On the Border: National Construction in Finland and Slovenia, Minority Policy, and the Nationalism of Minor Difference

The border opens like a crack.
In front of us is Asia, the East.
Behind us is the West and Europe;
I will guard it as a sentry…
-    Uuno Kailas, "On the Boundary"[1]

"The Balkans" is, to be sure, a geographic concept, but even more so the mark of a corrupt and primitive society. With [Slovenia's] attainment of independence we ought to rid ourselves of the Balkans in this sense, too."
-    Dimitrij Rupel, *Besede božje in božanske (The words of God and the divine)*, 1987[2]

1.   Introduction

Following the end of the Cold War, an interesting form of nation-state construction has taken place in the periphery of Central Europe. The classic exclusionary nation-state well documented by Brubaker (1995), Gellner (1981), Marx (2003), and others has passed out of vogue with the ascension of the European Union and the ratification of a number of documents protecting ethnic minorities within borders. Correspondingly, for states like Slovenia – a product of the 1991 Ten-Day War with no true historical antecedent – and Finland – a state whose Finnish-Swedish ethnic division was practically frozen in time by its geopolitical lot – the task of reifying the nation through expulsion or homogenization is no longer an option. Indeed, these practices find no popular purchase in the Finnish electorate at all, as Kestilä (2006) notes; minority parties like the *Slovenska nacionalna stranka* (SNS, Slovene National Party) notwithstanding, Slovenia too has mostly escaped the resurgence of overt nationalism that has marked the last two decades across the greater post-Communist space.

However, these states partially compose a cultural borderland in both internal and external discourses: between West and East, between Europe and Asia, even between civilization and barbarism. The two quotes listed above are indicative of a mood present both Slovene and

---

[1] Quoted in Browning, Christopher, and Marko Lehti. (2007). "Beyond East-West: Marginality and National Dignity in Finnish Identity Construction." *Nationalities Papers,* 35 (4), 691-716, 700.
[2] Quoted in Patterson, Patrick Hyder. (2003). "On the Edge of Reason: The Boundaries of Balkanism in Slovenian, Austrian, and Italian Discourse." *Slavic Review* 61 (1), 110-141. 116.

Finnish political thought that stretches back to the late 19th century and that, while by no means static, has nevertheless influenced the state in important ways. This paper examines the minority policy divergence between treatment of autochthonous (indigenous) minorities in Slovenia and Finland and immigrant or otherwise allochthonous minorities. The high level of cultural and political protection afforded the autochthonous communities of Italians and Hungarians in Slovenia and Swedes in Finland contrasts with the lack of recognition at any level of ex-Yugoslavs[3] in the former case and ex-Soviets in the latter. This is despite the fact that ex-Yugoslavs compose over six per cent of the Slovenian[4] population, a share 14 times greater than the constitutionally protected communities in 2002 (Statistični letopis, 2002). While the ex-Soviets (specifically Russians and Estonians) in Finland are a much smaller community than the autochthonous Swedes, they represent the fastest-growing group in Finnish demographics (Saukkonen, 1995: 107) and are likewise not protected in any way.

The difference between autochthonous and allochthonous minority policies highlights a few important issues. First, the construction of a "border state" identity has led to a high and asymmetric level of protection of statistically marginal communities that are Western in orientation. Finnish and Slovene exceptionalisms have traditionally had a Western slant that celebrates the historic location of these polities in multiethnic empires, namely under the Swedish and Habsburg crowns. Even nationalist movements that led to cleavage from empire focused on Western commonalities and dispensed with Eastern traditions. Consequently, I argue, the cultural and political protection conferred on Western minorities represents a manifestation of desire by these countries to locate themselves not just in the same cultural space as the West,

---

[3] Specifically, Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Albanians, and Macedonians.

[4] I use *Slovenian* to describe citizens or residents of Slovenia; the term *Slovene*, for the purposes of clarity, is reserved for those who identify as ethnically Slovene. Curiously (and obfuscatorily), there is no term in the Slovene language to distinguish Slovenes-by-ethnicity from Slovenians-by-residency; Finnish has the neologism *suomenmaalainen* (a person living in Finland) (Migration Institute 2002).

2

but on the frontier between the West and the East. To this end, linguistic and cultural relationships and modern ties that could be salient are instead downplayed in favor of the past. Finnish, a Finno-Ugric language related most closely to Estonian and not at all related to Swedish, nevertheless shares official language status with the minority Swedish language; Slovene, a South Slavic language similar to Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian/Montenegrin, shares official language status with Italian and Hungarian in those autochthonous ethnic communities.

Paraphrasing Freud, this is a quiet form of nationalism-by-minor-difference, motivated by a desire to belong to the West. I hypothesize that the construction of a border state identity affects attitudes toward specific minorities in different ways. The policy implications of nationalism-by-minor-difference, furthermore, call into question the generalizability of a number of recent studies on ethnic exclusion (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior, 2004; Kitschelt, 1997; Gradstein and Schiff, 2006) to states defined by this borderland mentality. In particular, Sniderman et al. show that in the Netherlands, cultural distance between groups – for example, language – increases salience of group boundaries. Using this model, it would follow that Hungarians or Italians would be viewed as less likely to integrate with Slovene society than Croatians or Serbs, not more, and consequently they would be viewed as a greater threat. While interethnic communication between Estonians and Finns – facilitated by a high degree of linguistic commonality – has led to assimilation of the former by the latter in Finland, such results have not been seen in Slovenia, demonstrating the reification of otherwise low barriers to entrance into the titular nation. These two cases indicate that border state mentality can have an impact on policy development, and that cultural distance between majority and minority groups, while important, may not be necessary or sufficient to impel ethnically exclusionist policies.

2. Social exclusion literature: lessons for the border state?

It is important to note a caveat of the ethnic exclusion literature. Many studies (see especially Sniderman et al., 2004, Kitschelt. 1997) that have examined the issue of minority exclusion have used firmly Western societies as the in-group and immigrants, specifically Muslims from North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Surinamese, as the out-group. Sniderman et al. (40) found that the cultural threat posed by these groups was perceived to be greater ($r = .203$, $n = 849$, $p < .001$) than economic threat ($r = .057$, $p < .01$). Correspondingly, the authors theorized that the cultural distance between Dutch nationals and Dutch non-nationals determined the level of cultural threat perceived by the in-group. This makes a certain amount of intuitive sense: societies with immigrant groups of a different linguistic family, race, and religion may find it difficult to locate commonalities. The costs of integration for more distinct groups like these, are higher; therefore, the likelihood of non-assimilation or non-integration is higher (Gradstein and Schiff, 2006: 329), and the threat remains, encouraging entrepreneurial types to use fear of that threat to enact anti-immigrant or pro-assimilationist policies (Kestilä, 2006).

