benefits of brokerage bring with them greater challenges, as well. For the purposes of my model, I consider three general categories of challenges that each type of broker faces to a greater or lesser extent: weak bridges, structural imbalance, and suspicion.

The idea behind *weak bridges* takes as a starting point Mark Granovetter's idea (1973) that weak brokerage ties are at times ideal for transmission of information. Obversely, however, it is extremely challenging to maintain weak and decentralized ties due both to a lack of social reinforcement and to the constraints of having limited time and

⁸ Scholars are conflicted, for instance, over whether greater numbers of similar organizations within a sector creates more or less tension for NGOs. Cooley and Ron (2002) are of the opinion that a higher density of INGOs within a sector increases uncertainty and competition. On the other hand, Jesse D. Lecy, George E. Mitchell, and Hans Peter Schmitz (2010) report that greater network density facilitates more intra-sectoral partnerships, which practitioners consider a key to success. As one NGO leader put it "there are huge benefits [of partnerships]. It's about making the issues heard... it's about building popular momentum... around issues that otherwise would not have traction" (p. 246). Perhaps the difference in implications of network density comes down to the difference between development orgs who need long-term cooperation with partners to accomplish their goals (Lecy et al) and short-term crisis-relief orgs who are working on a short timeline and have no such expectations of long-term interaction with others in that particular sector (Cooley and Ron). If scholars were to make use of a more logical and reproducible method of categorizing and contextualizing development organizations, then these – and other – apparently contradictory findings might rather be seen as complimentary.

resources to devote to marginal relationships. Tension due to *structural imbalance*, meanwhile, has its theoretical foundation in Fritz Heider's (1946) concept of cognitive dissonance reduction, which predicts that a triadic situation will always resolve into a perfectly transitive one in which it can be said that 'my friend's friend is my friend, and an enemy of my friend is my enemy, and so on. Brokers who straddle two unconnected side-parties will always feel the pull toward one side or the other as the social forces at play try to resolve the dissonance by closing the triangle. Short of closing, another mechanism for eliminating structural tension is for the structural hole to just dissolve. *Suspicion*, meanwhile, arises from a combination of trust and accountability issues. Trust issues stem from the difficulty brokers have of spanning cultures, linguistic, and ideological divides. Accountability issues arise from the low information flow between side parties and the resultant information asymmetries which privilege the broker upon whom the other members of the triad are dependent. Given the broker's ability to exploit this position of power, it is rational – if not always optimal – for side parties to become skeptical and distrusting of a broker's motivations.

For a contextualized discussion of how different DBOs face different challenges within the field of Moldovan countertrafficking organizations, see Table 2 and Section 10 below.

Stabilizing Mechanisms

Beyond simply striving to wield information and dependency advantages in the pursuit of higher reputational rewards and greater access to resources, DBOs must also use whatever tools are at their disposal to maintain their position in the development field. Different structural holes in different development fields come with different challenges and require different stabilizing strategies, but there are, nonetheless, just shy of 20 general stabilizing mechanisms that are common to many different development contexts. In Section 11 below, I make a full accounting of how each of these mechanisms has worked in the context of the Moldovan countertrafficking field. Table 3, found in that section, also contains a listing of each mechanism.

5 Moldova's Countertrafficking Brokers

In illustrating the analytical insights to be gained through a DBO model of a development field, why choose the field of organizations working to combat human trafficking in the Republic of Moldova? There are several factors that suggest this particular development field as one that is ideal for analysis.

First of all, Moldova is a tiny country. With a population under 4 million and a territory no larger than the state of Maryland, Moldova is an ideal setting in which to examine the dynamics of a development field in action. Few if any modern development fields could likely be characterized as simple, but at least in Moldova, the numbers and distances are manageable enough to allow an enterprising researcher to gain a good deal of insight without devoting a lifetime to the task.

Secondly, the human trafficking field in Moldova is particularly well suited for analysis because of the impressive amount of public documentation that is available. In addition to the typical tonnage of reports and brochures that can be found on the websites

and at the headquarters of most of the world's major NGOs, Moldovan DBOs (most notably the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]) have also published a veritable trove of minutes from technical coordination meetings along with detailed accounts of nearly every organizations in the human trafficking field and the initiatives they are involved in.

Additionally, the issue of human trafficking itself is a particularly interesting and timely one to make the subject of analysis. Migration policies and human security matters are both hot topics in Europe and beyond.

Finally, the decision to focus on an Eastern European development field is an interesting one, given that so much of the development literature is devoted – and justifiably so – to case studies from the Global South. If the observations and mechanisms elaborated in this study of a tiny, former soviet republic resonate well with empirical studies from other world regions, then that will speak to the generalizability of the concepts herein presented.

6 Data

Four primary sources of data inform this case study. The first and primary source for my analysis consists of 52 semi-structured interviews conducted with presidents, managers, and employees of nearly four dozen organizations active in the Moldovan countertrafficking field. These interviews took place during the months of June and July of 2009, and they were conducted in English, Romanian, and Russian. Interviews were requested with the top 70 most prominent⁹ organizations who had headquarters in Chisinau and the immediate outlying areas, as well as one major organization from Tiraspol in the breakaway region of Transnistria. Happily, I was able to meet with 25 of the top 30 most active organizations in the field, along with several other lower-activity organizations. More frequently than not, the interviewee was the leader of the organization or the supervisor of the organization's involvement with human trafficking.

The second source of data for my case study consists of technical coordination meeting minutes published online by the OSCE. These include 1 set of minutes from a National Countertrafficking Committee Meeting, 83 national-level technical coordination meeting minutes (2005-2012), and 33 regional-level technical coordination meeting minutes (2005-2011). These minutes are highly detailed and run anywhere from three to a dozen pages in length each, often containing attendance records, summaries of original dialogue between meeting participants, and extensive discussions of organizational history and ongoing projects.

A third source of information on organizations working to prevent trafficking in Moldova were the websites of the organizations themselves. All told, I was able to find 92 websites containing information on organizations and their involved in human trafficking projects.

A final source of data were the myriad reports available both online and in hard copy from DBO offices. In total, over 300 reports were collected.

⁹ Based upon technical coordination meeting attendance.

7 Human Trafficking in International Politics

The current consensus around how to understand human trafficking is something that has only emerged in the past decade. As Anne Gallagher has documented in her definitive work on the evolution of international law and norms on human trafficking, the key international organizations and government agencies working to combat “human trafficking” in the 1980s and 1990s had wildly different ideas about how to define it. Some groups considered human trafficking to be an instance of illegal migration, others focused exclusively on international sex work, or solely on cases of transnational criminal activity (2010: 16-25). Given these ad hoc conceptualizations of human trafficking and the lack of standardized approaches to dealing with it, international development agencies working to prevent whatever it was they called human trafficking had a difficult time finding stable structural holes across which to broker. Neither donors nor beneficiaries had stable expectations regarding how to measure, prevent, or ameliorate the effect of trafficking, and as such, durable preferences for transaction of countertrafficking development aid were rare. Consequently, human trafficking prevention in the international aid community was relatively limited during this period, even as it became increasingly clear that transnational sexual exploitation of women and children was an accelerating problem in certain parts of southeast Asia, as well as in the war-torn region of the Balkans.

In 2000, two major events transpired that helped to stabilize expectations around human trafficking as a development issue. First was the passage of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) by the United States in October. Second was the adoption of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (aka the Trafficking Protocol) by the United Nations in November.

The TVPA had a major impact on the international countertrafficking agenda in two ways. First, it mandated that the US Department of State publish an annual report on the efforts of every country in the world to combat trafficking. Each country is ranked in these annual Trafficking in Persons (TiP) Reports on a three tier scale based on their efforts to combat trafficking, as determined by State Department officials working with government authorities in each country and in consultation with local trafficking DBOs. Countries found to be at Tier 3 – the lowest possible ranking – are penalized by being cut off from all non-humanitarian American aid. At the same time, the TVPA authorized the creation of a special department within the State Department for monitoring trafficking, and a fund on the order of \$100 million per annum was established to provide grants for countertrafficking initiatives around the globe. Thus, the TVPA went a long way towards providing standardized metrics for countertrafficking efforts, and it also injected a good deal of left-side demand for brokerage into the global market for anti-human trafficking aid.

