{"id":70,"date":"2014-04-22T19:31:12","date_gmt":"2014-04-22T19:31:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/arcticincontext.com\/?p=70"},"modified":"2021-07-12T02:38:36","modified_gmt":"2021-07-12T02:38:36","slug":"frosty-relations-militarizing-the-arctic","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/2014\/04\/22\/frosty-relations-militarizing-the-arctic\/","title":{"rendered":"Frosty Relations: Militarizing the Arctic"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><em>In its 68th issue published in November, <\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/monocle.com\/magazine\/issues\/68\/defence-briefing\/\">Monocle Magazine<\/a> <em>published an in-depth feature on Arctic defense. This <a href=\"https:\/\/worldpolicy.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/04\/68_a_briefing_defence.pdf\">article and the accompanying graphics<\/a> were re-printed with permission from <\/em>Monocle<em>. <\/em><\/p>\n<p class=\"rtecenter\" style=\"text-align: center\"><em>*****<\/em><\/p>\n<p><strong>Written by Trefor Moss<br \/>\nIllustrated by Tokuma<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The Arctic melt is uncovering more than just resources and trade routes \u2013 it is also opening up a whole new theatre of military operations.<\/p>\n<p>Of all the world\u2019s territorial disputes, the ones in the Arctic \u2013 and there are plenty \u2013 used to matter the least: the only prize at stake was frozen ocean, and most of the time it was too cold for military forces to operate there anyway. National boundaries were left to blur among the floes.<\/p>\n<p>Suddenly those vague Arctic territories matter. The region is increasingly ice-free and the open ocean means rich fishing, undersea mineral and energy resources and new sea lanes. The Arctic, in other words, has become a valuable commodity.<\/p>\n<p>Best placed to assert ownership are the \u201cArctic Five\u201d, littoral Arctic Ocean states with well-established territorial claims and regional bases. \u201cRussia and Norway are the two states most active and deliberate in raising their capacity for operating in the Arctic,\u201d says Ernie Regehr, senior fellow in Arctic security at the Simons Foundation \u2013 a Canadian think-tank. Canada, Regehr says, made some \u201cdramatic announcements regarding enhanced military capacity in the north\u201d, but these have since run up against financial realities, while the US has been too preoccupied elsewhere to devote much energy to revamping its Arctic presence.<\/p>\n<p>Russia is arguably doing the most: its North Sea Fleet is being restocked and is due to receive a new Mistral-class amphibious assault ship from France; six new $1.1bn (\u20ac816m) icebreakers, which, at 170 metres in length, will be the world\u2019s biggest; and later new aircraft carriers. The Norwegians, meanwhile, have procured a new fleet of five Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates, which, together with its six Ula-class submarines, have significantly boosted its naval clout.<\/p>\n<p>Yet it would be misleading to suggest that an Arctic arms race is underway. Bases are being upgraded, ice-breaking fleets expanded and modernised, and Arctic battalions retrained and uparmed. But the sheer remoteness of the Arctic makes conflict almost unthinkable, says Regehr.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cMilitary preparedness in the Arctic is really only meaningful if it enhances a capacity to contribute effectively to search and rescue, emergency response and support for public safety,\u201d he says, citing a \u201cuniversal insistence\u201d among the Arctic Five that any competition will remain amicable.<\/p>\n<p>New interest in the Arctic threatens to make it a crowded place, however.The Arctic Council \u2013 which already includes Finland, Iceland and Sweden in addition to the Five \u2013 voted in May to admit several new observer members, including China, India and Japan. Of these, China has taken the keenest interest: in 2012 its sole icebreaker, Xuelong, completed the first transarctic voyage by a Chinese vessel and a new $200m (\u20ac150m) icebreaker is due for delivery in 2014, with additional ships planned, as Beijing seeks to open up the High North as a conduit for Chinese trade.<\/p>\n<p>Regehr is optimistic that these new players can be peacefully accommodated. \u201cThe risks are not China or India specifically,\u201d he says. The concern is that more and more ships will be operating in waters which will remain dangerous even as they become navigable. \u201cHuman and commercial activity are in a sharply ascending arch; so too are the risks.