However, studies of exclusionary attitudes in Eurasian states that are *not* firmly Western – that is to say, in some way discursively located outside the West – are underrepresented in the literature. The studies cited above are highly applicable to states with an unassailable Western identity: the Netherlands, Germany, France, and so forth have all played a part in constructing the West as a locale of generally common Caucasian racial features, a common linguistic heritage (however far removed), and religious and liberal democratic institutions. As a result, cultural distance from European immigrants to any of these countries is generally decidedly minor, and distance from non-European immigrants significant – and thus the possibility of an inflated effect in the latter group. States not in this space are a good place to test whether cultural

4

distance is a requisite for exclusionary reactions. While Slovenia and Finland are highly integrated with the West through the European Union and many of the other links listed above, they have also straddled the border between East and West (Patterson, 2003; Browning and Lehti, 2007). Cultural and political traditions in both of these countries were highly informed by a decidedly Eastern past: the 1918 transfer of Slovenia from the defunct Austro-Hungarian empire to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and eventually Yugoslavia, and Finland's 1809 shift from union with Sweden to the Russian Empire.

The borderland mentality is thus the product of cultural development in two differing spheres. Such a geographic conception owes a great deal to the Orientalist critiques of Said (1979) and the more recent and more geographically pertinent work of Hayden (1992), Hayden and Bakić-Hayden (1992), and Todorova (1997). Said described the discourse produced by Western observers about itself and the monolithic East as a study in contrast, between its rational and liberal self and the emotional, repressive, and stunted Other (Hayden and Bakić-Hayden 1992: 3-4). All states are guilty of producing Orientalist discourse to a greater or lesser extent; no one wants to describe their people (or themselves) as irrational, overly emotional, warlike, or stunted, and the act of "marking out", harmful though it may be, is so common as to be axiomatic to group behavior (Todorova 1998).

However, Orientalism from a country very much in the West – taking Sniderman and company's Netherlands, for instance – is different from a country in the borderland. Dutch appraisal of the cultures it colonized was colored by a significant cultural distance in a number of ways. Skin color but the most obvious example; religion, language, literacy and "high" culture (itself an Orientalist descriptor, albeit a brief and encompassing one), level of development, norms and values, and beliefs about gender roles can put vast space between cultures. Observing

that space, in-group members are likely to evaluate out-group members negatively (Brewer, 2001). Owing to the particular geography of East Central Europe[5], groups are more likely to be blended within and across borders – Slovenia, which was built at the intersection of Italians, Friulians, Germans, Hungarians, and Croats as well as the titular nationality is but one example of this. It is easier to draw a line between the Netherlands and Suriname or Indonesia than it is to draw a line between Slovenes and Croats, both culturally and literally: 30 percent of Slovenes were left outside the boundaries of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918 (Komac, 2001: 269). Motivation to reclaim Westernness necessitated creating an East out of cultures that literally inhabited the same space, and reify barriers to entry into the in-group that previously were very low.

3. A typology of border state cultural characteristics

The border state cultural location is marked by a few characteristics. As described by Trstenjak (1991; cited in Komac, 2001: 272), the border state "feels threatened, surrounded by strangers, jealous of its freedom and independence." To that end, it should tend to disavow its Eastern inheritance. The "certain orientalization of Finnish culture," depicted by unique architecture and feelings of "wilderness" described by Browning and Lehti (2007: 698) as a mark of Finland's marginality, placed them at the turn of last century in the Russian Empire. The theme of wilderness is maintained to this day in Finland's national narrative, but it emphasizes ecological thinking – a very Nordic mindspace, and not an Eastern (now post-Communist) one. It should also celebrate its links with the West. Ivan Cankar, the great Slovene author, described Slovenes as "strangers" to the Yugoslavs, setting them in opposition to the fraternal bonds of

---

[5] The definition of the West in Europe is a difficult task, surpassed by the definition of the East. While Finland is generally not included in Eastern Europe or Central Europe, geographic location and the presence on its border of a state whose Westernness is much more generally questioned puts it in the contested area shared with this designation. It is beyond the purview of this paper to assail or defend the borders of "East Central Europe" – I use it as a term of convenience, while acknowledging the novelty of introducing Finland to the region.

Slovene "peasant-farmers … to a Tyrolean, or … our vineyard-keepers from Gorica to his counterpart from Friuli" (cited in Patterson, 2003: 110). There should also be external recognition of the cultural location, but it should fluctuate so as to not statically guarantee a spot in the West, or otherwise be based on the recognition of a common Other. While Finland and Slovenia are both members of the European Union, their long histories of isolation from the core of that body has compelled other states to recognize their Westernness in bursts rather than streams. Germany and Austria unilaterally recognized Slovenia's independence from Yugoslavia in January 1992, the first states to do so, but Slovenia continues to be grouped into the "Balkan powderkeg," as Patterson (2003: 114) notes. The insecurity of this self-positioning is very influential on Slovene and Finnish society and policy: a constant re-assertion of Westernness-by-exclusion is needed to maintain cultural-spatial location.

It should be noted that this study does not seek to expel Slovenia or Finland from the West (nor could it!). The roots of Slovenia's affiliation with the West do run deep. Although Slovene is a Slavic language, the effects of contact with German are heard more than in other South Slavic languages, most notably in colloquial speech (Reindl, 2008: 19). National sovereignty claims against the Habsburgs overwhelmingly took the form of autonomy within the Austrian imperial structure, rather than secessionism (Žagar, 1994: 246) – no doubt this was informed by concurrent rhetoric like Cankar's, and in response to the increasing militarization of Serbian national claims to the south. Slovene exceptionalists of both the nationalist and liberal camps emphasized these ties and diminished their connections to Yugoslavia, except when Yugoslavia looked better than the rest of Eastern Europe: Patterson (2000: 419) describes this contrast as a "powerful rhetorical weapon," and it was wielded again and again.

Finland too largely disowned its Eastern connection. Alapuro (2004: 86) notes the uncommon combination of the "Eastern-type political dependence of a national minority… with a Western-type society and a separate administrative frame" within the Russian Empire. Support for the Russian monarchy was high among Finnish elites, even during the nationalization process. However, the nature of Finnish separation from the Russian Empire, which came during the greater civil war that played out there in 1918, fomented a quick change. The victory of the White Guards, composed mostly of traditionally conservative elites, over the social democratic Red Guards had a profound influence on Finnish discourse going forward. Subsequent interpretation by the victors told the story of the "struggle for the liberation of Finland from Russian imperialism…. The war became a struggle for the survival of the nation" (Alapuro, 2004: 89). The war weakened a previously strong social democratic movement and led to the recurring image of Russians, and more broadly Communists, as both an exogenous and endogenous threat. Depicting Russians as "evil, treacherous and sexually perverse" (Browning and Lehti, 2007: 700) dominated discourse until the Cold War, when geopolitics dictated an informal reincorporation of Finland into the Soviet space.