The Trafficking Protocol adopted by Palermo, meanwhile, also played a large role in stabilizing the market for brokerage of countertrafficking aid goods. In these terms, the main function of the Protocol was to frame and define the issue, and then to establish clear obligations of ratifying nations in protecting victims and preventing future trafficking. While a full discussion of the nuances of the Trafficking Protocol is outside the realm of this paper, it will suffice to point out a couple ways in which the Protocol established an agenda that favors state rights over the rights of actual or potential victims’ rights; and an agenda

that generally favors states that wish to prevent or tamp down on migration rather than facilitating it. First of all, the Trafficking Protocol was passed as an addendum to the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. From the get-go, then, trafficking was to be framed in terms of international movement (rather than also dealing with internal trafficking), and as a matter of organized crime (as opposed to a labor rights, human rights, or purely migration framing). Second, while state obligations toward trafficked persons are quite extensive, another protocol on smuggling of persons was simultaneously passed, which basically asserts that if a migrant was “smuggled” rather than “trafficked,” the obligations of ratifying states toward her basically consist of not killing or torturing her. Since there is no way to monitor how states decide who is trafficked versus who is smuggled, the human rights protections in the Trafficking Protocol are rather weak. Finally, much of the Trafficking Protocol is devoted to explaining the obligations of states to tighten their borders, improve their monitoring mechanisms, and bolster their ability to police their own territory and borders.

8 Countertrafficking in Moldova

The Emergence of the Countertrafficking Field

Such was the institutional situation in 2000-2001 when the countertrafficking field in Moldova began to take shape. Prior to that time, there had only been a handful of projects run by small, locally based NGOs and usually funded in a piece-meal fashion by small grants from multiple donors. Typically these projects focused on awareness campaigns and provided very basic services for trafficking victims on an ad hoc basis. Trafficking victims were being repatriated – at times by the dozens – by destination countries, particularly by the conflict-ravaged Balkans, and yet there was no systematic effort on the part of either donors or the Moldovan government to systematically address the needs of these victims, or to prevent further trafficking from taking place.

Everything began to change, however, in the immediate aftermath of the Palermo Trafficking Protocol and the TVPA. First, the United States began to fulfill its new TVPA mandate by sponsoring at least 15 small-to-medium scale countertrafficking projects in Moldova from 2000 to 2002, with several federal bureaus sponsoring initiatives that were administered in country by the US Embassy or USAID, who in turn worked through national and regional partners (Arnold and Doni 2002). During that same time period, a number of other major donors began to sponsor trafficking projects in the country for the first time, including inter alia: the OSCE, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC), the European Commission (EC), the Italian Government, and the United National Development Program (UNDP). The years 2000-2001 also saw the entry or creation of DBOs who would come to dominate the Moldovan countertrafficking field for much of the subsequent decade, including: the International Organization for Migration (IOM), La Strada International, Winrock International, Regina Pacis, the Italian Consortium on Solidarity (ICS), and the Center for the Prevention of Trafficking in Women (CPTW). Other organizations that already had a presence in Moldova first began to take part in countertrafficking around the year 2001, and many other donors and DBOs would enter the field in the next two or three years. From 1999 to 2002, the number of DBOs active in the trafficking field in Moldova rose from

fewer than ten to at least three dozen. By 2009, when OSCE and Winrock completed their rough census of national and regional actors working to counteract human trafficking in Moldova, they counted no fewer than 225 organizations in the field.


Demand for Aid at Structural Hole #1

So what changed? What explains the huge leap in donor attention, project funding, and density of development organizations working on human trafficking issues during those first few years of the new millennium? What explains, in particular, the entry of Behemoth DBOs between Top Tier donors and beneficiaries (see Figure 3)? Traditional accounts of the emergence of a development field would likely explain this rise in activity through one of two arguments. First, it could be asserted that the amplitude of the trafficking problem really began to grow in Moldova at that time. Second, it could be argued that the demand for countertrafficking aid was entirely supply-driven and was oriented entirely toward donor priorities rather than actual needs on the ground. There is, in fact, a good deal of merit to both of these arguments.

First of all, although it is extremely difficult to measure the actual extent of human trafficking at any given time in Moldova, there is good evidence to suggest that human trafficking increases with increased migration, especially when it is illicit. If raw emigration numbers can be taken as rough proxy for human trafficking, then it is actually not that unreasonable to presume that trafficking grew dramatically starting in the year 2000, as that is the year of inflection at which Moldovan outmigration began to really take steam. From 2000 to 2005, the number of Moldovans working abroad increased from just shy of 100,000 to somewhere around 400,000 (IOM 2008). In the years since, that number has risen to about 600,000. Thus, presumably, it could be that development organizations were becoming ever more interested in fighting human trafficking in Moldova because it was a growing problem over this time period. There are a couple of major flaws in this argument, however. First, the observed increase in out-migration was driven by and large by increases in male workers travelling abroad, with the number of female emigrants rising much more modestly (IOM 2008: 25). Second, during the decade starting in 2000 migration continued to increase, but the numbers of trafficking victims identified per year decreased in an almost linear fashion, from a high of 364 identified victims in 2001 to just 139 in 2010; and this decrease is in spite of the tremendous and increasing efforts of development organizations in the trafficking field to find and assist as many victims as possible. These figures confirm what experts in the field confided in private interviews, that human trafficking was likely most prevalent in the late 1990s, and that it quickly tapered off in the early 2000s as economic conditions slowly improved in Moldova, as post-conflict areas stabilized, and as a basic legal and social infrastructure was constructed to prevent further trafficking.

Perhaps, then, the increasing attention to the problem of human trafficking in Moldova was driven more by donor preferences than by realities on the ground. Here, too, there is more than a modicum of plausibility. It was at the Helsinki Summit held in December of 1999 that Romania, Moldova's neighbor to the west, first entered into serious talks with the European Council about its eventual accession to the European Union. It would have been clear to any observers that Moldova would soon be at the EU's doorstep. Moldova was already at that point a major exporter of migrant labor. The poorest country in Europe, its economy had been powered by its agricultural sector, and there were few

Figure 3: Structural Hole #1 and Behemoth DBOs



prospects for major industry to provide enough jobs to keep Moldovans home. Add to that the tiny size of the Moldovan territory, and the ties that many Moldovan citizens have to Romania and Ukraine – another EU border country – and it becomes clear why EU member states might fear a massive influx of Moldovan labor. And all this at a time when the EU expansion project was already creating anxieties for European citizens. Human trafficking prevention initiatives targeted at strengthening government capacity to police its own borders and to tamp down on organized crime, together with programs designed to convince and persuade Moldovans to stay home – for their own safety – may have presented an attractive investment option for European states and the multilaterals they sponsor. Indeed, a number of scholars have made just such an assertion – that countertrafficking donors are more concerned with keeping crime and migrants out than with helping prevent human rights abuses (see Berman 2003, e.g.).


While this, too, is a compelling argument, it only succeeds in telling half of the story. The reality is that it is extremely difficult for donors to finance projects, to lobby officials, and to have any success in pursuing institutional change unless there is demand for the exchange of aid from the beneficiary side of the equation as well. That is, there would not have been a massive influx of DBOs working on human trafficking issues in Moldova had there not been demand from both sides of the structural hole separating donors abroad from Moldovan beneficiaries. Numerous conversations with DBO and donor representatives have made clear exactly what it is that the Moldovan government stood to gain from countertrafficking aid.

First of all, the Moldovan government wanted to curb emigration. At one point in the early 2000s, with nearly half of the active labor force working abroad, the Moldovan government could not actually find enough native Moldovans to fill construction jobs, so they actually resorted to importing laborers from Ukraine and Turkey. Fears of a continued and deepening labor crisis, along with the sad realities of entire rural localities turning into ghost towns, have consistently been a core concern and motivating factor for the Moldovan government. Thus, a migration-negative countertrafficking agenda focused on keeping people home was perfectly consonant with the government's preferences.

Secondly, Moldovan government officials became quite sensitive about the image they were projecting to the international community. In the early part of the decade, enterprising journalists and overly-exuberant activists combined statistical extrapolation with (inadvertent?) misinterpretation of available information to begin promoting the image of Moldova as a hotspot for human trafficking in Europe and the supplier of Europe's brothels. In just one prominent instance, an MSNBC exposé on sex trafficking, published in June 2001, claimed that "experts estimate that since the fall of the Soviet Union between 200,000 and 400,000 women have been sold into prostitution" from Moldova (Mendenhall 2001). As similar reports piled up, the Moldovan government appears to have become much more image-conscious over time. Cooperating with donors and DBOs to fight trafficking was the quickest way to shake themselves of a reputation that was quite unlikely to attract foreign investors, and which could possibly threaten existing relationships.