\u201d \u2014 (M)<\/p>\n<p class=\"rtecenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-1077\" src=\"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/31\/2014\/04\/Screen-Shot-2014-04-22-at-1.10.29-PM_0.png\" alt=\"Frosty Relations: Militarizing the Arctic\" width=\"624\" height=\"600\" srcset=\"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/31\/2014\/04\/Screen-Shot-2014-04-22-at-1.10.29-PM_0.png 624w, https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/31\/2014\/04\/Screen-Shot-2014-04-22-at-1.10.29-PM_0-300x288.png 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 624px) 100vw, 624px\" \/><\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-1078\" src=\"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/31\/2014\/04\/Screen-Shot-2014-04-22-at-1.11.05-PM.png\" alt=\"Frosty Relations: Militarizing the Arctic\" width=\"800\" height=\"376\" srcset=\"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/31\/2014\/04\/Screen-Shot-2014-04-22-at-1.11.05-PM.png 800w, https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/31\/2014\/04\/Screen-Shot-2014-04-22-at-1.11.05-PM-300x141.png 300w, https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/31\/2014\/04\/Screen-Shot-2014-04-22-at-1.11.05-PM-768x361.png 768w, https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/31\/2014\/04\/Screen-Shot-2014-04-22-at-1.11.05-PM-530x250.png 530w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px\" \/><\/p>\n<p><strong>Five <\/strong><strong>Arctic Flaspoints: Territorial Disputes <\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>1) The Barents Sea:<\/strong> Cold War rivals Norway and Russia\u2028 settled their decades-old Barents Sea\u2028border dispute in 2010. However, the subsequent discovery of huge oil and\u2028gas deposits on Norway\u2019s side of the \u2028line has left some Russians questioning\u2028whether they\u2019re getting their full share.<\/p>\n<p><strong>2) The Bering Strait:<\/strong> China plans to start using the Arctic as\u2028a key trade route to cut long-distance\u2028 transit times. But ships must access the\u2028region via the Bering Strait \u2013 a narrow\u2028chokepoint between Russia and Alaska. A blockade of this chokepoint would be an obvious play should conflict arise between China and another power.<\/p>\n<p><strong>3) Greenland: <\/strong>The retreat of the icecap covering Greenland \u2013 an autonomous territory that is part of Denmark \u2013 is attracting foreign firms keen to exploit the island\u2019s resources. But commercial pressures are making it a contentious place to operate, while over-exploitation of its fragile environment could stir up trouble between local Inuit people, foreign business and the Danish government.<\/p>\n<p><strong>4) The North Pole: <\/strong>Ever since a Russian submarine planted a national flag on the seabed at the Pole in 2007, ownership of the High North has been a contentious issue. The Pole itself matters much less than the vast hydrocarbon resources thought to lie beneath it. Canada, Denmark, Russia and the US all have overlapping claims based on their conflicting interpretations of the maritime borders.<\/p>\n<p><strong>5) The Northwest Passage: <\/strong>Melting sea ice has opened up the fabled Northwest Passage, which runs along northern Canada and links the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. But while Canada claims sovereignty over the route, citing its proximity to the Canadian coast, other Arctic claimants \u2013 plus China \u2013 say the Passage is in international waters. As more ships ply the route, Canada must choose whether to enforce its claim or bow to pressure.<\/p>\n<p class=\"rtecenter\" style=\"text-align: center\">*****<\/p>\n<p class=\"rtecenter\" style=\"text-align: center\">*****<\/p>\n<p><em>To view the original article and graphics from <\/em>Monocle<em>, click <a href=\"https:\/\/worldpolicy.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/04\/68_a_briefing_defence.pdf\">here<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>This article first appeared on the World Policy Institute website.<\/p>\n<div class=\"social-sharing ss-social-sharing\"><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In its 68th issue published in November, Monocle Magazine published an in-depth feature on Arctic defense. This article and the accompanying graphics were re-printed with permission from Monocle. ***** Written by Trefor Moss Illustrated by Tokuma The Arctic melt is uncovering more than just resources and trade routes \u2013 it is also opening up a<\/p>\n<div><a class=\"more\" href=\"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/2014\/04\/22\/frosty-relations-militarizing-the-arctic\/\">Read more<\/a><\/div>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":71,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[5],"class_list":["post-70","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-geopolitics"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1836,"href":"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70\/revisions\/1836"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/71"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/aic\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}