Consequently, Finnish internal discourse has struggled to shake the influence of its vacillation in the first few decades of the state's existence. Under President Urho Kekkonen, Finland reinterpreted its wars with the Soviet Union as strategic and motivated on the Soviet side by rational insecurity (Browning, 2002: 51-52). A discourse formed around Finland's position outside the West's "aggressive" security structures and concordantly its own place as a bridge between West and East. Kekkonen, with his consolidation of foreign policy in the presidential post, damaged Finnish democracy (Browning and Lehti, 2007: 702) and inadvertently did more than anyone to encourage construction of the border state mentality in Finland in the post-Cold

War world. The consensus around his policies was later described as "symbiosis with… foreign masters" (Majander, 1999; cited in Browning, 2002: 48), who, now deposed, live in the "Wild East… just across the border" (Pihlaja, 1999; cited in Browning, 2002: 57).

Nousiainen (1967: 189; cited in Browning and Lehti, 2007: 704) noted Finland's reorientation into the Nordic world during the Cold War was a way for Finland to emphasize its "psychological bonds with the West" without jeopardizing its already precarious position on the border of the Soviet Union. Similarly, Mišo Jezernik described Slovenia as a "central European space characterized by a harmony of values" in an otherwise "completely alien cultural-historical environment" (Jezernik, 1989: 964; cited in Patterson, 2003: 118). Slovenia's desire to "fortify a conceptual border with the Balkans along [its] southern frontier" (Patterson, 2003: 137) emphasizes the Austrian connection across its northern frontier. And Finland, with its "real 'Western' self" (Browning and Lehti, 2007: 703) returning after the fall of the Soviet Union, renovated connections with Sweden. NATO, once a four-letter word in Finland of the destabilizing threat it represented, transformed in Finnish eyes to a Western "civilizational project" (Browning, 2002: 37) with which Finland should naturally cooperate; Finland has not acceded to NATO membership, but is a close partner in the Partnership for Peace. Placing oneself on this border, but simultaneously firmly in the West, became paramount by the 1990s in both cases.

But if the cultural-spatial location was endogenously crystallized, it was more dubiously fluid exogenously. Slovenia's insistence that it was an island of the West in the socialist East, while increasingly common in the European press as Serbian and Croatian rhetoric darkened, did not always resonate with its neighbors. The Italian press in particular attacked Slovene claims of Westernness: "Intending to become another Austria… it will be reduced instead to [its] mere

satellite… Instead of being welcomed by Europe, Slovenia remains excluded from it" (Casucci, 1993; cited in Patterson, 2003: 133). Worse in Slovene eyes, many observers were unwilling to differentiate Slovenia from Serbia. Slovenia was grouped "casually with the remainder of the Balkans" (Patterson, 2003: 137), which encouraged a redoubling of Slovene national distance from the other Yugoslav republics.

Finland came to be seen through the latter years of the Kekkonen presidency as a stooge for the Soviets. "'Subservience to the Soviet Union and a tendency to anticipate and comply with Soviet wishes even before they are formulated," in Singleton's (1978: 325; cited in Browning, 2002: 52) view, marked a form of kowtowing that earned its own name – Finlandization. The later rush to reengage with the West, especially with regards to the EU accession in 1995, is seen externally as a way to center Finland safely in Europe and away from the negative Other in the unstable Russia. Ingebritsen and Larson (1997: 217) cite a 1993 survey that indicated that while European identity was weak in the country, a significant number of poll respondents saw "Finland as a part of Europe" to be of steadily increasing importance in the future. Broad support in the EU for Finland's "Northern Dimension" project, begun in 1997 to bring "European" values to Russia and thereby foment stability, indicates European acceptance of Finland's move "home" to the West is largely predicated on fear or at least mistrust of its old neighbors. And Finland's positioning of itself on the border once within the EU (and therefore in a very different cultural context), particularly as an interlocutor between the West and East, is the product of that widely perceived mirror image polarity. As Browning (2002: 64) puts it, "Finland is all Russia is not."

4. National construction and policy implications

Having established the border state narrative in these two cases, we can focus on the specifics of their national construction policies. It is important to note that a specific precedent of past nationalizing states that had similar minority characteristics has been set. Brubaker (1995: 84-106) describes interwar Poland as making the same distinctions between autochthonous and allochthonous ethnic communities: Ukrainians and Belarusians in the former camp, Germans and Jews in the latter. In this sense, autochthonous became code for "assimilable", and Belarusians and Ukrainians were the target of concentrated attempts to erase and/or subsume their ethnic identities under a greater Polish umbrella. Germans and Jews were dissimilable, on the other hand: the cultural distance between the core and these groups was considered too great for assimilation and exclusionary tactics, including incentivizing group exit, were widely practiced (p. 90). Poland's track to nationality was mirrored to a greater or lesser degree in the other new post-Versailles states of Central Europe, but today such policies would be met with widespread disapproval, sanctions, and diplomatic censure.

National development of this kind is predicated on an ethnolinguistic interpretation of belonging. This conception of the nation found far more purchase at the end of empires – both after the First World War and the Cold War – than inclusive conceptions that glorified values common to all peoples in a territory. Self-determination along national lines was resurrected, notably in the Baltic and Yugoslav states. Beissinger (2009: 336) has noted the importance of nationalism as a political tool, especially with its ability to mobilize across otherwise salient divisions like political beliefs. Exclusivity, while a potent motivator, is not conducive to producing egalitarian minority policies, and this is apparent from a critical reading of Slovene and Finnish histories.

11

As an aside, both states have legal protection in place for the ethnic Roma community, and Finland has protected the autochthonous Sami population since the 1960s, reversing a previous policy of assimilation. The European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities offers these communities a high level of protection on paper; whether the same in true is practice is a matter for debate (European Roma Rights Centre; Saukkonen and Pyykkönen, 2008). Analysis of the treatment of Sami and Roma populations is beyond the scope of this paper, however; cultural attitudes of social exclusion of the Roma in particular are unfortunately widespread and do not appear to inform minority policies of border states any more than Western states previously discussed.

4.1   Slovenia

Slovenia led the calls for reform in the last years of Yugoslavia's existence. Slovene contributions to the design of the Yugoslav state in the post-war era, especially the unique system of worker self-management, helped set it apart from the rest of the Communist world. The 1974 constitution created a loose federal arrangement, on paper much like the Soviet system but in practice much more liberal, that allocated responsibility for management of internal affairs to the constituent republics. Slovenia accorded a level of press freedom higher than the other republics, and as a result Slovenia became the most vocal critic of state coercion, as Patterson (2000: 415) notes. This liberalization and tolerance was the high flagpole upon which Slovenia hung its claims to Westernness, particularly as the Communist collapse surrounded Yugoslavia and beat it to the punch, leaving Yugoslavia (and especially Slovenia's) dignified cultural-spatial location in "meaningless obsolescence" (Patterson 2000: 432).