Finally, the Moldovan government and the officials who populate its political and bureaucratic offices were generally motivated by the universal incentives of money and power. A large part of project funding by major multilateral organizations working in the human trafficking field in Moldova is spent on salaries and training for those in the

Figure 4: Structural Hole #2 and Bulldog DBOs



government. Budgets for these projects are approved in advance, money is transferred to government ministries, and there is very little oversight over how it is spent. Furthermore, while Moldovan authorities consistently dragged their heels in taking measures to protect victims or to lead the charge in prevention campaigns, they welcomed funding and technical from American and EU specialists in helping them to strengthen their centralized control mechanisms, particularly their capacity to police and monitor their population and its movements.


Countertrafficking Aid at Structural Hole #2

As DBOs began to move into this first structural hole between governments, the effects of this cascaded through the entire field. DBOs filling structural hole #1 at the Behemoth level were also tasked with building up civil society in order to empower local organizations and to ensure ownership in their countertrafficking efforts. The mid-2000s saw a few major projects, in particular, administered by DBOs such as IOM, Winrock, UNDP, and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), which had an express goal of creating what I call Baby Bulldog DBOs to help fill structural hole #2 (see Figure 4) between donors and the actually beneficiaries on the ground. As the demand for countertrafficking aid brokerage increased on both sides of the development field in Moldova, more and more DBOs moved into the Bulldog position to supply the expertise needed to facilitate the flow of aid. Within a few years, many of the DBOs who had been most central prior to 2001 (e.g. Save the Children, National Women's Studies and Information Center, Civic Initiative) had either become marginalized or had exited the field entirely. The new power-players, meanwhile (e.g. IOM, OSCE, La Strada, CPTW, Terres des Hommes) began, around 2004-2005, to better coordinate their efforts and to occupy specialized niches within the field. These efforts to cooperate were facilitated by monthly Technical Coordination Meetings (TCMs), which began in 2003 at the national level, and which were expanded in 2005 to include meetings at the regional level as well.

The initial focus of countertrafficking initiatives at the Bulldog level was on victim assistance and awareness campaigns. Starting around 2003-2004, however, a number of projects were funded with the intention of incentivizing Moldovans to stay home by creating jobs in local communities and by holding trainings in entrepreneurship for members of vulnerable population groups. While accounts differ, the general consensus among experts seems to be that these types of initiatives were not very successful, and most of them were not renewed for multiple rounds of funding. Simply put, the Moldovan economic climate is a rather hostile one, particularly for small business owners, who are not infrequently "bled dry" by corrupt tax collectors and city officials who descend upon them "like leeches on a newly whelped puppy" as one DBO manager put it. Moreover, even when entrepreneurial endeavors and other job creation efforts were successful, it was common for the newly "empowered" beneficiaries to use their recently acquired material resources to emigrate to fairer climes.

In 2006, a number of donors and DBOs began to work closely with Top Tier and Mid-Level Beneficiaries on what would become a much more fruitful project. The National Referral System (NRS) was piloted as a regional referral system for victims and potential victims of human trafficking. Over the course of about six years, various DBOs played a role in establishing a referral center in each of the 30 administrative units of the country, and in training multi-disciplinary teams in each region to refer all cases of trafficking victims or of

Figure 5: Structural Hole #3 and Butterfly DBOs



extremely vulnerable persons to the center. Cases are then triaged and the individuals in question are provided (by government service providers and/or DBOs) whatever social, legal, or medical services they might need in order to recover from or prevent a trafficking situation. An eminently flexible and scalable project, the countertrafficking version of the NRS appears to have been successful enough that the key DBOs behind it (i.e. IOM, OSCE, UNDP, UNFPA) were able to subsequently find a donor (the Government of Japan) to sponsor a multi-year, multi-million dollar effort to expand the scope of the NRS to include domestic violence prevention as well.

Structural Hole #3

A final note about the Moldovan countertrafficking field concerns the Butterfly Brokers (see Figure 5) who straddle the structural gap between individual donors and beneficiaries. For the most part, these organizations have operated independently of the Behemoths and Bulldogs of the field. Almost all of these organizations are religious-based groups, which receive the lion's share of their funding via private donors from North American churches. These organizations (e.g. Home of Hope, Beginning of Life, Stella's House, Children's Emergency Relief International) operate on a rather small scale, typically, but they have a great deal of freedom in what they can do. Since they drive the agenda of their own projects, and since they operate in close and immediate contact with their beneficiaries, they frequently offer services (e.g. long-term victim rehabilitation, long-term orphan care) that other organizations in the field do not.

9 Benefits

Within each development field, different types of brokers will have different incentive schemes, since it is in large part their side parties, the issue they are addressing, and the country they are in (i.e. the institutional environment in which they operate) that determine the benefits and challenges that fall to each of them. Table 1 indicates the distribution of benefits for each type of broker in the field of Moldovan countertrafficking DBOs.¹⁰ In the table, each type of organization is graded on a four-point scale, with 1 being the lowest and 4 being the highest, for four categories of benefits.¹¹ Each score is imagined to be an *average* score for the ideal type of each broker in the field. That is, to the extent that there is variation within the categories of broker – depending upon who the side parties are, e.g. – there will also be some deviation from these predicted values.

¹⁰ For purely illustrative purposes, I have separated Bulldog DBOs into two categories: Biggies and Babies. In this conceptualization, Biggies are imagined to always be connected directly to foreign donors on the left, and to Baby Bulldogs on the right. Babies, for their part, are imagined to always be connected to Biggies on the left and to some type of end beneficiary on the right. There can be, and frequently are, more or fewer steps between donors and beneficiaries, but having at least two groups of DBOs in my analysis can help to demonstrate the heterogeneity within the Bulldogs. The same caveat applies to Table 2, as well.

¹¹ It should also be noted that this ranking system constitutes an artificial scale, which I am using for heuristic and illustrative purposes only. There is nothing to say that the difference between a 1 and 2 is the same as the difference between a 3 and a 4. Nor is there any guarantee that this differences will be the same from category to category. While this is not extremely problematic for expository purposes, it precludes the valid statistical manipulation of these numbers in any way. The same caveats apply to Table 2, as well.

Table 1: Benefits for Moldova’s Trafficking DBOs

	Behemoths	Biggie Bulldogs	Baby Bulldogs	Butterflies
Information Advantage - L	3	3	1.5	2.5
Information Advantage - R	2.5	2.5	1.5	1
Dependency --> Control	4	3	2	4
Access to Resources	3.7	3	1.8	2.5

Information Advantage

The benefit categories of “Information Advantage – L” and “Information – R” correspond to the advantage that each type of DBO typically has over its left and right parties, respectively. There are two factors that are imagined to contribute to the information advantage category: difficulty of supervision (operationalized here as propinquity between parties – see Table 2) and difficulty of evaluation (i.e. how hard it is to evaluate the efforts of DBO initiatives – again, see Table 2). In general, the information advantages that DBOs enjoy over their left-hand parties are driven mostly by the large distances separating them from out of country donors, while the information advantage over right parties is driven more by the inferior abilities of right-hand parties to evaluate DBO activity.

As can be seen in the table, Baby Bulldogs generally have the lowest information advantages over their side parties, which makes sense given that they are physically close to parties on both sides, each of whom has an interest in watching them carefully. Behemoths and Biggies both enjoy relatively large information advantages over both sides. And Butterfly DBOs have high information advantages over their foreign donors, but little, if any, advantage over the individual beneficiaries with whom they work in close proximity.

Dependency and Control

This category is operationalized as a measure of the stability of centrality for each DBO, or the extent to which a DBO’s side parties are forced to rely upon it in order to accomplish their goals. Here, Behemoths and Butterflies are imagined to have side parties who are highly dependent upon them, due especially to: 1) the difficulty of trying to jump over them to connect directly to a party on the other side and 2) the few alternative paths connecting their left parties to their right parties.

DBOs with higher levels of dependency from their side parties are imagined to have greater influence over the agenda of projects that they pursue. That is, they will be more successful than low-dependency DBOs in convincing their side parties to change directions. In the Moldovan case, it was organizations who largely occupied the Behemoth position, for instance, who were able to convince donors that there should be a change in focus from working exclusively to counteract human trafficking to begin working on the issue of domestic violence as well.

Access to Resources

Finally, this category is operationalized as a combination of a DBO’s information advantages and the dependency of its side parties upon it together with the amount of

money and resources that their left-hand parties can muster. Unsurprisingly, Behemoths have the highest access to resources, due to the deep pockets of their donors and the vision and control advantages they have over their side parties. Baby Bulldogs have the lowest access to resources, as they enjoy but a limited vision advantage over their side parties, they exercise little control over the development agenda, and by the time aid flows reach them, the dollar amounts tend to be rather small.

It should be noted here that – although they are not included in the table – reputation rewards are another category of benefits for brokers, and they are closely related to access to resources. As a DBO gains greater access to resources, they simultaneously benefit from a bolstered reputation, which helps them to gain greater resources in the future, and so on.

10 Challenges

In the same logic as Table 1 above, Table 2 below provides a heuristic ranking for each type of DBO on a four-point scale, this time for the purposes of showing the distribution of challenges to brokerage that are present in the Moldovan countertrafficking field. These challenges to brokerage can be grouped roughly into three categories: threats to centrality (i.e. structural imbalance), weak bridges, and distrust (i.e. suspicion). For each sub-category, a higher ranking means that there are more difficulties for the DBO due to that particular issue. The average scores per broker should not be taken too literally, since they are not weighted or adjusted to reflect which challenges might be *more* challenging than others, but they do provide one type of measure regarding the amount of challenges each type of brokers has to overcome in order to maintain a particular position. Taking the high stakes and the relatively high number of challenges faced by Behemoth and Bulldog DBOs in the Moldovan countertrafficking field, it makes sense that these positions are largely dominated by well-established international NGOs, multi-laterals, and development agencies who are highly motivated to occupy them and have a relatively greater capacity to do so (See Section 11 below). To this point, many experts noted in interviews that prominent, home-grown Moldovan organizations were few and far between.

Table 2: Challenges for Moldova’s Trafficking DBOs

			Behemoths	Biggie Bulldogs	Baby Bulldogs	Butterflies	
Challenges to Brokerage	Threats to Centrality	Threats of closure	1	2	3	1	
		Increasing competition	2	4	2	2	
	Weak Bridges	Short contract length - L	2	3	3	4	
		Threat of non-cooperation - R	4	1	2	1	
		Marginal relationships - L	1	2	3	4	
		Marginal relationships - R	1	3	2	1	
		Low cohesion - L	1	3	2	4	
		Low cohesion - R	1	3	1	1	
		Low propinquity - L	3	3	1	4	
		Low propinquity - R	1	2	1	1	
	Distrust	Cultural spanning	4	3	2	4	
		Mismatched incentives	2	3	3	1	
		Difficulty of evaluation	4	3	2	1	
		Difficulty of supervision - L	2	3	1	4	
		Difficulty of supervision - R	1	2	1	1	
		High stakes	4	3	2	1	
				2.13	2.69	1.94	2.19
				Average scores per broker			

Threats to Centrality

The first sub-category here is that of *Threats to Closure*. This category is intended to measure the extent to which different types of organizations are threatened by the possibility of being cut out of their position by having their side parties begin to interact directly with each other. This is a particular concern for Baby Bulldogs who have to be concerned about the possibility that once the Biggie Bulldogs on their left have established relationships with the beneficiaries on their right, their services will be less in demand.

The second sub-category here is that of *Increasing Competition*. While all DBOs have to face competition to some extent, it is the Biggie DBOs who have seen the greatest rise in numbers, particularly as foreign NGOs entered the field. As described a bit in Section 8 above, the huge influx of Biggie Bulldog DBOs from 2000-2002 had the effect of marginalizing the organizations who had previously been occupying those particular structural holes. A similar process took place again in 2008-2009 as the trafficking field expanded into the Domestic Violence issue field. On that occasion, less professional organizations who had been occupying the Bulldog structural position in that field – of domestic violence prevention – were now sucked into the human trafficking issue field, where it proved much more difficult to compete with more established Biggie Bulldogs. In one example, the nation’s first women’s shelter had to close its doors for some months due to lack of donor funding in 2010. To its good fortune, this DBO managed to substantially change its behavior – more on this in Section 11 – and was eventually saved from full collapse when it found new sponsorship.

Weak Bridges

The first measure of weak bridges is the *duration of contracts* that DBOs have with their left-hand parties. The shorter the contract, the greater the risk that DBOs will lose

their funding as donors change their priorities. Generally, contracts get shorter moving down from Behemoths to Butterflies.

Next comes the *threat of non-cooperation* from right-hand parties. This threat is particularly potent for Behemoths working directly with national ministries, moderate for Baby Bulldogs working with municipal leaders, and very low for Biggies and Butterflies who work with Baby Bulldogs and individual beneficiaries, respectively. Regarding the threat of non-cooperation from national officials, numerous interview subjects from major multilateral organizations confided that this particular threat was ever-present. As one confidential UN informant put it: “When the government is unhappy, then they call the UN regional offices and say we don’t want to work with you anymore, we don’t need your help. The representatives in charge are rated by government officials here. It is a big part of their evaluation, and they don’t want to do anything to jeopardize getting a good review.”

Marginal relationships, too, are a concern for DBOs. This category is intended to capture the extent to which a particular brokerage relationship is a core focus of a DBO or its side parties. Behemoth DBOs tend to be experts in whatever area they are working in, and they typically have thick relationships with actors on both sides. Butterflies, on the other hand, have a mismatch when it comes to their right and left side parties. On the right, they have thick relationships with beneficiaries based on whatever countertrafficking aid they are brokering. On the left, however, even if they have thick relationships with donors back home (e.g. fellow church members), these relationships are not typically centered around countertrafficking. Also, it is not uncommon for these DBOs to have go on tours of churches, where they speak and raise funds for their cause. In these cases, their relationship to their donors is extremely thin, indeed.

Yet another factor that weakens bridges is the *low cohesion* among a DBO’s side parties.¹² Butterfly DBOs with dozens or hundreds of individual donors from different churches scattered across North America provide a good example of what it means to have low cohesion among side parties. In many of my interviews with Bulldog organizations, too, a common concern was with the time and resources organizations had to invest into grant writing and donor chasing just to stay afloat. Biggie Bulldogs are also in the unenviable position of usually having a number of unconnected right-hand parties as well, scattered across the country. Maintaining relationships with so many side parties over a sustained period of time can be very taxing and difficult to keep up.

Finally, the last factor when it comes to the category of weak bridges is the subcategory of *propinquity*, or physical distance. Simply put, low propinquity makes it harder to sustain ties over time. Baby Bulldogs are in the unique position of being relatively close in physical proximity to both of their side parties. For the other types of DBOs, however, they typically are very close to their right-hand parties, but quite distant from their left-hand parties.

Distrust and Suspicion

The first subcategory when it comes to distrust is one I call *Cultural Spanning*. This is intended to capture the extent to which DBOs have to try to manage the culture clash of

¹² Cohesion is a network analytical term that refers to the “level of internal solidarity among sets of actors linked by the broker” (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 142). Having just one left-side party would be an example of perfect cohesion, for instance. Having numerous uncoordinated side parties would indicate low cohesion.

straddling a structural hole between side parties of different ethnic, linguistic, or institutional backgrounds. This culture clash is most pronounced for Behemoth and Butterfly brokers who are each connected directly with foreign donors and native beneficiaries.

The next suspicion-promoting factor is that of *Mismatched Incentives*. Essentially, there will be a greater potential for distrust and suspicion when the goals between side parties are misaligned. Butterfly DBOs usually have the least to worry about on this count, because they are typically quite transparent about what services they are offering, and both donors and beneficiaries alike have to be on board in order for the project to happen. Similarly, because federal-level ministries have such veto power over who is allowed to engage in direct talks with them, a rough alignment of incentives between Top Tier donors and Top Tier beneficiaries is typically a pre-requisite for organizations to occupy the Behemoth structural position.¹³ Bulldogs have the greatest difficulties when it comes to misaligned incentives of their side parties. Countertrafficking initiatives intended to prevent out-migration, for instance, are quite poorly matched with the incentives of most individual Moldovans, 80% of whom have expressed aspirations for emigration according to surveys conducted by the IOM (IOM 2012).

Another suspicion-promoting factor is *Difficulty of Evaluation*. Typically, the more broad and sweeping an initiative's ambitions, the harder it is to evaluate the actual impact thereof, and the greater room there is for suspicion on the part of side parties. On average, projects become more piece-meal and concrete as they move down from Behemoths to Butterflies. If Behemoths strive to sensitize government leaders to gender and trafficking issues and to create an anti-trafficking culture; Biggie Bulldogs focus on building up civil society (i.e. Baby Bulldogs) and empowering them to raise awareness and provide services; and Butterflies spend almost all of their time and resources in country provided special services to individuals, such as shelter and care for trafficking victims or orphans.

Difficulty of Supervision, too, plays a role in undermining trust. Simply put, the further away a side party is from a DBO, the less able they are to see what is going on in the field and on the ground, and the greater the consequent potential for suspicion.