One of the most concrete expressions of that liberalism was protection for non-Slovenes who became members of the autochthonous communities after the breakup of the Austro-

Hungarian Empire. Klemenčič and Zupančič (2004: 871) note that as far back as 1963 the Slovene Constitution guaranteed equality for Hungarians and Italians, including "equality of their languages in ethnically mixed territories" and in the areas of education and the media. This protection was deepened by the aforementioned 1974 Constitution by establishing special organizations and proclaiming the right granted to community members to raise their children in their own languages (Klemenčič and Zupančič, 2004: 872). While some protection was granted to minorities in every republic, Slovenia emphasized it, possibly because of the concurrent tension between two members of Tito's inner circle, Serb Aleksandar Ranković and Slovene Edvard Kardelj, over the direction the country should move. Kardelj feared the formation of a single Yugoslav nation – favored by Ranković – since demographically it would mostly constitute Serbo-Croatian speakers (Velikonja, 2003: 94).

International obligations influenced these statutes, particularly the Treaty of Osimo that formalized the border between Yugoslavia and Italy in 1975 (Komac, 1999: 13). Endogenously, Klemenčič (1987: 58; cited in Klemenčič and Zupančič, 2004: 872) cites the "bridging" role that Hungarians and especially Italians played in maintaining Slovene connections with the West. It is interesting to note that in many ways, Slovenia even under Yugoslav rule afforded a higher protection of Italian and Hungarian communal and individual rights than ethnic Slovenes received in Italy (Ifimes, 18 June 2009). A number of authors (Klemenčič and Zupančič, 2004; Komac, 2001; Žagar, 1994) have argued that Slovene promotion of minority rights was a way to secure better treatment of its nationals outside Slovenian jurisdiction, and no doubt that concern motivated these articles as well. However, critical appraisal of the broader context of Slovene political thought surrounding independence indicates a selective retention of this Western-oriented minority policy as a manifestation of the border state mentality.

Velikonja (2003: 95) quotes graffiti in Ljubljana spotted in the late 1980s that reads: "Burek? Nein Danke!" Burek, one of the culinary legacies of Ottoman rule over the region, is in this case a puff-pastry fetish representing the rest of Yugoslavia to Slovenia's south. Ploštajner and Vahtar (1995: 307) note the major stereotype common in Slovene discourse in that period: "Immigrants from other Yugoslav republics… were often seen as lazy, dirty and primitive." While it is important to note that this was not the only view expressed – the alternative journal *Mladina*, for instance, retained a strong "civilizing mission" tone throughout the 1980s – it was a common enough view of other Yugoslavs. The journal *Nova revija*, *Mladina*'s major sales rival at the time, was notable for publicizing this view, albeit in kinder words. In *Nova revija*, Tomašić (January-February 1990: 188-94; cited in Patterson, 2003: 118) described Serbs as "herdsmen-warriors" who "inherited the Ottomans' dynastic despotism… and corruption." One year after independence, 63.7 percent of Slovenes polled mistrusted non-Slovenes in their country (Ploštajner and Vahtar, 1995: 309). With sentiments like this taking an increasingly central role in Slovene public discourse, it is no wonder why.

The difference in treatment of autochthonous and allochthonous minorities since Slovene independence starts with that dichotomy. While Klemenčič and Zupančič (2004: 872) argue that one of the principles of minority protection that guided Slovenia's legal development was the longevity of Italian and Hungarian settlement in the country, this ignores the catalyst that crystallized their minority communal status in the first place – border change. Komac (2001: 269-270) notes the overnight reduction of Hungarians and Germans in post-Versailles Slovenia to minority status, and asserts that a high level of minority protection was promoted as a means of mitigating their frustrations over this drastic change. However, Hungarians were never a majority in the region that became Slovenia, much like the ex-Yugoslav peoples after 1992. The

threat of ethnic conflict in the developmental years of the Slovene legal system as a part of the post-Versailles kingdom was less severe than the actual ethnic conflict that flared to the south in the 1990s. The longevity of Italian and Hungarian residence in Slovenia, while longer than ex-Yugoslav minority presence in the state, is essentially irrelevant to their status as autochthonous, as in this case the term applies to minorities present at the creation of the state – which describes the status of ex-Yugoslavs in Slovenia in 1991.

Most Yugoslavs came to Slovenia initially for work; there was both a high rate of labor mobility and an uneven regional distribution of wealth in Yugoslavia. As the industrial capital of the state, Slovene factories attracted mostly unskilled labor. Italian and Hungarians, although highly centralized in resource extraction industries like mining and fishing, are underrepresented in these industrial "primary" jobs: employment statistics drawn from the most recent census in 2002, cited by Komac (1999: 24, 34), demonstrate a high level of success correlating with positive discriminatory education practices. Italians as a group are more successful than Hungarians, owing to the legacy of the more open border between Italy and then-Yugoslavia. State funding has made much of this possible, with Italian and Hungarian communities receiving over 11 times the funding that the entire ex-Yugoslav population received in 2000 (Žitnik, 2004: 227); as a rate stat, this comes to one euro per average Croat, Serb, or Bosnian to €500 per Hungarian or Italian.

The protections today offered these communities are among the best and most comprehensive in Europe. Hungarians and Italians, by virtue of Article 80 of the 1991 Constitution, are each guaranteed representation in the National Assembly (*Državni zbor*) by a member of their respective communities. Each representative has veto power over any legislative decision that affects the community, and is chosen through a non-proportional electoral method

known as the Borda count. Toplak (2006: 826-827) notes the important role these representatives have played in forming broader parliamentary coalitions; the seats have been occupied since 1992 by Italian Roberto Battelli and Hungarian László Göncz, both of whom lean to the left, which has been a crucial advantage to left-leaning parties entering parliament. In addition, members of the communities retain another vote for general representation, for a unique dual voting right with no obvious analogue elsewhere. This dual voting right is extended to electoral participation in local councils, as well. Despite this, in 1994 a majority of Italians polled believed that they had no influence on political life, and that they had no power to shape their community's fate (Komac, 2001: 277). It is likely that the timing of this poll influenced these respondents' fears, coming as it did at the birth of a new state whose constitution also proclaimed the "permanent and inalienable right of the Slovene nation to self-determination" (Article 3, Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia). As Komac (n.d.) notes, the 1991 Constitution effectively demoted the communities from "constitutive elements of the Slovene nation" to their highly protected but insular community status – using the communities more as a political talisman of Westernness than integrating them. Hayden (1992: 659) describes the construction of a three-part hierarchy: Slovenes; Italians and Hungarians; and everyone else. It is possible that, were a similar poll conducted today, Italian and Hungarian fears of "gentle" assimilation would be somewhat mitigated.