The final factor when it comes to suspicion and mistrust is that of *how high the stakes are*. Basically, the higher the stakes, the greater the risk of suspicion undermining a DBO's relationship with its side parties. In the summer of 2009, for instance, the US TiP report quoted an ILO report in which it was supposedly stated that Moldova's National

¹³ A prime example of an unsuccessful attempt to occupy the Behemoth position in spite of mismatched incentives is the experience of the International Labor Organization's MIGRANT project. This project was intended to fight trafficking through promoting safe, legal migration paths instead of trying to convince Moldovans to stay home. An interview with the former head of ILO-MIGRANT in Moldova, revealed that the project had to be called off two years early due to the fact that government officials refused to cooperate in any project that could potential increase the number of Moldovans working abroad, thereby exasperating their difficulties with labor shortages. In fact, leaders and representatives of several Behemoth and Biggie Bulldog DBOs in the field told me that it was the government's strong anti-migration preferences that prevented much progress on the front of promoting safe, legal migration options, even though most experts agree that this would be an ideal intervention for preventing human trafficking while respecting the desires and ambitions of Moldovans themselves. Even as the European Union has initiated a Mobility Pact with Moldova (beginning in 2009) with the express purpose of promoting labor migration, the Government of Moldova has requested that this partnership focus on assisting in the promotion of return migration and strengthening borders (Luecke, Mahmoud, and Steinmayr 2009: 8).

Bureau of Statistics “estimated that there were likely over 25,000 Moldovan victims of trafficking for forced labor in 2008.” This large figure raised the hackles of Moldovan government officials who quickly convened a meeting of the National Committee to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings so that they could denounce it.¹⁴ The high-stake threat of losing all non-humanitarian funding from the US made Moldovan government officials very suspicious and extremely defensive. At the meeting, the director of Moldova’s intelligence agency “stressed that the report contains exaggerated data”; the co-director of the Moldovan Center for Combatting Trafficking in Persons called the figure “clearly exaggerated”; and the Moldovan Minister of Justice stated that “such information creates an extremely negative image for Moldova and it is necessary to clarify where these inflated data came from” (National Committee 2009). This kerfuffle over the 2009 TiP Report illustrates the sort of distrust and suspicion that comes into play when the stakes are raised. Behemoths dealing directly with the national government play for the highest stakes, and they have to deal with the brunt of the accompanying distrust and suspicion. For Butterflies who are dealing with small sums of money from many hundreds of donors, intense suspicion and distrust are rare.

11 Stabilizing Mechanisms

A number of stabilizing mechanisms have evolved over the years to help DBOs overcome the challenges and maximize the benefits of straddling particular kinds of holes in a development field. Most of these mechanisms are strategies that DBOs can choose to strategically deploy if it is within their capacity to do so. Usually, certain types of organizations are better able to utilize these stabilizing mechanisms than others, and this heterogeneous allocation of stabilization strategies plays a large part in determining who can occupy which structural positions in a given development field. Many of these mechanisms have become institutional norms that may seem mundane and obvious (staff expansion, e.g.), while others of them (the norm for intense cooperation e.g.) have sometimes puzzled observers. Others of these mechanisms are less normative and more entrepreneurial in nature (creating “Chinese walls”, e.g.).

In Table 3, I provide a list of the 19 mechanisms for brokerage stabilization that I discovered in the course of my engagement with the Moldovan countertrafficking field.

¹⁴ More than just being a relatively large number, this estimate was particularly ruffling for the Moldovan ministers for two further reasons: First, it was a huge jump from the estimate of total victims in the previous year’s TiP Report (7,500). Second, nobody had any idea where the number came from. Amazingly, when asked directly by government officials about which ILO report they were referencing the US Embassy refused to provide a specific citation. In my subsequent interviews with representatives from two ILO project groups in Moldova, along with dozens of other leaders in the countertrafficking field in Moldova AND with the very US officials who wrote the diplomatic cable upon which the US TiP Report was based that year, nobody knew where the 25,000 figure had come from. Interestingly, Wikileaks has made it possible to review the information that the US Embassy in Chisinau sent to the State Department for inclusion in the 2009 TIP report. In a cable sent on February 18, 2009 entitled MOLDOVA: NINTH ANNUAL TIP REPORT, there is no mention from the US Embassy of the ILO report or the 25,000 victim figure. Perhaps the reason why US Embassy officials in Chisinau could not provide a citation for the ILO report is that this data was inserted by a State Department analyst in Washington without consulting with officials at the embassy.

These mechanisms are roughly allocated into four groups representing the types of structural challenges they help DBOs to overcome. It is important to state, however, that there is a good degree of cross-over here that is profoundly difficult to capture in a simple, elegant visualization. A technique for supporting weak bridges (e.g. capture) might also be useful in defusing suspicion. The intention behind sorting these mechanisms as they are is for clarity of presentation and discussion, not to make a strong claim regarding which ones are used for what purposes. I am claiming, however, that each of the 19 mechanisms included in the table and discussed below can be helpfully viewed as either a strategy or an institutional norm that has evolved to help stabilize the role of DBOs in the modern international development landscape.

Table 3: Brokerage Stabilization Mechanisms

Brokerage Stabilization Strategies	Maintaining Structural Imbalance	Preserving Centrality	Hole Hunting Niche Coordination Hyperbole Ratcheting Capture Institutional Grafting Coordination Meetings Staff Expansion International Travel Staff Rotation Going Local, Going Foreign Chinese Wall Generalizing Goals "Creating Success" Specialization Professionalization Branding Web Presence Matchmaking
		Supporting Weak Bridges	
	Defusing Suspicion	Retaining Trust	
		Projecting Accountability	

Preserving Centrality

The first mechanism for stabilizing centrality is that of *Hole Hunting*. The idea behind this concept is simply that when a DBO with good vision of the structural landscape sees that the hole or holes they are currently straddling are in danger of either closing or disappearing, then one way to maintain a central position in the development field is to hunt for new holes to broker across. A prime example here is that of the coordinated decision by IOM, OSCE, UNDP, and UNFPA to get into the business of domestic violence prevention. Previous human trafficking initiatives centered on anti-migration messages and job creation programs had been driven in large part by donor priorities and preferences. The shift to begin efforts to curb trafficking by taking on domestic violence, in contrast, was clearly led by the aforementioned Behemoth and Bulldog DBOs, who in 2008 began hunting around for donors who would buy into their new initiative. Likely, these DBOs were looking at the trends of decreasing trafficking victims from year to year and anticipated a shift in donor priorities. Although they had to go far afield (i.e. the Government of Japan) before finding a donor to sponsor the 3-year, \$3.35 million project

they were proposing, the hunt for a new hole to straddle ultimately proved fruitful. The extent to which organizations can hunt for new holes likely depends upon the information advantages that their structural position provide, along with the control they have over the agenda of the development field (see Table 1). Thus, Behemoths and Butterflies, with high agenda control, will likely be more able to find new holes via alternative donors or new initiatives than would a Bulldog broker, who is more constrained by the priorities of their left-side parties. This is a raw deal for Baby Bulldogs who are highly threatened by threats of closure but unable to defuse these threats easily by seeking new holes. Thus, they are particularly susceptible to changes in the preferences of their side parties – a threat made all the more pointed when they have developed relatively specialized technologies, such as providing treatment of human trafficking victims.

Another mechanism for maintaining structural centrality is that of *niche coordination*. More than simply developing specialized technologies, the idea behind niche coordination is that organizations within a field who would otherwise be competitors coordinate with each other to make sure they are each straddling separate structural holes. In Moldova, for instance, after a few years of competing for funding and providing overlapping services, high-profile generalizing organizations such as IOM, La Strada, and CPTW began to specialize and cross-refer rather than duplicate efforts and compete for funding. La Strada took over full control of administering the in-country trafficking hotline, CPTW narrowed its focus exclusively to providing legal assistance, and IOM concentrated on administering a rehabilitation center for victims. This stabilizing strategy will likely be undertaken by those organizations who have high enough contextual expertise to pursue a specialized agenda, together with a large enough staff and generalized enough goals to be able to adapt to the changing ecology of organizations in the field. In the context of the high threat of competition for Biggie Bulldogs, it stands to reason that the organization who most successfully occupy this structural position will be highly skilled at niche coordination.