At the same time, polls were conducted questioning Slovenes on a broad range of topics concerning allochthonous minorities. Between 1990 and 1994, the percentage of respondents holding a "negative" or "very negative" view of ex-Yugoslav communities in Slovenia grew from 29.7 percent to 52.8 percent (Komac, 2001: 290). With a weak economic climate following a major loss of markets to instability and war, much of this negativity was focused on

16

employment. More people agreed than disagreed with the statement that immigrants took jobs from ethnic Slovenes (45.9 percent to 19.5 percent), and almost 50 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement "Immigrants are generally useful to the Slovene economy" (Komac, 2001: 291). The lack of a survey replication since accession to the EU makes it difficult to comment on current opinions of these communities. However, as Sniderman et al. (2004: 41) argue, concerns about the economic threat posed by out-groups are more likely to be mitigated as standard of living increases, so we can plausibly infer that the economic threat of the ex-Yugoslav presence may have lessened somewhat in the 16 years since this poll was published.

Sniderman et al. also argue that cultural threats are more difficult to mitigate than economic fears, and in this sense their prediction appears to be borne out. The use of the pejorative "čefur" to describe ex-Yugoslavs – both immigrants and longtime residents – is now mostly gone from the public sphere, but as self-proclaimed "čefur" and Slovenian author Goran Vojnović writes, "…If you don't use the language of the feral streets and, instead of the word "čefur", use the pretty Slovene literary term "newcomer" (*prišlek*), suddenly the doors to the Slovene media are wide-open to you"[6] (Vojnović, 12 May 2008). An exclusionary attitude toward this group, the majority of whose members was in residence at independence and employed for years before (Žitnik, 2004: 234-235), should be expected to endure in some capacity even as quality of life in Slovenia increases – this despite seven decades of parallel community development and a long history of community intermixing.

The super-enfranchisement of the constitutional ethnic communities and the contrasting communal disenfranchisement of the ex-Yugoslavs is most apparent in language laws. Legally, Italians and Hungarians have the right to use their national languages in every aspect of life in the defined "ethnically mixed areas" (EMA), from economic enterprise to the courts (Komac,

---

[6] Author's translation.

1999: 43). Furthermore, non-members of the ethnic communities who learn and use the official languages of the EMAs are entitled to bonus pay (Komac, 1999: 44). By contrast, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian/Montenegrin (BCSM), the *lingua franca* of Yugoslavia that is still widely remembered among the adult population, is afforded no protection and there is no official financial incentive to learn or use it. Slovene and BCSM are similar but not mutually intelligible, and as Žitnik (2004: 232) argues, the post-independence opportunity structure has made it difficult for ex-Yugoslavs to satisfactorily learn Slovene. This is the single most salient characteristic dividing Slovenes from the statistically average ex-Yugoslav.

That such an objectively low barrier to entry is so difficult to surmount indicates the nationalism of minor difference at work. On paper there is a rather narrow cultural distance between Slovenes and ex-Yugoslavs, with a common recent history and similar language, culture, and values. Bosnian Muslims and Slovenes are more distant than Croats and Slovenes, of course, but their differences are not analogous to the above-cited Moroccan immigrant and Dutch person. Slovene identity, the construction of which is predicated on the border state mentality, thus requires reification of relatively minor cultural boundaries to protect itself. Adida (forthcoming, 2011) finds a similar practice in Nigeria and Ghana, where culturally similar minority groups face exclusion by majority groups who seek to protect their position. The high level of ethnic community protection afforded to Italians and Hungarians, a carryover from local demographics in the 1920s, was not extended to ex-Yugoslavs who found themselves in a similar position in the 1990s. The cultural reasoning for this can be found in the attitudes of those who designed the Slovene constitution, who wrote in *Nova revija* and formed the DEMOS coalition that came to power in the first free elections in 1990. Ironically, these politicians who predicated their desire for secessionism on the Westernness of the Slovene people and the consequent

unnaturalness of their association with Yugoslavia were themselves chided for being insufficiently Western. Kovač (1990; cited by Patterson, 2000: 450-451) decried this ethnic nationalism as no better than that of Milošević in Serbia or Tuđman in Croatia – the implication being that Slovenes should hold themselves to a higher standard.

4.2   Finland

As a function of temporal distance from their analogous situation, Finland does not have a large ethnic minority community other than the Swedish population that was present at independence. McRae (1988: 94) quotes Allardt as describing this group as "a minority both at the center and at the periphery." While a more-or-less ethnic form of nationalism known as the Fennoman movement eventually won out, Saukkonen and Pyykkönen (2008: 52) note the inclusiveness of Finnish nation-building, with constitutional protection for Swedish speakers since independence. Like Italians and Hungarians in Slovenia, Swedes tend to occupy the margins of the country, with especially high concentrations along the Bothnian and Baltic coasts and in the Åland Islands, a small group of monoethnically-Swedish-inhabited islands.

The Ålands represent a unique case of ethnically derived autonomy. The status of the islands, disputed between Sweden and Finland after Finnish independence, was settled by the League of Nations in 1921. Subsequent Autonomy Acts have offered almost total legislative, linguistic, and cultural independence to the islands, including *de facto* veto power over treaties that affect the Ålands (in practice nearly any treaty with Finland could fall into this category) (Silverström, 2008: 264). Those with right to domicile in the Ålands may enter bilingual educational institutions without any knowledge of Finnish whatsoever (Section 41, 1991 Act on the Autonomy of Åland). As a case of minority rights, the Ålands are not analogous to the EMAs

in Slovenia, as their situation is a unique asymmetric federal devolution of power; however, they demonstrate the positive and inclusionary nature toward the Swedish minority.

Swedes outside the Ålands are also granted a high level of protection. Section 17 of the Finnish Constitution offers equal provision "for the cultural and societal needs of the Finnish- and Swedish-speaking populations". This was partially influenced by the development of two dynamic camps in the Swedish speaking population: *bygdsvenskhet*, who argued for cultural autonomy and the "distinct ethnicity" of Swedes in Finland, and *kultursvenskhet*, who argued that the institutions developed in Finland over hundreds of years of Swedish rule were a common inheritance (McRae, 1988: 96). Swedes have always been close to power, despite their small demographic share, and much of this is owed to the predominance of *kultursvensket*. The Swedish People's Party (*Svenska folkpartiet,* SFP) produced a number of prime ministers during Kekkonen's presidency and has had a stake in most coalition governments since the Continuation War; because the SFP has as its primary task the promotion of Swedish-speaking Finns, it has a broad liberal platform and a polity that encompasses most ideological positions, which has given it the flexibility to fit into coalitions. The state funds Swedish language media, education through the tertiary level, and guarantees access to public resources and administration in both languages. In addition, Swedish is a compulsory subject for all Finnish students – there is no real minority language policy in this regard, and it is rare to find the promotion of a minority language at this level anywhere else in Europe; however, according to the 2005 Eurobarometer "Europeans and Languages" poll, only 38 percent of Finns can carry on a conversation in Swedish. McRae (1988: 97) hypothesizes that this legalistic minority protection has contributed to the endurance of a "collective inferiority complex among many Finnish speakers," but at any

rate there seems to be little difference between Swedish language and cultural policy as written and in action.

Saukkonen and Pyykkönen (2008: 53) argue that this history of simultaneous Swedish integration and protection has set a precedent for state and societal conduct with new minorities. Indeed, in the SFP's "Kasnäs manifesto" (10 October 2009), a party policy document, they assert: "Bilingualism is a national success story that has to be combined with respect for new native languages." As Finland had almost no immigration apart from those Ingrians and Karelians who escaped from the Soviet Union – and who spoke languages similar to Finnish – there was no actual policy expression formulated until the 1980s, and it was not as egalitarian as would be expected from this sentiment. The Aliens' Act, enacted in 1984 to preempt the threat of asylum seekers, had its basis in a 1939 statute (Saukkonen, 1995: 109). Given the anti-Russian climate at that time, it is likely that there was some residual sentiment motivating the new act. At the time, more than 50 percent of Finns did not believe Russian immigrants would be a good fix for the country's shrinking labor pool (Saukkonen, 1995: 114). Attitudes toward Russians specifically hardened as the country "de-Finlandized" and moved West in its self-appraisal.

As Kestilä (2006: 181) notes, the 2002-2003 European Social Survey data shows Finnish attitudes toward "refugees" are significantly more welcoming than toward labor migrants. The term is undefined by the study, but it can be inferred that a plurality of asylum seekers come from conflict zones such as Iraq and Somalia (AFP, 22 July 2009). In fact, Finland has a better overall opinion of its refugee policy than Norway, Sweden, or Denmark, who nevertheless all report net positive attitudes toward refugees (ESS 2002-2003). This is in line with broader Nordic (and European) attitudes that these states have a social responsibility to help asylum seekers. However, Finland is significantly more anti-immigrant than other Nordic states, and

falls closer in line to Austria and France, which both have notable anti-immigrant political parties. In addition, Statistics Finland (2005; cited by Saukkonen and Pyykkönen, 2008: 54) indicates that the largest subset of labor seekers is ethnically Russian (26 percent of the total foreign-born population in 2004), and by virtue of the fact that the next-largest group is Estonian and therefore almost an "invisible" minority (thanks to their immediate competence with Finnish), it is likely that Russians have become the implicit archetype of immigrant in the Finnish mind. Russians are not as visible as asylum seeking groups like Somalis or Iraqis; it follows that most Finns would mentally segregate the two groups into refugees and labor seekers.

Connecting dislike of immigrants to dislike of Russians is not a major stretch: Jaakola (2005; cited in Mannila and Reuter, 2009: 940) found that Russians were not in the top 10 of the 20 most popular ethnic groups in Finland, despite their long history of affiliation with one another. Russians are the victims of ethnic discrimination in daily life at a rate (16 percent) twice that of Estonians (Mannila and Reuter, 2009: 948). More than one quarter of Russians report that they have a poor understanding of Finnish. Mannila and Reuter's study (2009: 951) also found that length of stay in Finland was not a mitigating factor in accumulation of risk factors for social exclusion.[7] In other words, the cultural threat of the Russian minority population as expressed by Finnish societal exclusion does not decrease over time, as Sniderman et al. (2004: 41) predict. Strangely, Estonians have integrated into Finnish society better than their ethnically Finnish counterparts. Estonian immigrants tended to integrate (defined as no accumulation of social exclusion risks) at a higher rate (71 percent to 53 percent) than ethnic Finns. This illustrates a serious difference between the Finnish and Slovene cases: given a similar set of stimuli –

---

[7] Defined as poverty risk (whether income was enough to meet household needs), ill-health (self-assessment of health), and unemployment risk (labor market exclusion: unemployment for at least 12 of the past 24 months prior to survey).

minorities that are culturally and linguistically similar to the host nation – Finns assimilate Estonians and Slovenes exclude ex-Yugoslavs.

The discrepancy between types of immigrants and attitudes points at a talismanic use of ethnic minorities in Finland. While it is difficult to establish why ethnic Finns have more limited life chances upon return to Finland, Mannila and Reuter (2009: 953) find the fact to be evidence that "immigration policy based on attracting 'returning' immigrants [does not] reduce immigrants' social exclusion risks." While Kestilä (2004: 187) finds Finns to be less tolerant than other Nordic states – "they do not welcome immigrants and especially fear the cultural and economic consequences of immigration" – she also demonstrates that this exempts attitudes toward refugees, and Mannila and Reuter show that non-Finnish immigrants can integrate to a higher degree than even Finnish immigrants. Marginalization of Russians should thus be seen as a continuation of Finnish identity formation along the border state mentality. Despite assertions to the contrary, McRae (1988: 100) argues that Finland is not a bicommunal state: the harmonious example set by Swedish-speaking Finns is a product of their constitutive role in constructing a Finnish nation, and actively orientate Finland toward the West. Consequently, while Finland has the advantage of successful management of a bilingual society and a strong desire to center itself in the West, it requires a reference point to guarantee that location, which it finds in Russia and Russian culture.

Perhaps the best illustration of this is with regard to the small Old Russian community. According to the UN High Commissioner of Refugees (Minority Rights Group International, 2007), the Old Russians, numbering some 5,000, are descended from the imperial civil servant class that resided in the old Grand Duchy of Finland, as well as Russians fleeing the 1917 Revolution. The Finnish government, per its treaty obligations to accede to the EU, offers some

cultural and linguistic protection to this group. However, the government also distinguishes between Old Russians and the post-1991 "New Russians", which it claims it is under no obligation to protect. The differential between these groups, following Kymlicka's (1995; cited in Saukkonen and Pyykkönen, 2008: 60) logic, is sound: "voluntary migrants" do not qualify for the same rights as "traditional minorities". This argument is mirrored in Slovene discourse, as well, but is faulty in both cases. Old Russians, by virtue of their endurance in Finnish society, are uniquely placed to aid integration of "New" Russians. Dividing the groups, with strong cultural and linguistic links between them, runs counter to the goal of including Russians – who, it bears repeating, played an important role in the cultural construction of the Finnish national identity.

5.   Conclusion

As the analysis above demonstrates, narratives associated with being on the cultural border between East and West are not only present in Slovenia and Finland, they have played a definitive role in shaping these states' attitudes toward Europe and the Other. Of course, all cultures to a greater or lesser degree justify their existence through the Other; the Irish are not English, Canadians are not American, and so on. However, the uniqueness of the border state lies in its aggrandizement of "Europe" and its exclusion of "non-Europe". Ingebritsen and Larson (1997: 217-218; cited in Browning, 2002: 55) describe the conflation of a "no" vote on Finnish EU accession in 1995 with being doomed to remain in isolation on the periphery of Europe. In 2002, Slovene President Milan Kučan echoed Finnish sentiment when described Slovenia's 2004 accession to NATO in terms of placing itself "in the stable part of Europe" and in an "area of common values", with South-eastern Europe clearly outside that domain.