Hyperbole to Sustain Weak Bridges

The first technique for supporting weak bridges is the time-worn demand stimulation technique of strategically-deployed *Hyperbole*. In the case of the Moldovan countertrafficking field, this hyperbole generally comes in the form of inflated estimates and sensationalized narratives. For brevity, I will stick to the numbers – although sensationalized trafficking narratives abound. My findings when it comes to hyperbole are that there seem to be two factors that determine who is most likely to use trumped up estimates of trafficking prevalence. First, DBOs are much less likely to use exaggerated numbers when they face a high threat of non-cooperation from government partners (i.e. Behemoths). Second, DBOs are much more likely to oversell the trafficking situation when they are directly connected to foreign donors; Baby Bulldogs, for instance, have little to gain from hyperbole, because both of their side parties are extremely familiar with the realities on the ground.

Since Biggie Bulldogs have to compete fiercely for funding, while also frequently acting as Behemoths and dealing directly with government partners, they have to carefully balance the gains of high estimates with the potential losses of burning bridges with Top Tier Beneficiaries. Earlier on, these organizations seemed more prone to quoting large estimates – favoring the fundraising side of the equation. In 2001, for instance, the UNFPA

country office claimed in its annual report that “60% of all women trafficked to Europe came from Moldova.” In their 2002 country report, this was modified to “60% of all the women and girl victims in Western Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East.” In 2004, they claimed without citation that “according to the IOM, at least 17,000 women are trafficked annually from Moldova.” But UNFPA was not alone among Biggies in promoting larger than life estimates. In 2002, La Strada stated that there were 10,000 Moldovan women trafficked abroad in 2001 (Revenco 2002). According to a report commissioned by ILO’s International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (ILO-IPEC) in 2003, “according to unofficial data provided by law enforcement bodies every year approximately 5,000 minors are transported to Russia and forced to provide sexual services” (ILO-IPEC 2003). In 2004, meanwhile, Medecins du Monde’s Moldovan office stated on their website that “in Moldova, the number of victims of human trafficking is estimated to be at 60,000, making it one of the countries most effected by this problem.”

As time went on, however, Biggies generally grew ever more wary about putting out estimates; they are now hard to come by in official reports, and many have been removed from webpages.¹⁵ DBOs who frequently occupy the Behemoth position of working with the government on trafficking issues tend to be particularly cautious about the types of numbers they quote, often preferring to talk about concrete numbers of victims assisted – just over 2,700 between 2000 and 2010 – rather than guessing at how many unidentified victims might exist. As one project manager for a Behemoth DBO related: “We are constantly thinking, oh, maybe we shouldn’t present this data because [government officials] won’t like it.... It often happens that we are forced to remove some data or other because it doesn’t make someone happy. It is very discouraging.” Moreover, to avoid sanctions from government partners, some DBOs seeking outside funding will continue to use inflated estimates for fundraising purposes, while simultaneously taking being careful not to broadcast these estimates publically. Another official from a Behemoth/Biggie Bulldog DBO, for instance, confided to me the following about the 25,000 victims figure that had been published in the US TiP Report of 2009: “Do I have any idea where that number came from? No. Do I think it’s accurate? Probably not. Will I use it to try to get more money? Absolutely.”

Others were either less crafty or less forthcoming to me about using double-talk to play both sides. The following anecdote illustrates, to the contrary, just how far some DBOs will go to avoid upsetting their partners in the Moldovan government: In 2006, a five-country study was conducted by the IOM mission to Ukraine, which produced a series of estimates on the prevalence of different kinds of trafficking in each country. Based upon survey responses, the report projected that since 2000, there have been 31,500 cases of forced labor trafficking, 19,000 cases of forced domestic work trafficking, and 6,500 cases of forced sex trafficking from Moldova, making 59,000 total trafficking cases. When I mentioned this report to the head of the IOM mission in Moldova, he visibly seethed and launched into a profanity-laden tirade regarding the IOM chief of mission in Ukraine who had published the report. He went on to relate how he had actually demanded the IOM chief in Ukraine fly down to Chisinau, where he had to personally apologize to the

¹⁵ As a case in point, when I interviewed a project manager with Moldova’s branch of the UNFPA and brought his attention to a page on the organization’s website stating the 17,000 victims per year figure, he took careful note of it and within the day the figure had been scrubbed from the site.

Moldovan authorities for his shoddy research. Since the IOM, like all Behemoth DBOs, depends upon the host government's good will to operate, the Moldovan chief of mission knew that he couldn't just ignore a report that made it seem like he wasn't doing his job. After all, over 90% of all trafficking cases in the IOM Moldova database are cases of sex trafficking, and all of these cases together total fewer than 3,000. Either the report out of Ukraine is completely false, or the victim profile created by Moldovan multilaterals is completely out of harmony with the realities of the trafficking situation and they have done a poor job in identifying and assisting the majority of victims. The fierce reaction of the IOM Moldova chief signals just how tenuous he considers his privileged brokerage position to be. A second round of surveys that was supposed to be conducted in 2009 was either never fielded or the results were never published.

If the Baby Bulldogs have no incentive to hyperbolize, and Biggie Bulldogs and Behemoths have to walk a tightrope, Butterflies are free to fly as high as they plausibly can without having to fear reprisal. For DBOs in the Butterfly position, they run a very low risk of losing cooperation from their Beneficiaries, while standing to gain bigger bucks through the attention they can attract with large numbers. Which is not to say that Butterflies just pull numbers out of the sky. All it takes for a scurrilously large exaggeration to go viral is for one intrepid foreign journalist, one overly exuberant activist, or one daring Butterfly to get purposefully or inadvertently creative with the truth. Once a number has been quoted a couple times, then Butterflies have little incentive *not* to use it. Just one example should suffice.

In June 2001, Preston Mendenhall wrote an article for MSNBC entitled "'Infiltrating Europe's Shameful Trade in Human Beings.'" In this article, it is claimed that "experts" estimate 200,000 – 400,000 Moldovan women have been sold into prostitution since the fall of the Soviet Union. Aside from the mention of "experts," there appears to be no other attribution for this figure. Most likely, this number was taken from a report published in December of 2000 by the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights (MAHR), which was commissioned by Winrock to produce a study on Domestic Violence in Moldova. In that report, the authors stated that there were anywhere between 200,000 and 400,000 Moldovan women working abroad as of the year 2000. "Most of the women," they continue, "are working without proper authorization, some as housekeepers, babysitters, nurses or assistants for the elderly. Unfortunately, however, the majority are trafficked for sexual exploitation or sold into prostitution" (MAHR 2000: 11). In turn, the MAHR report cites a pamphlet produced by the NGO Gender Center, which seems to never have been available online.¹⁶

¹⁶ It should be noted here that since this figure was published in 2000, it was likely prior to the promulgation of the Palermo Trafficking Protocol at the end of the that year. Therefore, the definition of trafficking used in producing this number would depend entirely on who was behind it and how they view such issues as sex work. Likely, the original Gender Center authors who generated the estimate were working from the assumption that any sort of sex work constituted being "trafficked into sexual exploitation or sold into prostitution." Regardless of definitions, however, it is almost laughably outlandish to claim that 200,000 or more Moldovan women were working in the sex industry abroad. Another point to consider is that at that point in time, the countertrafficking development field was just barely coalescing in Moldova. Gender Center, which would go on to be a mid-level Bulldog and a relatively major player in the field, was at that time not yet engaged in human trafficking projects. Perhaps the enormously exaggerated number was an attempt by

Subsequent to the MSNBC article, some US Peace Corps volunteers in Moldova made use of the unattributed figure in some promotional materials to raise funds from back home in 2003. Then in 2005, a Berkeley student named Mimi Chakarova cited these estimates in a photo-documentary project she produced for PBS/Frontline called the “Price of Sex.” In a Q&A with a Frontline reporter on the PBS website, Chakarova misattributed the estimate to the IOM:

REPORTER: You say that 200,000 women are trafficked from Moldova. Where did you get this number?

CHAKAROVA: The numbers vary - most estimates are between 200,000 and 400,000 women, depending on the source. I used the lesser number, which is from the International Organization for Migration, because I know sometimes this data is exaggerated in order to give more significance to the funding of specific projects. That number also includes girls and women who’ve been trafficked for labor, exploited as maids and factory workers and so on.

In subsequent years, numerous bloggers, journalists, activists, and at least one Butterfly DBO (Children’s Emergency Relief International) would continue citing this figure of 200,000 – 400,000 women having been trafficked from Moldova since the fall of the USSR. Then, in 2012, Chakarova released a full-length version of her documentary on sex trafficking, with Moldova again set as the central focus of the film. In numerous interviews with some of America’s most prestigious news outlets; in speaking engagements on the nation’s most renowned university campuses; and even in NGO headquarters, US embassies, and UN offices around the world, Chakarova has continued to use the figure of 200,000 Moldovan trafficking victims in promoting her latest, Emmy-nominated, multiple-award winning film project. In an email exchange with Chakarova in April of 2012, she related to me that she had omitted using these estimates in her new film because NGOs had become more wary in recent years of quoting such estimates. When I asked her for citations for the numbers she had used for her Frontline piece in 2005 and that she was continuing to use in promoting her new documentary she told me that she would have to check her notes, but she was confident they were from “at least two reputable organizations” back in 2002/2003. Further research on my part has yielded nothing aside from the evidence presented above, which suggests that the estimates most likely originated with a small, ambitious women’s rights NGO called the Gender Center.