This cultural location has important but differing effects on minority policy. Finland, when faced with a culturally and linguistically similar minority in Estonians, integrates them

24

very effectively; the group against which Finland builds it border mentality, Russian immigrants, remain excluded, and possible paths to their inclusion are blocked. Despite a long history of Russian and Finnish interethnic dialogue and similar cultural traits, the very different language presents a fairly high barrier to entry, but Finnish cultural attitudes play a major role as well. In this regard, Sniderman et al.'s study has some generalizability to the Finnish case, as it would predict attitudes toward Russian cultural threat to be significant. This study serves the purpose of illuminating how Finnish national discourse informs those attitudes.

However, the exclusion of ex-Yugoslavs from the Slovene nation is a distinct departure from that expectation. With a similar language and culture and shared recent history, ex-Yugoslavs could easily integrate into a more civic imagination of the Slovene nation. However, Slovene chauvinism and desire to "return" Slovenia to Europe necessitated exclusion of Eastern minorities – the nationalism of minor difference in practice. Interestingly, Slovenia's political structure is modeled on Nordic corporatist norms – indeed, the upper house of Parliament, the National Council (*Državni svet*) is a corporatist body that includes representatives of business, labor, education, culture, and local interests, among others. The National Council advises the National Assembly on laws, and should ensure a plurality of views is considered when making policy. Lukšic (1994: 208) describes it as an embodiment of "distrust of the party system and politics". Nevertheless, the Council does not explicitly incorporate minority members, and Ribičič (1999: 236) has noted its efforts to render unconstitutional the use of symbols of neighboring countries by ethnic minorities, including the constitutionally protected communities, running counter to Katzenstein's (1985: 155) assertion that a corporatist model necessarily protects minority groups.

Correcting these discriminatory attitudes will take a rethinking of the nation-state. As Žagar and Novak (1999: 184) note, nation-states are loath to recognize the fact that ethnic pluralism exists within their borders. Finland, long described as a bicultural society, is coming to terms with the fact that it is now multicultural (Mannila and Reuter, 2009: 952; Saukkonen and Pyykkönen, 2008: 60-61). The policies of Swedish inclusion and Russian exclusion, while not quite two sides of the same coin, represent a selective acceptance and denial of Western values. Working to include Russia and Russian culture in a more comprehensive and egalitarian conception of Western identity would gradually encourage positive re-incorporation of Russia into Finland's national narrative. Likewise, Croatia's accession to NATO – and the cultural significance that now carries – and subsequent entry by the rest of the former Yugoslavia may encourage Slovenia's slow recognition that it does not need to exclude them to locate itself in the West, and that "sentries" like those quoted at the beginning of the paper may stand down from their positions on the border.

6.   Bibliography

Adida, Claire. (2011, forthcoming). Too Close for Comfort? Immigrant Exclusion in Africa. *Comparative Political Studies*, 44 (10).

Agence France Presse. *Asylum seeker numbers up sharply in Finland.* Retrieved 3/16/2010, from http://www.swedishwire.com/nordic/571-asylum-seeker-numbers-up-sharply-in-finland.

Bakić-Hayden, M., & Hayden, R. M. (1992). Orientalist Variations on the Theme "Balkans": Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics. *Slavic Review*, 51 (1), 1-15.

Beissinger, M. R. (2009). Nationalism and the Collapse of Soviet Communism. *Contemporary European History, 18*, 331-348.

Bergholm, T. (2009). The Making of the Finnish Model. *Scandinavian Journal of History*, 34 (1), 29-48.

Bibič, A. (1994). In Search of Political Pluralism: The Case of Slovenia. In Bučar, B., & Kuhnle, S. (Eds.), *Small States Compared : Politics of Norway and Slovenia*. Bergen, Norway: Alma Mater, 161-182.

Blitz, B. K. (2006). Statelessness and the Social (De)Construction of Citizenship: Political Restructuring and Ethnic Discrimination in Slovenia. *Journal of Human Rights, 5* (4), 453-479.

Brewer, M. B. (2001). Ingroup Identification and Intergroup Conflict: When Does Ingroup Love Become Outgroup Hate? *Rutgers Series on Self and Social Identity.* 3, 17-41

Brinar, I. & Kuhnle, S. (1994). Perspectives on European Integration in Smaller Democracies: Norway and Slovenia Compared. In Bučar, B., & Kuhnle, S. (Eds.), *Small States Compared : Politics of Norway and Slovenia*. Bergen, Norway: Alma Mater, 1-28.

Browning, C. S. (2002). Coming Home or Moving Home?: 'Westernizing' Narratives in Finnish Foreign Policy and the Reinterpretation of Past Identities. *Cooperation and Conflict, 37* (1), 47-72.

Browning, C., & Lehti, M. (2007). Beyond East-West: Marginality and National Dignity in Finnish Identity Construction. *Nationalities Papers*, 35 (4), 691-716.

Constitution of the Republic of Finland.

European Roma Rights Centre. Retrieved 3/17/2010, from http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=1109.

Finnish Government. (1991). Act on the Autonomy of Åland.

Forestiere, C. (2008). New Institutionalism and Minority Protection in the National Legislatures of Finland and Denmark. *Scandinavian Political Studies, 31* (4), 448-468.

Gradstein, M., & Schiff, M. (2006). The Political Economy of Social Exclusion, with Implications for Immigration Policy. *Journal of Population Economics.* 19 (2), 327-344.

Hayden, R. M. (1992). Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics. *Slavic Review, 51* (4), 654-673.

Ingebritsen, C., & Larson, S. (1997). Interest and Identity: Finland, Norway and European Union. *Cooperation and Conflict., 32*(2), 207.

Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja. http://www.inv.si/domov.aspx?lang=slo

Katzenstein, Peter. (1985). *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe.* Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kestilä, E. (2006). Is There Demand for Radical Right Populism in the Finnish Electorate? *Scandinavian Political Studies, 29* (3), 169-191.

Kitschelt, H., & McGann, A. J. (1995). *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Klemencic, V. (1987). Državna meja na območju SR Slovenije in obmejna območja kot nov geografski fenomen. *Razprave in Gradivo,* , 57-79.

Klopčič, V. (1999). Implementation of the Framework Convention of the Council of Europe for the Protection of Minorities in the Republic of Slovenia. In Žagar, M., Jesih, B., Bešter, R. (Eds.), *The Constitutional and Political Regulation of Ethnic Relations and Conflicts*. Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja: Ljubljana, 289-298.

Komac, M. (n.d.). *MERCATOR :: Dossier 7: Protection of Ethnic Communities in the Republic of Slovenia.* Retrieved 3/16/2010 from http://www.ciemen.org/mercator/butlletins/46-10.htm.

Komac, M. (1999). *Protection of ethnic communities in the Republic of Slovenia : Vademecum*. Ljubljana: Institute for Ethnic Studies.

Komac, M. (2001). Forming a New Nation-State and the Repression or Protection of Ethnic Minorities: The Case of Slovenia. In Nagel, S. S., & Robb, A. (Eds.). *Handbook of Global Social Policy*. New York: Marcel Dekker, 267-296.

Kučan, M. (2002). *Address on Slovenia's NATO Integration.* Retrieved 3/17/2010 from http://nato.gov.si/eng/topic/public-opinions/speeches/kucan/.

Kunič, J. (2009). Contribution to the Discussion on Slovenia's Foreign Policy. Retrieved 3/12/2010 from http://www.ifimes.org/default.cfm?Jezik=En&Kat=10&ID=470&Find=carinthia&M=6&Y=2009.

Kymlicka, W. (2001). Immigrant Integration and Minority Nationalism. In Keating, M. & McGarry, J (Eds.), *Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. 61-83.

Lukšič, I. (1994). Corporatism in the Political System of the Republic of Slovenia. In Bučar, B., & Kuhnle, S. (Eds.), *Small States Compared : Politics of Norway and Slovenia*. Bergen, Norway: Alma Mater, 201-215.

MacTaggart, J. (2007). Erasure from the permanent registry : Slovenia's stateless population. Thesis (M.A.I.S), University of Washington.

Niemi, H. (2007). Russian Immigrants in Finnish Society. Retrieved 3/17/2010 from http://www.socmag.net/?p=270.

Ortino, S., Žagar, M., & Mastny, V. (2005). *The Changing Faces of Federalism : Institutional reconfiguration in Europe from East to West*. Manchester, UK; New York; New York: Manchester University Press.

Patterson, P. H. (2000). The East is Read: The End of Communism, Slovenian Exceptionalism, and the Independent Journalism of *Mladina*. *East European Politics and Societies,* 14 (2), 411-459.

Patterson, P. H. (2003). On the Edge of Reason: The Boundaries of Balkanism in Slovenian, Austrian, and Italian Discourse. *Slavic Review*. 62 (1), 110-141.

Pitkänen, P. & Kouki, S. (2002). Meeting Foreign Cultures: A survey of the attitudes of Finnish authorities towards immigrants and immigration. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* 28 (1), 103-118.

Ploštajner, Z. & Vahtar, M. (1995). Afterpains of Secession: "Nonslovenes" Out!? In Baumgartl, B., & Favell, A. (Eds.), *New Xenophobia in Europe*. London; The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 306-319.

Razpotnik, B. (2007). Struktura in položaj etničnih manjšin na Finskem. Thesis (Ph.D.), Univerza v Ljubljani.

Reindl, D. F. (2008). *Language Contact: German and Slovenian*. Bochum: Universitätsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer.

Ribičič, C. (1999). Constitutional and Legal Status of Italian and Hungarian Ethnic Communities in the Republic of Slovenia. In Žagar, M., Jesih, B., Bešter, R. (Eds.), *The Constitutional and Political Regulation of Ethnic Relations and Conflicts*. Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja: Ljubljana, 225-238.

Rizman, R. (1995). Nacionalna država, nacionalne manjšine in združena Evropa. In Štrajn, D. (Ed.), *Meje Demokracije: Refleksije prehoda v demokracijo.* Ljubljana: Liberalna akademija. 111-132.

Saukkonen, P. (1995). The Fortress Syndrome. In Baumgartl, B., & Favell, A. (Eds.), *New Xenophobia in Europe*. London; The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 106-117.

SFP - Kasnäs in English. Retrieved 3/16/2010 from http://sfp.fi/start/kasnas/kaslish/.

Silverström, S. (2008). The Competence of Autonomous Entities in the International Arena – With Special Reference to the Åland Islands in the European Union. *International Journal on Minority & Group Rights, 15* (2), 259-271.

Sniderman, P. M., Hagendoorn, L., & Prior, M. (2004). "Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities." *The American Political Science Review,* 98 (1), 35-49.

Šturm, L. (1999). The Slovenian Constitutional Court Review on Prevention of Ethnic (and Other) Discrimination. In Žagar, M., Jesih, B., Bešter, R. (Eds.), *The Constitutional and Political Regulation of Ethnic Relations and Conflicts*. Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja: Ljubljana, 239-246.

Todorova, M. (1998). *Imagining the Balkans*. Oxford University Press.

Toplak, J. (2006). The Parliamentary Election in Slovenia, October 2004. *Electoral Studies, 25* (4), 825-831.

United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees. (2007). World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Finland. Retrieved 3/16/2010 from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,MRGI,,FIN,4562d8b62,4954cdffc,0.html.

Ustava Republike Slovenije. [Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia.]

Velikonja, M. (2003). Slovenia's Yugoslav Century. In Djokic, D. (ed.), *Yugoslavism : Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992*. London: Hurst.

Vojnović, G. (2008.) O čem govorimo, ko govorimo o estetiki? (What are we talking about when we talk about aesthetics?) *Dnevnik,* 5 December 2008. Retrieved 3/17/2010 from http://www.dnevnik.si/debate/kolumne/1042227366.

Zorn, J. (2005). Ethnic Citizenship in the Slovenian State. *Citizenship Studies,* 9 (2), 135-152.

Zupančič, J. (2004). Ethnic Structure of Slovenia and Slovenes in Neighbouring Countries. *Slovenia: a geographical overview. Association of the Geographic Societies of Slovenia.* http://www.zrc-sazu.si/ZGDS/glasgow/16.pdf.

Žagar, M. (1994). National Sovereignty at the End of the Twentieth Century: Relativisation of Traditional Concepts; The Case of Slovenia. In Bučar, B., & Kuhnle, S. (Eds.), *Small States Compared : Politics of Norway and Slovenia*. Bergen, Norway: Alma Mater, 235-252.

Žagar, M. (2001). Ethnic Relations, Nationalism and Minority Nationalism in South-Eastern Europe. In Keating, M. & McGarry, J (Eds.), *Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. 325-341.

Žagar, M., Komac, M., Medvešek, & M., Bešter, R. (2006). Evaluation of the Impact of Inclusion Policies under the Open Method of Coordination in the European Union: Assessing the Cultural Policies of Six Member States. Final Report: Slovenia. Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja: Ljubljana.

Žagar, M. & Novak, A. (1999). Constitutional and International Protection of National Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. In Žagar, M., Jesih, B., Bešter, R. (Eds.), *The Constitutional and Political Regulation of Ethnic Relations and Conflicts*. Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja: Ljubljana 177-214.

Žitnik, J. (2004). Immigrants in Slovenia: Integration Aspects. *Migracijske in etničke teme*, 20 (3), 221-241.