Although Chakarova is not, herself, a DBO, her success in using wildly exaggerated estimates in order to promote her films is indicative of how tempting it must be for Butterfly brokers – even those who know better than to think that half of all women migrants from Moldova have been sold into sex slavery – to use hyperbole in order to subsidize the weak bridges between them and their donors in the developed world.

Other Mechanisms for Supporting Weak Bridges

Gender Center leadership to stimulate demand and to see if a structural hole would emerge for them to broker across.

In addition to hyperbole, *ratcheting* is another mechanism by which weak bridges can be maintained. The term “ratchet effect” was first coined by Stanley Lieberman (2000) in explaining the incremental changes in such mundane things as women’s fashions. The main idea is that a small, iterative tweak in an existing style can create a new, differentiated product. So too with the brokerage products offered by DBOs. By making small changes to their existing structures or by tweaking slightly their current practices, Moldovan DBOs can refashion themselves to better meet the demands of the market. A good example here is the way in which many women’s rights and children’s rights organizations that existed in Moldova prior to 2000 adjusted their focus just enough to be able compete for countertrafficking funding as that field emerged. The more susceptible an organization is to the vicissitudes of donor preferences (e.g. the shorter its contract length with left-side parties, the less control it has), the more likely it will be required to master the ratcheting technique to survive. With relatively low control and short contracts, smaller Baby and mid-level Bulldogs (and Biggie Bulldogs to a lesser extent, too) stand to benefit the most from successful ratcheting.

The next mechanism for stabilizing weak bridges is *capture*. In structural terms, capture involves the broker becoming so biased toward one of their side parties that they transform from neutral facilitator to interested agent, from intermediary to representative (Gould and Fernandez 1989). Thus, capture can reduce tension by solving the agency problem for the side that has taken the broker captive. Based on this definition, I would assert that organizations such as embassies and development agencies are, in essence, well-captured brokers. (Hence “agencies.”) Even if these captured Behemoth DBOs lose some of their ability to serve as impartial go-betweens in their dealings with the Moldovan government, they are at least spared the trouble of constantly striving to maintain short term relationships with left side parties. Conversely, Behemoth DBOs without a highly cohesive left-side party, capture is probably more likely to go in the other direction as they are pulled in by their highly cohesive right side parties in the Moldovan government. One representative of a Behemoth DBO operating in Moldova explained that it was nearly impossible to impose any sort of conditions on the Moldovan government for fear of falling out of the government’s good graces:

When the government is unhappy, they call the UN regional offices and say: We don’t want to work with you anymore. We don’t need your help. The in-country representatives are rated by the government officials here. It is a big part of their evaluation. One of the last UN reps got a medal from the Prime Minister, for instance, and that really added some stars to his CV. So why stir up conflict when you can just make some ridiculous statements to make you and the government look better than you really are and you both end up forwarding your careers?

He went on to give an example of the tremendous wastes and inefficiencies that this kind of a relationship had led to:

For example, there was a project where we got money to give to the government and I told them, okay, write up an itemized budget telling how much it will cost for each activity. They refused to write it, and I had to write it. So, I wrote up a budget and told them okay, here is a budget for just a fifth of the money that you want. Either accept this budget or write a new one showing what everything will cost.

They came back a month later and just asked for all the money. I just wanted to give them a fifth of the money, but my supervisors said, no it is the middle of the year, we need to start this activity, we are going to start evaluation reports really soon, so let's just give them all the money.

As long as this type of right-hand capture remains covert, it will help Behemoth DBOs to maintain their structural position and to benefit from the vision advantages, control, and access to resources that are tied to it. The other types of DBOs are less prone to capture, since they typically lack the sorts of highly cohesive side parties and the intense threats of non-cooperation that come with the Behemoth position.

For DBOs who have marginal relationships to their side parties, *organizational grafting* is a key stabilizing mechanism. Organizational grafting occurs when brokerage transactions are subsidized by an external organization, often in a way that helps to legitimate the broker (Meyer and Rowan 1977), and frequently through the provision of physical facilities (Small 2009). Butterfly DBOs with marginal left-hand relationships benefit tremendously from the organizational grafting of churches who provide both the facilities and a shared cultural vocabulary to help subsidize what would otherwise be weak ties between individual donors and Butterfly brokers. Biggie Bulldog DBOs, meanwhile, often have relatively marginal relationships with the Baby Bulldogs they work with, since these Baby organizations frequently are not specialists in trafficking, but have merely ratcheted themselves over to the trafficking issue from some other issue area that is more their main focus. In this case, the monthly OSCE-hosted technical coordination meetings (TCMs) hosted in Chisinau – along with regular regional TCMs in various localities throughout the country – serve marvelously as an organizational grafting venue to help Biggie and Baby Bulldogs come together regularly, thereby sparing them some of the costs of maintaining their marginal relationships. Furthermore, the ubiquitous treaties, conventions, and multi-lateral organizations that beneficiary state governments are pressured into signing, ratifying, and belonging to serve as additional institutional structures that help to legitimate brokerage activity and to reduce transaction costs, particularly for DBOs who mostly occupy the Behemoth position.

The next two stabilizing mechanisms – *coordination meetings* and *staff expansion* – are most useful for DBOs with low-cohesion side parties. In the same way that regular TCMs can help to subsidize marginal relationships through organizational grafting, these and other meetings also serve the core function of providing a forum in which DBOs can coordinate with multiple of their side parties at one time, rather than spending the time meeting with each of them individually. Staff expansion, meanwhile, is another way to help manage a high number of uncoordinated side parties, especially if they are left-hand parties without a physical presence in the country. Behemoth DBOs often have enough internal funding to actually afford the staff necessary to write grants, compile progress reports, and jump through all the other rote and tiresome hoops necessary to keep donors happy. Biggie Bulldogs, however, often have to rely upon the help of volunteers – at least, such was the case in the Moldovan countertrafficking field. At the time that I conducted my interviews in the summer of 2009, at least five of the Biggie Bulldogs I visited were currently working with American volunteers whose main goal was to help with grant writing and other donor-related activities. Unfortunately for Butterfly DBOs who have extremely low cohesion among their donors, coordination meetings are not possible and fundraising often

requires a personal touch that is hard to delegate to hired staff. Consequently, in order to maintain their structural position, many Butterfly DBOs are forced to spend a great deal of time and energy each year travelling from fundraiser to fundraiser just to stay afloat.¹⁷

Finally, the last stabilizing mechanism for sustaining weak bridges is *international travel*. I already discussed in the previous paragraph how Butterfly DBOs are forced to travel frequently in order to visit with their scattered left-hand donors. The fact that the distances between these Butterfly brokers and their donors are very large just adds to these travel costs. And yet, such travel is almost certainly necessary for Butterflies to be able to straddle the structural hole they occupy for any length of time. Similarly, Behemoths and Biggie Bulldogs with low propinquity to their donors can and do make frequent use of international travel to attend conferences, seminars, and workshops where they network, advertise, and build relationships with current and potential donors alike (see Merry 2006).

Mechanisms for Retaining Trust

The first of the mechanisms for maintaining trust is *staff rotation*. The idea here is simply that the difficulties of maintaining trust are extremely high for brokers who typically straddle such large cultural gaps (i.e. Behemoths and Butterflies). Given enough time, then, all but the most talented brokers will likely fall out of favor with one or the other of their side parties. Keeping a constant rotation of leadership, however, can help to prevent this. Many Behemoth-positioned DBOs such as embassies, development agencies, and multilaterals already have an institutionalized practice of limited terms and constant cycling of incumbents. Such a strategy would be practically much more difficulty for Butterflies, however, because 1) they typically have fewer resources with which to constantly hire and retrain staff, 2) they are often small-scale operations that do not have multiple offices through which to rotate incumbents, and 3) their fundraising efforts typically require a more personal touch than do the grant-writing, proposal submitting standards of fund-seeking in the rest of the development field.

The second mechanism for retaining trust is what I call *Going Foreign or Going Local*. A common practice for foreign DBOs operating in Moldova – even for the embassies and development agencies – was to hire natives and to use them to parlay with native beneficiaries. While mission chiefs and head representatives were often foreign nationals, the majority of program managers were native Moldovans. Less obvious, perhaps, is the need for certain organizations to go the other way. Being able to engage with international donors requires a certain cosmopolitan sensibility and a familiarity with the language and workings of the international aid industry. Some organizations – especially those more rooted in the Soviet-era Weltanschauung of the past – suffered tremendously for lacking this capacity. One prime example is Moldova's first women's shelter, which was founded by the former first lady of Moldova. While the staff at the shelter itself was reasonably friendly towards me, the leader of the umbrella organization that managed the shelter was borderline hostile throughout the course of my 45 minute interview with her. Throughout our conversation, she strove ardently to convince me that everything I had heard from

¹⁷ It is worth noting here that fundraising over the web and reporting on the progress of development projects via blogs is becoming an ever more popular option for coordinating with distant side parties. I will discuss the benefits of having an established web presence a bit later in this section.

everybody else about Moldova was wrong. No, civil society was not weak in Moldova. No, domestic violence was not a human trafficking issue. No, she was not interested in telling me about her shelter's history or successes. And no, she was not interested in any more help from foreigners, thank you very much. Given how our interview had proceeded, it was not particularly surprising to later read a line in a UN report stating that the shelter "operates with totally insufficient financial and human resources." Nor was it stunning to hear that the single foreign donor who had been sustaining the shelter decided at the end of 2009 to discontinue funding, due to "internal conflicts and dissatisfaction among staff." And it was not even that much of a shocker to find out that the shelter had spent an entire year without any funding, staffed entirely by unpaid volunteers, and was on the brink of shutting down for good. What truly *did* send me for a loop, however, was when I later discovered that in 2011 the shelter's management requested a Peace Corps volunteer to help them out. Amazingly, by the end of her 18-month assignment, this single American Peace Corps volunteer had created a snappy website; published documentation of what the shelter does, along with counts of beneficiaries assisted; helped secure numerous grants; and had even assisted the shelter in organizing conferences, training sessions, and publicity campaigns. That is the value of learning to "go foreign."

An almost diametrically opposing strategy for dealing with the distrust issues of having to straddle dueling cultural environments is that of creating a *Chinese Wall*. The idea behind this stabilizing strategy is that of creating a deep separation between how you present things to one side party and how you present them to the other. A key example of this is the website strategy of a small NGO called the Beginning of Life. This NGO is half Butterfly (filling the structural hole between individual American and Canadian Baptist donors and individual human trafficking victims, whom it assists through a rehabilitation center) and half Bulldog (filling the structural hole between an American donor NGO and Moldovan school children, whom the organization targets for anti-trafficking, anti-drug, and pro-life awareness campaigns). This organization has adopted the enterprising tactic of maintaining two websites with a practical "Chinese wall" between them. On the first of these sites, English is the only language option, the organization calls itself Beginning of Life, much of the site is devoted to their "Anti-Trafficking Program," and their Mission Statement is: "To restore God's original intent for His creation, simultaneously transforming people physically and spiritually, and integrating them into society." On the second site, Russian is the only language option, the organization calls itself the "Escape Movement," and the occasional mention of God or trafficking is overshadowed by the glossy, hip images intended to capture the attention of the teenage beneficiaries for whom the site is intended. By maintaining two completely separate pathways of communication with its side parties, Beginning of Life is able to project two separate images. On the one hand, they can show North American donors stock photos of women crying and tell them that "100,000 Moldovans are victims of human trafficking. More than 30,000 girls and women have disappeared without a trace." On the other hand, they can show teenage Moldovans stock photos of beautiful adolescents playing guitars and listening to music, only occasionally letting slip a subtle word of caution about not getting caught up in trafficking.

The final mechanism for retaining trust is that of *generalizing your goals*. This is a particularly helpful strategy for brokers who find themselves trying to broker between side parties with competing goals (e.g. Bulldogs trying to push an anti-migration agenda on a

population that almost universally wants to migrate). The idea behind generalizing your goals is that the more ambiguous your ambitions, the more leeway you have to frame things differently to each side party. This is where terms like empowerment and sustainability come in. If Moldovans want to leave, but donors want them to stay put, how can you satisfy both parties? Empower your beneficiaries. To donors, this sounds like empowering them to lead better lives in Moldova, whereas Moldovans see an opportunity to empower themselves across the border.

Projecting Accountability

The first mechanism among those that can help brokers to project accountability is that of *creating success*. Watkins et al. talk about creating success first in terms of what sorts of technologies are being used. Can success be easily demonstrated? If so, then creating success is a fairly straight forward matter of pointing to what you have done. Over the past 10 years, we have helped 2,700 trafficked women, for instance. On the other hand, if goals are broad and technologies unproven, then creating success is a much more difficult task. Typically, then, organizations who fear suspicion from side parties regarding the difficulty of evaluating what they are doing will create success via one or all of three paths: counting, testimonials, and reports. Part of what got the women's shelter in trouble with donors was a lack of desire to "create success" via beneficiary counts, reports, and stories of women it had helped. A large part of what helps captured Behemoths maintain their position, meanwhile, is their ability to "create success" out of practically nothing. Take, for example, the following anecdote recounted to me confidentially by a UN employee:

There is supposed to be this committee that would meet and decides which ministry takes care of what. So we said, okay, we will finance your roundtable meetings as long as you give us a seat at the table so that we can watch the process and see the conclusions you come to. The government said, no, we will take the money, but you are not allowed to be there. Also, we get no agenda, no minutes, no access to anything that comes out of those meetings.... And now I have to make a presentation and say that everything is going great, they are meeting, they have made goals, and I will have to make everything up. This committee has existed for five years, and they have a secretariat, and we have financed all of these people for the whole time, with UN style salaries, good salaries.

The second mechanism in projecting accountability is *specialization*. As opposed to niche coordination, this mechanism is not concerned with minimizing direct competition, but rather with developing more effective and transparent competencies, which can be more easily evaluated by distant donors. This is a particularly good strategy for Butterflies.

The third mechanism for projecting accountability is that of *professionalization*. There has also been a marked increase over the past half century in the professionalization, rationalization, and modernization of development workers, who have come to be recognized as a distinct class of actors (Chabbott 1999: 243-246). The better an organization is at speaking the language and sending out signals that it participates in this special category of Professionals who are unbiased and incorruptible, the more successful it will be in avoiding suspicions, particularly from its left-hand parties.

The fourth mechanism in this group is *branding* and establishing a *web presence*. The idea here is that the stronger your brand, the slicker your website, the cooler your logo, the easier it will be to signal to distant side parties that you have your stuff together.

The fifth and final mechanism for projecting accountability to distant side parties is that of *matchmaking*. Whereas most of the brokerage situations that I have discussed to this point have involved brokering between two permanently unconnected side parties (or middleman brokerage), there is a second type of brokerage that I have not yet touched upon. The main objective of these other types of brokers is to bring otherwise unconnected actors into contact with each other, with the result being a new network connection where one previously did not exist (Xiao and Tsui 2007). These actors can be thought of as catalyst brokers (Stovel, Golub, Milgrom 2011), insofar as they “alter the rate of interaction among actors and are minimally affected by the interaction” (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 146). Catalyzing, or matchmaking, within the Moldovan countertrafficking field (via TCMs and region-spanning projects) is one of the prime ways in which organizations such as OSCE, UNDP, IOM, and UNFPA were able to reinforce their position in the center of the trafficking field. Forming partnerships with other DBOs, and introducing other DBOs to each other helps catalyst brokers in the field to benefit from status gains that accrue from becoming ever more centrally embedded in a growing web of relations.

With all five of these accountability-projecting mechanisms, they will likely be most important for Biggie Bulldogs, least important for Baby Bulldogs and Butterflies, and somewhat important for Behemoths. This prediction stems from the distribution of challenges to each of these types of DBO when it comes to difficulties of evaluation and supervision.

12 Conclusion

The core thesis of this paper has been to demonstrate that a brokerage perspective on international development can help cut through the complexity of a development field. With my case study on the Moldovan countertrafficking field, I have demonstrated that the DBO concept can work well as an organizing heuristic to help make sense of the behavior of different organizations within a development field, based upon their relative structural endowment of benefits and challenges.

There yet remain a number of future paths that have yet to be explored using the DBO perspective. First and foremost would be to bring in a comparison case. Also, it would be a large improvement to reliably operationalize and meaningfully quantify concepts presented in this paper, such as the distribution of the different types of DBOs within a given development field. This would not only yield further insights, but it would also provide for greater ease of comparison between fields.

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